Justia Zoning, Planning & Land Use Opinion Summaries

Westside Gilts RE, LLC submitted an application to the Beadle County Planning Commission for a conditional use permit (CUP) to construct and operate a concentrated animal feeding operation. The Planning Commission recommended approval of the CUP. The Beadle County Board of Adjustment (Board) approved the CUP. Petitioners appealed, arguing that the Board was without authority to issue the CUP because the county zoning ordinances passed in 2011 (Ordinances), which authorized the Board to grant the permit, were improperly enacted. The circuit court reversed the Board’s decision granting the CUP, concluding that the Ordinances were improperly enacted. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the circuit court’s ruling reversing the Board’s decision to grant the CUP, holding that the Ordinances were invalid because the Planning Commission failed to comply with S.D. Codified Laws 11-2-18, and therefore, the Board lacked jurisdiction to grant a CUP; but (2) reversed the circuit court’s order declaring the Ordinances invalid, as the order exceeded the options available to the court under its limited scope of review on certiorari. View "Wedel v. Beadle County Comm’n" on Justia Law

A county Board of Adjustment granted Developer a conditional use permit for a concentrated animal feeding operation. Petitioners challenged the Board’s decision, arguing that the Board did not have jurisdiction to grant the permit because the county had failed to validly enact the ordinance authorizing the Board to issue permits. The circuit court affirmed the Board’s decision. In so doing, the court refused to consider whether the county validly enacted the ordinance, deciding that such review would be outside the scope of Petitioners’ writ challenging the Board’s decision. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Petitioners had standing to appeal the Board’s decision; and (2) the circuit court erred when it refused to consider the validity of the ordinances enacted by the county, as review in this case was not beyond the scope of the writ. View "Lake Hendricks Improvement Ass’n v. Brookings County Planning & Zoning Comm’n" on Justia Law

The Dewey County Commission (the Commission) granted an application to erect a power distribution line in a section line right-of-way bordering Margaret Upell’s property. Upell filed a notice of appeal of the Commission’s decision with the circuit court. Upell served her notice of appeal by mail on counsel for Coop and on the Dewey County State’s Attorney. But she did not serve a member of the board of county commissioners as required by SDCL 7-8-29. She appealed to the circuit court which dismissed her appeal for lack of jurisdiction. She then appealed to the South Dakota Supreme Court. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal. View "Upell v. Dewey Cty. Comm'n" on Justia Law

Developers obtained a conditional use permit to build a dairy on Owner’s property in Brookings County. The City of Hendricks and others (collectively, City) filed a petition for writ of certiorari in circuit court challenging the permit. The circuit court affirmed the grant of the permit. City appealed. Developers filed a notice of review to challenge City’s standing but did not serve their notice of review on Owner. City moved to dismiss Developers’ notice of review/cross-appeal, arguing that Owner was a party required to be served with the notice of review. The affirmed, holding (1) Owner was a party required to be served with Developers’ notice of review, and Developers’ failure to serve Owner required dismissal of their notice of review/cross-appeal; and (2) neither S.D. Codified Laws 15-6-5(a) nor Developers’ alleged alignment of interests with Owner excused Developers’ failure to serve Owner. View "Lake Hendricks Improvement Ass’n v. Planning & Zoning Comm’n" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a property owner, sought to expand the buildings on his property and, accordingly, asked the City to rezone a portion of his property zoned within the Flood Hazard Zoning District. The City denied the request along with Plaintiff's building permits because the proposed expansion extended to a portion of Plaintiff's property zoned within the Flood Hazard Zoning District. After unsuccessfully appealing to the Zoning Board of Adjustment, Plaintiff filed a complaint with the circuit court, which included a writ of certiorari, a request for declaratory judgment, a writ of mandamus, a civil rights claim, and a state constitutional claim. While the suit was pending, the City partially granted Plaintiff's rezone request. The circuit court subsequently denied Plaintiff's writ of certiorari and granted summary judgment in favor of the City on the remainder of Plaintiff's claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in dismissing Plaintiff's writ of certiorari and granting summary judgment in favor of the City on Plaintiff's remaining claims. View "Parris v. City of Rapid City" on Justia Law

Lamar Advertising submitted applications to Rapid City for sign building permits, which would allow Lamar to convert six traditional billboards to digital signs. The City denied Lamar's applications, finding that a conditional use permit was required to alter an existing off-premises sign. Lamar petitioned the circuit court for a writ of certiorari, arguing (1) the City, in at least 100 prior instances, allowed Lamar to alter existing signs without first obtaining a conditional use permit, and therefore, the City should be estopped from now requiring a conditional use permit; and (2) the City's denial was beyond its jurisdiction as an effort to improperly regulate digital billboards in contravention of existing ordinances. The circuit court denied Lamar's petition. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the City acted in an irregular pursuit of its authority when it denied Lamar's six applications for sign building permits. View "Lamar Adver. of S.D., Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment" on Justia Law

Rapid City ordinances required a developer to complete certain public improvements before the City accepted a final plat, but in lieu of completing the improvements before the City accepted a plat, the City could accept a surety from a developer. In this case, several Developers provided sureties, which the City accepted. The sureties expired, after which the City sued Developers, seeking relief to have the required public improvements completed or repaired to meet the City's standards. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Developers, concluding that when the sureties expired, Developers were no longer liable for the improvements. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, under the ordinances and specifications, Developers remained liable until the City accepted the improvements by a final acceptance letter. Remanded. View "City of Rapid City v. Estes" on Justia Law

Landowners owned property abutting former Exit 66 on I-90, a controlled-access highway that passed by an air force base. Part of Landowners' property was taken by condemnation in 1961 for the construction of I-90 and Exit 66. In that condemnation proceeding, the State mitigated the severance damages for the property not taken because of the "special benefit" the remaining property would receive from access that was designated to be provided at Exit 66. However, in 2003, the State removed the Exit 66 interchange to enhance the viability of the air force base. Landowners subsequently filed suit for inverse condemnation based on the closure of Exit 66. The circuit court granted summary judgment for the State, concluding that Landowners never possessed any property right that could have been taken. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Landowners were entitled to damages for inverse condemnation occasioned by the removal of the designated access. Remanded for a trial on damages.

At issue in this appeal was a zoning ordinance adopted by the City of Sioux Falls requiring that an on-sale alcoholic beverage business seeking to place video lottery machines in the establishment must meet certain location requirements and apply for a conditional use permit. Plaintiff Rick Law, who conditionally held a liquor license, brought a declaratory action against the City to determine the constitutionality of the ordinance. The South Dakota Lottery intervened in the action. The circuit court ruled that the City exceeded its authority when it enacted the ordinance, concluding that South Dakota's constitutional and statutory scheme indicated that the State intended to fully occupy the field of video lottery to the exclusion of municipal regulation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that (1) municipalities do not have the freedom or power to regulate video lottery as the South Dakota Constitution specifically reserves that right to the State and (2) existing legislation does not give municipalities power to license video lottery establishments or otherwise control the location of such establishments.

Appellants, ranchers, owned property in Alto Township separated by a section-line highway. Appellants historically fenced across the highway to join the adjacent pastures and installed gates at the highway. The township requested an injunction requiring Appellants to remove the fences that extended across the highway. Meanwhile, the county board of commissioners passed a resolution authorizing Appellants to erect and maintain fences across the section-line highway if the fences and gates met certain criteria. The trial court then enjoined Appellants from erecting and maintaining fences or gates across the highway unless they met the criteria of the resolution. After Appellants installed cattle guards and gates, the township brought a motion for contempt citation against Appellants, alleging they willfully and contumaciously failed to comply with the trial court's order. The county board of commissioners subsequently determined Appellants had complied with the resolution. The trial court found Appellants in contempt of court. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court's finding of contempt was clearly erroneous because a reasonable person could conclude that Appellants complied with the trial court's order.