Justia Zoning, Planning & Land Use Opinion Summaries

Appellant East Cherry Grove Realty Co., LLC, appealed a jury verdict which found that South Carolina held title to certain disputed canals in North Myrtle Beach. The question was submitted to the jury on three theories: that two quitclaim deeds established title in the canals; that the canals had been dedicated to the public; and that the State held title to the canals in trust for the public. The jury returned a verdict for the State on all three theories. Appellant argued that the trial court erred when it denied Appellant’s motions for directed verdict on each theory. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the question of ownership under the quitclaim deeds was properly submitted to the jury and therefore affirmed the verdict. View "City of North Myrtle Beach v. East Cherry Grove Realty" on Justia Law

The property which was the subject of this appeal was owned by Appellant Peggy McMaster and located in the City of Columbia in the immediate vicinity of the University of South Carolina. Pursuant to the Ordinance, only one "family" may occupy a single dwelling unit. At the time this dispute arose, the property was occupied by four unrelated individuals—Appellant Gray McGurn and three other young women, all of whom were undergraduate students at the University of South Carolina. After receiving a neighborhood complaint, the City's Zoning Administrator conducted an investigation and determined the occupants violated the Ordinance. McMaster appealed the violation notice to the City's Board of Zoning Appeals arguing the Ordinance was not violated and in the alternative, the Ordinance was unconstitutional. Following a hearing, the Board affirmed the zoning violation. Appellants appealed the Board's decision to the circuit court. The circuit court found the Ordinance's definition of "family" did not violate the Due Process Clause of the South Carolina Constitution. Following its review, the Supreme Court found the Ordinance was a valid exercise of the City's broad police power and that there was a rational relationship between the City's decision to limit the number of unrelated individuals who may live together as a single housekeeping unit and the legitimate governmental interests of controlling the undesirable qualities associated with "mass student congestion." View "McMaster v. Columbia Board of Zoning" on Justia Law

The South Carolina Coastal Conservation League (League) and the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (DHEC) appealed an administrative law judge's (ALJ) order that allowed Respondent Kiawah Development Partners to construct erosion control devices in a critical zone on Captain Sam's Spit (Spit). Respondent owend a peninsula (Spit) which lies primarily south of Kiawah Island, surrounded on three sides by the Atlantic Ocean, Kiawah River and Captain Sam's Inlet which separates the Spit from Seabrook Island. For the past sixty years, the Spit has been "growing," accreting sand on the ocean side at a greater rate than it has been losing ground to erosion on the river side. Respondent leased oceanfront property near the neck to the Charleston County Parks and Recreation Commission, which operates Beachwalker Park there. Respondent sought a permit from DHEC to erect a 2,783 foot bulkhead/revetment combination along the Kiawah River, with the structure to begin at the neck, that is, at Beachwalker Park. DHEC authorized construction of the proposed erosion control device for 270 feet, beginning at Beachwalker Park, and denied the remaining portion of the request. Both the League and Respondent requested a contested case hearing before the ALJ, the League to protest the portion of the permit request which was granted, and Respondent to challenge the portion denied. The Appellants contended the ALJ failed to give the deference due DHEC's interpretation of the statutes and regulations, and further that he exceeded his authority in rewriting the permit, resulting in one with terms neither approved by DHEC nor sought by Respondent. Upon review of the ALJ's ruling and the applicable legal standards, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded, finding the ALJ's decision was "affected by numerous errors of law … beginning with the ALJ's misunderstanding of the applicable statutes, regulations, and public policies, and concluding with his erroneous effort to craft a new permit, one which has never been sought by respondent, nor reviewed by OCRM, and which he, in any case, lack[ed] the authority to issue." View "Kiawah Development v. So. Car. Dept. of Health & Environ. Cont." on Justia Law

Respondent Atlantic Coast Builders & Contractors, LLC brought an action against Petitioner Laura Lewis for negligent misrepresentation, unjust enrichment, and breach of contract.  In 2003, Petitioner, acting through a leasing agent, entered into a commercial lease whereby Respondent would lease from Petitioner property located in Beaufort County.  Although Petitioner represented in the lease that the property could lawfully be used for a building and construction office, the property was zoned "rural," meaning virtually all commercial uses were prohibited. Respondent occupied the property and made numerous alterations to it. A few months later, a Beaufort County zoning official served Respondent with notice and warning of two violations for Respondent's failure to obtain a certificate of zoning compliance before occupying the premises and its failure to obtain a sign permit before erecting a sign.  Respondent vacated the property, relocated its business, and ceased making rental payments. Respondent then instituted this action. Petitioner denied the allegations and made a counterclaim for breach of contract.  The master in equity entered judgment in favor of Respondent. The Court of Appeals affirmed, finding the master properly granted judgment in favor of Respondent. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Petitioner did not appeal all grounds on which the master's judgment was based.  Namely, she did not challenge the determination that Respondent was entitled to recover based on unjust enrichment.  Accordingly, the Court affirmed the master-in-equity's and appellate court's decisions in favor of Respondent.

The Supreme Court accepted the certified question from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina on whether the South Carolina Solid Waste Policy and Management Act, (SWPMA) preempted Horry County Ordinance 02-09 entitled "An Ordinance Regulating the County-Wide Collection and Disposal of Solid Waste Generated within Horry County and for the Prohibition of the Disposal of Solid Waste Materials in any Manner Except as Set Forth Herein; and Providing Penalties for Violation Thereof."  Plaintiffs Sandlands C&D, LLC (Sandlands) and Express Disposal Service, LLC (EDS) are related, privately-owned South Carolina companies.  Sandlands owned and operated a landfill in Marion County, approximately two miles across the Horry County border, and EDS hauls waste originating in South Carolina and North Carolina to Sandlands' landfill.  DHEC granted Sandlands a permit to accept construction and demolition (C & D) waste at the Marion County site.  Prior to the passage of Horry County Ordinance 02-09, Sandlands received C & D waste originating in Horry County and hauled by EDS, accounting for a large portion of the waste processed at its landfill. Upon review of the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court responded in the negative: the county ordinance was not preempted by the SWPMA.

Carolina Chloride, Inc. sued Richland County alleging the County incorrectly advised it of the legal zoning classification of its property and that it lost a potential sale of the property due to the zoning issue.  The trial judge directed a verdict for the County on all of Carolina Chloride's claims.  The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded as to the claims for negligence and negligent misrepresentation but upheld the directed verdict as to Carolina Chloride's remaining claims. On appeal, the County argued the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the directed verdict in its favor on Carolina Chloride's claims for negligence and negligent misrepresentation. Upon review of the trial record and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court concluded that "[a]lthough it is certainly unfortunate that a mistake occurred in this case, Carolina Chloride had no legal right to rely solely upon the representations of County personnel and should have consulted the official record to determine the legal zoning classification of its property.  Carolina Chloride's owner and its broker are both experienced in business matters, but it appears that neither [the Company] nor his broker personally inspected the County's official records prior to making a sizable investment in developing the property."  The Court reversed the appellate court's decision with respect to the directed verdict as to the negligence and negligent misrepresentation claims. The Court affirmed the appellate court on all other matters.

Appellant Georgetown County League of Women Voters appealed an order that dismissed its action that sought a declaration that Respondent Smith Land Company had unlawfully filled wetlands and dismissed its request for an injunction requiring Smith to restore those wetlands. Respondent owns a .332 acre lot in Pawleys Island, .19 acres of which are isolated wetlands often referred to as Carolina Bays. Before developing the lot, Respondent notified both the Army Corps of Engineers and the Department of Health and Environmental Control (DHEC) of its plans. While the Corps cautioned respondent to notify DHEC before performing the work and respondent did so, it received no response from DHEC. Respondent then filled the wetlands. The League then filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment and related equitable relief. After a hearing, the circuit court held that DHEC did not have jurisdiction over isolated wetlands, that Respondent complied with all requirements before filling the wetlands, and that the League could not maintain a private suit under the South Carolina Pollution Control Act. Finding that the circuit court erred in holding that: (1) the DHEC lacked jurisdiction to regulate the wetlands; (2) Respondent did not violate the Act; and (3) the Act does not create a private cause of action, the Supreme Court reversed the reversed the case and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Appellants the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (DHEC), Office of Ocean and Coastal Resource Management (OCRM), and the South Carolina Coastal Conservation League appealed a final order of the Administrative Law Court (ALC) that granted Respondent Jerry Risher's "critical area permit" application to construct a bridge over a portion of wetlands contained within his property on Fripp Island. Respondent owns less than a half-acre, half of which is "upland high ground" or build-able property. The remainder of the property partially surrounds the build-able portion and is composed of wetlands. One year prior to Respondent's purchase of the lot, his predecessor in title applied to the DHEC and was approved for a critical area permit to construct a vehicular bridge across the non-build-able wetland portion of the lot to connect with the nearest vehicular road. In 2006, Respondent began to construct a bridge similar to the one previously submitted and approved by his predecessor in title. To that end, Respondent submitted a permit application to OCRM. OCRM took the matter under advisement but ultimately denied Respondent's application based on its finding that the upland build-able portion of the lot qualified as a coastal island which was too small to allow bridge access. After exhausting DHEC's review options, Respondent filed a request for review by the ALC. A hearing was held, and the ALC issued an order reversing DHEC's denial of Respondent's permit request. DHEC appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that there was insufficient evidence before the ALC to reverse its decision. Upon review of the briefs submitted and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court found substantial evidence sufficient to support the ALC's decision. The Court affirmed the ALC's decision in support of Respondent.

The Town of Rockville is listed in the National Register of Historic Places. Appellant Marc Merrill owns a historic home in Rockville. The property abuts a marsh. Appellant obtained a permit from the state Office of Coastal Resource Management (OCRM) to construct a dock and walkway on property he owned in Respondent Town of Rockville (Rockville). He then sought approval to construct the dock from the Rockville Design Review Board DRB which, pursuant to a newly adopted municipal ordinance, had to approve the construction of any dock or walkway already permitted by OCRM. The DRB declined to approve construction, and Appellant unsuccessfully appealed to circuit court. Although appellants raised numerous issues on appeal, the Supreme Court addressed only whether the evidence presented to the DRB was sufficient to support its conclusion that Appellant's proposed dock and walkway would impede a scenic rural view. Upon consideration of the DRB's review of Appellant's dock proposal, the Court found that there was simply nothing in the record to support the DRB's finding. Accordingly, the Court reversed both the DRB's and circuit court's decisions in this case, and remanded it for further proceedings.