Justia Zoning, Planning & Land Use Opinion Summaries

The Landowners own parcels of land adjacent to a 2.45-mile strip of a Union Pacific railroad line in McLennan County, Texas. Union Pacific’s predecessor in interest, Texas Central originally acquired the Line in 1902 through multiple deeds executed by the Landowners’ predecessors in interest. The Landowners sued, seeking compensation based on a theory that their predecessors in interest had conferred only easements to Texas Central, and that the Surface Transportation Board (STB) enforcement of the National Trails System Act, 16 U.S.C. 1241, by “railbanking” amounted to a “taking” of their property. Railbanking involves the transition of unused railroad corridors into recreational hiking and biking trails, generally by a transfer of an interest in the use of a rail corridor to a third-party entity. The Claims Court interpreted the deeds as having conveyed fee simple estates, not easements.The Federal Circuit affirmed. No takings from the Landowners occurred when the government later authorized conversion of the railroad line to a recreation trail; the granting clauses of the subject deeds unambiguously conveyed fee simple interests in the land and not easements despite contradictory language elsewhere in the deeds. View "Anderson v. United States" on Justia Law

Landowner Daniel Banyai appealed an Environmental Division decision upholding a notice of violation, granting a permanent injunction, and assessing $46,600 in fines, relating to alleged zoning violations and the construction of a firearms training facility in the Town of Pawlet. Banyai argued he had a valid permit, certain exhibits were improperly admitted at the merits hearing, and the fines were excessive. Finding no reversible error, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the Environmental Division's decision. View "Town of Pawlet v. Banyai" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the district court dismissing for lack of subject matter jurisdiction Main St Properties LLC's (MSP) complaint seeking to enjoin a zoning ordinance adopted by the city council for the City of Bellevue, holding that the court erred in dismissing MSP's complaint.After MSP received a notice of zoning violation MSP appealed to the board of adjustment, which upheld the zoning violation. While MSP's appeal was pending, the city council approved an ordinance to rezone MSP's property. MSP then filed a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief against the City. The district court granted the City's motion to dismiss, concluding that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because MSP failed to file a petition in error. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the cause for further proceedings, holding that the complaint was sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. View "Main St Properties LLC v. City of Bellevue" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal concluded that Public Resources Code section 30610.8 requires payment of an in-lieu public access fee for each coastal development permit (CDP) applicable to Hollister Ranch. In this case, after the California Coastal Commission denied a CDP request from Jack Wall and the Wall Family Trust to build a pool and spa on their Hollister Ranch property, plaintiffs challenged the Commission's denial in a petition for writ of administrative mandate.The court concluded that plaintiffs have not shown that the Commission required public access to their property; the trial court correctly concluded that the California Coastal Act of 1976 requires payment of an in-lieu public access fee for approval of plaintiffs' CDP; and plaintiffs' alternative contention -- that even if the Coastal Act requires them to pay a $5,000 in-lieu public access fee for their CDP, imposing that requirement would be unconstitutional -- is waived. View "Wall v. California Coastal Commission" on Justia Law

Dennis and Sherrilyn Munden (the Mundens) and their limited liability company, Coyote Creek Ranch, LLC, purchased property in Bannock County, Idaho in 2012 (the Upper Property), and acquired adjoining property (the Lower Property) in 2014. The Mundens’ ranch was accessible by a gravel road (the Road) which left a paved public road before crossing the Lower Property. It then traversed a neighbor’s parcel to the Upper Property, before exiting to the north. The Mundens began ranching on the Lower Property in 2013 and started construction of a barn and living quarters on the Upper Property in 2015 after obtaining a three-year building permit. In 2017, the Mundens were informed by the Bannock County Commissioners that, pursuant to a 2006 county ordinance, the Road had been designated by the Commissioners for “snowmobile use only” between December 15 and April 15. All other vehicular use was prohibited during this timeframe. In January 2019, Bannock County passed an ordinance which gave discretion to the Bannock County Public Works Director (the Director) to determine when snowmobile trails would be closed to all but snowmobile use. Subsequently, the Director decided to close the Road for the 2018–19 winter season. The Mundens filed a complaint in district court against Bannock County, bringing several claims involving the Road, and obtained an ex parte temporary restraining order (TRO) to prohibit enforcement of the 2019 ordinance. The County moved to dissolve the TRO, which the district court granted. The district court then awarded attorney fees to the County. The Mundens amended their complaint to add their ranching operation, Coyote Creek Ranch, LLC, as a plaintiff, to which the County responded with an answer and counterclaim, alleging that the Road was a public right-of-way with no winter maintenance that had been designated as a snowmobile trail by the 2006 ordinance. The County then moved to dismiss the amended complaint for failure to state a claim. The district court granted this motion, concluding that because the claims turned on a legal determination of the Road’s status, the Mundens were required by Idaho Code section 40-208(7) to first petition for validation or abandonment proceedings with the Board of County Commissioners before they could bring a lawsuit. The district court accordingly entered a judgment dismissing the plaintiffs’ amended complaint in its entirety. Ultimately, the district court entered a judgment certified under IRCP 54(b)(1) authorizing an immediate appeal, and the Mundens timely appealed. The only error the Idaho Supreme Court found in review of this case was that the district court erred in issuing a writ of execution before there was a final appealable judgment. Judgement was affirmed in all other respects. View "Munden v. Bannock County" on Justia Law

In consolidated appeals filed by Greenville County, South Carolina, the issue central to the cases involved a zoning dispute between the County and Greenville Bistro, LLC, d/b/a Bucks Racks & Ribs. Greenville Bistro filed suit against the County to enjoin the County from enforcing an ordinance to deny Greenville Bistro's desired method of operating Bucks Racks & Ribs. Citing other ordinances, the County counterclaimed and moved to enjoin Greenville Bistro from operating Bucks as a sexually oriented business. Both appeals concerned the legality of Greenville Bistro operating Bucks as a restaurant with the added feature of scantily clad exotic dancers. The circuit court granted Greenville Bistro's motion for a temporary injunction, and the County appealed. While the County's appeal was pending, another circuit court denied the County's motion for temporary injunctive relief, ruling that in light of the County's appeal it did not have jurisdiction to consider the County's motion. The South Carolina Supreme Court reversed both rulings, dissolved the injunction granted to Greenville Bistro, and held the County was entitled to injunctive relief. The case was remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings. View "Greenville Bistro, LLC. v. Greenville County" on Justia Law

Capitol Farmers Market, Inc., appealed a circuit court order entered in favor of Angie and Russell Ingram, enforcing certain restrictive covenants on property owned by Capitol Farmers Market that abutted property owned by the Ingrams. After review, the Alabama Supreme Court determined the trial court did not err in upholding the restrictive covenants found in the respective property declarations. Accordingly, judgment was affirmed. View "Capitol Farmers Market, Inc. v. Ingram" on Justia Law

Tax sharing agreements between the County of San Benito and the City of Hollister require the city to pay the county a fixed fee (the “Additional Amount”) for each residential unit constructed on land that is annexed into the city from the county. Plaintiff entered into development agreements with the city to build residential units on land subject to the city-county tax sharing agreements, and agreed to satisfy certain obligations from the tax sharing agreements, but sued the city and the county seeking a declaration that payment of the Additional Amount is not among plaintiff’s obligations.The court of appeal affirmed a defense judgment. The plaintiff agreed to pay the city the Additional Amount fees as part of the development agreements. Nothing in the tax sharing agreement suggests that obligations created by it would cease to exist merely because a project annexed during its effective period was not constructed until after the agreement expired. The court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that because the Additional Amount is an obligation of the city to the county under the tax sharing agreement, it cannot be a “Developer’s obligation.” The reference to “Developer’s obligations” in the development agreement did not mean only the capital improvement and drainage fees discussed in the tax sharing agreement; the term includes the Additional Amount. View "Award Homes, Inc. v. County of San Benito" on Justia Law

A tax-sharing agreement between the County of San Benito and the City of Hollister requires the city to pay the county a fixed fee (Additional Amount) per residential unit constructed on land annexed into the city from the county during the period covered by that agreement. Plaintiff’s predecessor entered into an annexation agreement with the city, agreeing to comply with “all applicable provisions” of that tax sharing agreement. When the plaintiff purchased the annexed land and sought to develop it into subdivisions, the city informed the plaintiff that it was liable for the Additional Amount fees. Plaintiff paid the fees under protest, then sued, seeking a declaration of its rights and duties under various written instruments.The court of appeal affirmed a defense judgment. Plaintiff is contractually liable for the Additional Amount by the terms of the annexation agreement. Any challenge to the calculation of the Additional Amount is beyond the scope of a declaratory relief action and time-barred. The court rejected the plaintiff’s arguments that neither the annexation agreement nor the tax sharing agreement requires the plaintiff to pay the Additional Amount and that the fees violate the Mitigation Fee Act and federal constitutional constraints on development fees as monetary exactions. View "BMC Promise Way, LLC v. County of San Benito" on Justia Law

In consolidated appeals, the issue presented for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's review centered on the Commonwealth Court’s holding that, to be held liable for damages under Pennsylvania’s inverse condemnation statute, an entity had to be "clothed with the power of eminent domain" to the property at issue. In 2009, Appellee, UGI Storage Company filed an application with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (the “Commission” or “FERC”), seeking a certificate of public convenience and necessity to enable it to acquire and operate certain natural gas facilities. Appellee wished to acquire and operate underground natural gas storage facilities, which the company referred to as the Meeker storage field. Appellee also sought to include within the certificated facilities a 2,980-acre proposed "buffer zone." FERC ultimately granted the application for Appellee to acquire and assume the operation of the Meeker storage field, but denied Appellee’s request to certificate the buffer zone. Appellants petitioned for the appointment of a board of viewers to assess damages for an alleged de facto condemnation of their property, alleging that though their properties had been excluded by FERC from the certificated buffer zone, they interpreted Appellee’s response to the Commission’s order as signaling its intention to apply for additional certifications to obtain property rights relative to the entire buffer zone. The common pleas court initially found that a de facto taking had occurred and appointed a board of viewers to assess damages. Appellee lodged preliminary objections asserting Appellants’ petition was insufficient to support a de facto taking claim. The Supreme Court reversed the Commonwealth Court: "we do not presently discern a constitutional requirement that a quasi-public entity alleged to have invoked governmental power to deprive landowners of the use and enjoyment of their property for a public purpose must be invested with a power of eminent domain in order to be held to account for a de facto condemnation. ... a public or quasi-public entity need not possess a property-specific power of eminent domain in order to implicate inverse condemnation principles." The case was remanded for the Commonwealth Court to address Appellants’ challenge to the common pleas court’s alternative disposition (based upon the landowners’ purported off-the-record waiver of any entitlement to an evidentiary hearing), which had been obviated by the intermediate court’s initial remand decision and that court’s ensuing affirmance of the re-dismissal of Appellants’ petitions. View "Albrecht, et al. v. UGI Storage Co. et al." on Justia Law