Justia Zoning, Planning & Land Use Opinion Summaries

After concluding that the project was not subject to the Housing Accountability Act (HAA) (Gov. Code 65589.5), the county denied the plaintiffs’ application o build a nearly 4,000-square-foot single-family home on a hillside lot in San Anselmo finding that the home was outsized compared to the surrounding neighborhood. Plaintiffs claim that their planned home qualified as a “housing development project” under the HAA and that the county improperly rejected it based on subjective criteria.The court of appeal affirmed the denial. The county lawfully rejected the plaintiffs’ application; the HAA does not apply to a project to build an individual single-family home. The court rejected the plaintiffs’ equitable-estoppel claims. There was sufficient evidence for the county to deny the project on the basis of the project’s outsized character. View "Reznitskiy v. County of Marin" on Justia Law

Southwest Virginia Wildlife Center of Roanoke (SVWC) provides medical and rehabilitative care to 2,000 animals each year. SVWC is located at the end of a shared private easement that is approximately 476 feet long; the other properties that can only be accessed by the easement’s unpaved, single-lane dirt driveway, across their lawns. The easement is not maintained by any governmental entity. SVWC sought a special use permit to build a large “raptor building.” The Zoning Administrator determined that existing “accessory structures” on SVWC's property were either improperly granted zoning permits or had not been granted permits. The Board of Supervisors granted the special use permit, which retroactively authorized the accessory structures and the construction of the raptor building, subject to conditions requiring buffering and materials. Neighboring owners challenged the approval, arguing that traffic on the easement has increased “20- to 50-fold” since, SVWC began operating in 2014, causing “congestion, noise, dust, and light pollution” and posing a danger to their children.The trial court dismissed their complaint, citing lack of standing. The Virginia Supreme Court reversed. The dust, noise, and light pollution allegedly caused by the traffic on the easement constitute particularized harm to the plaintiffs. The complaint sufficiently alleged that the construction of the raptor building and the corresponding expansion of SVWC’s services would cause more traffic and supports a reasonable inference that the decision to retroactively approve the accessory structures would lead to traffic on the easement. View "Seymour v. Roanoke County Board of Supervisors" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court finding in favor of the owner of rezoned property who claimed that the triggering of a conditional proffer operated as an unconstitutional condition, holding that the trial court did not err in ultimately reversing the zoning violation.The Board of Supervisors of Albemarle County approved a rezoning for property subject to voluntary proffers. A conditional proffer called the transit proffer continuously applied since the original rezoning. The county approved the establishment of a commuter route to run from Albemarle County to downtown Charlottesville and concluded that a substantial portion of the funding for the route could come from the transit proffer funds. The county approved the appropriation of funds to establish the commuter route. When the property owner failed to make payments required by the transit proffer the county concluded that the owner was in violation of the county's zoning ordinance. The circuit court granted judgment in favor of the owner. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in denying the county's demurrer and motion to strike and did not err in reversing the zoning violation. View "Board of Supervisors v. Route 29, LLC" on Justia Law

In 2017, Bakewell submitted applications regarding its proposed development of "Campus Town," on approximately 122 acres of the former Fort Ord military base. The City of Seaside certified an environmental impact report under the California Environmental Quality Act, Public Resources Code section 21000, and approved the project. After holding a public hearing, the Fort Ord Reuse Authority (FORA) determined that the project was consistent with the Fort Ord Reuse Plan. A nonprofit organization filed a petition for a writ of mandate, alleging that the Campus Town EIR violated CEQA and that FORA’s failure to provide the Committee with notices of the consistency hearing for the project violated the Committee’s right to due process. Bakewell argued that the CEQA causes of action were time-barred and the due process cause of action was moot.The court of appeal affirmed the dismissal of all claims. Under Emergency rule 9(b) the last day for the Committee to file its petition asserting CEQA causes of action was August 4, 2020; it was not filed until September 1, 2020. there is currently no requirement that development projects proposed for the former Fort Ord military base be consistent with the Fort Ord Reuse Plan, so the due process claim is moot. View "Committee for Sound Water & Land Development v. City of Seaside" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court that Neighbors lacked standing to challenge the judgment of Fairfax County's Zoning Administrator and Board of Zoning Appeals concluding that NewPort Academy, which sought to open a residential treatment center for teenage girls, was a "by right" use, holding that Neighbors had standing.Neighbors, who either owned houses or lived in houses next to the proposed treatment center, argued that the proposed facility was not a "by right" use in the zoning district, thus requiring a special exception permit to operate in a residential zone. The circuit court concluded that Neighbors lacked standing to challenge the Board's decision and dismissed the case on that basis. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the allegations made by Neighbors were sufficient to establish that they had standing. View "Anders Larsen Trust v. Board of Supervisors of Fairfax County" on Justia Law

S Bar Ranch owned approximately 3000 acres of land in rural Elmore County, Idaho. S Bar purchased the land in 2015. There were very few structures on S Bar’s property, save for an airplane hangar that included a five-hundred square-foot apartment. S Bar’s address was listed in Sun Valley, Idaho, and its principal, Chris Stephens, used the property for recreational purposes. Cat Creek Energy, LLC, an Idaho company managed by John Faulkner, owned and managed more than 23,000 acres of land in Elmore County near Anderson Ranch reservoir. Faulkner, on behalf of his other companies, leased land to Cat Creek to develop the project at issue in this dispute. In late 2014 and early 2015, Cat Creek began the process of obtaining conditional use permits (“CUPs”) for a proposed alternative energy development (“the project”) in Elmore County. As initially proposed, the project had five components: a 50,000 acre-foot reservoir with hydroelectric turbines, up to 39 wind turbines, approximately 174,000 photovoltaic solar panels, electrical transmission lines, and an onsite power substation. Cat Creek sought to build the project on approximately 23,000 acres of land that it had leased near Anderson Ranch Reservoir. In 2019, the district court issued a Memorandum Decision and Order, affirming the Board’s decisions with respect to the CUPs. The district court found that S Bar only had standing to challenge the CUPs relating to wind turbines, electric transmission lines, and the on-site substation. The district court also reiterated its prior oral ruling that a 2017 CUP Order was a final agency action and that S Bar’s petition for judicial review of that order was untimely. With regard to the development agreement and a 2018 CUP Amendment, the district court concluded that the Board did not err in a manner specified by Idaho Code section 67-5279 and that S Bar had not shown that its substantial rights had been prejudiced. S Bar appealed, but finding no reversible error in the district court's judgment, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed judgment in favor of Cat Creek. View "S Bar Ranch v. Elmore County" on Justia Law

The Town of Albany, Vermont, appealed an order granting summary judgment to a surviving relative of the grantors who had quitclaimed undeveloped property to the Town subject to certain conditions. The civil division found that the deed was ambiguous, considered extrinsic evidence to discern the grantors’ intent, and concluded that a logging operation overseen by the Town violated the deed. The Vermont Supreme Court concluded that the deed was unambiguous, and the logging was not a violation. Accordingly, judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Sanville v. Town of Albany" on Justia Law

Martha owns the largest undeveloped parcel of property in the vicinity of Tiburon, 110 acres on top of a mountain, overlooking much of the town and commanding a stunning view of San Francisco Bay. For decades, Martha has sought approval from the County of Marin to develop the property. Local opposition has been intense, including federal court litigation, starting in 1975 and resulting in stipulated judgments in 1976 and 2007. The county twice publicly agreed to approve Martha building no fewer than 43 units on the property. In 2017, the county certified an environmental impact report and conditionally approved Martha’s master plan for 43 single-family residences. The county believed its actions were compelled by the stipulated judgments.The town and residents sued, claiming that the county effectively agreed it would not follow or enforce state law, specifically, the California Environmental Quality Act, to prevent the development of an anticipated project. The court of appeal upheld the approvals. Governmental powers are indefeasible and inalienable; they cannot be surrendered, suspended, contracted away, waived, or otherwise divested. Government cannot bind the hands of its successors. In this case, the county did not abdicate its authority or otherwise undertake not to comply with CEQA. “With its eyes wide open,” the county complied with a binding, final judgment; that judgment in no way anticipated or legitimated ignoring CEQA. View "Tiburon Open Space Committee v. County of Marin" on Justia Law

Mark McAllister appealed an amended judgment of condemnation that ultimately allowed the City of West Fargo to use its eminent domain power to acquire a right of way across his property. After review of the district court record, the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the district court did not err in holding West Fargo was authorized to use quick-take eminent domain procedures for its sewage improvement project. Furthermore, the Court concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting West Fargo’s motion in limine to exclude testimony from trial that the taking impacted McAllister’s property’s conformance with the city’s setback requirements. View "City of West Fargo v. McAllister" on Justia Law

Consumers Energy Company filed an action against Brian and Erin Storm, and Lake Michigan Credit Union, seeking to condemn a portion of the Storms’ property for a power-line easement. The Storms challenged the necessity of the easement under the Uniform Condemnation Procedures Act (UCPA). The trial court concluded that Consumers had failed to establish the public necessity of the easement on the Storms’ property and entered an order dismissing Consumers’ action and awarding attorney fees to the Storms. Consumers appealed that order as of right to the Court of Appeals. The Storms moved to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, arguing that under MCL 213.56(6), Consumers could only appeal the trial court’s public-necessity determination by leave granted. The Court of Appeals initially denied the motion by order, but the order was entered without prejudice to further consideration of the jurisdictional issue by the case -call panel. The Court of Appeals case-call panel issued an opinion in which it agreed with the Storms that the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction; the Court of Appeals therefore dismissed the portion of Consumers’ appeal challenging the trial court’s determination of public necessity. Despite dismissing the public-necessity portion of Consumers’ appeal, the Court of Appeals addressed Consumers’ challenge to the trial court’s award of attorney fees and vacated the attorney-fee award. The Michigan Supreme Court determined the Court of Appeals should have considered the condemning agency’s appeal as of right and reached the ultimate question of whether the trial court erred by holding that there was no public necessity for the proposed acquisition. “Therefore, it is not yet apparent that the proposed acquisition was improper such that the property owners would be entitled to reimbursement so as to avoid being ‘forced to suffer because of an action that they did not initiate and that endangered, through condemnation proceedings, their right to private property.’” Accordingly, the Supreme Court vacated the analysis construing MCL 213.66(2) in Part III of the Court of Appeals’ opinion, and remanded to that court for further proceedings. View "Consumers Energy Company v. Storm" on Justia Law