Justia Zoning, Planning & Land Use Opinion Summaries

In 2019, an Idaho district court granted Respondents Matthew and Bonnie Latvalas’ claim for a prescriptive easement over a road known as “South Camp Bay Road” to reach their property located on the shores of Lake Pend Oreille. Because the prescriptive easement was created by the operations of an active mine, the district court determined that the scope of the easement included the ability to transport labor and materials to build a home on the Latvalas’ property. In Latvala v. Green Enterprises, Inc., 485 P.3d 1129 (2021) (Latvala I), the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s determination that the Latvalas had a prescriptive easement over South Camp Bay Road. However, the Court vacated the district court’s judgment after concluding it had impermissibly expanded the scope of that easement. On remand, the parties disputed whether the Supreme Court’s decision prohibited the Latvalas’ proposed residential use of South Camp Bay Road, or only the construction of a residence on the Latvalas’ property. The district court entered a second amended judgment that prohibited the Latvalas from using South Camp Bay Road to construct a residence on their property, but did not restrict the Latvalas from using the road for residential purposes. Appellants Green Enterprises, Inc., James and and Julie Frank, and Larimore and Kathryn Cummins (neighboring landowners) timely appealed. Finding no reversible error in the latter district court judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed: “Because possibly driving across South Camp Bay Road will do nothing to increase the burden on the servient landowners, we affirm the district court’s second and third amended judgments because they are consistent with our holding in Latvala I. The Latvalas may not use South Camp Bay Road to build a residence; they may drive along Camp Bay Road to access a residence. Whether and to what extent that burden may or could change in the future is a question for another day. On the record before us we will not hypothesize on what the outcome would be under those theoretical scenarios.” View "Latvala v. Green Enterprises, Inc." on Justia Law

The school's athletic stadium seats 2,008 persons and is surrounded by single-family homes. The school sought approval to add four permanent 90-foot tall outdoor light standards to enable its nighttime use. The planning department determined that the project was categorically exempt from review under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) (Pub. Resources Code 21000). The planning commission approved a permit, limiting the hours during which the lights could be used, and prohibiting use by groups unaffiliated with the school. The permit required the distribution of a large-event management plan and a code of conduct for students and others attending events. The board of supervisors affirmed, further restricting the hours that the lights could be used, requiring the school to report the dates and times the lights are turned on, dimmed, and turned off, requiring that for certain events, the school provide off-site parking, and requiring that trees be installed for screening.The court of appeal reversed. The project is not exempt from CEQA under the class 1 exemption for “existing facilities.” The project will significantly expand the nighttime use of the stadium. Nor does the class 3 exemption, entitled “New Construction or Conversion of Small Structures,” apply. View "Saint Ignatius Neighborhood Association v. City & County of San.Francisco" on Justia Law

Detroit prohibits street vendors from selling their goods within 300 feet of sports arenas or stadiums. After the completion of Little Caesar’s Arena in 2017, the new home of the Red Wings and Pistons, Detroit refused to renew three vendor licenses for locations that fell within the 300-foot exclusion zone. The licenses had been in place since 2008. The displaced vendors sued, claiming due process violations.The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of Detroit. The ordinance does not create a property interest in a vendor’s license; it never says that applicants will receive licenses for the places they choose but requires that they apply “for an approved location,” and warns that the city may “terminate[] or eliminate[]” a vendor location. Detroit retains the discretion to deny or suspend licenses to prevent a violation of the rules or to protect public safety. Even a protected property interest would not suffice to defeat Detroit’s decision. Detroit had rational reasons for denying these vendor applications: its interest in preventing congestion on its sidewalks, ensuring sidewalk safety, eliminating blight and litter, and protecting arena operators from competition. A 300-foot buffer zone around arenas is a rational way to advance Detroit’s interest in preventing congestion. View "Williams v. City of Detroit" on Justia Law

In this real property dispute, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court for Defendants following the court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendants, holding that the trial justice did not err in ruling that the disputed land was a paper street and in finding that Plaintiff had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.Plaintiff filed this action seeking a declaratory judgment that certain property was a public road that ran to the boundary of Plaintiff's property and that Plaintiff had the right to use the full length of the property and the right of access to his property. The superior court granted summary judgment for Defendants. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. View "Davis v. Town of Exeter" on Justia Law

O’Brien submitted an application in March 2011 for approval of a 315-unit residential apartment development. O’Brien’s application was deemed complete in July 2011, including 14 residential buildings, a clubhouse, a leasing office, parking in carports and garages, and internal roadways on a 22.27-acre site. The site was then designated Administrative/Professional/Multi-Family Residential on the city’s general-plan land-use map and was zoned Administrative/Professional. The city certified an environmental impact report (EIR) in 2013. Before the project was approved, O’Brien and the city suspended processing the original project while O’Brien pursued an alternative, smaller proposal.In 2018, when it proved impossible to proceed with the alternative project, O’Brien and the city revived the original proposal, with some modifications. The city finally approved the resumed project in 2020, after the preparation of an addendum to the original EIR. A citizen’s group claimed that the project conflicted with the city’s general plan as it existed when the project was revived in 2018, that the EIR was inadequate, and that a supplemental EIR is required. The court of appeal affirmed the trial court’s denial of the mandamus petition. Despite the lengthy delay between certification of the EIR and project approval, the city properly applied the general plan standards in effect when the application was deemed complete. The court rejected challenges to the EIR. View "Save Lafayette v. City of Lafayette" on Justia Law

Plaintiff TransFarmations, Inc. appealed a superior court decision to uphold the Town of Amherst Planning Board's (Town) decisions to deny TransFarmations' two successive applications for a conditional use permit (CUP). In May 2019, TransFarmations requested a “Conceptual Meeting” with the Town’s planning board (Board) concerning its proposed development of an approximately 130-acre property known as the Jacobson Farm. It stated that the “development will be designed to meet many of the desired attributes the Town . . . has articulated in [its] Master Plan and [Integrated] Innovative . . . Housing Ordinance (IIHO),” including workforce housing and over-55 housing. TransFarmations subsequently submitted a CUP application under the IIHO for a planned residential development containing 64 residential units. In its challenge to the decisions, TransFarmations argued both that the decisions failed to adequately state the ground for denial and that the Board acted unreasonably because the second CUP application was materially different from the first. The trial court concluded that the Board adequately provided the reason for its first decision on the record because “the Board members discussed, in detail, their reasons for concluding that no material differences [between the first and second applications] existed.” The court also concluded that “the Board acted reasonably and lawfully in reaching [that] decision.” Accordingly, the court affirmed both of the Board’s decisions. TransFarmations contended the trial court erred in affirming the Board’s decision not to accept the second application because TransFarmations submitted that application “at the Board’s invitation and with the information the Board requested.” The New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded TransFarmations’ second application supplying the requested information was “materially different from its predecessor, thus satisfying Fisher.” Because the trial court’s decision concluding otherwise misapplied Fisher v. Dover, it was legally erroneous. Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial court’s order as to the second CUP decision and remanded. View "TransFarmations, Inc. v. Town of Amherst" on Justia Law

In 2010, Pacific Grove authorized “transient use of residential property for remuneration,” subject to licensing. One-year “STR” Licenses were subject to revocation for cause. In 2016, the city capped the number of short-term rental licenses citywide at 250 and established a density cap of “15 [percent] per block.” In 2017, the city prohibited more than one license per parcel and required a 55-foot buffer zone between licensed properties. The changes provided that a license could be withdrawn, suspended, or revoked for any reason and that renewal was not guaranteed. The city resolved to “sunset” certain licenses using a random lottery. In 2018, Pacific Grove voters approved Measure M, to prohibit and phase out, over an 18-month sunset period, all existing short-term rentals in residential districts, except in the “Coastal Zone,” as defined by the California Coastal Act. Measure M did not restrict short-term rentals in nonresidential districts or otherwise modify existing rules.The court of appeal affirmed the dismissal of a suit by licensees. The Plaintiffs’ economic interest in renting their homes for transient visitors was not an entitlement subject to state or federal constitutional protection. The curtailment of short-term rental licenses is related to legitimate state interests. View "Hobbs v. City of Pacific Grove" on Justia Law

Long Beach Harbor Resort, LLC (the Resort), leased a parcel of land located on the Public Trust Tidelands from the City of Long Beach. The issue this case presented for the Mississippi Supreme Court to determine was whether the Resort was required to enter into a separate lease with the Secretary of State for the use of the tidelands property or whether the Resort already had a valid lease allowing use of the tidelands in question. The Supreme Court found that the State of Mississippi had, through its Boundary Agreement and Tidelands Lease with the City of Long Beach, ratified the prior lease entered into between the City and the Resort. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the chancery court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the Resort and found that the Resort had a valid tidelands lease as ratified by the Secretary of State. View "Mississippi v. Long Beach Harbor Resort, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied Petitioner's petition seeking a writ of prohibition to halt an ongoing appropriation case in the Mahoning County Court of Common Pleas, holding that Petitioner failed to establish that he was entitled to a writ of prohibition.In the appropriation case, the Mill Creek Metropolitan Park District sought to take Petitioner's property so it could build a biking trail. During the pendency of the case, the General Assembly passed a law stating that a park district in Mahoning County may not use its power of eminent domain to build a recreational trail. Arguing that the new law divested the Mahoning County court of jurisdiction, Petitioner brought suit asking for a writ of prohibition halting the appropriation proceeding. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding (1) the anti-appropriation provision did not patently and unambiguously eliminate the Mahoning County Common Pleas Court's subject matter jurisdiction; and (2) because Petitioner had an adequate remedy by way of an appeal and the trial court did not patently lack jurisdiction, Petitioner was not entitled to a writ of prohibition. View "Schlegel v. Sweeney" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court affirming the decision of the Hanson County Drainage Board granting a drainage permit sought by James Paulson to clean out a pre-existing ditch, holding that Appellants were not entitled to relief on their allegations of error.On appeal, Appellants argued that the Board failed to follow the relevant approval procedures and that the Board abused its discretion by approving the drainage permit. The circuit court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Board complied with the proper procedures for approving the permit; (2) the circuit court did not err in denying Appellants' request to present additional testimony; and (3) the circuit court did not err by denying Appellants' request to take judicial notice of an earlier proceeding. View "Little v. Hanson County Drainage Board" on Justia Law