Justia Zoning, Planning & Land Use Opinion Summaries

To improve a stretch of U.S. Route 22 near Altoona, the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation (PennDOT) sought two right-of-way easements from for new drainage pipes, covering less than one-tenth of an acre of Merritt's property. PennDOT initiated condemnation and over Merritts’s objections, acquired title to and possession of the easements. With no success in that state-court proceeding, Merritts filed a federal suit, claiming that PennDOT’s acquisition of the easements and the compensation offered for them violated the U.S. Constitution and Pennsylvania law.The district court dismissed all claims with prejudice, some based on Eleventh Amendment immunity, the remainder under “Burford abstention,” which protects “complex state administrative processes from undue federal interference.” The Third Circuit affirmed in part. The “Ex parte Young” exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity does not allow Merritts’s claims for injunctive and declaratory relief against the PennDOT officials in their official capacities because he does not seek prospective relief from an ongoing violation. Merritts’s section 1983 claims for damages against the PennDOT officials in their individual capacities for allegedly unlawfully acquiring the easements for PennDOT cannot be dismissed under Burford abstention; his claims for damages premised on the allegedly unlawful acquisition of the easements meet the conditions for dismissal under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, but his claims concerning the denial of just compensation do not. The dismissals on Eleventh Amendment and Rooker-Feldman grounds should have been without prejudice. View "Merritts v. Richards" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the Land Use Commission (LUC) denying Petitioners' petition for a declaratory order challenging the construction of the Thirty Meter Telescope (TMT), holding that Haw. Rev. Stat. 205-2(e) does not authorize the Commission to exclude or enforce certain land uses within conservation districts.Petitioners in this case sought to use the LUC's districting authority in a manner that would compel the removal of all astronomy facilities located within the Astronomy Precinct. The LUC denied the petition, and Petitioners appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) this Court had jurisdiction to directly review Petitioners' appeal; (2) the LUC correctly determined that it lacked jurisdiction to issue the requested declaratory orders; and (3) Petitioners were not entitled to relief on their remaining claims of error. View "In re Petition of Ku'ulei Higashi Kanahele" on Justia Law

Government Code 65913.4 provides for streamlined, ministerial approval of affordable housing projects meeting specified requirements. Berkeley denied Ruegg’s application for ministerial approval of a mixed-use development under section 65913.4. Ruegg alleged violations of both section 65913.4 and the Housing Accountability Act (HAA, section 65589.5). The trial court found Berkeley was not required to approve the proposed project under section 65913.4 and denied Ruegg’s petition without reaching the HAA issues. The court of appeal, without addressing the HAA, directed the trial court to grant the writ petition.On remand, the trial court reasoned that it could not avoid ruling on the HAA issues. With respect to the section 65913.4 claim the court ordered Berkeley to issue the permits; it set a briefing schedule and hearing date concerning the HAA issues. The court of appeal declined to prohibit that hearing. Berkeley issued the permit. After a hearing, the trial court found that the disapproval of the application violated the HAA and that Ruegg was entitled to the “albeit duplicative” injunctive relief. The court of appeal affirmed, finding that the trial court had jurisdiction to address the HAA issue, which was not forfeited nor rendered moot by the prior order. View "Ruegg & Ellsworth v. City of Berkeley" on Justia Law

The State of Alaska Department of Fish and Game brought this action against the Board and several federal officials, alleging that the changes violated the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (“ANILCA”) and the Administrative Procedure Act. Before the district court issued its decision, the Kake Hunt ended, and the district court deemed the challenge to it moot. And while this appeal was pending, the partial Unit 13 closure expired.   The Ninth Circuit reversed in part and vacated in part the district court’s decision in an action challenging the Federal Subsistence Board’s approval in 2020 of two short-term changes to hunting practices on federal public lands in Alaska, specifically (1) the Board’s opening of an emergency hunt for Intervenor, the Organized Village of Kake; and (2) the Board’s partial temporary closure of public lands in game management Unit 13 to nonsubsistence users.   The panel first held that Alaska’s claim that the Board violated ANILCA by opening the 60-day emergency Kake hunt without statutory authority was not moot because it fit within the mootness exception of being capable of repetition yet evading review. Alaska’s claim that ANICLA did not authorize the federal government to open emergency hunting seasons raised a question of first impression in this circuit and required resolution of complicated issues of statutory interpretation. Noting that the district court had not reached the merits, the panel remanded this claim to the district court. With regard to Alaska’s partial Unit 13 closure claim, the panel vacated the part of the district court’s order that addressed the claim. View "STATE OF ALASKA DEPARTMENT OF V. FEDERAL SUBSISTENCE BOARD, ET AL" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court held that when an otherwise qualifying entity sells an urban redevelopment project during the forty-year tax window set forth in Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 121A, 18C, the tax concession extends to the capital gain from the sale.The tax exemption at issue provides an incentive for private entities to invest in constructing, operating, and maintaining urban redevelopment projects in deteriorated areas. At issue was whether the sale of an urban redevelopment project during the forty-year tax-exempt window is "on account of" the project, thus extending the tax concession to the capital gain from the sale. In this case, the Commission of Revenue issued notice of assessment to Appellants related to their capital gains from the sales of certain ch. 121A projects. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding that the capital gain from the sale of the ch. 121A project fell within the tax concession. View "Reagan v. Commissioner of Revenue" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court overruled Maha-ulepu v. Land Use Commission, 790 P.2d 906 (1990), superseded by statute, 2005 Haw. Less. Laws Act 205, 2-3 at 669-71, which held that a use not permitted under Haw. Rev. Stat. 205-4.5(a)(6) could be authorized by special use permit, holding that it was incorrectly decided.At issue was Ho'omoana Foundation's proposed overnight campground development for unhoused and commercial campers on Class B land in an agricultural district in Maui could be authorized by special use permit or whether a district boundary amendment was required. The Supreme Court held (1) the specific exclusion of overnight camps from permitted uses in Haw. Rev. Stat. 205-4.5(a)(6) sets forth that the public and private recreation use of overnight camps is not permitted in Class A and B land in agricultural districts and cannot be permitted by special use permits; (2) Maha'ulepu is overruled; and (3) because the proposed campground project included a public or private recreational overnight camp use, the project required a district boundary amendment. View "Ho'omoana Foundation v. Land Use Comm'n" on Justia Law

For years, the High Lonesome Ranch restricted access to two roads by locking a gate. But in 2015, during a county meeting, the Garfield County Commission directed the Ranch to remove the locked gate after concluding that the two disputed roads were subject to public rights-of-way. The Ranch refused and filed a declaratory-judgment action in Colorado state court opposing the County’s position. At first, the County asked the state court to dismiss the case for failure to name the U.S. Bureau of Land Management (“BLM”) as a party. But rather than dismissing, the state court ordered the Ranch to join the United States (BLM) as a necessary party, and the Ranch did so. The United States removed the case to federal district court. In October 2020, after a five-day bench trial, the district court ruled that the entire lengths of the two disputed roads were subject to public rights-of-way. On appeal—and for the first time—the Ranch contended that various procedural shortcomings deprived the district court of subject-matter jurisdiction. It also challenged the district court’s rights-of-way rulings. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s adverse-use ruling, but reversed its Colorado R.S. 2477 ruling and remanded for the court to reconsider that ruling under recent circuit authority governing acceptance of R.S. 2477 rights. The Court also remanded for the district court to determine the locations and widths of the rights-of-way by survey. View "High Lonesome Ranch v. Board of County Commissioner, et al." on Justia Law

Southern California Edison Company (Edison), an investor-owned public utility, filed a complaint in eminent domain to condemn an easement across a landowner’s property for the purpose of accessing and maintaining existing power transmission lines. Edison also filed a motion for order of prejudgment possession under the quick-take provisions of Code of Civil Procedure section 1255.410.1 The trial court granted the motion. The landowners filed a petition for writ of mandate requesting the court vacate the order granting Edison prejudgment possession.   The Fifth Appellate District vacated the order of prejudgment possession and directed the trial court to conduct further proceedings on the motion. Because the maintenance of power transmission lines is a matter of urgency, the court issued a peremptory writ in the first instance. The court explained a trial court evaluating a quick-take motion in the absence of a timely opposition shall grant the motion “if the court finds each of the following: (A) The plaintiff is entitled to take the property by eminent domain (B) The plaintiff deposited pursuant to Article 1 an amount that satisfies the requirements of that article.”   Here, the trial court did not make express findings. Among other things, the court did not expressly find that it was necessary for the access easement to be 16 feet wide, that the 16-foot-wide access easement was compatible with the least private injury, or that it was necessary for Edison to have the right to move guy wires and anchors, crossarms, and other physical fixtures onto the property. View "Robinson v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court dismissing, for lack of jurisdiction, this matter opposing the grant of a conditional use permit (CUP) to construct a commercial wind turbine, holding that the district court never acquired jurisdiction over this CUP appeal.The Cherry County Board of Commissioners granted the CUP to BSH Kilgore, LLC for it to construct and operate commercial grade wind turbines near Kilgore, Nebraska. Plaintiffs, parties who opposed the project, appealed the decision to the district court and later were allowed to amend their complaint to challenge the CUP pursuant to a petition in error. The district court dismissed the amended complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the jurisdictional requirements were not met in this case. View "Preserve the Sandhills v. Cherry County" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court denying a motion to intervene on the grounds that it was untimely, holding that the proposed intervenors were not entitled to relief on their claim of error.Plaintiffs appealed to the trial court from a decision of the Zoning Board of Appeals of the Town of New Canaan (Board) upholding the issuance of a zoning permit to Grace Farms Foundation, the intervening defendant. Nearly nineteen months later and after the trial court issued a decision remanding the case to the Board for further proceedings, the proposed intervenors brought the motion to intervene at issue. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that it was untimely. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the motion to intervene as of right was untimely. View "Markatos v. Zoning Board of Appeals" on Justia Law