Justia Zoning, Planning & Land Use Opinion Summaries

The case involves the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA) Communities Act, which mandates that cities and towns with local access to MBTA services adopt zoning laws to provide at least one district of multifamily housing "as of right" near their MBTA facilities. The town of Milton, which has four MBTA stations, voted down a proposed zoning scheme to comply with the act. The Attorney General then sued the town to enforce the act.The Supreme Judicial Court for the county of Suffolk reviewed the case. The town initially took steps to comply with the act, including hiring a consultant and submitting an action plan to the Executive Office of Housing and Livable Communities (HLC). However, a town-wide referendum ultimately rejected the proposed zoning bylaw. The Attorney General filed a complaint seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to enforce compliance with the act.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that the MBTA Communities Act is constitutional and that the Attorney General has the authority to enforce it. However, the court found that the HLC did not comply with the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) when promulgating the guidelines, rendering them ineffective. The court granted declaratory relief in part and dismissed the remaining claims, directing the single justice to enter a declaratory judgment consistent with the opinion. View "Attorney General v. Town of Milton" on Justia Law

The City of Hillsboro, Missouri, enacted ordinances prohibiting new private wells within city limits and requiring residences to connect to the city water system. The Antoinette Ogilvy Trust, owning a 156-acre property within Hillsboro, claimed these ordinances constituted an uncompensated regulatory taking under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The trustees, William Becker and Darcy Lynch, argued that the regulations made developing the property financially unfeasible due to the high costs of connecting to the city water system.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri granted summary judgment in favor of the City, rejecting the trustees' claims. The court found that the regulations did not constitute a per se taking, as they did not involve a physical invasion of the property or deprive it of all economic value. The court also determined that the regulations did not fail the Penn Central balancing test for regulatory takings.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the regulations did not mandate a permanent physical invasion of the property, as the trustees were not compelled to build structures or dedicate land to the City. The court also found that the property retained substantial value, thus not constituting a taking under Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council. Additionally, the court declined to consider the trustees' exaction claim, as it was not sufficiently raised in the lower court.Under the Penn Central test, the court concluded that the economic impact on the trustees was not significant enough to constitute a taking, and the regulations did not interfere with reasonable investment-backed expectations. The character of the governmental action was deemed a legitimate exercise of the City's police powers to prevent water contamination and protect the aquifer. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's summary judgment in favor of the City. View "Becker v. City of Hillsboro" on Justia Law

The case involves the Santa Clarita Organization for Planning the Environment and Advocates for the Environment (collectively, SCOPE) challenging the County of Los Angeles and Williams Homes, Inc. (Williams) over the approval of a residential housing development project in the Santa Clarita Valley. SCOPE's lawsuit contested the County's approval of a conditional use permit, an oak tree permit, and a vesting tentative tract map, alleging violations of the Subdivision Map Act (SMA) and the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA).The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted Williams's motion for judgment on the pleadings without leave to amend, finding that SCOPE's claims were barred under Government Code section 66499.37 of the SMA because SCOPE failed to serve a summons within 90 days of the County's approval of the vesting tentative tract map. The court concluded that section 66499.37 applied to both the SMA and CEQA causes of action, as the CEQA claims were intertwined with the SMA claims.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, reviewed the case. The court held that section 66499.37 does not bar SCOPE's CEQA claims to the extent they allege procedural violations of CEQA and the County's failure to analyze and disclose the project's environmental impacts, as these claims are unique to CEQA and could not have been brought under the SMA. However, the court found that section 66499.37 does apply to SCOPE's CEQA claims challenging the reasonableness of the conditions of approval of the vesting tentative tract map, specifically the mitigation measures adopted as a condition of approval.The Court of Appeal reversed the judgment and remanded the case, directing the trial court to enter a new order denying the motion for judgment on the pleadings with respect to the first cause of action for violation of CEQA and granting the motion with respect to the second cause of action for violation of the SMA and zoning and planning law. View "Santa Clarita Organization for Planning the Environment v. County of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

Santa Rita Holdings, Inc. applied for a conditional use permit (CUP) from the County of Santa Barbara to cultivate cannabis on a 2.54-acre parcel owned by Kim Hughes. The only access to the parcel is through a private easement over land owned by JCCrandall, LLC. The County's fire and public works departments deemed the road adequate for the project. Despite JCCrandall's objections, the County granted the CUP, and the Board of Supervisors upheld this decision.JCCrandall petitioned for a writ of administrative mandate, arguing that the use of the easement for cannabis activities was prohibited by the easement deed and federal law, that state law required their consent for such activities, and that the road did not meet County standards. The trial court denied the petition, applying the substantial evidence standard and finding the County's decision supported by substantial evidence.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, reviewed the case. The court determined that the trial court erred in applying the substantial evidence standard instead of the independent judgment standard, as JCCrandall's right to exclude unauthorized persons from their property is a fundamental vested right. The appellate court held that under federal law, cannabis is illegal, and thus, the use of the easement for cannabis transportation exceeds the scope of the easement. The court also found that the County's reliance on Civil Code section 1550.5, subdivision (b), which deems cannabis activities lawful under California law, defies the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Consequently, the judgment was reversed, and costs were awarded to JCCrandall. View "JCCrandall v. County of Santa Barbara" on Justia Law

The case involves a proposed residential housing development project near the University of Southern California (USC) by the City of Los Angeles. The project, which includes 102 units and various amenities, was found by the City to be exempt from environmental review under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) as a Class 32 urban in-fill development. The appellants, West Adams Heritage Association and Adams Severance Coalition, challenged this determination, arguing that the City abused its discretion by not finding the project consistent with the applicable redevelopment plan, improperly relying on mitigation measures for noise impacts, and failing to show the project would not have significant adverse impacts on traffic safety.The Los Angeles County Superior Court denied the appellants' writ petition, rejecting their challenges to the project. The court found that the City did not abuse its discretion in concluding the project would not have significant impacts on traffic or historical resources. The appellants then appealed the decision.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. The court initially reversed the trial court's decision, holding that the City improperly relied on mitigation measures for noise impacts. However, the Supreme Court transferred the case back to the Court of Appeal with instructions to reconsider in light of Assembly Bill No. 1307 and the Make UC A Good Neighbor v. Regents of University of California decision.Upon reconsideration, the Court of Appeal held that under the new law, noise generated by project occupants and their guests is not considered a significant environmental effect under CEQA. Therefore, the noise concerns do not preclude the application of the Class 32 exemption. The court also determined that the City must assess whether the project is consistent with the applicable redevelopment plan before granting the exemption. The court reversed the trial court's decision and remanded the case for the City to conduct this analysis. The court also concluded that the state density bonus law preempts the redevelopment plan's density provisions, allowing the City to calculate the project's allowable density based on the general zoning ordinance. View "West Adams Heritage Assn. v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

Best Development Group, LLC proposed to develop a Grocery Outlet store in King City. The King City Planning Commission approved the project, determining it was exempt from the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) under the class 32 categorical exemption for infill development. Efrain Aguilera appealed this decision to the King City Council, which denied the appeal and upheld the exemption. Aguilera and Working Families of Monterey County then filed a petition for writ of mandate, arguing that the class 32 exemption did not apply because the project was not in an urbanized area and the environmental assessment was inadequate.The Monterey County Superior Court denied the petition, ruling that the class 32 exemption did not require the project to be in an urbanized area as defined by CEQA and that substantial evidence supported the City’s determination that the project met the exemption criteria. The court also found that the City was not required to conduct a formal environmental review.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that the terms “infill development” and “substantially surrounded by urban uses” in CEQA Guidelines section 15332 should not be interpreted using the statutory definitions of “infill site,” “urbanized area,” and “qualified urban uses” from other sections of CEQA. The court found that the regulatory intent was to reduce sprawl by exempting development in already developed areas, typically but not exclusively in urban areas. The court also determined that substantial evidence supported the City’s finding that the project site was substantially surrounded by urban uses, based on the environmental assessment and aerial photographs.The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment, concluding that the class 32 exemption for infill development applied to the Grocery Outlet project, and no further CEQA compliance was required. View "Working Families of Monterey County v. King City Planning Com." on Justia Law

Flathead Properties, L.L.C. (Appellant) owned a tract of land along Flathead Lake that became an island during certain months due to rising water levels. In 2011, Appellant received a permit from the Flathead County Planning and Zoning Office to build a bridge connecting the island to the peninsula. The Community Association for North Shore Conservation (C.A.N.S.C.) challenged the permit, arguing it violated the Montana Lakeshore Protection Act. The District Court voided the permit and ordered the bridge's removal, a decision upheld by the Montana Supreme Court.Following the Supreme Court's decision, Appellant filed a claim for inverse condemnation against Flathead County, arguing that the court-ordered removal of the bridge constituted a taking of its vested property interest, requiring compensation. The County filed a motion to dismiss under M. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), arguing that since the permit was void ab initio, Appellant never had a vested property interest. The District Court granted the motion, agreeing with the County's reasoning.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case and reversed the District Court's decision. The Court held that Appellant's complaint contained sufficient facts to support a claim for inverse condemnation or, alternatively, a regulatory takings claim. The Court noted that Appellant had a constitutionally protected property interest in the bridge once it was built and that the County's actions in issuing and then voiding the permit could be seen as a taking requiring just compensation. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Flathead Properties L.L.C. v. Flathead Cty" on Justia Law

15 Langsford Owner LLC (15 Langsford) acquired eleven condominium units in Kennebunkport between December 2020 and June 2021. The units were previously approved as residential dwellings under the Town’s Land Use Ordinance (LUO). In April 2021, 15 Langsford began renting the units for short-term stays of less than thirty days. The Town of Kennebunkport, which did not regulate short-term rentals at that time, later contacted 15 Langsford, suggesting that the rentals violated the LUO and the Declaration of Condominium. In June 2021, the Town enacted a Short-Term Rental Ordinance (STRO) requiring licenses for short-term rentals.The Town’s code enforcement officer (CEO) denied 15 Langsford’s applications for short-term rental licenses in May 2022, reasoning that the units were being operated as a hotel or inn, which are not eligible for licenses under the STRO. 15 Langsford filed complaints in the York County Superior Court seeking review of the CEO’s decision. The Superior Court vacated the CEO’s denial, concluding that the units were “[l]egally existing residential dwelling units” eligible for licenses under the STRO.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment. The Court held that the CEO’s denial of the licenses was reviewable under Rule 80B of the Maine Rules of Civil Procedure, as the denial involved a ministerial act rather than a discretionary one. The Court determined that 15 Langsford’s units were legally existing residential dwelling units and not hotels or inns under the LUO definitions. Therefore, 15 Langsford was entitled to the short-term rental licenses based on the undisputed facts and the terms of the STRO. View "15 Langsford Owner LLC v. Town of Kennebunkport" on Justia Law

The City of Fargo, a home rule municipality, adopted zoning ordinances prohibiting the sale of firearms and ammunition as home occupations and in non-farm commercial use zoned districts. In 2023, the North Dakota legislature passed House Bill 1340, amending N.D.C.C. §§ 40-05.1-06 and 62.1-01-03 to limit the authority of political subdivisions, including home rule cities, regarding firearms and ammunition. Fargo filed a declaratory judgment action challenging the constitutionality of H.B. 1340 and seeking a declaration that the amended statutes did not void its ordinances.The District Court of Cass County granted summary judgment in favor of the State, holding that H.B. 1340 did not violate the North Dakota Constitution and expressly preempted and voided Fargo’s zoning ordinances. Fargo appealed the decision.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that H.B. 1340 was a valid exercise of the legislature’s constitutional authority to define the powers of home rule cities. The court concluded that the amended statutes were constitutional as applied to Fargo’s home rule charter and ordinances. The court also determined that H.B. 1340 preempted and rendered void Fargo’s zoning ordinances prohibiting the sale of firearms and ammunition, as the legislature had expressly limited the authority of political subdivisions in this area. View "City of Fargo v. State" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, Mill Road Realty Associates, LLC, Morris Maglioli, and William L. Ricci, Jr., d/b/a Wright’s Auto Parts, operated a junkyard in Foster, Rhode Island. They violated the conditions of their municipal license and continued operations despite a cease-and-desist letter from the Town’s zoning officer. Their municipal license expired, leading to the nonrenewal of their state license. Despite this, they continued operations without either license from 2018 to 2021. The Town issued another cease-and-desist letter in September 2021 and imposed a $100-per-day fine. The plaintiffs appealed to the zoning board of review, which denied their appeal. They then sought judicial review in Superior Court, alleging arbitrary, capricious, and tortious conduct by the defendants and seeking declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief.The Superior Court dismissed the plaintiffs’ action under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, citing the plaintiffs' failure to notify the attorney general of their constitutional claims as required by G.L. 1956 § 9-30-11. The trial justice dismissed the case sua sponte at the start of the hearing without allowing the parties to present evidence or argument on the issue of compliance with § 9-30-11.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that the trial justice erred by not providing the plaintiffs an opportunity to present evidence or argument on the issue of compliance with § 9-30-11 before dismissing the case. The Supreme Court vacated the order and judgment of the Superior Court and remanded the case for further proceedings, instructing the trial justice to allow the parties to present evidence on the issue of compliance with § 9-30-11 and the grounds for their initial motions. View "Mill Road Realty Associates, LLC v. Town of Foster" on Justia Law