Justia Zoning, Planning & Land Use Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs, lakefront property owners and others, filed a complaint for declaratory judgment and mandamus against the Ohio Department of Natural Resources (ODNR) and the State, seeking declarations that owners of property abutting Lake Erie hold title to the land between the high-water mark and the actual legal boundary of their properties as defined in their deeds or a writ of mandamus to compel ODNR to compel the State to compensate them for its alleged taking of the property. The trial court subsequently consolidated the action of other Plaintiffs claiming ownership of their land to the low-water mark of Lake Erie. The trial court concluded that the public-trust territory of Lake Erie was a moveable boundary consistent with the water's edge. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's holdings regarding the boundary of the public trust. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) the territory of Lake Erie is held in public trust and extends to the natural shoreline, which is the line at which the water usually stands when free from disturbing causes; and (2) the boundary of the public trust does not change from moment to moment, and artificial fill cannot alter the boundary. Remanded.

The South Euclid City Council enacted an ordinance that amended the zoning for certain property. Relators, city residents, filed a referendum petition seeking submission of the ordinance to the city's electorate. The city council denied the petition because Relators had not filed a certified copy of the ordinance with the city's finance director. Relators then filed the present action, seeking a writ of mandamus to compel the city council clerk to determine the referendum petition was valid, to compel the clerk to communicate that determination to the city council, and to compel the city council to repeal the ordinance or submit it to the electors. The Supreme Court granted the writ, holding that Relators established their entitlement to the requested relief as (1) the clerk of council and city council abused their discretion and disregarded Ohio Rev. Code 731.32 by determining that Relators had not complied with the statute by filing a copy of the ordinance with the clerk of council instead of the city's director of finance; and (2) the ordinance was not exempt from referendum even though it contained an emergency declaration.

The Liberty Township board of trustees approved a zoning amendment that rezoned three parcels of township land. Subsequently, a group of petitioners filed a referendum petition seeking to submit the board's action approving the rezoning of the property to the electors of the township. Relators, the owner of the property at issue, the developer of the property, and the developer company's president, submitted a protest to the county board of elections against the referendum petition. The board certified the referendum petition and placed the rezoning issue on the general-election ballot and rejected Relators' protest grounds. Relators then filed this action for a writ of prohibition and a writ of mandamus to compel the board to sustain their protest. The Supreme Court granted the writ of prohibition, holding that the board of elections abused its discretion by denying Relators' protest, certifying the referendum petition, and submitting the zoning amendment to the electorate because the petitioners did not timely file their referendum petition pursuant to statute.

Gayle Sperry, her son, and her daughter-in-law owned and operated a winery at Sperry's residence. The property was in a residentially zoned district. A zoning inspector filed a complaint for preliminary and permanent injunction seeking to enjoin the Sperrys' use of the property as a retail business and restaurant in a residentially zoned district. The trial court granted summary judgment to the zoning inspector, finding that the winery was not exempt from township zoning. The Sperrys appealed, contending that under Ohio Rev. Code 519.21(A) their winery was exempt from township zoning regulations because they also engaged in viticulture on the property within the meaning of the statute. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals, holding that exemption from township zoning under the statute does not require for its application that viticulture be the primary use of property engaged in the vinting and selling of wine. Remanded.