Justia Zoning, Planning & Land Use Opinion Summaries

This case concerned a city's preexisting lien on land eventually condemned. At issue was whether the city could file a motion in either county or district court for setoff of the lien amount from the condemnation award. The landowner argued (1) the city must condemn the lien, as well as the subject property, in order to claim the land in condemnation proceedings; and (2) it was error for the county court in this case to grant such a setoff because county courts lack jurisdiction to make judicial determinations in condemnation proceedings. The Supreme Court vacated in part and reversed in part, holding (1) it is appropriate for a district court to consider the question of a setoff upon a timely motion by the condemnor when the condemnor has a lien interest in the land acquired; and (2) the district court in this case erred in remanding the matter of the setoff to the county court, as the issue was properly presented to the district court through a timely motion by the city, and the district court had jurisdiction to determine the city's lien and whether and to what amount it should be deducted from the condemnation award. View "City of Waverly v. Hedrick" on Justia Law

The County of Dixon did work on Landowners' property, including grading and removing fences and trees, as part of a road maintenance project. Landowners eventually brought an inverse condemnation proceeding. The district court awarded Landowners damages of $4,049 and attorney fees in the amount of $5,600. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the portion of the court of appeals' decision that affirmed the award of attorney fees, holding that the court of appeals misconstrued the controlling statutes; and (2) otherwise affirmed. Remanded with directions to award reasonable attorney fees under both Neb. Rev. Stat. 76-720 and 76-726(2).

Appellants, three individuals, filed an initiative and referendum petition to refer a proposed ballot measure, which would have amended a city ordinance imposing an occupation tax, to the electorate of the City. The City filed a declaratory judgment action to have the proposed measure declared invalid. The district court ruled that the petition proposed a referendum measure that violated Neb. Rev. Stat. 18-2528(1)(a), which prohibits referendums that interfere with a city's contractual obligations. The electors voted on the proposed amendment. The district court subsequently ordered the county clerk not to count the votes cast and not to report or certify the results. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part and vacated, holding (1) the district court lacked the authority to block the count of the votes cast because the City failed to comply with the statutory requisites that would allow a court to take that action; (2) the district court erred in ruling that the proposed referendum violated section 18-2528(1)(a); and (3) the proposed referendum violated a common-law single subject rule, which invalidates proposed ballot measures that ask voters to approve independent and distinct measures in a single vote.

American Central City (ACC) appealed from two separate decisions of the district court. The cases were consolidated before the Supreme Court and involved complaints regarding the condemnation of three properties located in Lincoln, Nebraska. In the first case, a civil suit for damages apart from the condemnation award, ACC claimed it had compensable property interests for which it was not paid when the Joint Antelope Valley Authority (JAVA) and the City of Lincoln took its land through condemnation. In the second case, an appeal from the condemnation award, ACC argued that it did not receive adequate compensation for its land. The district court granted JAVA's motion for summary judgment in the civil suit and granted JAVA's motion to dismiss in ACC's appeal from the condemnation award. The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that (1) in the appeal of the civil suit for damages, ACC did not present sufficient evidence to present a genuine issue of material fact; and (2) in the appeal from the condemnation award, ACC did not offer sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case.

James Tierney and Jeffrey Tierney brought an action against Four H Land Company and other defendants to compel them to lower the elevation of a lakeside housing development adjoining the Tierneys' land. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, and the Tierneys appealed. While their appeal was pending the Tierneys discovered that the district court judge who issued the order harbored a personal prejudice against the Tierneys' attorney. The Supreme Court concluded that the three-factor test set forth in Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp. is the best means of determining when the rulings of a judge who should have recused himself or herself will be vacated and adopted the test. Applying the Liljeberg test to the facts of the case, the Court concluded that the district court judge's order on the summary judgment motions should be vacated.