Justia Zoning, Planning & Land Use Opinion Summaries

The City of Papillion condemned property owned by Appellant for a road project. The City built a new road on Appellant's new property along with an iron fence on the north side of the road, which abutted Appellant's remaining property. Appellant brought suit. The trial court concluded that the City had statutory authority to condemn the property for the fence and that the City's building of the fence was not a second taking that limited Appellant's access to the new road. Appellant appealed these issues. The City cross appealed, arguing that the district court erred in granting Appellant interest, fees, expenses, and costs. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant failed to timely appeal its claims that the trial court erred in concluding the City had statutory authority to condemn the property for the fence and the City's building of the fence was not a second taking; and (2) the court's award of interest, fees, expenses, and costs was proper. View "Pinnacle Enters. v. City of Papillion" on Justia Law

The County Board of Equalization determined that land owned by Ladd Krings was not agricultural or horticultural land. On appeal, the Tax Equalization and Review Commission (TERC) upheld the Board's decision but further concluded that the value of Krings' property should be equalized with the value of agricultural and horticultural land. Determining that the assessor's assessments of agricultural and horticultural land to be impermissibly low, TERC subsequently equalized Krings' property by reducing its assessed value. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the portion of TERC's order determining that Krings' land was nonagricultural and nonhoricultural; but (2) reversed the portion of the order in which TERC equalized the value of Krings' nonagricultural, nonhorticultural land with the value of agricultural and horticultural land in the county, as this decision did not conform to the law. Remanded. View "Krings v. Garfield County Bd. of Equalization" on Justia Law

Appellants in this case were rental property owners in the City of La Vista. Appellant sought a declaration that the City's ordinance establishing a rental housing licensing and inspection program was unconstitutional. Appellants claimed that the ordinance's application to rental property residences only, and not to owner-occupied residences, was an arbitrary and unreasonable classification that violated Nebraska's constitutional prohibition against special legislation. The district court entered summary judgment for the City. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the City's ordinance did not violate the prohibition against special legislation, as (1) the distinction between rental property residences and owner-occupied residences presented a real difference in circumstances; and (2) the City's regulation of rental properties was reasonably related to its legitimate goal of maintaining safe rental housing and livable neighborhoods. View "D-CO, Inc. v. City of La Vista" on Justia Law

This appeal involved a declaratory judgment action challenging the constitutionality of a municipal ordinance creating an offstreet parking district adjoining a Cabela's store. Plaintiff, a resident of the City, filed a complaint against the City and its mayor and city council members, seeking a declaration of the unconstitutionality of the ordinance. The district court found the action was barred by the general four-year statute of limitations because it was commenced more than four years after the ordinance was adopted. At issue on appeal was when the statute of limitations began to run. The Supreme Court reversed without reaching the constitutionality of the ordinance because the Court could not tell from the face of Plaintiff's complaint when Plaintiff's cause of action accrued for purposes of the running of the statute of limitations. Remanded. View "Lindner v. Kindig" on Justia Law

The issue in this appeal was whether a homeowners' association may enforce a covenant prohibiting "business activities of any kind whatsoever" against homeowners who have operated a daycare in their home for a period of twelve years. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the district court's order to the extent it found that the daycare business violated the "no business activities" covenant and to the extent it granted summary judgment on the defenses of estoppel, laches, and unclean hands; but (2) reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the homeowners' association with respect to the affirmative defense of waiver raised by the homeowners because there were genuine issues of material fact surrounding this issue. View "Farmington Woods Homeowners Ass'n v. Wolf" on Justia Law

Appellants in this case operated restaurants in the City of Omaha subject to a municipal ordinance which became effective on October 1, 2010. The ordinance declared itself to be an "occupation tax" on restaurants and drinking places in the City in the amount of 2.5 percent of gross receipts. Appellants filed an action for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief against the City, asking the district court to declare the ordinance unconstitutional, invalid, illegal, and unenforceable. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the City. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because the legal incidence of the tax fell on the business and not the customer, the restaurant tax was an occupation tax, not an illegal sales tax; (2) the ordinance did not violate limitations in the Nebraska Liquor Control Act on the amount of occupation tax for liquor licensees; and (3) the ordinance did not violate the constitutional prohibition against special legislation. View "Anthony Inc. v. City of Omaha" on Justia Law

Volunteers of America, Dakotas (VOA) proposed to build an apartment-style building for veterans in Omaha. To construct the building as planned, VOA applied for variances from area and use restrictions under the Omaha Municipal Code (Code). VOA applied to the zoning board of appeals of Omaha (Board) for the variances. Appellants, Field Club Home Owners League and Thornburg Place Neighborhood Association, opposed the application. The Board granted the variances, concluding that the Code created an unnecessary hardship because it did not contemplate a project like VOA's. The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed and vacated the district court's judgment, holding (1) the record failed to show that VOA had standing to seek the variances; but (2) because Appellants raised standing for the first time on appeal to the Court, the district court must conduct an evidentiary hearing on the issue. Remanded. View "Field Club v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Omaha" on Justia Law

David and Wilai Burden provided childcare services in their home. The Southwind Homeowners Association filed suit against the Burdens, alleging that the childcare services as provided violated several restrictive covenants applicable to the premises and asking that the Burdens be enjoined from providing those services. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Association, concluding that the childcare services were in violation of several restrictive covenants, and granted an injunction. The Burdens appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that summary judgment was appropriate where no genuine issues of material fact remained, and as a matter of law, the Burdens' activities on the property violated the Association's covenants. View "Southwind Homeowners Ass'n v. Burden" on Justia Law

This case concerned a city's preexisting lien on land eventually condemned. At issue was whether the city could file a motion in either county or district court for setoff of the lien amount from the condemnation award. The landowner argued (1) the city must condemn the lien, as well as the subject property, in order to claim the land in condemnation proceedings; and (2) it was error for the county court in this case to grant such a setoff because county courts lack jurisdiction to make judicial determinations in condemnation proceedings. The Supreme Court vacated in part and reversed in part, holding (1) it is appropriate for a district court to consider the question of a setoff upon a timely motion by the condemnor when the condemnor has a lien interest in the land acquired; and (2) the district court in this case erred in remanding the matter of the setoff to the county court, as the issue was properly presented to the district court through a timely motion by the city, and the district court had jurisdiction to determine the city's lien and whether and to what amount it should be deducted from the condemnation award. View "City of Waverly v. Hedrick" on Justia Law

The County of Dixon did work on Landowners' property, including grading and removing fences and trees, as part of a road maintenance project. Landowners eventually brought an inverse condemnation proceeding. The district court awarded Landowners damages of $4,049 and attorney fees in the amount of $5,600. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the portion of the court of appeals' decision that affirmed the award of attorney fees, holding that the court of appeals misconstrued the controlling statutes; and (2) otherwise affirmed. Remanded with directions to award reasonable attorney fees under both Neb. Rev. Stat. 76-720 and 76-726(2).