Justia Zoning, Planning & Land Use Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment of the superior court affirming a decision of the Town of York Board of Appeals purporting to grant Daniel and Susan Raposa's appeal from a decision of the Town's Code Enforcement Officer (CEO), holding that because the Board's written findings of fact directly nullified its decision to grant the appeal, the matter must be remanded for further proceedings.The Raposas contacted the Town's CEO to express their concern that Joshua Gammon's use of his property was not consistent with his predecessor's lawful nonconforming use. The CEO determined that Gammon's operation of his business on his property was not a change in use from his predecessor's use of the property. On appeal, the Board granted the Raposas' appeal as to the change-of-use issue. In the Board's written decision, however, the Board stated, "The use of the lot by Mr. Gammon's landscaping business does not constitute a change of use but is an intensification of the same use." The superior court affirmed, concluding that the Board's written decision was the operative decision for judicial review. The Supreme Judicial Court held that because the Board's written decision contained factual findings directly contradicting its initial decision, the matter must be remanded for further proceedings. View "Raposa v. Town of York" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the business and consumer docket vacating a decision by the Town of Lamoine Board of Appeals that reversed the Town Planning Board's denial of Hard MacQuinn, Inc.'s application for a permit under the Town's site plan review ordinance and affirming and reinstating the Planning Board's decision, holding that the lower court did not err.Specifically, the Supreme Judicial Court held (1) the Me. R. Civ. P. 80B complaint filed by Friends of Lamoine and Jeffrey Dow as Trustee for the Tweedie Trust was timely; (2) the Board of Appeals properly conducted appellate review of the site plan permit decision rather than de novo review; (3) the Planning Board’s findings in denying the permit were supported by substantial evidence; and (4) MacQuinn's argument that the Planning Board should have waived a criterion of the ordinance as duplicative or inapplicable did not require discussion. View "Friends of Lamoine v. Town of Lamoine" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the order of the district court granting the Town of Gorham's motion to enforce a consent decree entered earlier in a land-use dispute, holding that there was not a proper record to support the trial court's findings.The Town filed a land-use enforcement claim in the district court charging Defendants with violations of the Gorham Land Use and Development Code. The parties settled the dispute by agreeing to terms set forth in a consent decree, and the trial court ordered the consent decree to be entered as a judgment. The Town then filed a motion to enforce the consent decree, alleging noncompliance on the part of Defendants. The court granted the Town's motion. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment below, holding that the court order was not supported by competent evidence in the record. View "Town of Gorham v. Duchaine" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment of the Business and Consumer Docket (BCD) in favor of the Town of Bar Harbor on Landowners' complaint seeking a declaratory judgment that the Town's Zoning Ordinance Amendment was invalid, holding that Landowners failed to demonstrate a particularized injury and commenced this action prematurely.The Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) issued an order approving the Amendment, which changed the Town's Land Use Ordinance by, among other things, creating a new Shoreland Maritime Activities District that would apply to the Town's Ferry Terminal Property. Landowners, individuals whose properties had views overlooking the waters adjacent to the Town's Ferry Terminal Property, sought a declaratory judgment that the Amendment was invalid. The BCD entered judgment for the Town. Landowners appealed, arguing that the Amendment was inconsistent with state law and that the court erred in deferring to the order of the DEP in approving the Amendment. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the court's judgment on standing and ripeness grounds and remanded the case for dismissal without prejudice, holding that Landowners lacked standing to challenge the Amendment and that their claim was not ripe. View "Blanchard v. Town of Bar Harbor" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court affirming a decision of the Town of Belgrade Zoning Board of Appeals (BOA), which denied Appellant's application for commercial use of his property, holding that the superior court did not err in affirming the BOA's decision.Appellant submitted applications to the Town's Planning Board for a seasonal dock and boat rental business at his property. The Planning Board denied both applications, concluding that the property failed to meet the minimum lot standards provided in the relevant zoning ordinance. The BOA upheld the decision. The superior court affirmed. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the BOA did not err, and the BOA's decision was supported by substantial evidence in the record. View "Grant v. Town of Belgrade" on Justia Law

In two consolidated land-use matters the Supreme Judicial Court vacated an order entered by the superior court denying a motion for contempt filed by several individuals (the individuals) against the Town of Arundel and others and granting the Town's motion for sanctions in the form of a vexatious litigant order (VLO), holding that the individuals were not properly before the court.The Town filed two complaints against Dubois Livestock, Inc. and Cynthia Dubois (collectively, the Dubois entities) alleging land-use laws violations. The parties agreed to a consent order resolving the issues. One year later, the individuals, who were not parties in the underlying case, filed a motion seeking a contempt order against the Town, the Arundel Planning Board (APB), and individual members of the APB, asserting that they had violated the consent order. The Town moved for sanctions in the form of a VLO against the individuals and the Dubois entities. The superior court denied the motion for contempt and entered a VLO against the individuals. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment below, holding (1) the individuals had no standing to file the motion for contempt; and (2) because the individuals were earlier dismissed as parties to this appeal, the VLO must be vacated as well. View "Town of Arundel v. Dubois Livestock, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court dismissing Appellants' claim for a declaratory judgment in this zoning dispute, holding that the superior court did not err in dismissing the claim as duplicative of Appellants' appeal from a municipal action that was included in the same complaint.Appellants owned a parcel of land that abutted a parcel owned by Landowners. After the zoning board of appeals (ZBA) approved Landowners' application for permission to raze an existing house located on their property and to build a new one Appellants filed a complaint against the Town of Cape Elizabeth and Landowners, asserting, inter alia, a request for judicial review of the ZBA's approval of Appellants' application pursuant to Me. R. Civ. P. 80B and an independent claim for a declaratory judgment that section 19-6-11(E)(2) of the Cape Elizabeth Zoning Ordinance is preempted by the state's Mandatory Shoreland Zoning Act, Me. Rev. Stat. 38, 439-A(4)(C)(1). The superior court dismissed the declaratory judgment claim as duplicative of the Rule 80B appeal. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that because Appellants' claim for declaratory relief was not independent from its Rule 80B, the superior court's dismissal of the declaratory judgment claim as duplicative was not an abuse of discretion. View "Cape Shore House Owners Ass'n v. Town of Cape Elizabeth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment of the superior court dismissing for lack of subject matter jurisdiction Plaintiffs’ Me. R. Civ. P. 80B complaint for review of factual findings made by the Board of Appeals of the Town of York, holding that the superior court had jurisdiction to review the Board’s decision.Plaintiffs contacted the Town’s Code Enforcement Officer (CEO) to express their concern that their neighbor’s use of his property was not consistent with the previous owner’s nonconforming use. The CEO found no violations. The Board found that the neighbor’s use of the lot did not constitute a change in use but was rather an intensification of the previous use. Plaintiffs appealed to the superior court pursuant to Rule 80B. The court granted the Town’s motion to dismiss, concluding that the Board’s review of the CEO’s decision was advisory and, therefore, unreviewable. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that, absent an express provision in the Town’s ordinance stating that Plaintiffs may not appeal, a determination of whether there has been a violation of the ordinance is reviewable on appeal. View "Raposa v. Town of York" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the order of the superior court dismissing Plaintiffs’ complaint but vacated the order imposing sanctions on Plaintiffs, holding that the superior court abused its discretion in imposing sanctions.After the Town of Arundel Planning Board denied an application to renew a conditional use permit submitted by Dubois Livestock Inc., Plaintiffs - Marcel Dubois and Sol Fedder - filed this complaint against the Town, individual members of the Planning Board, and the Town Planner, alleging that the Planning Board met at an illegal executive session or sessions. The superior court dismissed the complaint for lack of standing and failure to state a claim. The superior court then granted Defendants attorney fees and costs. The Supreme Judicial Court held (1) the superior court did not err in dismissing the complaint because Plaintiffs lacked standing to pursue a Me. R. Civ. P. 80B complaint, and the complaint failed to state a claim under the Freedom of Access Act, Me. Rev. Stat. 1, 400-414; and (2) the superior court’s imposition of sanctions pursuant to Me. R. Civ. P. 11 was an abuse of discretion. View "Dubois v. Town of Arundel" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the district court finding that the City of Portland had proved that Appellant, the owner of an apartment building, had violated violated fire, electrical, and life safety provisions of Maine statutes and the Portland City Code, holding that the record supported the court’s decision.The City notified Appellant of code violations on eight occasions, but Appellant did not remedy significant violations that endangered her tenants. Ultimately, the City commenced an enforcement action. After a trial that Appellant failed to attend, the court found that the City had proved multiple code violations. The court imposed penalties on Appellant of more than $500,000, plus costs and attorneys fees. On appeal, Appellant challenged the district court’s determination of the penalties. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the court correctly applied the statute governing penalties, Me. Rev. Stat. 30-A, 4452(3)(E). View "City of Portland v. Chau" on Justia Law