Justia Zoning, Planning & Land Use Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Injury Law
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Petitioners Thomas Morrissey, Dorothy Sears, Reginald Rogers, John Quimby, Michael O’Donnell, Jonathan Chamberlain, Patricia Reynolds, Richard and Barbara Sanders, Margaret Russell, and Robert and Judith Dupuis, appealed a superior court order that granted motions to dismiss filed by Respondents New Hampshire Department of Environmental Services and New Hampshire Fish and Game Department (collectively referred to as the State), and Town of Lyme (Town). Post Pond is in Lyme, held in trust by the State for public use. Petitioners own properties with frontage on Post Pond and the west side of the Clay Brook wetlands. The Town owns property on the east side of the Clay Brook wetlands as well as a contiguous parcel with frontage on Post Pond, which consists of a recreation area. In May 2009, Petitioners filed a petition in equity and writ of mandamus alleging that the Town's removal of beaver dams in the Pond that controlled the natural mean high water mark adversely affected their properties and disrupted the entire Clay Brook wetlands ecosystem. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Petitioners' writ allegations were insufficient to state a claim for taking or nuisance against the Town, and that the trial court did not err in dismissing their claims. Further, the Court concluded that Petitioners failed to plead a claim entitling them to declaratory relief. View "Morrissey v. Town of Lyme" on Justia Law

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Carolina Chloride, Inc. sued Richland County alleging the County incorrectly advised it of the legal zoning classification of its property and that it lost a potential sale of the property due to the zoning issue.  The trial judge directed a verdict for the County on all of Carolina Chloride's claims.  The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded as to the claims for negligence and negligent misrepresentation but upheld the directed verdict as to Carolina Chloride's remaining claims. On appeal, the County argued the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the directed verdict in its favor on Carolina Chloride's claims for negligence and negligent misrepresentation. Upon review of the trial record and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court concluded that "[a]lthough it is certainly unfortunate that a mistake occurred in this case, Carolina Chloride had no legal right to rely solely upon the representations of County personnel and should have consulted the official record to determine the legal zoning classification of its property.  Carolina Chloride's owner and its broker are both experienced in business matters, but it appears that neither [the Company] nor his broker personally inspected the County's official records prior to making a sizable investment in developing the property."  The Court reversed the appellate court's decision with respect to the directed verdict as to the negligence and negligent misrepresentation claims. The Court affirmed the appellate court on all other matters.

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Plaintiff sought damages from the United States for injuries to a child allegedly caused by exposure to the toxic heavy metal thallium from soil dumped into a landfill adjacent to the child' residence and school. The child, by her guardian ad litem, appealed a decision of the district court finding that the United States acted "reasonably" and did not breach any duty in conducting the soil remediation projects. The district court also found that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction because the "discretionary function" exception to tort liability of the United States applied in this case. The court held that because the district court erred in holding that the "discretionary function" exception barred the Navy's liability on and the court's subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiff's claim, and clearly erred in finding that the Navy acted "reasonably" and not in breach of its duty in conducting the remediation of contaminated soil in the project at issue here, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. The court, nevertheless, held that it was unnecessary to reassign the case to a different judge on remand.

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Appellant owned and operated the Sewell Creek Energy Facility, a "peaking" power plant that began operating in 2000. Appellees, neighbors of the power plant, filed suit in 2007 alleging that the power plant constituted a nuisance. At issue was whether appellants were entitled to summary judgment where the power plant was either a permanent nuisance or continuing nuisance that could be abated. The court found that the power plant's exhaust silencing system, which was an integral part of the gas turbines that generated power, was an enduring feature of the power plant's plan of construction and the noise emanating from the exhaust stacks resulted from the essential method of the plant's operation. Consequently, the exhaust stacks were a permanent nuisance. Thus, the court held that the Court of Appeals erred when it omitted any consideration of whether the nuisance resulted from an enduring feature of the power plant's plan of construction or an essential method of its operation and grappled only with whether the nuisance could be abated at "slight expense." The court held that appellees' action was barred under the statute of limitation for permanent nuisances because they did not file their lawsuit until almost seven years after the plant became operational, unless some new harm that was not previously observable occurred within the four years preceding the filing of their cause of action. The court also held that, to the extent the trial court found that a factual issue remained concerning whether there was an "adverse change in the nature" of the noises and vibrations coming from the plant after the start of the 2004 operating season, the denial of summary judgment was appropriate. By contrast, to the extent that the trial court found that a factual issue remained concerning whether there was an "adverse change in the... extent and amount" of the noises and vibrations after the 2004 operating season, the denial of summary judgment was inappropriate. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part and reversed in part.