Justia Zoning, Planning & Land Use Opinion Summaries

This appeal arose from a petition for judicial review of the Camas County Board of Commissioners' (Board) decision to approve a preliminary subdivision plat. The district court held that the Board’s findings of fact and conclusions of law did not amount to a "reasoned statement" as required by I.C. 67-6535, and that the lack of a reasoned statement violated the petitioners' substantial right to due process. The district court also held that the Board erroneously interpreted a number of Camas County Ordinances. The district court awarded attorney fees to petitioners. The Board timely appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s order vacating the Board's findings and conclusions but reversed the district court’s award of attorney fees.

Jacklin Land Company (Jacklin) owned real property that it developed into a commercial industrial complex. The development was subject to multiple covenants, conditions and restrictions (CC&Rs). One of the CC&Rs was that the development was not intended for retail businesses. In April 2008, Blue Dog RV, a retailer, began negotiating with Jacklin about the purchase of land in within the complex. During the course of the negotiations, Blue Dog also discussed renting four undeveloped lots across the street, but still within the complex. KL Properties owned those four lots. Ultimately Blue Dog leased space from KL Properties. Citing the CC&Rs, Jacklin sent notice to Blue Dog to vacate the KL leased space. When further negotiations between the parties proved unfruitful, Jacklin filed suit to enjoin KL Properties and Blue Dog from using the space for RV retail. The trial court ruled in KL and Blue Dog's favor. On reconsideration, the court issued an injunction against Blue Dog for violation of the CC&Rs. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the district court's injunction was technically flawed because it did not give "explicit notice of precisely what conduct was outlawed," and that it enjoined unknown persons who were not party to this action. The Court vacated the district court's judgment, and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Petitioner-Appellant Stan Hawkins appealed a decision by the Bonneville County Board of Commissioners that granted his neighbors Dale and Mary Meyers variances to replace aging homes on two parcels of their land. The parcels in question were originally zoned as agriculture, and each contained homes built before the 1940s. People living on the Meyers' land regularly used a road over Mr. Hawkins' land for access. Bonneville County enacted its zoning ordinance in 1959, after the homes on the Meyers' land were built and occupied. The ordinance required dwellings to have frontage along a county-approved road. No easement was ever granted across Mr. Hawkins' land, nor was a public road officially designated to the Meyers' property. The Meyers filed for variances in 2007 believing that they needed to comply with the frontage requirement. At a hearing, the Commissioners found that the Meyers' did not need variances because their property had been "grandfathered in" so that the frontage requirement did not apply. However, the Commissioners granted the variance anyway. A trial court dismissed Mr. Hawkins' petition for review, holding that he did not have standing to file a petition for judicial review, and he did not show that the County had prejudiced any of his substantial rights. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court found that Mr. Hawkins had standing to pursue his petition for judicial review. However, the Court dismissed his petition because he did not show any prejudice to his substantial rights. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court's order dismissing Mr. Hawkins' petition.

Petitioner-Appellant Roger Steele and several residents appealed a district court order that dismissed their claim that the City of Shelley (City) illegally annexed land in Bingham County known as "Kelley Acres." The district court found that there was no statutory authorization for the district court's review of the annexation. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Appellants argued that the annexation was "arbitrary and capricious" and procedurally defective. Upon careful consideration of the arguments and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court found that there was indeed, no statutory authority for judicial review of the annexation. Furthermore, the Court found substantial evidence that supported the City's annexation of Kelley Acres. The Court affirmed the lower court's decision.

Coeur d'Alene Paving, Inc. (CDA Paving) leased several parcels of real property in Kootenai County from Beacon West, LLC. Approximately thirty acres of this leased property was zoned for mining activity. CDA had an interest in two undeveloped parcels that were initially zoned for agricultural use. The two agricultural parcels bordered the mining-parcel, but were not adjacent to it. In January 2008, CDA Paving submitted an application to the Kootenai County Building and Planning Department to have its two agricultural lots rezoned for mining. The Kootenai County Board of County Commissioners (BOCC) held public hearings on the application, and eventually approved the application. Several property owners located in the vicinity of the zone changes, including Appellant Linda Ciszek, petitioned the district court for a declaratory judgment, alleging the zone change was invalid. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of CDA Paving, holding that the BOCC had the authority to amend its zoning map. Appellants raised multiple issues with the district court's decision. Principal among their arguments to the Supreme Court was that the BOCC lacked statutory authority to approve a zoning application as it had for CDA Paving. The Supreme Court found all of Appellants' arguments persuasive, and affirmed the district court's decision.

The Idaho Department of Water Resources (Department) appealed an order of the district court that required it to strike a term from a hydropower water right license issued to the Idaho Power Company. In 1984, an agreement was entered into between Idaho Power, the State, the governor, and the attorney general, in an effort to resolve a controversy associated with the company's water rights at the Swan Falls Dam. As part of the Swan Falls agreement, the parties agreed to support legislation for the commencement of an adjudication of water rights in the Snake River Basin. One key piece of the legislation that was passed pursuant to the Swan Falls Agreement gave the Department specific authority to subordinate hydropower rights in a permit or license to the rights of subsequent upstream depletionary users. The Department was also authorized to limit a permit or license involving hydropower to a term of years. The Department issued a final order that articulated the legal basis for including the "term of years" condition in the license to Idaho Power. The Company sought judicial review of the Department's final order, arguing that the Department did not have statutory authority to include a term condition in its license. The court indeed concluded that the Department did not have the authority to limit the license. The Department appealed to the Supreme Court. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the Department had the statutory authority to include a term condition in Idaho Power's license. The Court reversed the district court's decision.

Plaintiff-Appellant James Wylie owned a subdivision in the City of Meridian. He sought a declaration from the district court that the City and the Idaho Transportation Department improperly denied access for his property directly onto a nearby state highway. The district court dismissed Plaintiffâs complaint on the ground that he failed to present a âjusticiable issue.â The Supreme Courtâs review of the record revealed that Plaintiff acquired the land in question subject to certain conditions recorded in the plat for the subdivision. The plat listed plainly that âthe subject property does have frontage along [the state highway] but . . . not direct access [to the highway].â The Court reasoned that Plaintiff failed to bring an issue for the Court to resolve since Plaintiffâs recorded deed clearly listed the frontage road as access to his property. Therefore, the Court reasoned that the case was ânon-justiciableâ and affirmed the lower courtâs decision to dismiss Plaintiffâs case.

In October 2008, the Idaho Power Company filed an application with the Idaho Public Utilities Commission (IPUC) to modify its tariff. Some of the proposed amendments applied to the relocation of utilities facilities within public rights-of-way. The City of Nampa and the Association of Canyon County Highway Districts intervened in the proceedings, and each objected to the Companyâs proposed amendments to the tariff. The IPUC approved the amendments, and Ada County Highway District (ACHD) filed a petition or reconsideration and clarification. Specifically, ACHD argued that the IPUC exceeded its authority in approving the amendments and that portions of the amended tariff were âan unlawful attempt to amend or abrogate the common law rule requiring a utility to relocate its facilities placed in a public right-of-way at its expense.â Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the IPUC exceeded its authority in determining utilities relocation within public rights-of-way. The Court set aside the amended tariff.

Petitioners-Appellants Douglas and Michelle Stafford obtained a building permit to construct an addition to their residence on Lake Coeur d'Alene in Kootenai County. A framing inspector advised the Appellants' contractor that they would not receive a certificate of occupancy because the landscaping violated the County site disturbance ordinance. The ordinance provided that lots with frontage on the Lake maintain a 25-foot natural vegetation buffer from the water line. Appellants were served a notice of violation of the ordinance, and were directed to prepare a remediation plan to return a portion of the property back to its natural state. Because Appellants were in violation of the site disturbance violation, the zoning board withheld an occupancy permit for Appellants' entire residence. They appealed to the district court which upheld the zoning board. On review, the Supreme Court found problems with the overlapping zoning ordinances in place at the time Appellants sought to develop their property. Appellants argued that the board cited them under the wrong ordinance. But the Court found no statute granting judicial review of administrative proceedings enforcing a zoning ordinance. The Court vacated the district court decision and remanded this case to dismiss Appellants' petition for judicial review.