Justia Zoning, Planning & Land Use Opinion Summaries

Petitioner applied to the Town of Scituate building official for a building permit to build a single-family home on an unimproved lot. The building official denied the permit, citing numerous deficiencies with Petitioner's plans, including a lack of street frontage. Petitioner appealed the denial and, alternatively, applied for a dimensional variance. The town zoning board denied the appeal and the request for a dimensional variance. The superior court affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the superior court, concluding that the zoning board abused its discretion in determining that a frontage requirement was required for Petitioner's property. Remanded.View "Iadevaia v. Town of Scituate Zoning Bd. of Review" on Justia Law

Richard Dahm appealed a district court judgment affirming the decision of the Stark County Board of County Commissioners to deny his application for a zoning change and a preliminary plat approval. After review of the decision, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding the County Board's decision to deny the application and institute a six-month appearance prohibition was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. View "Dahm v. Stark County Board of County Commissioners" on Justia Law

The County of Kauai Planning Commission approved a subdivision application for a Trust's development of land in Koloa, Kauai. During the Commission's consideration of the application, the parties assumed that a historic road (Road) that the Trust needed to breach to provide access into the subdivision belonged to the County of Kauai. Plaintiff filed a civil complaint alleging several claims against Defendants, including breaches of the public trust. Plaintiff subsequently amended his complaint because he discovered that the road belonged to the State and not the County and asserted two additional claims against the Trust for allegedly breaching the Road. The circuit court dismissed the claims, concluding (1) because the State had not given its approval to breach the Road, the issues raised in Plaintiff's complaint were not ripe; and (2) even if Plaintiff had claims that were ripe and severable, the court had the discretion to dismiss the claims in the interest of judicial economy. The Supreme Court vacated the circuit court's final judgment, holding (1) all of Plaintiff's claims were ripe for adjudication; and (2) the circuit court erred in dismissing claims on the basis of judicial economy. Remanded.View "Blake v. County of Kauai Planning Comm'n" on Justia Law

PPM Atlantic Renewable (“PPM”) unsuccessfully requested that the Fayette County Zoning Board grant it numerous special exceptions and variances for it to build 24 windmill turbines on leased land. This matter involved whether an objector must comply with a county court order to post bond as a condition of appealing to the Commonwealth Court, where the developer was the appellant in the county court. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the Commonwealth Court should not have quashed the objector's merits appeal based on the the objector's failure to post bond. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the Commonwealth Court’s order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "PPM Atlantic Renewable v. Fayette County Zoning Hearing Board" on Justia Law

Bremer, LLC and KGG Partnership (collectively "Bremer") appealed a district court’s grant of summary judgment to East Greenacres Irrigation District ("EGID") and the district court’s denial of several additional motions. This case arose after EGID looped its pressurized water system to a main water line extension that Bremer constructed to serve Bremer’s land. Bremer claimed the extension was an illegal tax. The district court granted EGID summary judgment on the grounds that Bremer and EGID had an agreement under I.C. 43-330A where Bremer was responsible for constructing water line improvements to serve their land. Bremer argued on appeal that the district court erred because there were genuine issues of material fact regarding: (1) whether the parties reached an agreement under I.C. 43-330A; and (2) whether EGID had authority to require Bremer to pay for the extension. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court in all regards.View "Bremer v. E. Greenacres Irrig Dist" on Justia Law

The University of Hawaii (UH) sought to construct an advanced solar telescope and observatory near the summit of Haleakala on Maui. Kilakila 'O Haleakala (KOH) opposed UH's conservation district use application to build on the project site to the Department of Land and Natural Resources (Department). KOH formally petitioned the Department for a contested case hearing on the application. Without either granting or denying KOH's petition, the Board of Land and Natural Resources (Board) voted at a regularly scheduled public board meeting to grant the permit. KOH filed an agency appeal. The circuit court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because there had been no contested case hearing and concluded that KOH's appeal was mooted by the fact that the Board had subsequently granted KOH's request for a contested case hearing subject to a preliminary hearing on KOH's standing. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the lower courts' judgments, holding that KOH's appeal was not moot and that a contested case hearing should have been held, as required by law and properly requested by KOH, on UH's application prior to the Board's vote on the application.View "Kilakila 'O Haleakala v. Bd. of Land & Natural Res." on Justia Law

Mike and Becky Carey applied for a building permit for an interior renovation of an apartment building. A municipal building inspector denied the application because the construction documents were not prepared by a registered design professional. The city's appeals board denied the Careys' appeal. The district court overruled the appeals board and ordered that the Careys be issued a building permit without the requirement that they retain a licensed architect, concluding (1) the appeals board did not act within its jurisdiction, and (2) the renovation fell into one of the exemptions to the Engineers and Architects Regulation Act. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the appeals board acted within its jurisdiction and that there was sufficient evidence to support a reasonable conclusion that the proposed renovation failed to qualify for statutory and regulatory exemptions to the Act.View "Carey v. City of Hastings" on Justia Law

Capital Assets Financial Services, the owner of property within the City of Saratoga Springs, asked the city council to rezone its property from a low density to a medium density residential zone. The city council granted the request. A group of citizens submitted a petition to the City requesting that the site-specific rezoning be placed on the ballot as a referendum. The City granted the request. Capital Assets subsequently filed a complaint against the City requesting a declaration that the action of the city council was made through its administrative, and not legislative, power. The district court ruled in favor of Capital Assets, declaring that the site-specific zoning was administrative and thus not subject to referendum, and enjoining the City from placing the referendum on the ballot. Thereafter, the citizens' group filed a petition for an extraordinary writ. The Supreme Court granted the petition and directed the City to place the referendum on the ballot, holding that the site-specific rezone of Capital Assets' property was a legislative matter and thus subject to referendum.View "Krejci v. City of Saratoga Springs" on Justia Law

The district court ordered Defendant to pay a civil penalty and attorney fees and to remove three unregistered, uninspected vehicles from his property after finding that he maintained an automobile graveyard on his property in violation of Me. Rev. Stat. 30-A, 3753. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court (1) did not misconstrue the applicable law in determining that the vehicles on Defendant's property did not meet the definition of "antique auto"; (2) did not clearly err in finding that one of the vehicles on Defendant's property was not a tractor used solely for logging purposes; (3) did not err by accepting Defendant's interrogatory answers into evidence and finding that his truck was an "altered vehicle"; and (4) did not abuse its discretion in declining to award additional attorney fees to the Town of China. View "Town of China v. Althenn" on Justia Law