Justia Zoning, Planning & Land Use Opinion Summaries

Shelby Land Partners, LLC and Alabaster Land Company, LLC each own a 50% undivided interest in a parcel of undeveloped real property located within the municipal limits of the City of Alabaster. At the request of Shelby Land, the property was initially zoned as a "community business district," permitting only commercial uses. In 2009, Shelby Land petitioned the City to rezone the land to permit multifamily residential use in order to pursue the development of a low-income apartment complex for senior citizens on the property. The Alabaster City Council denied Shelby Land's rezoning application. Shelby Land and Alabaster Land then brought this action to appeal the denial of the rezoning request. The trial court entered a summary judgment in favor of Shelby Land and Alabaster Land and ordered the City and the City Council to rezone the land to permit multifamily residential development. The City and the members of the City Council, who were sued in their official capacities, appealed. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings.View "The City of Alabaster v. Shelby Land Partners, LLC" on Justia Law

Applicant Alan Bjerke appealed the Environmental Division's affirmance of the Burlington Development Review Board's decision to deny his application for a zoning permit to alter the exterior of his house. Applicant argued that his zoning permit application was "deemed approved" because the municipal zoning administrator did not act upon it within thirty days. Furthermore, he claimed the Environmental Division erred by admitting the municipal zoning ordinance into evidence after trial and putting the burden of proof of compliance with that ordinance on applicant. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the permit denial.View "In re Bjerke Zoning Permit Denial" on Justia Law

The Town of Monkton brought a consolidated appeal from decisions of the state appraiser in three property tax cases challenging the Town's 2011 assessment. At issue was the manner in which the Town assessed land that had the potential for subdivision and further development. The state appraiser ruled that the Town had treated taxpayers inequitably by adding additional "home-site values" to undeveloped parcels that are subject to a permitted and recorded subdivision plan. The Town did not add this additional element of appraised value to other undeveloped parcels that may be eligible for subdivision without a permit due to their history or configuration. The Town argued it acted fairly in applying different valuation methods to properties with different characteristics. From the Town’s perspective, the appraised value of a parcel of land with a permit for more than one home should reflect additional development value, and land that could be subdivided but is not the subject of a permit is not similarly situated for purposes of tax appraisal. After review, the Supreme Court agreed with the Town's arguments and reversed the state appraiser. View "Lathrop v. Town of Monkton" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was a forty-nine acre parcel of land. After the County of Hawai’i and the County Planning Director (collectively, County Defendants) gave the subject property’s owners approval to subdivide the property, Plaintiff, an adjacent land owner, filed an action challenging the subdivision approval. The circuit court ultimately granted summary judgment on all counts for the County Defendants, concluding that no genuine issue of material fact existed in this case. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) vacated the circuit court’s judgment and remanded for an order dismissing the case, concluding that Appellant failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, and therefore, the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to act on the complaint. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA’s judgment and remanded to the ICA for consideration of the remaining issues raised by Plaintiff in his appeal, holding that Appellant did not fail to exhaust administrative remedies.View "Kellberg v. Yuen" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs in this case consist of four Charleston citizens' groups. Plaintiffs brought suit seeking an injunction against what they believed to be the unlawful use of a terminal by the Carnival Corporation's cruise ship, the "Fantasy." The Terminal is within the City's Old and Historic District which is listed on the National Register of Historic Places maintained by the United States Department of the Interior. Plaintiffs' complaint sought injunctive relief based on ten claims: seven based on City ordinances, a public nuisance claim, a private nuisance claim, and a claim based on the South Carolina Pollution Control Act. Following a hearing, the trial court commissioned a report which concluded: that as a matter of law, none of the ordinances applied to the Fantasy's use of the Terminal; the Pollution Control Act did not govern the Fantasy's discharges in South Carolina waters; but that the complaint made sufficient allegations to set forth both a private and a public nuisance cause of action. Plaintiffs and Defendants filed exceptions to the report. After considering the report and the exceptions, the Supreme Court dismissed the noise ordinance, sign ordinance, and Pollution Control Act claims, and withheld ruling on the motions to dismiss on the five zoning and two nuisance claims. After ordering briefing on the issues of standing, preemption, and whether the zoning ordinances applied to the Fantasy's use of the Terminal, the Supreme Court concluded Plaintiffs lacked standing. Accordingly, the Court granted Carnival's motions to dismiss. View "Carnival Corporation v. Historic Ansonborough Neighborhood" on Justia Law

In order to meet the 300 inhabitants required for incorporation under section 11-41-1, the petitioners included 51 people actually living in Caritas Village along with 296 people who had declared that they have designated Caritas Village as their place of residence pursuant to 12-13-23, Ala. Code 1975. The probate court determined that: (1) the proposed municipality had a population of less than 300; (2) the population of the proposed municipality did not constitute a body of citizens whose residences were contiguous and formed a homogeneous community; (3) the application was not signed by at least 15 percent of the qualified electors residing within the municipality limits; (4) there were not 4 qualified electors residing on each quarter of a quarter section of the platted or unplatted lands; (5) the application did not contain an accurate plat of the land to be included within the proposed corporate limits; (6) the place of residence by street and number of those living within the proposed municipality was not included; and (7) the petition did not accurately state the name of the proposed municipality. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the probate court erred in its determination, and whether the declarations of residency were indeed sufficient under 11-41-1. After careful consideration of the probate court record, the Supreme Court concluded petitioners' declarations were not sufficient to meet the statute's requirements, and therefore affirmed the probate court's decision. View "In re The incorporation of Caritas Village" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was Va. Code Ann. 15.2-2303.1:1(A), which provides that cash payment made pursuant to a cash proffer offered or accepted for residential construction on a per-dwelling unit shall be accepted by any locality only after the completion of the final inspection of the property. Here several developers and Williamsburg Landing (collectively, Respondents) made proffers to the County, which included per-dwelling cash payments, related to the rezoning of their property. The cash payments for some dwelling units made by Respondents were accepted by the County under the terms of the proffers after June 30, 2010 and prior to the completion of a final inspection of the dwelling units. The County filed a complaint for declaratory judgment, contending that section 15.2-2303.1:1(A) had no application to proffers agreed to prior to its effective date of July 1, 2010. The district court granted summary judgment to Respondents. The Supreme Court affirmed the grant of summary judgment, holding that the circuit court did not err in ruling that section 15.2-2303.1:1(A) applies to all payments of cash proffers due on or after July 1, 2010 regardless of whether the proffers were agreed to prior to that date.View "Bd. of Supervisors of James City County v. Windmill Meadows, LLC" on Justia Law

Landowner initiated plans to develop his property as a cluster subdivision. Landowner received a compliance letter from the county zoning administrator indicating that Landowner’s property met the standards set forth in the applicable ordinance. After the zoning administrator issued the compliance letter, the county’s board of supervisors repealed the ordinance. Landowner filed a declaratory judgment action against the county and the board, seeking a declaration that he obtained a vested right to develop his property as a by-right cluster subdivision in accordance with the terms of the ordinance. In support of his claim, Landowner asserted that the compliance letter constituted a significant affirmative governmental act under Va. Code Ann. 15.2-2307, which was necessary to find Landowner had vested land use rights. The circuit court ruled in favor of Landowner. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the zoning administrator’s issuance of the confirmation letter was not a significant affirmative governmental act; and (2) therefore, the circuit court erred in holding that Landowner acquired a vested right under section 15.2-2307 to develop his property as a cluster subdivision. View "Bd. of Supervisors of Prince George County v. McQueen" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs owned property near but not on Sebago Lake. Defendants owned shorefront property on the lake. Through their deeds, Plaintiffs acquired an easement consisting of a right-of-way over lot 40A, a strip of land situated between Defendants' lots. In 2007, the lot was conveyed to Defendants. Before the conveyance, Plaintiffs obtained a permit for the construction of a dock extending from the lot to the lake. In 2010, the Town's code enforcement officer rescinded the permit and ordered the dock to be removed. The Town's zoning board upheld the enforcement officer's decision. Plaintiffs filed suit, challenging the zoning board's decision and Defendants' fee simple title to the lot and seeking a declaratory judgment that they were entitled to maintain a dock on the lot. Ultimately, the superior court found Defendants held fee simple title to the lot and that the easement held by Plaintiffs did not grant them a right to maintain the dock. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment, holding that the deed in Defendants' chains of title unambiguously excepted the lot from a prior conveyance and that deeds in Plaintiffs' chains of title were ambiguous as to whether the dock was allowed. Remanded.View "Sleeper v. Loring" on Justia Law

In April 2010, the State Senate expressly rejected Duane Kanuha's nomination for a second term as a commissioner on the State Land Use Commission (LUC). Following the Senate's rejection, Kanuha continued to serve on the board and to participate in the LUC's consideration of a development project involving the reclassification of agricultural land for urban use. Sierra Club filed an action to disqualify Kanuha from serving on the LUC and to invalidate the actions Kanuha had taken with regard to the development project. The LUC denied the action. That same day, LUC voted to approve the development project. Without Kanuha's vote, the LUC lacked the requisite number of votes to approve the reclassification. The circuit court reversed the LUC's decision and order. The ICA reversed, determining that Kanuha continued to serve as a valid holdover member of the LUC after the Senate's rejection of his nomination for a second term. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Kanuha was not a valid holdover when he voted on the reclassification; (2) Kanuha did not qualify as a de facto member of the LUC; and (3) therefore, Kanuha's actions taken with respect to the reclassification petition were invalid. View "Sierra Club v. Castle & Cooke Homes Haw., Inc. " on Justia Law