Justia Zoning, Planning & Land Use Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs-appellants, Craig Immel, Terry Young, Herb Beattie, and Ray Pearcey (collectively, "Taxpayers"), sought a declaratory judgment that Defendants-appellees, Tulsa Public Facilities Authority (TPFA) and the City of Tulsa (City), could not sell 8.8 acres of park land to a private developer for the construction of a commercial shopping center because the land was held in a public trust expressly as a park for the people. All parties moved for summary judgment, and the trial court granted the TPFA and the City's joint motion for summary judgment as to all claims. Taxpayers appealed. The Oklahoma Supreme Court held: (1) Taxpayers had standing; (2) the TPFA and the City could not sell the 8.8 acres of park land to a private developer for construction of a commercial shopping center because the land was indeed held in a public trust for the people, unless it was abandoned and/or was no longer fit for its intended use as a public park; (3) there were disputed material facts as to whether the TPFA and the City lawfully abandoned the 8.8 acres of park land; and (4) there were disputed material facts as to whether the expenditure met the public purpose requirement under the Oklahoma Constitution. The trial court's order granting the TPFA and the City's joint motion for summary judgment was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Immel et al. v. Tulsa Public Facilities Authority" on Justia Law

In 1958, the Northern Pacific Railroad physically abandoned the 20-mile segment outside of Noxon, Montana. Part of that segment runs through the Finnigan property, which is entirely within the boundaries of the Kanisku National Forest. Several landowners along the right of way sought a judicial decree of abandonment and ultimately gained title to their respective segments of the abandoned railway. The Finnigan property’s then-owner did not seek a judicial decree of abandonment. In 2018, the Finnigan Estate brought suit to quiet its title to the right of way across its property. The district court rejected the action on summary judgment.The Ninth Circuit affirmed. Northern Pacific stopped using the segment in 1958, but the railway was not formally declared abandoned before the 1988 enactment of the Rails-to-Trails Act, 6 U.S.C. 1248(c), so the United States retained its reversionary interest in the land. The Act provides that title “shall remain” with the U.S. for railroad rights-of-way abandoned after October 4, 1988, except to the extent that the right of way was converted to a public highway. To transfer rights-of-way to neighboring landowners, abandonment requires both physical abandonment and a judicial decree of abandonment. The judicial-decree requirement was not met when another parcel in the segment obtained a judicial decree of abandonment that did not cover the Finnigan property. View "Estate of Finnigan v. United States" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the court of appeals holding that the City of Waconia's ordinance was subject to the procedural requirements of Minn. Stat. 462.357 for municipal zoning, including notice and a public hearing.After Appellants began building a dock extending from their lakeshore property into the lake the City adopted an ordinance that prohibited the construction of the dock. When the construction was nearly complete the City filed a complaint seeking a permanent injunction under the new ordinance to halt further construction and require the dock's removal. The district court granted summary judgment for the City. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) Appellants' appeal was timely; (2) the City's ordinance was subject to the procedural requirements of section 462.357; and (3) because the City failed to comply with the procedural requirements of section 462.357, the ordinance was void, and the permanent injunction against Appellants was also void. View "City of Waconia v. Dock" on Justia Law

In a California Environmental Quality Act (Act) challenge, the issue presented concerned the adoption of a mitigated negative declaration for and approval of the Newtown Road Bridge at South Fork Weber Creek Replacement Project (the project) by respondents El Dorado County (County) and its board of supervisors (collectively, respondents). The proposed project would replace an existing bridge. Petitioners Newtown Preservation Society, an unincorporated association, and Wanda Nagel (collectively, petitioners) challenged the mitigated negative declaration, arguing, among other things, the project might have significant impacts on fire evacuation routes during construction and, thus, the County was required to prepare an environmental impact report. The trial court upheld the mitigated negative declaration. Petitioners appealed, arguing the trial court erred in upholding the mitigated negative declaration because: (1) substantial evidence supported a fair argument of potentially significant impacts on resident safety and emergency evacuation; (2) the County impermissibly deferred analysis of temporary emergency evacuation impacts; (3) the County impermissibly deferred mitigation of such impacts; and (4) the County deferred analysis of impacts pertaining to construction of a temporary evacuation route. In the published portion of its opinion, the Court of Appeal concluded petitioners’ framing of the fair argument test in terms of the project having “potentially significant impacts on resident safety and emergency evacuation” was erroneous. Petitioners thus failed to carry their burden of showing substantial evidence supported a fair argument of significant environmental impact in that regard. In the unpublished portion of the opinion, the Court concluded the County did not impermissibly defer mitigation and decline to consider the two remaining arguments. Finding no merit in petitioners’ contentions, judgment was affirmed. View "Newtown Preservation Society v. County of El Dorado" on Justia Law

In this appeal, several Summerville residents and public interest groups (Petitioners) asked the South Carolina Supreme Court to invalidate approval granted by the Town of Summerville Board of Architectural Review (the Board) for construction of a proposed development project (the Project). Petitioners contended the Board violated the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and various Summerville ordinances. At some point during Petitioners' appeal of the Board's decision, Applegate & Co. (the Developer) decided not to go forward with the Project. Since there remained no actual controversy for the Supreme Court to decide, it vacated the court of appeals' decision and dismissed Petitioners' appeal as moot. View "Croft v. Town of Summerville" on Justia Law

The issue in this case relates to Captain Sam’s Spit on Kiawah Island, South Carolina. Twice before, the Administrative Law Court (ALC), over the objections of the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (DHEC), granted permits for the construction of an extremely large erosion control device in a critical area. Both times, the South Carolina Supreme Court found the ALC erred. In this third appeal, the Coastal Conservation League raised numerous issues with respect to the approval of another “gargantuan structure” designed to combat the erosive forces carving into the sandy river shoreline, especially along its narrowest point called the "neck," in order to allow a developer to construct a road to facilitate development of fifty houses. DHEC, reversing its prior stance, issued four permits to construct the steel wall, which the ALC upheld. The Supreme Court found the ALC erred in three respects: (1) in accepting DHEC's narrow, formulaic interpretation of whether a permit that indisputably impacts a critical area warrants the more stringent review normally accorded to such structures; (2) in relying on the protection of Beachwalker Park to justify the construction of the entire wall; and (3) in determining the public will benefit from the wall based on purely economic reasons. Accordingly, judgment was reversed. View "SC Coastal Conservation League v. SCDHEC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court dismissing Appellants' challenges to certain amendments to the Fairfax County Zoning Ordinance and the imposition of a Transient Occupancy Tax, holding that the circuit court did not err.Appellants owned or possessed homes within Fairfax County. In 2018, the Board of Supervisors of Fairfax County amended the Zoning Ordinance (the STL Amendment) redefining a dwelling and adding definitions for "transient occupancy" and "short-term lodging." The Board also amended the County Code to impose a transient occupancy tax of two percent of the cost of the short-term lodging (the TOT Amendment). Appellants brought a declaratory judgment action challenging the validity of the STL Amendment and the TOT Amendment. The trial court dismissed Appellants' claims with prejudice. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in dismissing Appellants' challenges to the amendments. View "Norton v. Board of Supervisors of Fairfax County" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court determining that the Historic Alexandria Foundation lacked standing to pursue the claims asserted in this case, holding that there was no error in the circuit court's judgment.Vowell, LLC filed applications to obtain certain permits for the renovation of property located in the Old and Historic District of the City of Alexandria. The Old and Historic Alexandria District Board of Architectural Review (the BAR) approved Vowell's applications, and the City Council affirmed the BAR's decision. The Foundation appealed the City's Council decision. The circuit court dismissed the matter with prejudice, concluding that the petition did not establish that the Foundation was an aggrieved party with standing to pursue the appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Foundation lacked standing because the allegations of the petition failed to establish that the Foundation suffered particularized harm that differed from that suffered by the public in general. View "Historic Alexandria Foundation v. City of Alexandria" on Justia Law

Plaintiff New Hampshire Alpha of SAE Trust (SAE) appealed a superior court order ruling that the Town of Hanover Zoning Board of Adjustment (ZBA) had subject matter jurisdiction to hear SAE’s administrative appeal in the related case of New Hampshire Alpha of SAE Trust v. Town of Hanover, 172 N.H. 69 (2019) (SAE I). Defendant Town of Hanover (Town) cross-appealed the trial court’s denial of its request for attorney’s fees. Dartmouth College notified the Planning and Zoning Office that the chapter of the New Hampshire Alpha Chapter of Sigma Alpha Epsilon was suspended by the national organization. The College officially derecognized the fraternity, which meant the facility became ineligible to operate as an “I” district student residence. Continued use of the property as a residence would have been a violation of the zoning ordinance. In subsequent proceedings, SAE challenged the ZBA’s jurisdiction to hear SAE’s appeal in the first instance. The Town argued it was entitled to attorney’s fees because SAE’s challenge in this case was frivolous with no good faith basis in fact or law, and asserted that it was only intended to waste time and needlessly delay final judgment in this matter. Finding no reversible error in the superior court’s judgment, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed judgment to SAE’s appeal and the Town’s cross-appeal. View "New Hampshire Alpha of SAE Trust v. Town of Hanover" on Justia Law

Neighbors appealed three Vermont Environmental Division rulings related to their appeal of the Agency of Natural Resources’ (ANR) decision to authorize Snowstone, LLC, to discharge stormwater at a proposed project site pursuant to a multi-sector general permit (MSGP). The court dismissed for lack of statutory standing most of neighbors’ questions on appeal and dismissed the remaining questions as not properly before the court. In addition, the court concluded that neighbors’ motion for a limited site visit was moot, given its dismissal of neighbors’ appeal. Finally, the court granted landowners Justin and Maureen Savage’s motion to intervene in the proceedings. The Vermont Supreme Court concluded that neighbors had standing to appeal the ANR’s authorization to act under a MSGP, and that their motion for a limited site visit was not moot. Furthermore, the Supreme Court concluded the court acted within its discretion to allow landowners to intervene. Accordingly, dismissal of neighbors’ appeal was reversed, as was the dismissal of the motion for a site visit, and the court’s decision to grant landowners intervention was affirmed. View "In re Snowstone Stormwater Discharge Authorization (Harrington et al., Appellants)" on Justia Law