Justia Zoning, Planning & Land Use Opinion Summaries

The California Coastal Act of 1976 (Pub. Resources Code 30000) requires a coastal development permit (CDP) for any “development” resulting in a change in the intensity of use of, or access to, land or water in a coastal zone. In December 2018, Los Angeles adopted the Home-Sharing Ordinance, imposing restrictions on short-term vacation rentals, with mechanisms to enforce those restrictions. Objectors sought to enjoin enforcement of the Ordinance in the Venice coastal zone until the city obtains a CDP, claiming the Ordinance constituted a “development” requiring a CDP.The trial court denied relief, finding the petition time-barred by the 90-day statute of limitations in Government Code section 65009, and that the Ordinance does not create a change in intensity of use and, therefore, is not a “development” requiring a CDP. The court of appeal affirmed, agreeing that the 90-day statute of limitations applies, rather than the three-year statute of limitations in Code of Civil Procedure section 338(a). The court did not address whether the Ordinance constitutes a “development” subject to the CDP requirements of the Coastal Act. View "Coastal Act Protectors v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals finding that Northern Monticello Alliance (NMA) had a due process right to participate in the hearing leading to the San Juan County Planning and Zoning Commission's decision not to revoke a wind farm's conditional use permit (CUP), holding that NMA did not possess such a right.NMA complained to the Planning Commission that the wind farm was not fulfilling the conditions of its CUP. After a hearing at which NMA was not allowed to participate, the Planning Commission voted not to revoke the CUP. The San Juan County Commission ultimately upheld the Planning Commission's decision not to revoke the CUP. The district court affirmed. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that NMA members had due process rights granted by the County Land Use, Development, and Management Act and the San Juan County Zoning Ordinance and the San Jan County Zoning Ordinance. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that NMA did not have a protectable due process interest in the enforcement of the CUP or in participation in the revocation hearing. View "Northern Monticello Alliance v. San Juan County" on Justia Law

Appellant Save the El Dorado Canal sought reversal of a judgment entered after the trial court denied its petition for writ of mandate. The petition challenged certification of an environmental impact report (EIR) and approval of a project under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA). The challenged project, the Upper Main Ditch piping project, was approved by the El Dorado Irrigation District and the El Dorado Irrigation District Board of Directors (collectively, respondents). On appeal, appellant contended respondents’ approval of the challenged project violated CEQA because: (1) the EIR failed to provide an adequate project description because it omitted “a crucial fact about the ditch the District proposes to ‘abandon,’ ” i.e., “the Main Ditch system is the only drainage system” for the watershed; and (2) the EIR failed to adequately analyze the impacts of abandonment to hydrology, biological resources, and risks associated with wildfires. The Court of Appeal affirmed, finding respondents did not abuse their discretion in approving the Blair Road alternative. The draft and final EIR’s adequately apprised respondents and the public about both the nature of the watershed and the fact that the District would no longer maintain the abandoned portion of the Upper Main Ditch. These environmental documents also adequately analyzed the Blair Road alternative’s impacts to hydrology, biological resources, and risks associated with wildfires. View "Save the El Dorado Canal v. El Dorado Irrigation Dist." on Justia Law

The Vermont Environmental Division concluded that Snowstone, LLC, did not need an Act 250 permit to operate a small dimensional-stone extraction operation on a 0.93-acre parcel of land to be purchased from landowners Justin and Maureen Savage. It found the proposed sale between landowners and Snowstone was an arm’s-length transaction and that neither party would exercise “control” over the land to be held by the other such that they should be considered one “person” for Act 250 purposes. Neighbors challenged these conclusions on appeal, and challenged other aspects of the court’s merits decision as well. Finding no reversible error, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the Environmental Division. View "In re Snowstone, LLC Act 250 Jurisdictional Opinion (Michael Harrington, et al., Appellants)" on Justia Law

The City of Gautier granted David Vindich a permit to build a 1,410 square foot garage/workshop on his .76 acre lot. When the building was almost completed, Vindich’s neighbor, Martin Wheelan, filed a lawsuit arguing the City’s decision was unlawful because Vindich actually sought a variance, which required a public hearing rather than a building permit. Thus, Wheelan said he was denied due process. Wheelan also claimed the City’s decision was arbitrary and capricious and that the workshop “completely overwhelm[ed]” the neighborhood and created a nuisance. After a trial, the chancellor dismissed Wheelan’s claims, finding that the City’s interpretation of the applicable ordinance was not manifestly unreasonable. The chancellor also found that the building was not a nuisance. Wheelan appealed, but the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Mississippi Supreme Court agreed with the appellate court's dissenting opinion, finding the City erred in its interpretation of the ordinance at issue here. The Court therefore reversed the Court of appeals and the chancery court, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Wheelan v. City of Gautier, et al." on Justia Law

Bankers Hill 150 and Bankers Hill/Park West Community Association (collectively, the Association) appealed after a trial court denied their petition for writ of mandate challenging a decision by the City of San Diego (City) to approve a development application for the 6th & Olive Project (the Project), a 20-story mixed-use building with a total of 204 dwelling units in the Bankers Hill neighborhood near downtown San Diego. Generally, the Association believed the Project was inconsistent with the neighborhood because it is too dense, too tall, and too close to the street. The Association contends the City abused its discretion in approving the Project because it was inconsistent with development standards and policies set forth in the City’s General Plan and the Uptown Community Plan, which governed development in the Project’s neighborhood. The Court of Appeal found the Project qualified for the benefits of the Density Bonus Law, and the evidence did not support any of the limited exceptions to its application. Because the City was obligated to waive those standards if they conflicted with the Project’s design, the Association’s claim that the Project conflicted with certain development standards did not establish a basis for denying the Project. Regardless, the Court concluded the City did not abuse its discretion in finding the Project to be consistent with the City’s land use plans. View "Bankers Hill 150 v. City of San Diego" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court dismissing Appellants' appeal from the decision of the Planning and Zoning Commission of the City of Shelton approving an application for a planned development district submitted by Shelter Ridge Associates, LLC, holding that the trial court did not err or abuse its discretion.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) contrary to Appellants' argument on appeal, the zoning authority conferred by Conn. Gen. Stat. 8-2 supports the creation of planned development districts; (2) the planned development district proposed by Shelter Ridge did not violate the uniformity requirement contained in section 8-2; and (3) the Commission’s decision did not result in an unlawful subdivision. View "Tillman v. Planning & Zoning Commission of the City of Shelton" on Justia Law

The Army Corps of Engineers denied a permit to build student housing on the Russellville property, next to Arkansas Tech University. The land is bordered by two waterways. Downstream from the tract, the Corps maintains the Russellville Dike and Prairie Creek Pumping Station to protect Russellville from flooding by pumping water into the backwaters of the Arkansas River, away from the city. Upstream from the station is a sump, 730 acres of low-lying land that holds water that then flows toward the pumping station, The Corps purchased flowage easements giving it the right to flood the land subject to those easements to a certain elevation. Part of the tract at issue lies within the sump and is subject to an easement, "that no structures for human habitation shall be constructed." The owner proposed four apartment buildings on land subject to the easement.The Eighth Circuit upheld the denial of a permit. It is unlawful for anyone "in any manner whatever [to] impair the usefulness of any . . . work built by the United States . . . to prevent floods" unless the Corps permits it, 33 U.S.C. 408(a). The proposed construction would impair the usefulness of the Corps's pumping station. The Corps found that the structures would result in water velocities and depths that would be "a significant hazard that can deny escape," and "may threaten the lives and security of the people and property in Russellville.” View "Russellville Legends LLC v. United States Army Corps of Engineers" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court dismissed this appeal from the judgment of the district court dismissing Appellants' appeal from a decision of the Madison County Board of Commissioners for lack of appellate jurisdiction, holding that this Court lacked jurisdiction.At issue in this appeal was the Madison County Board of Commissioners' approval of the Elkhorn Valley Sportsman Club's application for a conditional use permit. Appellants appealed the Board's decision to the district court, which dismissed the appeal for failure to pay the docket fee. The Supreme Court dismissed Appellants' subsequent appeal, holding that the district court did not err in dismissing this appeal from the Board's determination for lack of appellate jurisdiction. View "Kowalewski v. Madison County Board of Commissioners" on Justia Law

Tran applied to the Department of Regional Planning for renewal of the conditional use permit (CUP) for his unincorporated Los Angeles County liquor store. Considering the store’s location and site plan, information from the California Department of Alcohol and Beverage Control, a crime report, and letters from the public, the Department recommended approval of the CUP subject to conditions. Tran objected to conditions limiting the hours of alcohol sales to 6:00 a.m.-10:00 p.m., and that distilled spirits not be sold in small containers. The Commission approved the CUP with the recommended small bottle prohibition but permitting alcohol sales from 6:00 a.m.-2:00 a.m. The County Board of Supervisors voted to review the approval. At the close of an August 1, 2017, hearing the Board voted to indicate its "intent to approve” the CUP, restricting alcohol sales to 10:00 a.m-10:00 p.m. and forbidding small bottle sales. About eight months later, the Board adopted the findings and conditions of approval prepared by county counsel and approved the CUP with the modified conditions.Tran unsuccessfully sought a judicial order to set aside the decision as untimely under the County Code, which provides that review decisions “shall be rendered within 30 days of the close of the hearing” The court of appeal vacated the Board’s decision. The 30-day time limit was mandatory, not directory. The Board failed to render its decision within 30 days. View "Tran v. County of Los Angeles" on Justia Law