Justia Zoning, Planning & Land Use Opinion Summaries

Sackett began backfilling an Idaho lot with dirt to build a home. The Environmental Protection Agency informed Sackett that the property contained wetlands and that the backfilling violated the Clean Water Act, which prohibits discharging pollutants into “the waters of the United States,” 33 U.S.C. 1362(7). The EPA ordered Sackett to restore the site, threatening penalties of over $40,000 per day. The EPA classified the Sacket wetlands as “waters of the United States” because they were near a ditch that fed into a creek, which fed into Priest Lake, a navigable, intrastate lake. The Ninth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the EPA.The Supreme Court reversed. CWA jurisdiction over an adjacent wetland requires that the adjacent body of water constitutes waters of the United States (a relatively permanent body of water connected to traditional interstate navigable waters) and a continuous surface connection between the wetland and that water, making it difficult to determine where the ‘water’ ends and the ‘wetland’ begins.”The Court reviewed the history of judicial interpretation of “the waters of the United States” and enforcement by federal agencies, which argued that the significant-nexus test was sufficient to establish jurisdiction over “adjacent” wetlands. Under that test, nearly all waters and wetlands are potentially susceptible to regulation, “putting a staggering array of landowners at risk of criminal prosecution for such mundane activities as moving dirt.” The CWA’s use of “waters” encompasses only relatively permanent, standing, or continuously flowing bodies, ordinarily called streams, oceans, rivers, and lakes. Wetlands qualify as “waters of the United States” only if “indistinguishable from waters of the United States,” having a continuous surface connection to bodies that are waters of the United States in their own right, with no clear demarcation between waters and wetlands. View "Sackett v. Environmental Protection Agency" on Justia Law

In 2005, the Regents adopted a long-range development plan (LRDP) for UC Berkeley through the year 2020. An Environmental Impact Report (EIR, California Environmental Quality Act (Pub. Resources Code, 21000) noted the LRDP “represents a maximum amount of net new growth.” which the University could substantially exceed only by amending the LRDP. In 2018, the Regents approved a new development for additional academic space and campus housing and certified a Supplemental EIR, which established an updated population baseline.SBN challenged decisions to increase enrollment beyond the level described in the 2005 EIR without further CEQA review. On remand, the trial court found that parts of the SEIR did not comply with CEQA and ordered the Regents to revise the SEIR and suspend enrollment increases. The Regents cited its certification of a 2021 LRDP and related EIR and Senate Bill 118, which modifies section 21080.09 to clarify that “Enrollment or changes in enrollment, by themselves, do not constitute a project” under CEQA and limit the remedies available if a court finds deficiencies in an environmental review based on enrollment.The court of appeal vacated, holding that certification of the 2021 EIR and S.B. 118 moot SBN’s challenge to the enrollment increases and make unenforceable the orders suspending enrollment increases. The SEIR’s project description complied with CEQA and there was no error in the discussion of mitigation measures for historic resources. View "Save Berkeley's Neighborhoods v. Regents of the University of California" on Justia Law

The eight-acre San Jose City View Plaza contained nine buildings, including the Bank, built in 1971, which later housed the County Family Court. The Bank was eligible for listing on the California Register of Historic Resources and National Register of Historic Places. The site development permit provided for the demolition of all structures, followed by the construction of three, 19-story office towers, 65,000 square feet of ground-floor retail, and five levels of underground parking.The city council certified the Downtown Strategy 2040 final environmental impact report under the California Environmental Quality Act (Pub. Resources Code 21000 (CEQA)), finding that the Plaza required a supplemental environmental impact report (SEIR). The draft SEIR identified the proposed demolition of the buildings as a “significant unavoidable impact” and presented mitigation measures, to document the structures, advertise their availability for relocation, and otherwise make the structures available for salvage. The city voted not to designate the Bank as a city landmark and approved the permit, certifying the Final SEIR and rejecting project alternatives as infeasible because the “anticipated economic, social, and other benefits” of the project outweighed its “significant and unavoidable impacts.”After the trial court denied a mandate petition filed by opponents, the Bank was demolished. The court of appeal affirmed. The Final SEIR’s discussion of mitigation for the unavoidable loss of significant historic resources complied with CEQA. San Jose did not abuse its discretion by briefly considering and rejecting additional mitigation measures. View "Preservation Action Council of San Jose v. City of San Jose" on Justia Law

Front Range Feedlots, LLC challenged certain orders issued by the Colorado State Engineer, and the District Court for Water Division 1 (the “water court”). Specifically, Front Range challenged the State Engineer’s authority to issue an Order to Comply with a February 4, 2020 substitute water supply plan issued to Front Range (the “2020 SWSP”). Front Range further contended that the water court abused its discretion in several ways when it issued its Order Granting Mandatory Injunction, requiring Front Range to comply with the 2020 SWSP and the Order to Comply. The Colorado Supreme Court concluded: (1) under the plain language of the applicable statutes, the State Engineer had the authority to issue the Order to Comply; (2) the State Engineer had the authority to enforce the terms and conditions of the 2020 SWSP after the expiration of that SWSP and Front Range’s withdrawal of its related water court application; (3) the State Engineer properly attached the 2020 SWSP terms and conditions to Front Range, rather than to the water rights at issue; (4) the State Engineer had jurisdiction to require the replacement of depletions from pre-application pumping; and (5) the water court properly exercised its discretion in ordering Front Range to acquire additional replacement sources. View "Front Range Feedlots v. Rein et al." on Justia Law

After the San Francisco Planning Commission approved a final mitigated negative declaration for the owner’s proposed renovation of a residence, Kaufman, the owner of an adjacent property, appealed the matter to the San Francisco Board of Supervisors, which reversed the approval. The owner filed a petition for writ of mandate against the City and County, the Board, the Planning Commission, and the Planning Department, naming Kaufman as a real party in interest. In response,Kaufman filed a special motion to strike under the anti-SLAPP (strategic lawsuit against public participation) law (Code Civil Procedure 425.16), arguing that the petition arose from his protected petitioning activity and lacked minimal merit. The trial court granted the anti-SLAPP motion and awarded Kaufman attorney fees as the prevailing party. The court of appeal reversed. The trial court erred in finding the mandamus petition arose from Kaufman’s protected conduct, as the activities that form the basis for the petition’s causes of action are all acts or omissions of the Board. That Kaufman’s administrative appeal preceded or even triggered the events leading to the petition’s causes of action against the Board did not mean that the petition arose from Kaufman’s protected conduct within the contemplation of the anti-SLAPP law. View "Durkin v. City and County of San Francisco" on Justia Law

The State of Alaska Department of Fish and Game brought this action against the Board and several federal officials, alleging that the changes violated the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (“ANILCA”) and the Administrative Procedure Act. Before the district court issued its decision, the Kake Hunt ended, and the district court deemed the challenge to it moot. And while this appeal was pending, the partial Unit 13 closure expired.   The Ninth Circuit reversed in part and vacated in part the district court’s decision in an action challenging the Federal Subsistence Board’s approval in 2020 of two short-term changes to hunting practices on federal public lands in Alaska, specifically (1) the Board’s opening of an emergency hunt for Intervenor, the Organized Village of Kake; and (2) the Board’s partial temporary closure of public lands in game management Unit 13 to nonsubsistence users.   The panel first held that Alaska’s claim that the Board violated ANILCA by opening the 60-day emergency Kake hunt without statutory authority was not moot because it fit within the mootness exception of being capable of repetition yet evading review. Alaska’s claim that ANICLA did not authorize the federal government to open emergency hunting seasons raised a question of first impression in this circuit and required resolution of complicated issues of statutory interpretation. Noting that the district court had not reached the merits, the panel remanded this claim to the district court. With regard to Alaska’s partial Unit 13 closure claim, the panel vacated the part of the district court’s order that addressed the claim. View "STATE OF ALASKA DEPARTMENT OF V. FEDERAL SUBSISTENCE BOARD, ET AL" on Justia Law

Objectors challenged the adequacy of an environmental impact report (EIR) for the long-range development plan for the University of California, Berkeley through the 2036-2037 academic year and the university’s immediate plan to build student housing on the site of People’s Park, a historic landmark and the well-known locus of political activity and protest.The court of appeal remanded. The court rejected arguments that the EIR was required to analyze an alternative to the long-range development plan that would limit student enrollment; that the EIR improperly restricted the geographic scope of the plan to the campus and nearby properties, excluding several more distant properties; and that the EIR failed to adequately assess and mitigate environmental impacts related to population growth and displacement of existing residents. However, the EIR failed to justify the decision not to consider alternative locations to the People’s Park project and failed to assess potential noise impacts from student parties in residential neighborhoods near campus, a longstanding problem. The court noted that its decision does not require the abandonment of the People’s Park project and that the California Environmental Quality Act allows an agency to approve a project, even if the project will cause significant environmental harm if the agency discloses the harm and makes required findings. View "Make UC a Good Neighbor v. Regents of University of California" on Justia Law

The City of Palm Springs closed off one of its downtown streets to all vehicular traffic for a period of three years to allow a tourism organization to install and display a large statue of Marilyn Monroe in the middle of the street. A citizens’ group called the Committee to Relocate Marilyn ("the Committee") petitioned for a writ of administrative mandate challenging the street closure, alleging the City did not have the statutory authority to close the street. Additionally, the Committee alleged the City erroneously declared the street closure categorically exempt from environmental review under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA). The City demurred to the petition for writ of administrative mandate, arguing it had the authority to close the street for three years under Vehicle Code section 21101(e), and its local equivalent, Palm Springs Municipal Code section 12.80.010. The City claimed the street closure was temporary, and therefore permissible. Further, the City argued the CEQA cause of action was untimely. The trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend and entered a judgment of dismissal in favor of the City. After its review, the Court of Appeal concluded the Committee pleaded allegations sufficient to establish: (1) the City exceeded its authority under the Vehicle Code and Municipal Code; and (2) the timeliness of its CEQA cause of action. After the notice of exemption was filed, the City abandoned its plan to vacate vehicular access to the street and elected to close the street instead. Because the City materially changed the project after it filed its notice of exemption, and it did not afford the public an opportunity to consider the revised project or its environmental effects, the notice of exemption did not trigger a 35-day statute of limitations. Instead, the CEQA cause of action was subject to a default statute of limitations of 180 days, measured from the date the Committee knew or should have known about the changed project. The Court determined the Committee timely filed its CEQA cause of action. In light of these conclusions, the Court reversed the judgment of dismissal, vacated the demurrer ruling, and instructed the trial court to enter a new order overruling the demurrer as to these three causes of action. View "Committee to Relocate Marilyn v. City of Palm Springs" on Justia Law

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission granted a license to Interim Storage Partners to store spent nuclear fuel near the New Mexico border. New Mexico challenged the grant of this license, invoking the Administrative Procedure Act, and the National Environmental Policy Act. The Commission moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. Objecting to the motion, New Mexico invoked jurisdiction under the combination of the Hobbs Act, and the Atomic Energy Act. The Tenth Circuit determined these statutes could combine to trigger jurisdiction only when the petitioner was an aggrieved party in the licensing proceeding. This limitation applied here because New Mexico didn’t participate in the licensing proceeding or qualify as an aggrieved party. "New Mexico just commented to the Commission about its draft environmental impact statement. Commenting on the environmental impact statement didn’t create status as an aggrieved party, so jurisdiction isn’t triggered under the combination of the Hobbs Act and Atomic Energy Act." The Court found the Nuclear Waste Policy Act governed the establishment of a federal repository for permanent, not temporary storage by private parties like Interim Storage. And even when an agency acts ultra vires, the Court lacked jurisdiction when the petitioner had other available remedies: New Mexico had other available remedies by seeking intervention in the Commission’s proceedings. So the Commission’s motion to dismiss the petition was granted for lack of jurisdiction. View "Balderas, et al. v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, et al." on Justia Law

In 2010, the City of Irvine adopted a plan to guide development of the Irvine Business Complex (the IBC), which covered roughly 2800 acres in the City. It also prepared and approved a program environmental impact report (the 2010 PEIR) that studied the effects of the development plan under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA). Several years later, real party in interest and appellant Gemdale 2400 Barranca Holdings, LLC (Gemdale), submitted a plan to redevelop a 4.95-acre parcel in the IBC. The City determined all the environmental effects of the proposed project had been studied in the 2010 PEIR, and it found the project would have no further significant environmental effects. It approved the project over the objections of Hale Holdings, LLC, the managing member of plaintiff IBC Business Owners for Sensible Development (petitioner). Petitioner then filed a petition for writ of mandate. The trial court granted the writ and entered judgment in favor of petitioner. The City and Gemdale appealed, arguing the City correctly approved the project. The Court of Appeal disagreed with the contentions made on appeal: (1) there was insufficient evidence showing the project’s greenhouse gas emissions were within the scope of the 2010 PEIR; and (2) no exemption applied because the project involved unusual circumstances which could cause significant environmental effects. As such, the Court affirmed the judgment. View "IBC Business Owners for Sensible Development v. City of Irvine" on Justia Law