Justia Zoning, Planning & Land Use Opinion Summaries

From 1910 until 1986, Greenlease Holding Co. (“Greenlease”), a subsidiary of the Ampco-Pittsburgh Corporation (“Ampco”), owned a contaminated manufacturing site in Greenville, Pennsylvania. Trinity Industries, Inc. and its wholly-owned subsidiary, Trinity Industries Railcar Co. (collectively, “Trinity”), acquired the site from Greenlease in 1986 and continued to manufacture railcars there until 2000. An investigation by Pennsylvania into Trinity’s waste disposal activities resulted in a criminal prosecution and eventual plea-bargained consent decree which required, in relevant part, that Trinity remediate the contaminated land. That effort cost Trinity nearly $9 million. This appeal arose out of the district court’s determination that, under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (“CERCLA”), and Pennsylvania’s Hazardous Sites Cleanup Act (“HSCA”), Trinity was entitled to contribution from Greenlease for remediation costs. The parties filed cross-appeals challenging a number of the district court’s rulings, including its ultimate allocation of cleanup costs. The Third Circuit ultimately affirmed the district court on several pre-trial rulings on dispositive motions, vacated the cost allocation determination and remanded for further proceedings. View "Trinity Industries Inc v. Greenlease Holding Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff-respondent San Diego Unified Port District (District) unsuccessfully asked defendant-appellant California Coastal Commission (Commission) to certify an amendment of District's port master plan to authorize hotel development in the East Harbor Island subarea, including construction of a 175-room hotel by real party in interest Sunroad Marina Partners, LP (Sunroad). District filed a petition for peremptory writ of mandate challenging Commission's denial of certification, and the trial court in January 2017 issued the writ, finding Commission violated provisions of the California Coastal Act of 1976 and "impermissibly set policy" by setting a maximum rental rate or fixing room rental rates. Commission did not appeal that ruling, but reheard District's application and again denied certification, finding the master plan amendment lacked sufficient specificity to adequately protect lower cost visitor and public recreational opportunities, including overnight accommodations. On objections by District and Sunroad, the trial court in August 2017 ruled that Commission had essentially conditioned its certification on the provision of lower cost overnight accommodations, which "infring[ed] on the wide discretion afforded to the District to determine the contents of land use plans and how to implement those plans." The court ruled that Commission acted in excess of its jurisdiction and did not proceed in the manner required by law. Commission appealed the August 2017 postjudgment order, contending it complied with the writ, but afterwards, in the face of Port's and Sunroad's objections, the trial court expanded the writ's scope, thereby exceeding its jurisdiction. Commission asked the Court of Appeal to find it complied with the writ as issued, reverse the order sustaining District and Sunroad's objection, and direct the trial court to discharge the writ. Furthermore, the Commission contended it properly denied District's proposed amendment on remand. The Court of Appeal narrowly reviewed the correctness of the trial court's postjudgment ruling that Commission exceeded its jurisdiction or acted contrary to law in denying certification of District's proposed master plan amendment. Doing so, the Court held the trial court erred by relying in part on provisions of the Act governing a local government's authority and imposing limits on Commission's jurisdiction with respect to local coastal programs, which did not pertain to port master plans or master plan amendments. Furthermore, the Court concluded the lower court engaged in an impermissibly broad interpretation of a provision of the Act barring Commission from modifying a master plan amendment as a condition of certification. View "San Diego Unified Port Dist. v. Cal. Coastal Commission" on Justia Law

The city’s General Plan policy LU-7 encourages new neighborhood commercial facilities and supermarkets to be located to maximize accessibility to all residential areas. Wal-Mart proposed to expand its store to add 36,000 square feet for a 24-hour grocery/supermarket. The city's draft environmental impact report (EIR) concluded the project was “consistent” with LU-7, stating: “There are no existing grocery stores within a 1-mile radius …project would install bicycle storage facilities and enhance pedestrian facilities to improve accessibility.” Objectors claimed that the project would close existing neighborhood-serving grocery stores, is located in a large commercial area, and would contribute to an over-concentrated area. The planning commission declined to approve the original EIR, citingPolicy LU-7. The city council granted an appeal. Previous litigation concerned noise and traffic impacts and resulted in a revised EIR and reapproval. Opponents then challenged the approval based on the General Plan. The trial court concluded the petition was barred by res judicata and the statute of limitations and that substantial evidence supported the approval. The court of appeal affirmed. The project is in a new growth area with increasing residential communities and is located at least a mile from the next closest supermarket but it may place stress on other local supermarkets. Considering the evidence as a whole, the decision was not palpably unreasonable, and did not exceed the city’s “broad discretion.” View "Atwell v. City of Rohnert Park" on Justia Law

Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) operates the coal-fired electricity-generating Gallatin Fossil Plant on a part of the Cumberland River called Old Hickory Lake, a popular recreation spot. The plant supplies electricity to approximately 565,000 households in the Nashville area but generates waste byproducts, including coal combustion residuals or coal ash. The plant disposes of the coal ash by “sluicing” (mixing with lots of water) and allowing the coal ash solids to settle unlined man-made coal ash ponds adjacent to the river. The plant has a permit to discharge some coal combustion wastewater, which contains heavy metals and other pollutants, into the river through a pipe. Other wastewater is allegedly discharged through leaks from the ponds through the groundwater into the Cumberland River, a waterway protected by the Clean Water Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C. 1251. The district court found that TVA violated the CWA because its coal ash ponds leak pollutants through groundwater that is “hydrologically connected” to the Cumberland River without a permit. The theory is called the “hydrological connection theory” by the federal Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The Sixth Circuit reversed, finding no support for the hydrological connection theory in either the text or the history of the CWA and related environmental laws. View "Tennessee Clean Water Network v. Tennessee Valley Authority" on Justia Law

From 1910-1986, Greenlease owned the Greenville Pennsylvania site and operated railcar manufacturing facilities there. Trinity acquired the site from Greenlease in 1986 and continued to manufacture railcars there until 2000. A state investigation of Trinity’s waste-disposal activities resulted in criminal prosecution and, eventually, a plea-bargained consent decree, requiring that Trinity remediate the contaminated land. That effort cost Trinity nearly $9 million. The district court held that, under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. 9601 (CERCLA), and Pennsylvania’s Hazardous Sites Cleanup Act, Trinity is entitled to contribution from Greenlease for remediation costs. After eight years of litigation, and having sorted through a century of historical records, the court allocated 62% of the total cleanup costs to Greenlease and the remainder to Trinity. The Third Circuit affirmed pre-trial rulings on dispositive motions but vacated the cost allocation determination. The agreement between Trinity and Greenlease did not shift liability away from Greenlease after a three-year contractual indemnification period expired. Trinity’s response costs were necessary and reasonable. The court’s methodology, however, failed to differentiate between different remediation activities and their varied costs, and, as applied, treated data measured in square feet as equivalent to data measured in cubic yards. View "Trinity Industries Inc v. Greenlease Holding Co" on Justia Law

Real parties in interest Carlton and Raye Lofgren, as Trustees of the Lofgren Family Trust and the Lofgren 1998 Trust (the Lofgrens), sought a residential development permit to build six single-family homes on a parcel of just over 11 acres in Riverside. After respondent City of Riverside (the City) approved the permit and issued a negative declaration stating the development did not require environmental review under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA), Friends of Riverside’s Hills (FRH) filed a petition for a writ of mandate challenging that decision. FRH alleged the City was required to conduct a CEQA Environmental Impact Review (EIR) of the development because it violated certain land use provisions in the City’s municipal code. FRH also alleged the City abused its discretion by approving a project that violated its own land use provisions. The trial court denied FRH’s petition. The Court of Appeal found no evidence of the alleged land use violations, and affirmed the judgment. View "Friends of Riverside's Hills v. City or Riverside" on Justia Law

Portersville Bay Oyster Company, LLC ("the Oyster Company"), and its members, filed suit against 4H Construction Corporation, Greystone Industries, LLC, and Christopher Blankenship, in his official capacity as Commissioner of the Alabama Department of Conservation and Natural Resources, and filed an interlocutory appeal challenging the trial court's order dismissing Commissioner Blankenship as a defendant in this action. Tensaw Land & Timber Company, Inc. ("Tensaw"), owned land fronting on Portersville Bay which it leased its statutory right to grow and to harvest oysters on the bottom in Portersville Bay to the Oyster Company. The Alabama Department of Conservation and Natural Resources ("the Department") grants shellfish aquaculture easements on state-owned submerged lands for the purpose of cultivating and harvesting shellfish, including oysters. The Department conveyed to the Corneliuses a shellfish aquaculture easement allowing them to raise oysters in cages above the area encompassed by one of the Tensaw leases. Subject to certain exceptions, the riparian landowner does not have the right to harvest oysters in elevated cages within 600 yards from the shoreline in front of the waterfront property; the shellfish aquaculture easement enables the oyster farmers to grow oysters in elevated cages in the area of the easement. The oysters grown elsewhere on the Tensaw leases were grown on the bottom. 4H Construction Corporation contracted with the Department to construct a breakwater and marsh for coastal protection in Mobile Bay ("the Marsh Island project"). According to the allegations of the complaint, the sediment and silt deposits have increased over time and are killing the oysters being farmed on those oyster beds. The Oyster Company sued the Commissioner alleging negligence and nuisance relating to the easement. The Commissioner moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim and improper venue; the trial court granted the motion to transfer but not the motion to dismiss. After filing an amended complaint, the trial court dismissed the amended complaint against the Commissioner. The Alabama Supreme Court determined that dismissal was made in error, and reversed the trial court's order. View "Portersville Bay Oyster Company, LLC v. Blankenship" on Justia Law

After a challenge to its 2004 general plan, San Francisco, acting under court order, prepared an environmental impact report (EIR) pursuant to the California Environmental Quality Act (Pub. Resources Code 21000) and approved revisions of the housing element of its general plan. The 2009 Housing Element examined the type, amount, and affordability of new construction needed, as determined by the Association of Bay Area Governments, which determined that San Francisco’s fair share of the regional housing for January 2007 through June 2014 would be 31,190 units, or about 4,160 units per year. The stated goal was to “alleviate a tight housing market.” In certifying the EIR, the planning department notified the public that the 2009 Housing Element, by encouraging housing near transit lines, will have a single, significant, unavoidable environmental impact on transit that cannot be mitigated to a level of insignificance. Opponents filed a petition for writ of mandate challenging the adequacy of EIR. The trial court denied relief. The court of appeal affirmed. The EIR addresses mitigation measures proposed by the opponents. The Housing Element EIR adequately analyzed the impacts on water, traffic, land use, and visual resources by using the future conditions projected by ABAG, rather than analyzing the existing conditions. View "San Franciscans for Livable Neighborhoods v. City and County of San Francisco" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's ruling that the city violated the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) because the city treated the creation of a new subzone as follow-on to its prior, initial approval of a Target store rather than as an entirely new "project" under CEQA. The court held that the city's ordinance should be examined under Public Resources Code section 21166, and that the city complied with CEQA in proceeding by way of an addendum to the prior environmental impact report because substantial evidence supported the city's finding that the specific plan amendment would not have any reasonably foreseeable environmental consequences beyond the construction of the Super Target store. The court also held that the ordinance constituted "spot zoning," but that it was permissible because the city did not abuse its discretion in finding that its amendment to the specific plan was in the public interest and compatible with the general plans of which it was a part. View "Citizens Coalition Los Angeles v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

Coal residuals, “one of the largest industrial waste streams,” contain myriad carcinogens and neurotoxins. Power plants generally store it on site in aging piles or pools, risking protracted leakage and catastrophic structural failure. Regulations implementing the 1976 Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. 6901, were long delayed. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), facing public outrage over catastrophic failures at toxic coal residual sites, and directed by a federal court to comply with its obligations under RCRA, promulgated its first Final Rule regulating coal residuals in 2015, 80 Fed. Reg. 21,302. Opponents challenged that Rule under the Administrative Procedure Act and RCRA, which requires EPA to promulgate criteria distinguishing permissible “sanitary landfills” from prohibited “open dumps.” Each claim relates to how coal residuals disposal sites qualify as sanitary landfills. EPA announced its intent to reconsider the Rule. The D.C. Circuit denied the EPA’s abeyance motion; remanded as to pile-size and beneficial-use issues; vacated 40 C.F.R. 257.101, which allows for the continued operation of unlined impoundments and a provision that treats “clay-lined” units as if they were lined; found the Rule’s “legacy ponds” exemption unreasoned and arbitrary; rejected claims by industry members that EPA may regulate only active impoundments; found that EPA provided sufficient notice of its intention to apply aquifer location criteria to existing impoundments; and held that EPA did not arbitrarily issue location requirements based on seismic impact zones nor arbitrarily impose temporary closure procedures. View "Utility Solid Waste Activities v. Environmental Protection Agency" on Justia Law