Justia Zoning, Planning & Land Use Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, a property owner within the Lee's Crossing subdivision, sought declaratory and injunctive relief and an award of monetary damages against Defendants, the Lee's Crossing Homeowners Association, the developer of the subdivision, and the general partner, alleging that the Association had perpetrated the misuse of power and other unlawful activities by permitting the developer and general partner to exercise authority under the Lee's Crossing Homeowners Association Declaration to unilaterally amend the Declaration's provisions to the detriment of the individual property owners within Lee's Crossing. At issue between the parties was whether certain provisions of the Virginia Property Owners' Association Act (POAA) restricted the declarant of a recorded declaration creating a property owners' association from unilaterally amending that declaration under its express term providing for such authority. The circuit court granted partial summary judgment in favor of Defendants, concluding that the POAA did not bar a declarant from providing in a declaration the power to unilaterally amend the declaration. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in concluding that the Declaration provision at issue was not inconsistent with the provisions of the POAA.

The South Dakota Public Assurance Alliance (SDPAA), a local government risk pool, negotiated with Aurora County to provide what was essentially insurance coverage. After coverage was finalized, a local dairy farm sued the County over a pre-existing zoning dispute. The County was found liable for damages. SDPAA then sought a declaration that it did not have a duty to defend or indemnify, arguing, inter alia, that the County failed to disclose material facts relating to the claim. In a jury trial, the circuit court excluded as parol evidence the parties' pre-contract communications regarding coverage for zoning issues, including communications that could be interpreted as having disclosed the dairy farm zoning dispute. The jury found for SDPAA. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial, holding that because the excluded coverage communications were not offered to alter or contradict any written terms of the agreement, their admission would not have violated the parol evidence rule.

The Industrial Development Board of the City of Montgomery (IDB) appealed a circuit court's interlocutory order that denied its motion for summary judgment as to a breach-of-contract claim asserted against it by George and Thomas Russell as co-executors and co-trustees of the wills and testamentary trusts of Earnest and Myrtis Russell, Price and Mary McLemore and several others. In 2001, various officials of the State of Alabama, the City of Montgomery, the Montgomery County Commission, Montgomery Chamber of Commerce and the local water works board began making preparations to secure options to purchase property in the Montgomery area in an attempt to persuade Hyundai Motor Company to build an automobile plant in the area. All the trusts owned acres of land in the targeted area. The IDB signed separate options with the Russells, the McLemores and other trusts to purchase the respective properties. Hyundai's plans for its manufacturing plant changed, and subsequently, not all of the options were exercised. The Russells and the McLemores each filed breach-of-contract actions against the IDB and Hyundai alleging that neither adhered to the terms of their respective options. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the trial court did not err in denying the IDB's motion for summary judgment. The Court affirmed the lower court's decision.

Jacklin Land Company (Jacklin) owned real property that it developed into a commercial industrial complex. The development was subject to multiple covenants, conditions and restrictions (CC&Rs). One of the CC&Rs was that the development was not intended for retail businesses. In April 2008, Blue Dog RV, a retailer, began negotiating with Jacklin about the purchase of land in within the complex. During the course of the negotiations, Blue Dog also discussed renting four undeveloped lots across the street, but still within the complex. KL Properties owned those four lots. Ultimately Blue Dog leased space from KL Properties. Citing the CC&Rs, Jacklin sent notice to Blue Dog to vacate the KL leased space. When further negotiations between the parties proved unfruitful, Jacklin filed suit to enjoin KL Properties and Blue Dog from using the space for RV retail. The trial court ruled in KL and Blue Dog's favor. On reconsideration, the court issued an injunction against Blue Dog for violation of the CC&Rs. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the district court's injunction was technically flawed because it did not give "explicit notice of precisely what conduct was outlawed," and that it enjoined unknown persons who were not party to this action. The Court vacated the district court's judgment, and remanded the case for further proceedings.

The Missoula City Counsel, the City of Missoula, and the Mayor, (collectively "City") and Muth-Hilberry, LLC ("developer") appealed a district court determination that found that the City was arbitrary and capricious in approving a zoning and preliminary plat for a subdivision known as Sonata Park located in Rattlesnake Valley, Montana. At issue was whether neighbors, several parties opposed to the subdivision, and the North Duncan Drive Neighborhood Association, Inc. ("Association") had standing. Also at issue was whether the district court erred in striking affidavits filed by the developer and the City in connection with their motions for summary judgment. Further at issue was whether the 1989 Sunshine Agreement between the City and the developer's predecessor in interest superseded the City's growth policy. Finally at issue was whether the City's decision in Sonata Park was arbitrary, capricious, or unlawful. The court held that the neighbors had standing to sue in their own right and that the Association had associational standing to proceed on behalf of its members. The court also held that any error made by the district court in granting the neighbor's motion to strike the developer's affidavit was harmless. The court further held that the Sunlight Agreement did not supersede the City's growth policy where the Sunlight Agreement could be void ab initio and did not appear to guarantee certain density. The court finally held that substantial compliance was still valid and that a government body must substantially comply with its growth policy in making zoning decisions and that the City's decision to approve Sonata Park was arbitrary, capricious, and unlawful.