Justia Zoning, Planning & Land Use Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs own mineral interests in Chalybeat Springs and granted 21 oil and gas leases based on those interests. EnerQuest and BP America are the lessees. The property interests in Chalybeat, including the leases at issue, are subject to a Unit Agreement that establishes how the oil and gas extracted from certain formations will be divided and provides for a unit operator with the exclusive right to develop the oil and gas resources described in the Unit Agreement. In the late 1990s, PetroQuest became the operator of the Chalybeat Unit. Unhappy with the level of extraction, lessors filed suit against EnerQuest and BP, seeking partial cancellation of the oil and gas leases on the ground that EnerQuest and BP breached implied covenants in the leases to develop the oil and gas minerals. The district court granted the companies’ motion for summary judgment, reasoning that the lessors had not provided EnerQuest and BP with required notice and opportunity to cure a breach. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the plaintiffs’ earlier effort to dissolve the Chalybeat Unit constituted notice. View "Lewis v. Enerquest Oil & Gas, LLC" on Justia Law

This case concerned a dispute over the paving of a parking lot located on park land leased to a restaurant. A formal agreement between the restaurant and a community organization restricted the paving of the property, and the restriction was incorporated in administrative zoning orders. Still, the lot was paved. Baltimore County was, in this case, landlord of the property, code enforcer, and final administrative adjudicator of disputes arising under local land use laws. As administrative adjudicator, the County forbade the paving. As landlord, the County directed its tenant, Oregon, LLC, to pave the lot. As code enforcer, it refrained from taking action in response to the apparent violation of a final administrative order issued by the Board of Appeals. Plaintiffs brought suit against the County and Oregon seeking declaratory and mandamus relief. The circuit court ruled against Plaintiffs. The court of special appeals affirmed, concluding that Plaintiffs had failed to exhaust administrative remedies. The Court of Appeals largely affirmed, albeit on different grounds, holding (1) Plaintiffs need not initiate an administrative proceeding to pursue enforcement of the Board’s orders; (2) the circuit court properly granted summary judgment with respect to the mandamus counts of the complaint; and (3) the circuit court has authority to issue a declaratory judgment as to whether the Board’s orders were violated. Remanded.View "Falls Road Cmty. Ass’n, Inc. v. Baltimore County" on Justia Law

This case involved a parcel of real estate previously owned by Four H Land Company Limited Partnership (Four H). Four H twice applied for a conditional use permit (CUP) to operate a sand and gravel pit on the property. James Tierney and Jeffrey Tierney objected to the applications. To resolve their dispute, the Tierneys, Four H, and Western Engineering Company (Western), the operator of the sand and gravel pit, entered into an agreement in 1998 in which the Tierneys agreed to waive their right to appeal the issuance of the CUP, and Four H and Western accepted various conditions regarding operation of the sand and gravel pit. In 2009, the Tierneys brought an action for specific performance, alleging that Four H and Western had not fulfilled the conditions of the agreement. The district court dismissed the Tierneys’ complaint for specific performance, concluding that Four H and Western had not met the requirements of the 1998 CUP and the agreement but that specific performance was not an appropriate remedy. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that specific performance was an appropriate remedy for Four H’s and Western’s breach, and the district court should have ordered it. Remanded. View "Tierney v. Four H Land Co. Ltd. P’ship" on Justia Law

Shellie and Robert Symonds executed a lease agreement granting AT&T Mobility the right to use a portion of their property to build a wireless communication tower. The town planning board approved AT&T's application seeking approval for the project. William Horton and others appealed, and the town zoning board of appeals (ZBA) upheld the planning board's approval of AT&T's application. Horton appealed, arguing that the lease agreement created a new lot that did not meet the minimum space and setback requirements of the town's zoning ordinances. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the lease did not create a new lot and that the setback requirements of the relevant zoning ordinance were satisfied.View "Horton v. Town of Casco" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, several taxpayers who managed or owned land in the vicinity of a landfill, challenged the validity of an agreement for hosting of the landfill. The district court dismissed Plaintiffs' complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The court further found that the complaint was frivolous and filed in bad faith and ordered Plaintiffs to pay the landfill parties' and counties' attorney fees and costs. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the portion of the district court's judgment imposing attorney fees because the court failed to resolve doubt over the merits of the complaint in Plaintiffs' favor; and (2) affirmed the dismissal of the complaint because the reason for dismissal was relevant only to the fee issue. View "White v. Kohout" on Justia Law

Appellants Richard Hehr and Greystone Villages, LLC (collectively "Greystone") appealed a district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Respondent City of McCall. Greystone's claims arose out of its development agreement with McCall. Greystone alleged it deeded nine lots to McCall in lieu of paying the required community housing fee, which was later declared unconstitutional in a separate proceeding. Greystone brought inverse condemnation claims against McCall alleging that the conveyance of the lots and the improvements made to those lots constituted an illegal taking under both the Idaho Constitution and the United States Constitution. McCall moved for summary judgment, which the district court granted. Finding no error in the district court's decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Hehr v. City of McCall" on Justia Law

Amjad Tufail leased property to Midwest Hospitality pursuant to a lease agreement. The City Board of Zoning Appeals ultimately approved Midwest's application for a special use permit to operate a Church's Chicken fast-food restaurant with a drive-through on the property but placed conditions on the permit. Midwest subsequently notified Tufail that it was no longer responsible for lease payments because Tufail made a false representation to Midwest regarding the terms of the lease. Specifically, Midwest contended that Tufail represented that Midwest may not be prevented from using the property for certain specified purposes. Tufail brought this breach of contract action against Midwest. Midwest counterclaimed for breach of contract, deceptive advertising, and unjust enrichment. The trial court ruled in favor of Tufail. The court of appeals reversed, determining that Midwest's early termination of the lease was justified by Tufail's misrepresentation. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Tufail's representation was not false where (1) the representation did not include any use of the property as a Church's Chicken fast-food restaurant with a drive-through; and (2) the circuit court found Midwest was not prevented from using the property for the uses specified in the lease. Remanded. View "Tufail v. Midwest Hospitality, LLC" on Justia Law

This case involved a mediated settlement agreement between two of the heirs of Alfredo and the executrix of his estate, Maria. The superior court ordered Plaintiffs, Lucilio and Patricia, to execute general releases and pay attorney's fees incurred by Maria in seeking to enforce the settlement agreement. Plaintiffs appealed, arguing that the superior court erred in ordering them to execute general releases with terms that were materially different from those contemplated during settlement negotiations, and in assessing attorney's fees. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the superior court, holding (1) the trial justice erred in ordering Plaintiffs to execute the general release where the general release's language exceeded the clear and unambiguous terms of the settlement agreement; and (2) the superior court erred in awarding attorney's fees to Defendant pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws 9-1-45, as the statute's threshold requirement that the party to receive the attorney's fees award be the "prevailing party" had not been met. View "Furtado v. Goncalves" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, owners of garaged lots in a subdivision, filed a complaint against the homeowners' association (HOA) alleging that the unequal treatment resulting from the HOA's assignment of parking spaces only to ungaraged lots in an amendment violated the subdivision's declaration of covenants, conditions, and restrictions (the Declaration). The circuit court determined that the amendment was invalid and ruled that the reservation of parking spaces in the common area for use solely by owners of ungaraged lots violated the Declaration. The court also found Plaintiffs were entitled to attorneys' fees. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the circuit court (1) did not err in ruling the Declaration requires that parking spaces in the common area be assigned equally among all lot owners; (2) did not err in ruling that the amendment was invalid; (3) erred in its award of certain compensatory damages but did not err in awarding other compensatory damages; and (4) did not err in ruling that Plaintiffs were entitled to attorneys' fees and in determining the amount of that award. Remanded for a determination of attorneys' fees incurred by Plaintiffs subsequent to the court's entry of the judgment appealed from. View "Manchester Oaks Homeowners Ass'n v. Batt" on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal was the question of an agent's authority to bind his or her principal to an arbitration agreement presented with other documents upon the principal's admission to a long-term care facility. Agent in this case was the daughter and executrix of the deceased Principal. Agent brought a claim for negligence against the long-term care facility where Principal spent the last years of her life. Invoking an arbitration agreement executed in conjunction with Principal's admission to the nursing home, Defendants moved the trial court to dismiss the complaint. The trial court denied the motion, holding that Agent, who executed the admissions agreement on behalf of Principal, had no authority to agree to arbitration. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the agreement was enforceable. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the optional arbitration agreement Agent purported to execute on Principal's behalf was beyond the scope of Agent's authority and was therefore unenforceable. View "Ping v. Beverly Enters., Inc." on Justia Law