Justia Zoning, Planning & Land Use Opinion Summaries

In this Section 1983 case, four homeless plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of two ordinances in the City Code of St. Petersburg, Florida and of the city's enforcement of the ordinances. The trespass ordinance at issue authorized certain city agents to issue a temporary trespass warning for specific city land on which the agent determined that the warning recipient had violated city or state law. The storage ordinance at issue prohibited storage of personal property on city land such as parks and rights-of-way. The district court dismissed all of plaintiffs claims. The court affirmed the district court's rulings, except the court vacated part of the district court's ruling about the trespass ordinance. Plaintiffs have stated claims on the issues of procedural due process under the United States Constitution and on their right to intrastate travel under the Florida Constitution.

This case stemmed from FEMA's determination that the Holy Cross School was eligible for public assistance funds to construct a new school campus on the site of Cabrini Church and Cabrini School in Gentilly to replace its old campus six miles away in the Lower Ninth Ward. Friends of Cabrini Church filed a complaint against FEMA, alleging that, inter alia, the section 106 review process, which defined the "area of potential effects" (APE), C.F.R. 800.4(a), 800.16(d), was deficient. On appeal, Friends of Cabrini Church subsequently challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of FEMA. The court held that because Friends of Cabrini Church lacked standing to bring its claims, the court vacated the judgment of the district court and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss for lack of standing.

This case arose when the Port of Los Angeles prohibited motor carriers from operating drayage trucks on port property unless the motor carriers entered into concession agreements with the port. The concession agreements set forth fourteen specific requirements covering, among other things, truck driver employment, truck maintenance, parking, and port security. The agreements were adopted as part of the port's "Clean Truck Program," adopted in response to community opposition that had successfully stymied port growth. Plaintiff challenged the concession agreements, arguing that they were preempted by the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act (FAAA Act), 49 U.S.C. 14501 et seq. The court held that the district court meticulously identified and applied the governing law. The court affirmed the district court's holding that the financial capability, maintenance, off-street parking, and placard provisions were not preempted. The court reversed the district court's conclusion that the employee-driver provision was saved from preemption by the market participant doctrine, and remanded for further proceedings.

At issue in this appeal was a zoning ordinance adopted by the City of Sioux Falls requiring that an on-sale alcoholic beverage business seeking to place video lottery machines in the establishment must meet certain location requirements and apply for a conditional use permit. Plaintiff Rick Law, who conditionally held a liquor license, brought a declaratory action against the City to determine the constitutionality of the ordinance. The South Dakota Lottery intervened in the action. The circuit court ruled that the City exceeded its authority when it enacted the ordinance, concluding that South Dakota's constitutional and statutory scheme indicated that the State intended to fully occupy the field of video lottery to the exclusion of municipal regulation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that (1) municipalities do not have the freedom or power to regulate video lottery as the South Dakota Constitution specifically reserves that right to the State and (2) existing legislation does not give municipalities power to license video lottery establishments or otherwise control the location of such establishments.

The Supreme Court accepted the certified question from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina on whether the South Carolina Solid Waste Policy and Management Act, (SWPMA) preempted Horry County Ordinance 02-09 entitled "An Ordinance Regulating the County-Wide Collection and Disposal of Solid Waste Generated within Horry County and for the Prohibition of the Disposal of Solid Waste Materials in any Manner Except as Set Forth Herein; and Providing Penalties for Violation Thereof."  Plaintiffs Sandlands C&D, LLC (Sandlands) and Express Disposal Service, LLC (EDS) are related, privately-owned South Carolina companies.  Sandlands owned and operated a landfill in Marion County, approximately two miles across the Horry County border, and EDS hauls waste originating in South Carolina and North Carolina to Sandlands' landfill.  DHEC granted Sandlands a permit to accept construction and demolition (C & D) waste at the Marion County site.  Prior to the passage of Horry County Ordinance 02-09, Sandlands received C & D waste originating in Horry County and hauled by EDS, accounting for a large portion of the waste processed at its landfill. Upon review of the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court responded in the negative: the county ordinance was not preempted by the SWPMA.

Plaintiffs, five individuals with disabilities, alleged that defendant recently built and altered sidewalks that were not readily accessible to them and requested injunctive relief under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12132, and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 794(e). At issue was whether Title II and section 504 extended to newly built and altered public sidewalks. Also at issue was whether that private right of action accrued at the time the city built or altered its inaccessible sidewalks, or alternatively at the time plaintiffs first knew or should have known they were being denied the benefits of those sidewalks. The court held that plaintiffs have a private right of action to enforce Title II and section 504 with respect to newly built and altered public sidewalks, and that the right accrued at the time plaintiffs first knew or should have known they were being denied the benefits of those sidewalks.

Protrero Hills Landfill, a privately owned solid waste and recycling business in Solano County, and twenty-two related businesses appealed the dismissal on Younger v. Harris abstention grounds of their 42 U.S.C. 1983 action for declaratory and injunctive relief, challenging the constitutionality of a voter-enacted county ordinance restricting the import of out-of-county solid waste into Solano County. The court held that Younger abstention did not apply here because a federal court's exercise of jurisdiction over Protrero Hill's claim would not interfere with the state's exercise of basic state function and would not offend the principles of comity and federalism that Younger abstention was designed to uphold. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded, asking the district to consider whether R.R. Comm'n of Tex. v. Pullman rather than Younger abstention might be appropriate.

The City of Hugo, Oklahoma, and the Hugo Municipal Authority, a public water trust, (collectively "Hugo") contracted with the City of Irving, Texas, ("Irving") for the sale of water Hugo has been allocated or sought to be allocated under permits issued by the Oklahoma Water Resources Board ("Board"). Hugo and Irving brought suit against the nine members of the Board for a declaration that certain Oklahoma laws governing the Board’s water allocation decisions were unconstitutional under the dormant Commerce Clause and an injunction prohibiting their enforcement. The district court granted summary judgment for the Board, and Hugo and Irving appealed. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit concluded that Hugo, as a political subdivision of Oklahoma, lacked standing to sue the Board under the dormant Commerce Clause. Irving, whose injury was solely premised on a contract it entered into with Hugo, likewise could not demonstrate standing because any injury to Irving cannot be redressed. Concluding no plaintiff had the necessary standing, the Court vacated the district court’s order and remanded the case back the district court to dismiss for lack of federal jurisdiction.

Tarrant Regional Water District ("Tarrant"), a Texas state agency, applied to the Oklahoma Water Resources Board ("the OWRB") for permits to appropriate water at three locations in Oklahoma for use in Texas. Just before filing its applications, Tarrant sued the nine members of the Oklahoma Water Resources Board in the district court for the Western District of Oklahoma and sought a declaratory judgment to invalidate certain Oklahoma statutes that govern the appropriation and use of water and an injunction preventing OWRB from enforcing them. Tarrant alleged that the Oklahoma statutes restricted interstate commerce in water and thereby violated the dormant Commerce Clause as discriminatory or unduly burdensome. Tarrant further alleged that Congress did not authorize Oklahoma through the Red River Compact ("Compact") to enact such laws. OWRB responded that Congress did authorize Oklahoma to adopt these statutes by consenting to the Compact. Tarrant also claimed that the Compact preempted the Oklahoma statutes insofar as the Compact applied to Tarrant’s application to appropriate water located in the Red River Basin. The district court granted summary judgment for OWRB on both the dormant Commerce Clause and Supremacy Clause claims. After that decision, Tarrant took steps to export to Texas Oklahoma water that was not subject to the Compact. Tarrant negotiated a contract with property owners in Stephens County, Oklahoma to export groundwater to Texas and also entered a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the Apache Tribe concerning the Tribe’s potential water rights. In court Tarrant then reasserted its dormant Commerce Clause challenge based on these transactions. The district court dismissed the Stephens County matter for lack of standing and the Apache Tribe matter as not ripe. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the grants of summary judgment on the dormant Commerce Clause and preemption issues, and the dismissals based on standing and ripeness: [w]e hold that the Red River Compact insulates Oklahoma water statutes from dormant Commerce Clause challenge insofar as they apply to surface water subject to the Compact."

Plaintiffs brought an action against the City of Marietta, Georgia, challenging the validity of its zoning ordinance. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the city and against plaintiffs on all claims except for one plaintiff's claim (Covenant) that the city's ordinance, as amended in November 2004, facially violated the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. 2000cc, by treating religious assemblies less favorably than non-religious assemblies. The court held that claims seeking injunctive relief were moot in light of the passage of the 2008 Ordinance and dismissed those claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court held that, to the extent that RLUIPA claims sought damages, they failed on the merits because all damages stemmed from Covenant's inability to build a church in the R-2 residential zone and Covenant was not entitled to build a church in that zone. The court further held that the district court did not err in concluding that the 2004 Ordinance facially violated the equal terms provision of RLUIPA and did not err in awarding nominal damages for this claim. The court finally held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Covenant's motion to leave to amend the complaint.