Justia Zoning, Planning & Land Use Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs, five individuals with disabilities, alleged that defendant recently built and altered sidewalks that were not readily accessible to them and requested injunctive relief under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12132, and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 794(e). At issue was whether Title II and section 504 extended to newly built and altered public sidewalks. Also at issue was whether that private right of action accrued at the time the city built or altered its inaccessible sidewalks, or alternatively at the time plaintiffs first knew or should have known they were being denied the benefits of those sidewalks. The court held that plaintiffs have a private right of action to enforce Title II and section 504 with respect to newly built and altered public sidewalks, and that the right accrued at the time plaintiffs first knew or should have known they were being denied the benefits of those sidewalks.

Protrero Hills Landfill, a privately owned solid waste and recycling business in Solano County, and twenty-two related businesses appealed the dismissal on Younger v. Harris abstention grounds of their 42 U.S.C. 1983 action for declaratory and injunctive relief, challenging the constitutionality of a voter-enacted county ordinance restricting the import of out-of-county solid waste into Solano County. The court held that Younger abstention did not apply here because a federal court's exercise of jurisdiction over Protrero Hill's claim would not interfere with the state's exercise of basic state function and would not offend the principles of comity and federalism that Younger abstention was designed to uphold. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded, asking the district to consider whether R.R. Comm'n of Tex. v. Pullman rather than Younger abstention might be appropriate.

The City of Hugo, Oklahoma, and the Hugo Municipal Authority, a public water trust, (collectively "Hugo") contracted with the City of Irving, Texas, ("Irving") for the sale of water Hugo has been allocated or sought to be allocated under permits issued by the Oklahoma Water Resources Board ("Board"). Hugo and Irving brought suit against the nine members of the Board for a declaration that certain Oklahoma laws governing the Board’s water allocation decisions were unconstitutional under the dormant Commerce Clause and an injunction prohibiting their enforcement. The district court granted summary judgment for the Board, and Hugo and Irving appealed. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit concluded that Hugo, as a political subdivision of Oklahoma, lacked standing to sue the Board under the dormant Commerce Clause. Irving, whose injury was solely premised on a contract it entered into with Hugo, likewise could not demonstrate standing because any injury to Irving cannot be redressed. Concluding no plaintiff had the necessary standing, the Court vacated the district court’s order and remanded the case back the district court to dismiss for lack of federal jurisdiction.

Tarrant Regional Water District ("Tarrant"), a Texas state agency, applied to the Oklahoma Water Resources Board ("the OWRB") for permits to appropriate water at three locations in Oklahoma for use in Texas. Just before filing its applications, Tarrant sued the nine members of the Oklahoma Water Resources Board in the district court for the Western District of Oklahoma and sought a declaratory judgment to invalidate certain Oklahoma statutes that govern the appropriation and use of water and an injunction preventing OWRB from enforcing them. Tarrant alleged that the Oklahoma statutes restricted interstate commerce in water and thereby violated the dormant Commerce Clause as discriminatory or unduly burdensome. Tarrant further alleged that Congress did not authorize Oklahoma through the Red River Compact ("Compact") to enact such laws. OWRB responded that Congress did authorize Oklahoma to adopt these statutes by consenting to the Compact. Tarrant also claimed that the Compact preempted the Oklahoma statutes insofar as the Compact applied to Tarrant’s application to appropriate water located in the Red River Basin. The district court granted summary judgment for OWRB on both the dormant Commerce Clause and Supremacy Clause claims. After that decision, Tarrant took steps to export to Texas Oklahoma water that was not subject to the Compact. Tarrant negotiated a contract with property owners in Stephens County, Oklahoma to export groundwater to Texas and also entered a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the Apache Tribe concerning the Tribe’s potential water rights. In court Tarrant then reasserted its dormant Commerce Clause challenge based on these transactions. The district court dismissed the Stephens County matter for lack of standing and the Apache Tribe matter as not ripe. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the grants of summary judgment on the dormant Commerce Clause and preemption issues, and the dismissals based on standing and ripeness: [w]e hold that the Red River Compact insulates Oklahoma water statutes from dormant Commerce Clause challenge insofar as they apply to surface water subject to the Compact."

Plaintiffs brought an action against the City of Marietta, Georgia, challenging the validity of its zoning ordinance. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the city and against plaintiffs on all claims except for one plaintiff's claim (Covenant) that the city's ordinance, as amended in November 2004, facially violated the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. 2000cc, by treating religious assemblies less favorably than non-religious assemblies. The court held that claims seeking injunctive relief were moot in light of the passage of the 2008 Ordinance and dismissed those claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court held that, to the extent that RLUIPA claims sought damages, they failed on the merits because all damages stemmed from Covenant's inability to build a church in the R-2 residential zone and Covenant was not entitled to build a church in that zone. The court further held that the district court did not err in concluding that the 2004 Ordinance facially violated the equal terms provision of RLUIPA and did not err in awarding nominal damages for this claim. The court finally held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Covenant's motion to leave to amend the complaint.

Laclede Gas Company maintained gas lines along Pitman Hill Road in St. Charles County. Pitman Hill Road and the gas lines were located within areas established as public roads on five recorded subdivision plats. Each of the subdivision plats first established public roads and then designated the roads as utility easements. The plats specifically stated that one of the purposes of the utility easements was for the installation and maintenance of gas lines. The County planned to widen Pitman Hill Road, which required Laclede to relocate its gas lines. Laclede declined to pay for the relocation, after which the County filed a declaratory judgment action to require Laclede to bear the cost of relocation. The circuit court entered summary judgment in favor of the County. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the County was required to reimburse Laclede for displacing the gas lines from Laclede's utility easement because the easements were constitutionally cognizable property interests and, therefore, requiring Laclede to relocate its gas lines without compensation would amount to an unconstitutional taking of private property.

In 2007, Davison County adopted a county-wide plan to reassess agricultural structures. The County reassessed agricultural structures in four of its twelve townships that year. Donald and Gene Stehly, who owned agricultural structures in the four reassessed townships, initiated a declaratory judgment action, alleging that the plan to reassess four townships each year created an unconstitutional lack of uniform taxation within the county. The trial court concluded that the Stehlys' claim failed because they did not establish lack of uniformity within a single taxing district as required by the South Dakota Constitution. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) townships are taxing districts under the Constitution, and (2) a reassessment plan that creates a temporary lack of uniform taxation among townships within a county is constitutional.

Over a period of two years, the City of Sioux Falls issued Daniel Daily four citations for a concrete extension to his driveway. Daily appealed each of the citations, but a hearing was held only on the final two citations received. Daily then initiated a declaratory judgment action against the City. The trial court ultimately concluded that the City's administrative appeals process, both as written and as applied, and the City's enforcement of its zoning ordinances violated Daily's constitutional rights to procedural due process and equal protection. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because the hearing examiner in this case did not hold the City to its burden of proof, the City's administrative appeals process deprived Daily of a protected property interest without due process of law; and (2) the hearing examiner's application of the rules of evidence deprived Daily of a fair hearing.

In an effort to regulate gravel pits within the county, the Gallatin County Board of Commissioners (Commission) created an interim zoning district and proposed creation of four permanent zoning districts throughout the county. The Gateway Opencut Mining Action Group (GOMAG) sought an injunction against the Commission, claiming the public comment provision of the applicable zoning statute, Mont. Code Ann. 76-2-205(6), was unconstitutional. Subsequently, GOMAG and Gallatin County agreed to defer certain statutorily-required actions until GOMAG's injunction request was heard by the district court. Meanwhile, several county farms and ranchers and two gravel pit owners (Intervenors) intervened in the action, seeking summary judgment on the ground that the Commission had failed to act within the statutorily-required time and, therefore, the case was moot. The district court granted Intervenors' motions for summary judgment. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because protests filed under the challenged statute had no impact on the course of the Commission proceedings and that no constitutional violation capable of repetition occurred here, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to Intervenors on the basis of mootness.

Letitia Kilby filed a complaint with the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities, claiming unlawful housing discrimination by Defendants, the town housing authority and a property management company. The Commission found reasonable cause to believe that unlawful discrimination occurred. The trial court then granted Defendants' request to file a civil action in the trial court. Kilby moved to intervene, claiming both intervention as of right and permissive intervention. The trial court denied the motion. The appellate court reversed, concluding that although the statute at issue, Conn. Gen. Stat. 46a-83(d)(2), did not expressly grant Kilby a right of intervention, it impliedly granted Kilby a right of intervention. The Supreme Court granted Defendants' petition for certification to appeal, but while the case was pending, the legislature enacted Conn. Pub. Acts 11-237, which amended the text of section 46a-83 to allow a complainant to intervene as of right in a housing discrimination action brought by the commission on behalf of the complainant. The Court dismissed the appeal, concluding that the significance of Defendants' appeal was substantially undermined by Conn. Pub. Acts 11-237, and, thus, certification was improvidently granted.