Justia Zoning, Planning & Land Use Opinion Summaries

Willie Keen, a former zoning official for Dixie County, Florida, appealed convictions arising from two different cases consolidated on appeal. In Case No. 09-16027, a jury convicted Keen of fraudulently obtaining low-income housing funds in violation of federal criminal law. In Case Nos. 09-16028, 10-10438, and 10-10439, a jury convicted Keen, together with former Dixie County Commissioners John Driggers and Alton Land, of federal bribery charges that stemmed from an undercover investigation of corruption in Dixie County. On appeal, Keen, Driggers, and Land challenged their convictions. The court confirmed all convictions after careful review of the record and the parties' briefs, and after having had the benefit of oral argument. However, because the court concluded that the district court erred in calculating Keen's sentence, the court remanded to the district court with a mandate to vacate the sentence and re-sentence him. View "United States v. Keen, Jr.; United States v. Driggers, et al." on Justia Law

Beginning in 2007, the City of Lewiston assessed stormwater fees on Robert Gladu's property, which contained a small shopping mall and parking lot, pursuant to the City's stormwater ordinance. The ordinance at issue created the Stormwater Management Utility and gave it the authority to assess and collect fees for stormwater management system and facilities. Gladu did not pay the fees, and in 2010, the City filed a civil complaint alleging that Gladu owed the City for unpaid stormwater fees. Both parties filed motions for summary judgment. In his motion, Gladu argued that the stormwater assessment was a tax, not a fee, and that the Utility was not authorized to impose a tax. The superior court granted the City's motion and denied Gladu's motion and ordered that Gladu pay the delinquent stormwater fees, interest, attorney fees, collection costs, and a penalty. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) under the test set forth in Butler v. Supreme Judicial Court, the stormwater assessment is a fee and not a tax; and (2) the superior court did not err in awarding a civil penalty, attorney fees, and other costs. View "City of Lewiston v. Gladu" on Justia Law

The City of Jefferson City annexed property on which a fireworks retailer's business was located. The City had an ordinance banning the sale of fireworks within its city limits. The retailer filed suit seeking compensation for a regulatory taking or, in the alternative, for a declaration that Tenn. Code Ann. 13-7-208(b), which allows pre-existing nonconforming businesses to continue to operate despite a "zoning change," permitted it to continue to sell fireworks. The trial court dismissed the retailer's complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the City's ordinance banning the sale of fireworks was not a "zoning change" or "zoning restriction" under the test announced in Cherokee Country Club, Inc. v. City of Knoxville, the retailer did not qualify for relief under section 13-7-208(b)(1). View "SNPCO, Inc. v. City of Jefferson City" on Justia Law

Pin Ups, an adult entertainment business, brought this appeal from an order of the trial court denying its petition for an interlocutory injunction against the Board's "Hours of sale and operation" ordinances. As Pin Ups alleged a violation of free speech rights under the Georgia Constitution, the trial court erred in applying the rational basis test. Such laws could be upheld only "if it furthers an important government interest; if the government interest is unrelated to the suppression of speech; and if the incidental restriction of speech is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest." Therefore, the court held that, inasmuch as the trial court made its ruling based upon an incorrect legal standard, the court must reserve its decision and the court remanded the case to that court for it to evaluate Pin Ups's request for injunctive relief using the correct legal standard. View "Great American Dream, Inc., d/b/a Pin Ups Nightclub v. DeKalb County, et al." on Justia Law

In 1995, Petitioner John Rhodes, a resident of the Town of Georgia, petitioned his local governing body, the selectboard, to clarify several issues surrounding two roads that bordered his land.  While this case began as a suit over the existence and use of two ancient roads, "it grew over time into a test of constitutional guarantees and a saga about abuse of power."  After almost fifteen years of litigation, including two side trips to federal court, the trial court entered judgment against the Town of Georgia.  The court found that Petitioner's request to access his land over town roads had been repeatedly and maliciously frustrated by the Town selectboard in an ongoing attempt to protect the value of a neighbor's property, a violation of Chapter I, Article 7 of the Vermont Constitution, the Common Benefits Clause.  The court concluded that Article 7 was self-executing and awarded monetary damages for the constitutional violation.  In this consolidated appeal, the Town of Georgia sought to overturn the trial court decision.  Upon careful review, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of liability against the Town: the Court "underscore[d] the unique circumstances" of this case, finding that the "trial court's unchallenged findings describe a deliberate, decades-long course of discriminatory conduct by the Town so malicious and self-serving as to deny Rhodes his fundamental rights to due process and equal treatment under the Vermont Constitution.  Absent such egregious misconduct, and clear proof of the exacting elements necessary for relief, towns and local officials have no cause for concern about the myriad decisions made in the normal exercise of authority.  Failing to recognize a remedy in a case such as this, however, would undermine the constitutional principles that all Vermonters hold dear.  Vermont has consistently sustained its essence as one big small town by affirming and reinforcing the fundamental values that define it.  This decision affirms those values." View "In re Town Highway No. 20 Town of Georgia" on Justia Law

The City appealed the district court's summary judgment enjoining it from implementing a purported housing ordinance that required all adults living in rental housing within the City to obtain an occupancy license conditioned upon the occupant's citizenship or lawful immigration status. The court concluded that the ordinance's sole purpose was not to regulate housing but to exclude undocumented aliens, specifically Latinos, from the City and that it was an impermissible regulation of immigration. The court held that the ordinance was unconstitutional and presented an obstacle to federal authority on immigration and the conduct of foreign affairs. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Villas at Parkside Partners, et al. v. City of Farmers Branch, Texas" on Justia Law

In this eminent domain proceeding, Landowner, Manhattan Ice and Cold Storage, initiated district court review of the $3.2 million appraisers' award for the taking of three tracts of land by the condemning authority, the City of Manhattan. The jury returned a verdict of $3.5 million. Landowner appealed, arguing that the trial judge's evidentiary rulings and refusal to instruct on special use prevented it from presenting its theory of the case. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Landowner's challenges to the trial judge's evidentiary rulings lacked merit and/or resulted in no prejudice; and (2) the jury instructions given in this case were legally sound. View "Manhattan Ice & Cold Storage v. City of Manhattan" on Justia Law

The Foggs challenged the issuance of a building permit to 81 Spooner Road, LLC (developer), by the building commissioner for the town of Brookline. At issue was whether a judge in the Land Court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Mr. Fogg and his mother, on the issue of their standing as "aggrieved" persons under G.L.c. 40A, section 17. The court concluded that the developer failed to rebut the Foggs' presumption of standing. Because the Foggs were deemed to have standing, the judge properly eliminated that issue from the ensuring trial on the merits of the parties' complaints seeking judicial review of the board's decision to rescind the building permit. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed. View "81 Spooner Road, LLC vs. Zoning Board of Appeals of Brookline & others (and a companion case )" on Justia Law

The City filed a complaint in eminent domain against Zara Thomas, trustee of two revocable trusts, and a motion for an order of immediate possession, seeking to procure a portion of Thomas's property for the purpose of constructing a bike trail. The circuit court granted the City's motion for order of immediate possession, and the City commenced construction on Thomas's property. Thomas appealed. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal without prejudice, holding that the order did not conclude the parties' rights as to the subject matter in controversy, and therefore, was not a final and appealable order, as the circuit court had not yet addressed the issue of Thomas's right to just compensation and the amount of damages. View "Thomas v. City of Fayetteville" on Justia Law

Chuck Starbird submitted an application for a building permit for the construction of a home on a lot abutting a public easement portion of a road in the Town of Minot. The Town denied the application. The Board of Appeals ultimately granted Starbird's appeal, concluding that the parcel had a private right-of-way because the the term "right-of-way," as used in section 4-501.8 of the Town's Land Use Code, included a public easement. The superior court affirmed but remanded to the Board for further factual findings on whether Starbird's application met all of the factors listed in section 4-501.8(A)-(G). The Supreme Court affirmed the superior court but vacated the portion of the court's judgment remanding the matter, holding (1) the unique circumstances of the matter caused the interlocutory appeal to fall within the judicial economy exception to the final judgment rule; and (2) the Board did not err by granting Starbird's appeal of the denial of his application. View "Town of Minot v. Starbird" on Justia Law