Justia Zoning, Planning & Land Use Opinion Summaries

A justice of the superior court found Defendant guilty of having violated section 16-93 of the Providence Code of Ordinances for allowing the emanation of loud music from his vehicle. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) section 16-93 was not preempted by state law because it was not in direct conflict with state statutes regulating noise and also because it did not constitute an impermissible invasion of a field of regulation that was fully occupied by state law; (2) the statute was not unconstitutional for being impermissibly vague; and (3) the statute was not unconstitutional for being overly broad. View "State ex rel. City of Providence v. Auger " on Justia Law

An Indiana statute, the "Barrett Law," Ind. Code 36-9-15(b)(3), authorized Indiana's cities to impose upon benefited owners the cost of sewer improvement projects. The Law also permitted those lot owners to pay either immediately in the form of a lump sum or over time in installments. In 2005, the city of Indianapolis adopted a new assessment and payment method, the "STEP" plan, and it forgave any Barrett Law installments that lot owners had not yet paid. A group of lot owners who had already paid their entire Barrett Law assessment in a lump sum believed that the City should have provided them with equivalent refunds. At issue was whether the City's refusal to do so unconstitutionally discriminated against them in violation of the Equal Protection Clause, Amdt. 14, section 1. The Court held that the City had a rational basis for distinguishing between those lot owners who had already paid their share of project costs and those who had not. Therefore, the Court concluded that there was no equal protection violation. View "Armour v. Indianapolis" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's dismissal of its complaint, alleging that Arlington County's sign ordinance violated the First Amendment. Plaintiff had commissioned a painting described as including "happy cartoon dogs, bones, and paw prints" and the county subsequently notified plaintiff that the painting violated the sign ordinance. The court agreed with the district court that the ordinance was a content-neutral restriction on speech that satisfied intermediate scrutiny. Finding no merit to the other constitutional challenges, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Wag More Dogs, LLC v. Cozart" on Justia Law

Appellants in this case operated restaurants in the City of Omaha subject to a municipal ordinance which became effective on October 1, 2010. The ordinance declared itself to be an "occupation tax" on restaurants and drinking places in the City in the amount of 2.5 percent of gross receipts. Appellants filed an action for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief against the City, asking the district court to declare the ordinance unconstitutional, invalid, illegal, and unenforceable. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the City. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because the legal incidence of the tax fell on the business and not the customer, the restaurant tax was an occupation tax, not an illegal sales tax; (2) the ordinance did not violate limitations in the Nebraska Liquor Control Act on the amount of occupation tax for liquor licensees; and (3) the ordinance did not violate the constitutional prohibition against special legislation. View "Anthony Inc. v. City of Omaha" on Justia Law

Volunteers of America, Dakotas (VOA) proposed to build an apartment-style building for veterans in Omaha. To construct the building as planned, VOA applied for variances from area and use restrictions under the Omaha Municipal Code (Code). VOA applied to the zoning board of appeals of Omaha (Board) for the variances. Appellants, Field Club Home Owners League and Thornburg Place Neighborhood Association, opposed the application. The Board granted the variances, concluding that the Code created an unnecessary hardship because it did not contemplate a project like VOA's. The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed and vacated the district court's judgment, holding (1) the record failed to show that VOA had standing to seek the variances; but (2) because Appellants raised standing for the first time on appeal to the Court, the district court must conduct an evidentiary hearing on the issue. Remanded. View "Field Club v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Omaha" on Justia Law

In 2006, the city enacted an ordinance that, in essence, proscribed the installation of all but one of the fire protective signaling systems approved by 780 Code Mass. Regs. 907.14.3. At issue was whether the code preempted the ordinance. The court held that, whether construing the Legislature's stated intention of ensuring uniformity in building regulations either as an explicit statement of its desire to foreclose local action, or as a statutory purpose that would be frustrated thereby, the ordinance could not stand. View "St. George Greek Orthodox Cathedral of Western Massachusetts, Inc. v. Fire Dept. of Springfield & another." on Justia Law

Defendants-Appellants David and Pamela Randel appealed the denial of their request for attorney fees under I.C. 12-117, following the dismissal of a zoning enforcement action brought against them by the City of Osburn (City). The district court found the Randels to be the prevailing party but held they were not entitled to a fee award because the City had not pursued the action frivolously or without foundation. The Randels appealed to the Supreme Court and upon review, the Court affirmed: "the court discussed that, having considered the parties' arguments and the issues raised, it 'remain[ed] convinced that the action was not brought frivolously or without foundation.' That conclusion is eminently reasonable, especially since the City moved to dismiss the action when it failed to prevail on its motion for summary judgment. The court was presented with relatively little information about the merits of the action, and the arguments it did consider were fairly characterized as non-frivolous. The court acted within the bounds of its discretion and reached its decision through an exercise of reason. It, therefore, did not abuse its discretion when it denied the Randels' fee request." View "City of Osburn v. Randel" on Justia Law

In 1991, the predecessor in title to the disputed property at issue in this case to Petitioner, HNS Development, and Baltimore County failed to resolve conclusively whether certain development restrictions would be placed on parcels including and adjacent to a historic building. HNS purchased the two parcels in 2004 with knowledge of a cautionary note on the 1991 development plan. After having its proposed amended development plan rejected by three county agencies, the circuit court, and the court of special appeals, HNS asked the Court of Appeals to conclude that its amended development plan met the applicable development regulations of the Baltimore County Code and ignore the conceded Baltimore County Master Plan conflict. Respondents, People's Counsel for Baltimore County and the Greater Kingsville Community Association, argued that the Master Plan conflict provided a stand-alone basis for the County to reject the proposed amended development plan. The Court of Appeals agreed with Respondents and affirmed the judgment of the court of special appeals. View "HNS Dev., LLC v. People's Counsel for Baltimore County" on Justia Law

Defendant-Appellee the Village of Angel Fire (the Village) held an election to determine whether a public improvement district (PID) should be formed within its boundaries, after supporters of the PID petitioned the Village to do so. The requisite majority of eligible voters approved formation of the PID. Plaintiffs-Appellants Ron Glaser and his wife, Theresa Cull, Cheryl Host and several others, owners of real property located in Angel Fire, filed suit in district court, seeking a declaration that the PID formation election was procedurally defective and therefore void, that the PID lacked legal existence, and that a special levy approved and assessed by the PID was invalid. The district court dismissed Appellants' complaint as untimely, and Appellants sought review by the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals determined that Appellants’ complaint presented an election contest, which was subject to a thirty-day statute of limitations under the Election Code. The Court further determined that because Appellants waited more than one year to file suit, their complaint was time-barred. After thoroughly analyzing these issues, however, the Court of Appeals ultimately concluded that it lacked jurisdiction and transferred the appeal to the Supreme Court, pursuant to the Election Code’s directive that appeals in election contest proceedings should be made directly to the Supreme Court. Upon review, the Supreme Court adopted the appellate court's reasoning for dismissing Appellants' case. View "Glaser v. LeBus" on Justia Law

Wanting to place its advertising benches on private property and in public rights-of-way, the company first sued the city in 1993. The parties settled. The city granted the company 300 permits and amended laws to give the company access to place benches in rights-of-way. In 2006-2007, the city rescinded those amendments and amended other laws and the company again filed suit, alleging violations of the First Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection rights and claiming non-conforming use protection. While the case was pending, the city again amended the laws at issue. The district court determined that certain claims were moot, that the company lacked standing to bring its First Amendment claims, that the company was not similarly situated for purposes of its equal-protection claim, and that it would not consider the non-conforming use claim. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Noting that there has been no admission or finding of unconstitutionality, the court agreed the claims were moot. The only claimed injury, the difference between fees paid by bench advertisers and those paid by the other advertising media, did not establish standing.View "Bench Billboard Co. v. City of Cincinnati" on Justia Law