Justia Zoning, Planning & Land Use Opinion Summaries

In 2006, the city enacted an ordinance that, in essence, proscribed the installation of all but one of the fire protective signaling systems approved by 780 Code Mass. Regs. 907.14.3. At issue was whether the code preempted the ordinance. The court held that, whether construing the Legislature's stated intention of ensuring uniformity in building regulations either as an explicit statement of its desire to foreclose local action, or as a statutory purpose that would be frustrated thereby, the ordinance could not stand. View "St. George Greek Orthodox Cathedral of Western Massachusetts, Inc. v. Fire Dept. of Springfield & another." on Justia Law

Defendants-Appellants David and Pamela Randel appealed the denial of their request for attorney fees under I.C. 12-117, following the dismissal of a zoning enforcement action brought against them by the City of Osburn (City). The district court found the Randels to be the prevailing party but held they were not entitled to a fee award because the City had not pursued the action frivolously or without foundation. The Randels appealed to the Supreme Court and upon review, the Court affirmed: "the court discussed that, having considered the parties' arguments and the issues raised, it 'remain[ed] convinced that the action was not brought frivolously or without foundation.' That conclusion is eminently reasonable, especially since the City moved to dismiss the action when it failed to prevail on its motion for summary judgment. The court was presented with relatively little information about the merits of the action, and the arguments it did consider were fairly characterized as non-frivolous. The court acted within the bounds of its discretion and reached its decision through an exercise of reason. It, therefore, did not abuse its discretion when it denied the Randels' fee request." View "City of Osburn v. Randel" on Justia Law

In 1991, the predecessor in title to the disputed property at issue in this case to Petitioner, HNS Development, and Baltimore County failed to resolve conclusively whether certain development restrictions would be placed on parcels including and adjacent to a historic building. HNS purchased the two parcels in 2004 with knowledge of a cautionary note on the 1991 development plan. After having its proposed amended development plan rejected by three county agencies, the circuit court, and the court of special appeals, HNS asked the Court of Appeals to conclude that its amended development plan met the applicable development regulations of the Baltimore County Code and ignore the conceded Baltimore County Master Plan conflict. Respondents, People's Counsel for Baltimore County and the Greater Kingsville Community Association, argued that the Master Plan conflict provided a stand-alone basis for the County to reject the proposed amended development plan. The Court of Appeals agreed with Respondents and affirmed the judgment of the court of special appeals. View "HNS Dev., LLC v. People's Counsel for Baltimore County" on Justia Law

Defendant-Appellee the Village of Angel Fire (the Village) held an election to determine whether a public improvement district (PID) should be formed within its boundaries, after supporters of the PID petitioned the Village to do so. The requisite majority of eligible voters approved formation of the PID. Plaintiffs-Appellants Ron Glaser and his wife, Theresa Cull, Cheryl Host and several others, owners of real property located in Angel Fire, filed suit in district court, seeking a declaration that the PID formation election was procedurally defective and therefore void, that the PID lacked legal existence, and that a special levy approved and assessed by the PID was invalid. The district court dismissed Appellants' complaint as untimely, and Appellants sought review by the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals determined that Appellants’ complaint presented an election contest, which was subject to a thirty-day statute of limitations under the Election Code. The Court further determined that because Appellants waited more than one year to file suit, their complaint was time-barred. After thoroughly analyzing these issues, however, the Court of Appeals ultimately concluded that it lacked jurisdiction and transferred the appeal to the Supreme Court, pursuant to the Election Code’s directive that appeals in election contest proceedings should be made directly to the Supreme Court. Upon review, the Supreme Court adopted the appellate court's reasoning for dismissing Appellants' case. View "Glaser v. LeBus" on Justia Law

Wanting to place its advertising benches on private property and in public rights-of-way, the company first sued the city in 1993. The parties settled. The city granted the company 300 permits and amended laws to give the company access to place benches in rights-of-way. In 2006-2007, the city rescinded those amendments and amended other laws and the company again filed suit, alleging violations of the First Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection rights and claiming non-conforming use protection. While the case was pending, the city again amended the laws at issue. The district court determined that certain claims were moot, that the company lacked standing to bring its First Amendment claims, that the company was not similarly situated for purposes of its equal-protection claim, and that it would not consider the non-conforming use claim. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Noting that there has been no admission or finding of unconstitutionality, the court agreed the claims were moot. The only claimed injury, the difference between fees paid by bench advertisers and those paid by the other advertising media, did not establish standing.View "Bench Billboard Co. v. City of Cincinnati" on Justia Law

Willie Keen, a former zoning official for Dixie County, Florida, appealed convictions arising from two different cases consolidated on appeal. In Case No. 09-16027, a jury convicted Keen of fraudulently obtaining low-income housing funds in violation of federal criminal law. In Case Nos. 09-16028, 10-10438, and 10-10439, a jury convicted Keen, together with former Dixie County Commissioners John Driggers and Alton Land, of federal bribery charges that stemmed from an undercover investigation of corruption in Dixie County. On appeal, Keen, Driggers, and Land challenged their convictions. The court confirmed all convictions after careful review of the record and the parties' briefs, and after having had the benefit of oral argument. However, because the court concluded that the district court erred in calculating Keen's sentence, the court remanded to the district court with a mandate to vacate the sentence and re-sentence him. View "United States v. Keen, Jr.; United States v. Driggers, et al." on Justia Law

Beginning in 2007, the City of Lewiston assessed stormwater fees on Robert Gladu's property, which contained a small shopping mall and parking lot, pursuant to the City's stormwater ordinance. The ordinance at issue created the Stormwater Management Utility and gave it the authority to assess and collect fees for stormwater management system and facilities. Gladu did not pay the fees, and in 2010, the City filed a civil complaint alleging that Gladu owed the City for unpaid stormwater fees. Both parties filed motions for summary judgment. In his motion, Gladu argued that the stormwater assessment was a tax, not a fee, and that the Utility was not authorized to impose a tax. The superior court granted the City's motion and denied Gladu's motion and ordered that Gladu pay the delinquent stormwater fees, interest, attorney fees, collection costs, and a penalty. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) under the test set forth in Butler v. Supreme Judicial Court, the stormwater assessment is a fee and not a tax; and (2) the superior court did not err in awarding a civil penalty, attorney fees, and other costs. View "City of Lewiston v. Gladu" on Justia Law

The City of Jefferson City annexed property on which a fireworks retailer's business was located. The City had an ordinance banning the sale of fireworks within its city limits. The retailer filed suit seeking compensation for a regulatory taking or, in the alternative, for a declaration that Tenn. Code Ann. 13-7-208(b), which allows pre-existing nonconforming businesses to continue to operate despite a "zoning change," permitted it to continue to sell fireworks. The trial court dismissed the retailer's complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the City's ordinance banning the sale of fireworks was not a "zoning change" or "zoning restriction" under the test announced in Cherokee Country Club, Inc. v. City of Knoxville, the retailer did not qualify for relief under section 13-7-208(b)(1). View "SNPCO, Inc. v. City of Jefferson City" on Justia Law

Pin Ups, an adult entertainment business, brought this appeal from an order of the trial court denying its petition for an interlocutory injunction against the Board's "Hours of sale and operation" ordinances. As Pin Ups alleged a violation of free speech rights under the Georgia Constitution, the trial court erred in applying the rational basis test. Such laws could be upheld only "if it furthers an important government interest; if the government interest is unrelated to the suppression of speech; and if the incidental restriction of speech is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest." Therefore, the court held that, inasmuch as the trial court made its ruling based upon an incorrect legal standard, the court must reserve its decision and the court remanded the case to that court for it to evaluate Pin Ups's request for injunctive relief using the correct legal standard. View "Great American Dream, Inc., d/b/a Pin Ups Nightclub v. DeKalb County, et al." on Justia Law

In 1995, Petitioner John Rhodes, a resident of the Town of Georgia, petitioned his local governing body, the selectboard, to clarify several issues surrounding two roads that bordered his land.  While this case began as a suit over the existence and use of two ancient roads, "it grew over time into a test of constitutional guarantees and a saga about abuse of power."  After almost fifteen years of litigation, including two side trips to federal court, the trial court entered judgment against the Town of Georgia.  The court found that Petitioner's request to access his land over town roads had been repeatedly and maliciously frustrated by the Town selectboard in an ongoing attempt to protect the value of a neighbor's property, a violation of Chapter I, Article 7 of the Vermont Constitution, the Common Benefits Clause.  The court concluded that Article 7 was self-executing and awarded monetary damages for the constitutional violation.  In this consolidated appeal, the Town of Georgia sought to overturn the trial court decision.  Upon careful review, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of liability against the Town: the Court "underscore[d] the unique circumstances" of this case, finding that the "trial court's unchallenged findings describe a deliberate, decades-long course of discriminatory conduct by the Town so malicious and self-serving as to deny Rhodes his fundamental rights to due process and equal treatment under the Vermont Constitution.  Absent such egregious misconduct, and clear proof of the exacting elements necessary for relief, towns and local officials have no cause for concern about the myriad decisions made in the normal exercise of authority.  Failing to recognize a remedy in a case such as this, however, would undermine the constitutional principles that all Vermonters hold dear.  Vermont has consistently sustained its essence as one big small town by affirming and reinforcing the fundamental values that define it.  This decision affirms those values." View "In re Town Highway No. 20 Town of Georgia" on Justia Law