Justia Zoning, Planning & Land Use Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in Constitutional Law
Cinnamon Hills Youth Crisis v. Saint George City
Plaintiff-Appellant Cinnamon Hills Youth Crisis Center ran a residential treatment facility in St. George, Utah for young people with mental and emotional disorders. It wanted to expand its operations with a "step-down" program hereby participants would live in a separate facility with more responsibility and autonomy that other students in preparation for reentry to society. Cinnamon Hills applied to the City for a zoning variance to use the top floor of a hotel it owned for the program, the City denied its request. Cinnamon Hills subsequently sued the City for discrimination against the disabled. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the City, and Cinnamon Hills appealed. Upon review of the district court record, the Tenth Circuit found that Cinnamon Hills could not prove by the evidence on record, instances of discrimination as it alleged. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district court's decision in dismissing Cinnamon Hills' claims.
View "Cinnamon Hills Youth Crisis v. Saint George City" on Justia Law
Haralson County v. Taylor Junkyard of Bremen, Inc.
The Supreme Court granted discretionary appeal to Haralson County to review a superior court's grant of the writ of mandamus. In 2008, Taylor Junkyard of Bremen, Inc. sought to purchase a piece of property in a residential area. Before doing so, it wanted confirmation that the property had a permitted nonconforming use, so Taylor Junkyard asked for, and was issued, a letter written by the County Zoning Administrator, which stated that the business operated by Trawick "falls under the grandfather clause." When Taylor Junkyard applied for a business license for the year 2009, Haralson County administratively rejected the application, with the stated reason that the business engaged in on the property had changed from the original nonconforming business of "used automobiles and parts" to "metal recycling and metal fabrication," and thus violated the County's zoning ordinance. Taylor Junkyard appealed to the County Zoning Board of Appeals (ZBA), which, after a hearing, rejected the application for a business license, based upon found zoning violations. Taylor Junkyard then filed its petition for a writ of mandamus in superior court, which the court granted, finding that there was no evidence to support the ZBA's decision. The County contended on appeal to the Supreme Court that the superior court erred in addressing the petition for writ of mandamus, arguing that the County Zoning Ordinance provided a means for Taylor Junkyard to file an appeal from the adverse decision of the ZBA, and thus, mandamus was not an available remedy. "When local zoning ordinances do not establish a means by which an aggrieved party may gain judicial review of an adverse decision by a zoning appeal board, a petition to the appropriate superior court for a writ of mandamus is the proper remedy." Accordingly, as no provision of the Haralson County ordinances set forth an available means of judicial review, the superior court did not err in concluding that a petition for a writ of mandamus was the proper avenue for Taylor Junkyard to seek review of the ZBA's decision. View "Haralson County v. Taylor Junkyard of Bremen, Inc." on Justia Law
Weber Coastal Bells v. Metro
Petitioner Plaid Pantries, Inc. argued before the Supreme Court that the land use final order that Respondent Metro adopted after a remand from the Court did not comply with the applicable statutory standards. Metro and Respondent Tri-County Metropolitan Transit District of Oregon (TriMet) asserted that the land use final order was legally sufficient. The center of the dispute concerned the construction of one part of the South North MAX Light Rail Project. Plain Pantries and other parties challenged the land use final order before the Land Use Board of Appeals (LUBA). The parties made a number of arguments before LUBA, one of which was that Metro had exceeded its statutory authority in adopting the land use final order because the order purported to approve parts of the project that lay outside the Portland metropolitan urban growth boundary. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Metro neither exceeded its authority not made any decision on the light rail route, associated facilities or highway improvements that was not supported by substantial evidence in the record. The Court affirmed the land use final order.
View "Weber Coastal Bells v. Metro" on Justia Law
Huggins v. Prince George’s County, MD
Plaintiff Jane Huggins, trading as SADISCO of Maryland (SADISCO) sued Prince George’s County, Maryland and five County officials after the County shut down the salvage automobile wholesaling business operated by SADISCO on a parcel of land that SADISCO owned within the County. SADISCO’s complaint alleged one count under federal law and four counts under Maryland’s common law. The district court dismissed certain counts pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and granted summary judgment in favor of the County and officials with respect to the remaining counts. Plaintiff appealed, and after review, the Fourth Circuit found that the district court correctly rejected Plaintiff's arguments. View "Huggins v. Prince George's County, MD" on Justia Law
Bldg. Ind. Ass’n of Wash. v. Wash. State Bldg. Code
This case was a challenge to the State of Washington's Building Code brought by the Building Industry Association of Washington (BIAW) along with individual builders and contractors. The impetus for this challenge was the State's 2009 requirement that new building construction must meet heightened energy conservation goals. At issue was the Energy Policy and Conservation Act's (EPCA) preemption-exemption provision, which expressly preempts state standards requiring greater efficiency than federal standards but exempts from preemption state building codes promoting energy efficiency, so long as those codes meet statutory conditions. Plaintiffs argued that the Building Code did not satisfy EPCA's conditions for exemption. The district court held that Washington had satisfied EPCA's conditions and therefore was not preempted. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that the Building Code satisfied the conditions Congress set forth in the EPCA for exemption from federal preemption. View "Bldg. Ind. Ass'n of Wash. v. Wash. State Bldg. Code" on Justia Law
Aamodt v. City of Norfork
Jason and Marian Aamodt sued the City of Norfolk, Arkansas, to enjoin the application of a 2008 zoning ordinance prohibiting the short-term rental of their property. The Aamodts also requested records under the Arkansas Freedom of Information Act (AFOIA). The district court granted summary judgment to the City. The Aamodts appealed, contending (1) the 2008 ordinance was invalid because it did not contain a map, and (2) the district court interpreted the AFOIA in violation of the Privileges and Immunities Clause. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the Aamodts' first claim failed because their complaint made no such claim and the district court did not rule on it; and (2) the Aamodts' second claim failed because they did not assert this constitutional claim in the district court. View "Aamodt v. City of Norfork" on Justia Law
Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak
Petitioner requested that the Secretary of the Interior take into trust on its behalf a tract of land known as the Bradley Property, which petitioner intended to use "for gaming purposes." The Secretary took title to the property and respondent subsequently filed suit under the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 500 et seq., asserting that the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA), 25 U.S.C. 465, did not authorize the Secretary to acquire the property because petitioner was not a federally recognized tribe when the IRA was enacted in 1934. At issue was whether the United States had sovereign immunity from the suit by virtue of the Quiet Title Act (QTA), 86 Stat. 1176, and whether respondent had prudential standing to challenge the Secretary's acquisition. The Court held that the United States had waived its sovereign immunity from respondent's action under the QTA. The Court also held that respondent had prudential standing to challenge the Secretary's acquisition where respondent's interests came within section 465's regulatory ambit. View "Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak" on Justia Law
Samson, et al. v. City of Bainbridge Island
Plaintiffs filed suit in federal court seeking damages for the 31 months during which they were barred from improving their shoreline property by the moratorium imposed by local officials on new projects. Plaintiffs asserted that the moratorium violated their substantive and procedural due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, and sought damages against the city under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The court concluded that the moratorium ordinances were validly enacted, nonarbitrary, and manifestly related to the city's legitimate municipal interests. Accordingly, the court held that the city did not violate plaintiffs' constitutional rights. View "Samson, et al. v. City of Bainbridge Island" on Justia Law
United States v. California State Lands Commission, et al.
The Lands Commission appealed the district court's final judgment in this eminent domain case, wherein the United States took a fee simple interest in the property at issue on behalf of the Navy, which has continuously leased this parcel since 1949. In condemning the property, the United States sought to extinguish California's public trust rights. The court concluded that, having paid just compensation, the United States was entitled to the interest it sought in its complaint in condemnation; full fee simple, free of California's public trust. The court concluded that neither the equal-footing doctrine nor the public trust doctrine prevented the federal government from taking that interest in the land unencumbered. View "United States v. California State Lands Commission, et al." on Justia Law
Livingston v. Va. Dep’t of Transp.
Geoff Livingston and 134 other homeonwers or renters (collectively Plaintiffs) in a Fairfax County subdivision brought an inverse condemnation suit against the County and the Virginia Department of Transportation (VDOT) after their homes were flooded during a severe storm. The circuit court dismissed the suit on demurrer, holding that a single occurrence of flooding could not support an inverse condemnation claim under Va. Const. art. I, 11. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because the facts alleged in Plaintiffs' complaint, if taken as true, established that their homes and personal property were damaged by VDOT's operation of, and failure to maintain, the relocation of a tributary stream, the circuit court erred in dismissing their inverse condemnation suit on VDOT's demurrer. Remanded. View "Livingston v. Va. Dep't of Transp." on Justia Law