Justia Zoning, Planning & Land Use Opinion Summaries

The City of Glendale and various other parties sought to set aside the Department of the Interior's decision to accept in trust, for the benefit of the Tohono O'odham Nation, a 54-acre parcel of land known as Parcel 2. The Nation hoped to build a destination resort and casino on Parcel 2, which was unincorporated county land, entirely surrounded by the city. This appeal related the the status of the land as trust. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the government after that court concluded that the Secretary of the Interior reasonably applied the Gila Bend Indian Reservation Lands Replacement Act, Pub. L. No. 99-503, 100 Stat. 1798, and that the Act did not violate the Indian Commerce Clause or the Tenth Amendment. View "City of Glendale, et al v. United States, et al" on Justia Law

This case involved a dispute over the fair market value of acreage on which a gas processing facility was located. At issue was whether the trial court abused its discretion by admitting an expert's testimony that allegedly violated the value-to-the-taker rule, which prohibits measuring land's value by its unique value to a condemnor in determining a landowner's compensation. The court of appeals concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the expert's testimony violated the rule because it impermissibly focused on the condemnor's interest in retaining the property and was therefore inadmissible. Remanded. View "Enbridge Pipelines L.P. v. Avinger Timber, LLC" on Justia Law

The City notified a building owner that her property was in disrepair and that, unless she repaired it, the City might demolish it. After the owner failed to remedy the problem, the City declared the property a public nuisance and condemned it. Rather than appeal the nuisance determination, the property owner asserted a takings claim after the demolition. The City field an immunity-based plea to the jurisdiction, which the trial court granted. The court of appeals reversed in part, holding that the administrative-level decision to demolish the owner's property did not preclude her from seeking a de novo review of that decision in a constitutional suit. The Supreme Court reversed in part and rendered judgment dismissing the owner's claims, holding that because the owner never appealed her nuisance determination, her takings claims were barred, and the trial court correctly dismissed them. View "City of Beaumont v. Como" on Justia Law

In 2002, EJS wanted to build a charter school at a commercial site in Toledo. The site needed to be re-zoned. After initially supporting rezoning, McCloskey, the region’s city council representative, changed his mind. The city denied re-zoning. EJS claims that McCloskey’s reversal occurred only after EJS refused to acquiesce to McCloskey’s demand that EJS donate $100,000 to a local retirement fund. McCloskey does not deny making the demand. EJS sued the city and McCloskey under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming violations of its rights to substantive and procedural due process, to equal protection, and to petition under the First Amendment, and asserting a state-law claim of tortious interference with a business expectancy. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Approval was a discretionary matter, so that EJS had no property interest. A property owner cannot create an interest in discretionary re-zoning simply by conveying his land to another party contingent upon obtaining re-zoning. Although “a compelling proposition,” the court declined to recognize a liberty interest in corruption-free decision making. The decision not to re-zone passes rational-basis review in light of the clearly expressed desire to maintain the area for future industrial use. View "EJS Properties, LLC v. City of Toledo" on Justia Law

In 2004, Resurrection sought to rezone property around Saint Joseph Hospital in Chicago to allow further development of the campus. Plaintiffs own property within 250 feet of the property and objected to the rezoning. In 2006, the city approved the rezoning and amended the Chicago Zoning Ordinance to create IPD 1019. Plaintiffs filed a complaint in state court, claiming that the ordinance violated plaintiffs’ constitutional rights under the due process clauses of the Illinois and U.S. Constitutions because it was inconsistent with provisions of the Chicago Zoning Code. The state trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the city. The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed, stating: “The IPD ordinance … is not rendered unconstitutional simply because this municipality, a home rule unit, violated its own self-imposed ordinances in enacting the IPD ordinance.” The Illinois Supreme Court denied leave to appeal. Plaintiffs filed in federal court. The district court dismissed the claim as barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, under which federal district and circuit courts lack jurisdiction to review decisions of state courts. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.View "Commonwealth Plaza Condo. Assoc. v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

This appeal considered whether defendant County had the authority pursuant to its general zoning powers or, in the alternative, a 2004 law enacted by the General Assembly, to adopt an adequate public facilities ordinance (APFO) that effectively conditioned approval of new residential construction projects on developers paying a fee to subsidize new school construction to prevent overcrowding in the County's public schools. The trial court concluded that the County did not have the authority to enact its APFO pursuant to North Carolina's general zoning or subdivision statutes. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the County did not have the statutory authority to adopt its APFO, and N.C. Sess. Laws 2004-39 did not authorize enactment of the APFO. View "Lanvale Props. v County of Cabarrus" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court in this case granted review to decide whether the City of Florence violated the Open Meetings Act when it agreed in private discussions to settle a pending lawsuit in a zoning matter when the settlement itself was voted on in an open meeting. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the City. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the Open Meetings Act specifically allows for private discussions of pending or proposed litigation, the City did not violate the Open Meetings Act, where the final, binding vote on the settlement was conducted at a public meeting. View "Cunningham v. Whalen" on Justia Law

Frankenmuth, “Michigan’s Little Bavaria,” is a tourist destination, famous for Bavarian-themed stores, family-style restaurants, and the world’s largest year-round Christmas store. Plaintiffs own a 37-acre tract just outside city limits. A 2003 property-tax appraisal valued the land at $95,000. It has been used as farmland for nearly 100 years. Under a joint agreement with the township, about 15 acres on the western portion of the property was zoned as Commercial Local Planned Unit Development, with the remaining 22 acres designated as Residential Planned Unit Development. In 2005, the plaintiffs agreed to sell 23.55 acres to Wal-Mart for $125,000 per acre. Wal-Mart had 180 days to determine the feasibility of its plan and was permitted to, for any reason, cancel and receive a refund of the $50,000 deposit.” The city first enacted a moratorium and then rezoned a relatively small area, including the property. Wal-Mart cancelled the agreement and a jury awarded plaintiffs $3.6 million for selective zoning. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The district court erred in finding that a reasonable jury could conclude that the city harbored animus against the plaintiffs, as opposed to animus against Wal-Mart and gave inaccurate instructions on damages. View "Loesel v. City of Frankenmuth" on Justia Law

In June 2004, Petitioners-Appellants Hui O Na Wai 'Eha and Maui Tomorrow Foundation, Inc. (Hui/MTF), through Earthjustice, petitioned Appellee Commission on Water Resource Management to amend the Interim Instream Flow Standards (IIFS) for Na Wai 'Eha, which had been in place since 1988. Around the same time, several parties, including Appellee Maui County Department of Water Supply (MDWS), and Appellees Hawaiian Commercial & Sugar Company (HC&S) and Wailuku Water Company (WWC), filed Water Use Permit Applications (WUPA) for the same area. The Commission held a combined case hearing to resolve the IIFS and WUPA; in addition to the petitioner and applicants, the Office of Hawaiian Affairs (OHA) applied to participate in the hearing. The appeal before the Supreme Court sought review of the Commission's resulting Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law (FOF/COL), and Decision and Order (D&O), in which the Commission amended the IIFS for two of the four streams, and substantially retained the existing IIFS for the two remaining streams as measured above diversions. The FOF/COL and D&O also resolved several WUPA. Hui/MTF and OHA appealed on related grounds: their primary complaint was that the Commission erred in balancing instream and noninstream uses, and therefore the IIFS does not properly protect traditional and customary native Hawaiian rights, appurtenant water rights, or the public trust. Both parties also contested the Commission’s treatment of diversions, including an alternative source on HC&S’s plantation that could have been used to irrigate HC&S’s cane fields. The parties contested the Commission’s determination that HC&S would not be required to pump the alternate source to its full capacity, a decision that resulted in a higher estimated allowable diversion for HC&S, and lower IIFS for the streams. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. First, in considering the effect of the IIFS on native Hawaiian practices in Na Wai 'Eha, the Commission failed to enter findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding the effect of the amended IIFS on traditional and customary native Hawaiian practices regarding the feasibility of protecting any affected practices. Second, the Commission’s analysis of instream uses was incomplete. Third, the Commission erred in its consideration of alternative water sources and in its calculation of diverting parties’ acreage and reasonable system losses. View "In re 'Iao Ground Water Management Area High-Level Source Water Use Permit Applications" on Justia Law

Sherman Anderson and other concerned residents of the City of Deer Lodge (Anderson) appealed a district court order that denied their petition for a writ of mandamus. The issue in this case arose from the revocation of Zoo Mountain Natural Care, Inc.'s business license. Zoo Mountain contacted the City in 2010 regarding a business license. Zoo Mountain had purchased property in the City limits for the purpose of lawfully growing and selling medical marijuana. The City was not issuing business licenses at that time, however, due to a change from a calendar-year licensing system to a fiscal year licensing system. The City previously had determined that it would waive the business license requirement for new applicants during this transition period. The City accordingly allowed Zoo Mountain to operate lawfully without a business license until July 2010. The City Council convened shortly after Zoo Mountain’s move to Deer Lodge. Anderson expressed concern over Zoo Mountain’s location at this meeting. He specifically disliked the fact that Zoo Mountain was located in a residential neighborhood, and that Zoo Mountain was located near the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints. Anderson believed that the City’s decision to issue the business license violated Ordinances 130 and 136. Anderson further believed that the City violated the 2009 version of the Medical Marijuana Act when it issued the business license to a corporation, rather than to an individual. Anderson sought a writ of mandamus from the District Court to require the City to revoke Zoo Mountain’s business license. The court declined to issue the writ. It concluded that the MMA provided no clear legal duty for the City to revoke the business license. It similarly concluded that the City Code, particularly Ordinances 130 and 136, contained no clear legal duty to revoke the business license. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed: Anderson has failed to establish any clear legal duty that requires the City to revoke Zoo Mountain’s business license. The District Court acted accordingly in denying the writ. View "Deer Lodge v. Chilcott et al." on Justia Law