Justia Zoning, Planning & Land Use Opinion Summaries

In 2003, the Legislature passed the Red Rock Canyon Conservation Area and Adjacent Lands Act (Act), which adopted amendments to Nevada law that prohibited Clark County from rezoning land in certain areas adjacent to Red Rock Canyon National Conservation Area, including 2,500 acres owned by Gypsum Resources, LLC (Gypsum). Gypsum subsequently filed suit against the Attorney General in federal district court, asking the court to enjoin the State from enforcing the Act and claiming that the Act violated portions of the Nevada Constitution. The federal district court granted summary judgment in favor of Gypsum. The district court certified questions regarding the state constitutional issues to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court found (1) the Act is a local law that regulates county business, and as such, it violates the portion of the Constitution prohibiting the Legislature from passing local or special laws that regulate county business; (2) the Act violates the section of the Constitution prohibiting a nonuniform system of county government by establishing a nonuniform system of county government; and (3) the Act does not fall within any recognized exception to the Nevada Constitution. View "Attorney Gen. v. Gypsum Res., LLC" on Justia Law

Bethel brought this action asserting that the County's zoning regulations, which prevented Bethel from constructing a church, violated the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. 2000cc et seq., the United States Constitution, and the Maryland Declaration of Rights. The district court granted summary judgment to the County on all claims. The court concluded that the County had presented no evidence that its interest in preserving the integrity of the rural density transfer zone could not be served by less restrictive means, like a minimum lot-size requirement or an individualized review process. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the County on Bethel's substantial burden claim. The court affirmed in all other respects and remanded for further proceedings. View "Bethel World Outreach Ministries v. Montgomery County Council" on Justia Law

Respondent William Rines appealed a superior court order that enjoined him from excavating on his property until he obtained a local use variance from Petitioner Town of Carroll. Ultimately, the trial court concluded that respondent's excavation was exempt from the permitting requirements, the Town's zoning ordinance required the variance before respondent began excavating, and that state law did not preempt the local zoning ordinance. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's injunction, but remanded the case with respect to the calculation of attorney's fees. View "Town of Carroll v. Rines" on Justia Law

First Korean Church alleged that the township violated its First Amendment right to religious freedom, its Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection, and its rights under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 by preventing First Korean from using its property as a church and seminary. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the township. The Third Circuit affirmed. View "First Korean Church of NY, Inc. v. Cheltenham Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd." on Justia Law

Petitioners filed a petition for judicial review of the Baltimore City Council's approval of a planned unit development (PUD) with a Wal-Mart supercenter. Both Petitioners' residences were approximately 0.4 miles away from the PUD. The Mayor and City Council of the City, the owners of the property, and the developers of the PUD (Respondents) filed motions to dismiss, alleging that Petitioners lacked standing to challenge the PUD. The circuit court granted Respondents' motions and dismissed Petitioners' petition for review. The court of special appeals affirmed, concluding that Petitioners did not qualify for prima facie aggrieved status and that they had failed to show any special aggrievement different from the general public. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and held that the circuit court did not err in its judgment, as Petitioners failed to allege specific facts that they had been specially aggrieved in a manner different than the public generally. View "Ray v. Baltimore" on Justia Law

In 1961, the U.S. Bureau of Land Management (BLM) issued a right-of-way grant to the Alaska Department of Public Works conveying a "road building material site" along the Denali Highway with no expiration date and no rental fee. After the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA) was enacted in 1971, the United States conveyed the surface and subsurface estates encompassing the State's material site to Ahtna, Inc., an Alaska Regional Native Corporation. The conveyance was "subject to" the "[r]ights-of-way for Federal Aid material sites." ANCSA allowed the federal government to waive administration of the rights-of-way, which BLM did in 1984. The BLM waiver stated that the State was the grantee of the right-of-way at issue, and instead of providing an expiration date the waiver described the term of duration of the right-of-way as "[p]erpetual." The waiver entitled Ahtna to "any and all interests previously held by the United States as grantor," but the waiver explicitly stated there were no rental or other revenues associated with the right-of-way. The State removed material from the site until 1988, but the State did not use material from the site for the next 20 years. The State began using the site again in 2008. Ahtna demanded compensation for the removal of gravel from the material site and directed the State to cease and desist further entry onto Ahtna lands. The State responded that its right to remove the gravel pre-existed Ahtna's title interest. The State filed suit against Ahtna, and the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The superior court granted summary judgment to the State, concluding that the State had a valid interest in the material site right-of-way under the Federal-Aid Highway Act, and that Ahtna could not cancel the right-of-way for nonuse or abandonment so long as the State operated and maintained the Denali Highway. Ahtna appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that under the assumption that BLM's waiver transferred administrative authority to Ahtna, that authority did not include the right to cancel the State's interest in the material site for nonuse or abandonment without consent from the State. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the superior court's grant of summary judgment to the State. View "Ahtna, Inc. v. Alaska Dept. of Trans. & Public Facilities" on Justia Law

Roundstone Development, LLC, sought to develop an affordable-housing subdivision in the City of Natchez. The land which it sought to develop had two different zoning classifications: O-L (Open-Land) and R-1 (Single-Family Residential). The City’s Planning Commission denied Roundstone's site plan, finding that the O-L area must be rezoned R-1 before the development could be approved. The Mayor and Board of Alderman then denied Roundstone's rezoning request. The Circuit Court of Adams County and the Court of Appeals both affirmed the City’s decision. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address: (1) whether the City erred in requiring that the O-L area be rezoned R-1 and (2) whether the City erred in failing to grant Roundstone's rezoning request. Upon review, the Court found that the City’s interpretation of its zoning ordinance to require rezoning from O-L to R-1 was not manifestly unreasonable and that it did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in denying the rezoning. Therefore, the Court affirmed the judgments of the circuit court and the Court of Appeals. View "Roundstone Development, LLC v. City of Natchez" on Justia Law

In 1987, Waterfront purchased 5.3 acres in Philadelphia’s Central Riverfront District, zoned G-2 industrial. In exchange for rezoning to C-4 commercial, for a mixed-use, high-rise project, Waterfront agreed to restrictive covenants. When financing became possible in 2005, Waterfront obtained a permit for demolishing existing structures and constructing a 28-story apartment tower and entered into a financing agreement with a construction start date of February 2006. Waterfront had to postpone construction. In March 2006, the city extended to the site a zoning overlay with a height restriction of 65 feet and a width restriction of 70 feet. Waterfront alleged mistake; that the area councilman admitted that inclusion of the site was a mistake; and that Mayor Street stated that he would not have signed it had he known that the height restriction applied to the site. Waterfront unsuccessfully sought repeal, but never applied for a permit under the ordinance and did not seek a variance. Waterfront filed suit. In 2010 the city rescinded application of the height restriction. The district court held that the rescission mooted federal constitutional claims, denied Waterfront’s motion to amend to attack the width restriction, and granted the city summary judgment on all other claims. The Third Circuit affirmed. View "CMR D.N. Corp. v. City of Philadelphia" on Justia Law

In a direct appeal to the Supreme Court, Appellant Dunes West Golf Club, LLC, challenged the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Respondent Town of Mount Pleasant. In 2006, the Town of Mount Pleasant amended its zoning ordinance to create the Conservation Recreation Open Space zoning district, which imposed land-use restrictions on all golf course properties in Mount Pleasant, permitting only recreation and conservation uses. Appellant desired to carve out residential lots on its golf course property by designating several noncontiguous parcels as potential home sites. Because the new zoning designation did not permit construction of new homes, Appellant sought to have the golf course property rezoned to allow residential development. The Town denied the rezoning request, and Appellant filed suit, claiming the Town's actions violated its equal protection and due process rights, and amounted to an unconstitutional taking of its property. Following discovery, the Town of Mount Pleasant successfully moved for summary judgment. The Court carefully reviewed each assignment of error and found summary judgment was properly granted. View "Dunes West v. Town of Mount Pleasant" on Justia Law

Anne Bates Gibbons appealed a circuit court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Town of Vincent ("the Town"), the town's planning commission, and White Rock Quarries, LLC ("White Rock") (collectively, "appellees"). This matter stemmed from a zoning change impacting 86 acres of undeveloped land owned by White Rock that were annexed into the Town. Gibbons's complaint challenged the Town's rezoning of the land based on a rezoning application submitted by White Rock and its annexation of the 86 acres. White Rock sought the rezoning and annexation so that it could construct and operate a rock quarry on the property. Gibbons alleged that the Town did not satisfy the notice requirements of the applicable statutes that give municipal corporations in Alabama the power to enact zoning ordinances and that set out the requirements for enacting such ordinances in adopting a 2009 amendment. In the alternative, assuming that the 2009 amendment was validly adopted, Gibbons sought a declaration that White Rock's proposed use of the land was covered under section 5.5, not section 5.14.5, of the Town's zoning code. The circuit court ultimately granted appellees' motion for summary judgment, and Gibbons appealed. Finding that the Town complied with the applicable statutes in its annexation of the 86 acres, the Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the appellees. View "Gibbons v. Town of Vincent" on Justia Law