Justia Zoning, Planning & Land Use Opinion Summaries

The Arkansas Department of Community Correction (DCC) owned a prison complex in Jefferson County that was part of several tracts of state land annexed to the City of Pine Bluff in 1999. The property was automatically zoned as residential. In 2011, DCC, with the approval of the Board of Correction, decided to use three existing buildings on its property to house persons who had been granted parole. The City objected to DCC's adding transitional housing to its prison complex. The circuit court granted declaratory judgment and injunctive relief in favor of the City, concluding that Ark. Code Ann. 16-93-1603 acted as a waiver of sovereign immunity and that DCC was subject to the zoning laws of the City. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred in concluding that the General Assembly intended to waive the State's sovereign immunity in section 16-93-1603, and therefore, the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to hear the City's petition pursuant to the doctrine of sovereign immunity. View "Ark. Dep't of Cmty. Corr. v. City of Pine Bluff" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Roger Schanzenbach owned several properties in the town of Opal on which he intended to install mobile manufactured homes. He applied for permits with town authorities. The town council issued several building permits to Plaintiff but shortly thereafter enacted an ordinance that included a provision banning the installation of any manufactured home that was older than 10 years at the time of the relevant permit application (the 10-Year Rule). When the permits were about to lapse and Plaintiff requested an extension, the town council denied his request. It also rejected his applications for new permits because the proposed houses were more than 10 years old. Plaintiff then sued the town and town council asserting that the 10-Year Rule was preempted by the National Manufactured Housing Construction and Safety Standards Act of 1974 as well as a variety of constitutional claims. The district court awarded summary judgment to the defendants. On appeal to the Tenth Circuit, Plaintiff raised claims based on preemption, equal protection, and substantive due process. Upon review, the Court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment on these claims. The 10-Year Rule was not preempted and the rule was sufficiently rational to survive an equal-protection or substantive-due-process challenge. View "Schanzenbach v. Town of Opal" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Roger Schanzenbach owned several properties in the town of LaBarge on which he intended to install mobile manufactured homes. He applied for permits with town authorities. The town council initially granted him a building permit for one property but revoked it about two weeks later and then enacted an ordinance that included a provision banning the installation of any manufactured home older than 10 years at the time of the relevant permit application (the 10-Year Rule). Both of Plaintiff's homes were more than 10 years old. The town council denied Plaintiff's applications for a building permit, a variance, and a conditional-use permit to enable him to install the homes despite the 10-Year Rule. Plaintiff thereafter sued, arguing a variety of constitutional claims as well as a claim that the 10-Year Rule was preempted by the National Manufactured Housing Construction and Safety Standards Act of 1974. The district court awarded summary judgment to the defendants. On appeal to the Tenth Circuit, Plaintiff raised issues regarding the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause, procedural due process, preemption, municipal authority to enact the 10-Year Rule, and attorney fees. Upon review, the Court held that the takings claim was unripe, the due-process claim failed because Plaintiff did not have a protected property interest, the 10-Year Rule was not preempted, the town had authority to enact the rule, and the attorney-fee issue was moot. View "Schanzenbach v. Town of La Barge" on Justia Law

Appellant Association of Guineans in Atlanta, Inc. applied to the DeKalb County Board of Commissioners (BOC) for a special land use permit (SLUP) for a single-family house located in a residential area of DeKalb County and zoned as a single-family residence. In its permit application, appellant stated an intent to use the property as a "place of worship and family life center." The BOC denied appellant's application and appellant appealed to the superior court seeking a declaratory judgment, an injunction, and a writ of mandamus. After several hearings, the trial court granted the BOC's motions to dismiss and denied appellant's petition for a writ of mandamus on the merits. Appellant argued to the Supreme Court that the trial court erred when it dismissed its constitutional challenges to the zoning statute. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated in part and remanded with direction. The Court concluded that the trial court's ruling that appellant failed to make a prima facie case showing a violation of "RLUIPA" was in error. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Ass'n of Guineans in Atlanta, Inc. v. Dekalb County" on Justia Law

Appellant Camas County appealed an injunction granted by the district court against the enforcement of Camas County Ordinances 150 and 153, and Resolutions 96 and 103 (2007 zoning amendments). Plaintiff-Respondent George Martin opposed the zoning amendments at a public hearing of the Camas County Board of Commissioners. In late 2008 while this case was still being adjudicated, Martin filed a complaint for declaratory judgment against 2008 zoning amendments. Camas County removed the case to the federal district court, which ultimately granted Martin's requested relief to the 2007 amendments. The federal district court then remanded the case to the state district court. Martin was granted attorney fees and costs as a result of the federal district court's order; the court held that Camas County acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law. Camas County appealed, maintaining that the district court abused its discretion in ordering the injunction and should have awarded the County attorney fees. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the 2007 and 2008 zoning amendments were practically identical. Both cases involved the same property owned by Martin in Camas County. Thus, the facts between this case and the underlying case "Martin I" (concerning the 2007 amendments) were nearly identical. . . . as such, Martin properly conceded that the district court's injunction against the 2007 zoning amendments should have been reversed. Martin also properly conceded that his award of attorney fees by the district court also should have been reversed. The County was not entitled to a fee award. View "Martin v. Smith" on Justia Law

The City brought an eminent domain action to acquire a forty-foot-wide strip of real property from Respondent. Respondent's predecessor-in-interest originally acquired title to this property through a federal land patent that reserved a thirty-three-foot-wide easement across the strip of property for "roadway and public utilities purposes." The City asserted that it sought to utilize its existing rights to the thirty-three-foot right-of-way under the federal land patent's easement and to attain, by condemnation, the remaining seven-foot portion of land. The district court granted Respondent partial summary judgment and awarded Respondent $394,490 in compensation, concluding that the City lacked any right to use the easement because the federal patent did not specifically name the City. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred in (1) determining that the federal land patent did not create a thirty-three-foot-wide easement, as the plain meaning of the patent's language created a valid public easement; (2) determining that the City's proposed use of the easement constituted a taking, as the use of this easement was within its scope and did not strip Respondent of a property interest; and (3) awarding Respondent just compensation and attorney fees. View "City of Las Vegas v. Cliff Shadows Prof'l Plaza, LLC" on Justia Law

In 2003, the Legislature passed the Red Rock Canyon Conservation Area and Adjacent Lands Act (Act), which adopted amendments to Nevada law that prohibited Clark County from rezoning land in certain areas adjacent to Red Rock Canyon National Conservation Area, including 2,500 acres owned by Gypsum Resources, LLC (Gypsum). Gypsum subsequently filed suit against the Attorney General in federal district court, asking the court to enjoin the State from enforcing the Act and claiming that the Act violated portions of the Nevada Constitution. The federal district court granted summary judgment in favor of Gypsum. The district court certified questions regarding the state constitutional issues to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court found (1) the Act is a local law that regulates county business, and as such, it violates the portion of the Constitution prohibiting the Legislature from passing local or special laws that regulate county business; (2) the Act violates the section of the Constitution prohibiting a nonuniform system of county government by establishing a nonuniform system of county government; and (3) the Act does not fall within any recognized exception to the Nevada Constitution. View "Attorney Gen. v. Gypsum Res., LLC" on Justia Law

Bethel brought this action asserting that the County's zoning regulations, which prevented Bethel from constructing a church, violated the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. 2000cc et seq., the United States Constitution, and the Maryland Declaration of Rights. The district court granted summary judgment to the County on all claims. The court concluded that the County had presented no evidence that its interest in preserving the integrity of the rural density transfer zone could not be served by less restrictive means, like a minimum lot-size requirement or an individualized review process. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the County on Bethel's substantial burden claim. The court affirmed in all other respects and remanded for further proceedings. View "Bethel World Outreach Ministries v. Montgomery County Council" on Justia Law

Respondent William Rines appealed a superior court order that enjoined him from excavating on his property until he obtained a local use variance from Petitioner Town of Carroll. Ultimately, the trial court concluded that respondent's excavation was exempt from the permitting requirements, the Town's zoning ordinance required the variance before respondent began excavating, and that state law did not preempt the local zoning ordinance. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's injunction, but remanded the case with respect to the calculation of attorney's fees. View "Town of Carroll v. Rines" on Justia Law

First Korean Church alleged that the township violated its First Amendment right to religious freedom, its Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection, and its rights under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 by preventing First Korean from using its property as a church and seminary. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the township. The Third Circuit affirmed. View "First Korean Church of NY, Inc. v. Cheltenham Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd." on Justia Law