Justia Zoning, Planning & Land Use Opinion Summaries

This appeal arose from a dispute between the City and RBIII where the City demolished a dilapidated building on property that RBIII owned. The City did not provide notice to RBIII before razing the structure and RBIII filed suit against the City. The district court granted summary judgment for the City on all claims except a Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claim and a Fourth Amendment unreasonable search and seizure claim. Those claims were tried to a jury, which returned a verdict in favor of RBIII. The City then appealed. The court agreed with the City's argument on appeal that the district court's jury instructions did not accurately reflect the applicable law and that, under the correct legal standards, it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings. Because the court vacated the trial court's judgment against the City, the court need not consider the other issues raised in the City's appeal. View "RBIII, L.P. v. City of San Antonio" on Justia Law

Plaintiff applied for a special permit to open an adult entertainment establishment within an industrial district. By the terms of a City ordinance, adult entertainment was forbidden on sites within an industrial district. The City denied Plaintiff's application. The Zoning Board of Appeals denied Plaintiff's appeal for variances from the ordinances. At issue on appeal was whether the City's zoning ordinances violated the First Amendment by preventing Plaintiff from opening his adult entertainment establishment on land zoned industrial without providing an adequate opportunity elsewhere. The federal district court entered summary judgment for the City. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in calculating the land available to Plaintiff for adult use; and (2) the available land provided Plaintiff a reasonable opportunity to open an adult business. View "Lund v. Fall River, Mass." on Justia Law

Lowell and Deborah Fuller, and Ronald Sheila Turner, appealed a circuit court judgment that found that although the Town of Magnolia Springs held no riparian rights in or to the Magnolia River, the Town was entitled to construct improvements on the shores and to construct a boat launch, dock and/or pier to be used in connection with "Rock Landing," a public landing on the River, and that Rock Street (a public street adjoining land owned by the Fullers and Turners) could be used as temporary parking for the purpose of launching a boat or other float at Rock Landing. The Town cross-appealed that portion of the judgment which declared that the Town held no authority to convert a portion of Rock Street from a public street to a parking facility and recreational area. The Supreme Court, after its review, concluded that the trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law were contradictory to the remedy it ultimately fashioned. Because of this contradiction, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case for revision of either the conclusion of law or the relief ordered. With regard to the Town's cross appeal, the Court found that because the issue of parking along Rock Street directly related to the issues on appeal, it too should have been reconsidered. View "Fuller v. Town of Magnolia Springs " on Justia Law

Appellants in this case were rental property owners in the City of La Vista. Appellant sought a declaration that the City's ordinance establishing a rental housing licensing and inspection program was unconstitutional. Appellants claimed that the ordinance's application to rental property residences only, and not to owner-occupied residences, was an arbitrary and unreasonable classification that violated Nebraska's constitutional prohibition against special legislation. The district court entered summary judgment for the City. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the City's ordinance did not violate the prohibition against special legislation, as (1) the distinction between rental property residences and owner-occupied residences presented a real difference in circumstances; and (2) the City's regulation of rental properties was reasonably related to its legitimate goal of maintaining safe rental housing and livable neighborhoods. View "D-CO, Inc. v. City of La Vista" on Justia Law

Plaintiff owned and operated certain water and sewer facilities in the City of Fort Wayne. The facilities were divided into two separate geographic areas - the North System and the Aboite System. In 2002 the City passed a resolution appropriating and condemning the North System. The City assessed damages in the amount of $14,759,500. Plaintiff challenged the condemnation proceedings alleging that the City failed to follow the proper eminent domain or condemnation statutes. The trial court granted summary judgment for the City, and the Supreme Court affirmed. The City subsequently reaffirmed its initial resolution appropriating and condemning Plaintiff's North System and adopted a resolution assessing damages in the amount of $16,910,5000. Plaintiff appealed the decision to the trial court and requested a trial by jury. The trial court refused the trial request and granted the City's motion for partial judgment on the pleadings. The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that Plaintiff had a right to the trial court's review of the record which included a full evidentiary hearing before a jury. View "Util. Ctr., Inc. v. City of Fort Wayne" on Justia Law

Petitioner Town of Bartlett Board of Selectmen appealed a superior court order that upheld a decision of the Town of Bartlett Zoning Board of Adjustment (ZBA) finding that a sign erected by intervenor River Run Company, Inc. (River Run) was permitted under the Town's zoning ordinance. Upon review of the applicable ordinances and the superior court record, the Supreme Court found no error in the superior court's decision and affirmed. View "Town of Bartlett Board of Selectmen v. Town of Bartlett Zoning Board of Adjustment" on Justia Law

Petitioners Steve and Laura Trefethen appealed a superior court order that dismissed their appeal from a Town of Derry Zoning Board of Adjustment for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Board concluded that the petitioners' appeal was untimely filed, but the Supreme Court disagreed. The decision was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Trefethen v. Town of Derry" on Justia Law

Elba Township brought an action against the Gratiot County Drain Commissioner seeking to enjoin the commissioner from consolidating the drainage districts associated with the No. 181-0 drain and its tributary drains. Elba Township argued that the consolidation proceedings had violated the Drain Code because the No. 181-0 drain petition for consolidation lacked the statutorily required number of freeholder signatures and the notice of the hearing by the board of determination had been deficient. Plaintiffs David Osborn, Mark Crumbaugh, Cloyd Cordray, and Rita Cordray intervened, similarly seeking declaratory and injunctive relief and claiming that the petition was defective and that the notice of the meeting of the board of determination was defective, resulting in a violation of their due process rights. With regard to the due process claim, plaintiffs’ primary complaint was that some of the property that would be affected by the drainage project lay outside the townships listed in the notice, although the notice stated that it was being sent to persons liable for an assessment. The drain commissioner moved for summary judgment, arguing that the appropriate number of signatures had been gathered and that the notice given appropriately informed those affected by the proposed consolidation of the date, time, and place of the board-of-determination hearing. Elba Township and plaintiffs filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The court granted the drain commissioner’s motion, finding that only 5 freeholder signatures were required on the petition rather than the 50 signatures the township claimed. Elba Township and the Osborn plaintiffs appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s exercise of equitable jurisdiction, but reversed on the merits. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the lower courts improperly exercised equitable jurisdiction over the signature-requirement question but properly exercised such jurisdiction over the question of notice. "The former question is purely statutory and, as such, there were no grounds on which the lower courts could properly exercise equitable jurisdiction. Though the exercise of equitable jurisdiction over the latter question was proper, we conclude that constitutional due process did not entitle plaintiffs to receive notice of the 'board of determination' hearing. The trial court’s order granting summary judgment for defendant was reinstated. View "Elba Township v. Gratiot County Drain Commissioner" on Justia Law

In 1903 the railroad acquired a right-of-way for a 100-foot wide, 76-mile long, strip across Arizona land near the Mexican border. After operating for about 100 years, the railroad initiated proceedings to abandon the railway with the Department of Transportation’s Surface Transportation Board, which issued a Notice of Interim Trail or Abandonment (NITU) in 2006 authorizing conversion to a public trail under the National Trails System Act Amendments of 1983, 16 U.S.C. 1247(d). The landowners sued, alleging that issuance of the NITU constituted a compensable taking. The claims court dismissed, reasoning that the government had not physically invaded the property. The Federal Circuit reversed and held that the takings claim accrued when the 2006 NITU issued. During discovery on remand, the government produced a NITU affecting the property that had issued in 1998. There was no indication that the NITU was published; the landowners submitted declarations that they were not aware of the 1998 NITU. The claims court held that the limitations period began in 1998 and that the claims were time-barred. The Federal Circuit reversed. In these circumstances, the government’s interest in bright-line legal rules must yield to the landowners’ right to receive actual or constructive notice that their claims have accrued. View "Ladd v. United States" on Justia Law

This case involved a three-way transfer of boat tie-up spaces in a recreational subdivision. The principal issue before the Supreme Court was whether the trial court erred in requiring the joinder of one of the people involved in the transfer as an indispensable party. Upon review, the Court concluded that the trial court did not err because appropriate relief could not be afforded in the absence of the person in question. The Supreme Court also concluded that the case was properly dismissed because the plaintiff refused to comply with the court's order requiring joinder. View "Weilbacher v. Ring" on Justia Law