Justia Zoning, Planning & Land Use Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court held that in a case involving issues for zoning variances under the Municipal Land Use Law (MLUL), evaluation of the suitable standard is a fact-specific and site-sensitive matter requiring a finding that the general welfare would be served because the proposed use was peculiarly fitted to the particular location. Although the availability of alternative locations is relevant, it does not bar a finding of particular suitability. View "Price v. Himeji, LLC" on Justia Law

The Town of Hartford and Marc and Susan Wood have been involved in a property dispute for over a decade. At issue: the construction of a large concrete retaining wall along the Woods property. They appealed the latest superior court decision in the matter. In 1999, the Town approved the Woods' application for a zoning permit to construct the wall. In early 2000, Woods began stockpiling recycled concrete slab sections in order to construct it. The Town served Woods a Notice of Violation (NOV) and filed an enforcement action, arguing that the concrete was not what was specified in the zoning permit. A court determined that Woods failed to meet the specifications for the permit. Woods appealed, and thus began the litigation that ultimately wound up before the Supreme Court in this case. In 2011, the superior court concluded that Woods still had not adhered to the permit's specifications. Woods raised thirteen claims of error on appeal, mostly challenging the sufficiency of evidence and errors in interpretation of the zoning code. Finding no error in the superior court's 2011 decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re Wood NOV, Town of Hartford v. Wood" on Justia Law

The Town of Fairfax cited homeowner Leon Beliveau for changing the use of his property from a single-family dwelling to a rooming-and-boarding house without obtaining the necessary zoning permits. Beliveau argued on appeal that the trial court erred in finding his property was used as a boarding house, and that the Town's zoning laws were unconstitutionally vague. Finding no error in the trial court's view of Beliveau's property, and that the town's zoning laws were not unconstitutionally vague, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re Beliveau NOV, Town of Fairfax v. Beliveau" on Justia Law

A group of Dewey Beach property owners appealed the dismissal of their lawsuit against the Town. They sued to challenge the town's authority to enter into what they characterized as a "private zoning arrangement" to violate certain longstanding zoning requirements. The Court of Chancery dismissed the complaint finding it was not filed within 60 days of the notice given following approval of the developer's record plan. Finding that the Court of Chancery lacked jurisdiction, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Murray v. Town of Dewey Beach" on Justia Law

The Caroline County Board of Supervisors issued a special exception permit that approved the use of land adjacent to the Rappahannock River for a sand and gravel mining operation. Complainants, the Friends of the Rappahannock and several local landowners and one lessee, challenged the issuance of the permit by filing this declaratory judgment action. The circuit court dismissed the complaint, finding that Complainants lacked standing to bring the suit because the claims alleged were not supported by sufficient facts and because the allegations did not show a loss of a personal or property right different from that "suffered by the public generally." The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not erroneously apply the aggrieved party standard in determining standing in this case; and (2) based on the insufficiency of allegations in their complaint, the individual complainants did not have standing to proceed. View "Friends of the Rappahannock v. Caroline County Bd. of Supervisors" on Justia Law

This case involved a facial challenge to the constitutionality of the City of Red Wing's rental property inspection ordinance. Appellants were landlords and tenants who brought suit seeking a declaratory that the City's ordinance violated the Minnesota Constitution. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the City, concluding that Appellants lacked standing and that the constitutional claim failed on the merits. The court of appeals affirmed, ruling that Appellants lacked standing. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Appellants' facial challenge presented a justiciable controversy. On remand, the court of appeals again affirmed, this time concluding that the City's ordinance did not violate the state constitution. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the law can be applied constitutionally; and (2) because Appellants did not satisfy their burden in a facial challenge to show that the ordinance operated unconstitutionally in all of its applications, Appellants' facial challenge failed. View "McCaughtry v. City of Red Wing" on Justia Law

Respondent Town of Danville appealed a Superior Court order abating "land use change tax" (LUCT) assessments issued to petitioners Maplevale Builders, LLC, Hoyt Real Estate Trust, and John H. and Maryann Manning, on the basis that the LUCT bills were untimely under RSA 79-A:7 (Supp. 2006) (amended 2009, 2010, 2012). Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the superior court erred in ruling that all of the lots of the subdivision in question changed in use in 2009, when the Planning Board granted final subdivision approval. Because the trial court did not follow the caselaw in its consideration of when each lot changed in use, the Supreme Court vacated its abatement order. The parties did not ask the Court to determine on appeal when each lot changed in use or whether the exception in RSA 79-A:7, V(a) applied. Thus, the Court remanded for a redetermination of when each lot changed in use, and whether in light of the change in use date, the LUCT bills were timely. The Court concluded that the amended version of RSA 79-A:7, II(c) applied to any notice or discovery of change in use occurring on or after April 1, 2009. View "Maplevale Builders, LLC v. Town of Danville" on Justia Law

Appellees owned a 166-acre farm in Lower Makefield Township. On December 6, 1996, Lower Maker Township condemned the property in order to build a public golf course. Appellees filed preliminary objections challenging the validity of using eminent domain for such a purpose. That issue was eventually appealed to the Commonwealth Court, which found the taking was for a legitimate public use. As the parties were unable to agree on damages, the matter proceeded to a jury trial for a calculation of the property's value. The trial lasted six days, and a total of 11 witnesses were called, one of whom was appellee Chester Dalgewicz. Mr. Dalgewicz testified regarding the farm's history and the interest shown by several developers in purchasing the property, and described some of the offers received both before and after the property was condemned, including a 1995 agreement of sale with Ryland Homes for $5.1 million, and a 1998 sales agreement with Toll Brothers for $7 million, contingent upon the condemnation being overturned. During Mr. Dalgewicz's testimony, he described a December, 1998 written offer from Pulte Homes, Inc., including a $8 million offer price; the offer letter was also introduced into evidence. The Township objected arguing the offer was inadmissible as it did not result in a sales agreement and any testimony concerning the offer price would be irrelevant and prejudicial. The Township appealed the Commonwealth Court's order affirming the trial court's ruling that testimony regarding a bona fide offer and the underlying offer letter itself could be introduced into evidence in a condemnation valuation trial. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts' decisions. View "Lower Maker Township v. Lands of Chester Dalgewicz" on Justia Law

The Public Regulation Commission (PRC) issued Moongate Water Company (Moongate) a certificate of public convenience and necessity (CCN) authorizing Moongate, as a public utility, to provide water to an area located outside the city limits of Las Cruces (the "certificated area.") Las Cruces later annexed three undeveloped tracts of land within Moongate's certificated area, and Las Cruces committed itself to provide water to this area despite Moongate's CCN. The Supreme Court addressed two questions in this appeal: (1) did Moongate have a right to provide water within the certificated area to the exclusion of Las Cruces?; and (2) did Las Cruces engage in an unlawful taking of Moongate's property entitling Moongate to just compensation when Las Cruces chose to provide water within the certificated area? The Court answered both questions in the negative: (1) because Las Cruces was not subject to the Public Utilities Act (the PUA); and (2) because on the record before the Court, Moongate did not prove that it had established infrastructure and was already serving customers in the annexed area. "Absent such proof of a tangible loss, a public utility is not entitled to just compensation when a municipality lawfully exercises its right to serve in the public utility's certificated area." The Court therefore affirmed the Court of Appeals and reversed the district court. View "Moongate Water Co., Inc. v. City of Las Cruces" on Justia Law

The City amended it's zoning laws to prohibit the nonconforming use of non-owner-occupied multiple dwellings in various zoning districts. Plaintiffs alleged that the City's failure to notify them, as affected property owners, prior to enacting this zoning change violated their due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. The court affirmed the district court's conclusion that the change of zoning rules did not offend the procedural guarantees of the Due Process Clause because the zoning amendment was prospective and generally applicable, and was therefore "legislative" in character rather than "adjudicative." View "Edelhertz v. City of Middletown" on Justia Law