Justia Zoning, Planning & Land Use Opinion Summaries

This case concerned efforts by the Town of Nags Head, North Carolina, to declare beachfront properties that encroach onto "public trust lands" a nuisance, and regulate them accordingly. In the related appeal of Sansotta v. Town of Nags Head, the district court adjudicated the claims but concluded that it was inappropriate for a "federal court to intervene in such delicate state-law matters," and abstained from decision under Burford v. Sun Oil Co. The court reversed the district court's decision to abstain in this case where resolving the claims in this case was not sufficiently difficult or disruptive of that policy to free the district court from its "unflagging obligation to exercise its jurisdiction." Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "Town of Nags Head v. Toloczko" on Justia Law

When passing a 1997 ordinance, the Anchorage Municipal Assembly amended the boundaries of a proposed Downtown Improvement District to exclude some properties on K and L Streets. The building at 420 L Street, the property owned by appellant L Street Investments, was in the original proposal but was subsequently carved out by the Assembly. In 2000 the Assembly extended the life of the District for ten years. Beginning in 2009, the Anchorage Downtown Partnership canvassed businesses hoping to extend the term of the District and expand it to include businesses between I and L Street. After the majority of business owners in the proposed District approved the extension and expansion, the Assembly extended the term of the District and expanded it to include businesses between I and L Streets, including the building at 420 L Street. L Street Investments filed suit, arguing: (1) Section 9.02(a) of the Municipality of Anchorage's Charter did not authorize the Municipality to finance services within the District by an assessment; and (2) the District is a "service area," and AS 29.35.450(c) prohibits the expansion of a service area unless a majority of voters in the area to be added vote in favor of expanding the service area. The Anchorage Downtown Partnership intervened, and all parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The superior court granted summary judgment to the Municipality and the Anchorage Downtown Partnership. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed the grant of summary judgment. View "L Street Investments v. Municipality of Anchorage" on Justia Law

The Lakeside Neighborhood Planning Board approved a revised neighborhood plan (Plan) created by the Lakeside Neighborhood Planning Committee (LNPC). The Flathead County Commissioners passed a resolution to adopt the Plan. Numerous property owners in Flathead County sought to have the Plan declared void, contending that the LNPC violated Montana's open meeting laws by holding unannounced meetings in private homes or via a private Yahoo Group website and that LNPC unlawfully destroyed public records by deleting files that had been posted to the Yahoo Group website. The district court entered judgment in favor of LNPC and Flathead County, concluding (1) LNPC initially failed to fully comply with the open meeting laws, but voiding the final Plan was not an appropriate remedy for the offense; and (2) the term "meetings" as defined by the relevant statute could not be held on Yahoo Group. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err (1) when it declined to void the Plan and determined that no relief was available on Plaintiffs' claims regarding the destruction of public records and violations of Montana's open meeting laws; and (2) in determining that an electronic meeting did not occur in this case. View "Allen v. Lakeside Neighborhood Planning Comm." on Justia Law

Appellant John Nichols appealed a final Superior Court judgment affirming the order of the State Coastal Zone Industrial Board granting motions to dismiss filed by appellees Diamond State Generation Partners LLC and the Delaware Department of Natural Resources and Environmental Control in response to Nichols' appeal of the grant of a Coastal Zone industrial permit application. Nichols raised two claims on appeal: (1) the Board's vote on whether Nichols had standing to pursue the appeal failed due to the lack of a five-vote majority; and (2) that he possessed standing under the "any person aggrieved" standard of title 7, section 7007(b) of the Delaware Code, or, in the alternative, as a matter of common law. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded both of Nichols' arguments lacked merit and therefore affirmed the Superior Court. View "Nichols v. State Coastal Zone Industrial Control Board, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against the city alleging that the city's zoning scheme violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The court concluded that the zoning ordinances at issue were content-neutral, time, place and manner regulations subject to intermediate scrutiny; the zoning scheme was narrowly tailored to serve a substantial government interest; and there were reasonable alternative avenues in which plaintiffs could operate an adult entertainment business despite the zoning ordinances. Accordingly, the zoning ordinances did not violate plaintiffs' constitutional rights and the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Peterson, et al. v. City of Florence" on Justia Law

In 2007 Hamilton Township imposed impact fees of about $2,100 per lot on developers of residential property. Salt Run, a residential developer, sought to avoid the fees by annexation to the Village of Maineville. Unable to stop the annexation in court, Hamilton Township imposed a lien on the property. Salt Run ultimately defaulted on its loan as a result of funding an escrow so that it could sell the property, despite the lien. Salt Run sued the Township, alleging a takings claim. While the case was pending, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that Hamilton Township had no authority to impose the fee. The district court granted judgment in favor of Salt Run on some claims but denied its claim that the lien amounted to an unconstitutional taking. Salt Run appealed that ruling and sought attorney’s fees. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding that Salt Run was not a prevailing party and characterizing the suit as, at most, asserting an improper “collection mechanism.” View "Vill. of Maineville, OH v. Hamilton Twp. Bd. of Trs." on Justia Law

The City of Papillion condemned property owned by Appellant for a road project. The City built a new road on Appellant's new property along with an iron fence on the north side of the road, which abutted Appellant's remaining property. Appellant brought suit. The trial court concluded that the City had statutory authority to condemn the property for the fence and that the City's building of the fence was not a second taking that limited Appellant's access to the new road. Appellant appealed these issues. The City cross appealed, arguing that the district court erred in granting Appellant interest, fees, expenses, and costs. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant failed to timely appeal its claims that the trial court erred in concluding the City had statutory authority to condemn the property for the fence and the City's building of the fence was not a second taking; and (2) the court's award of interest, fees, expenses, and costs was proper. View "Pinnacle Enters. v. City of Papillion" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against the Town after the Town declared plaintiffs' cottages to be in violation of its nuisance ordinance. The cottages were considered nuisances as a result of storm or erosion damage. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment on plaintiffs' procedural due process claims because plaintiffs' procedural due process rights were not violated where the Town never deprived plaintiffs of any property interest; affirmed the grant of summary judgment on plaintiffs' equal protection claims because plaintiffs' equal protection rights were not violated where the Town had a rational basis for its decision to declare plaintiffs' cottages nuisances under the Town's ordinance; and remanded the takings claims based on the court's conclusion that a state and its political subdivisions waived the state-litigation requirement by removing a case to federal court. View "Sansotta v. Town of Nags Head" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that a trial court judge erred in finding that a state agency complied with the state's Real Property Acquisition Act before it moved to condemn petitioners' property. Accordingly, the trial court's judgment was reversed, the orders vacated and the case remanded with instructions to dismiss the condemnation action without prejudice. View "Lawson v. Department of Transportation" on Justia Law

The City of Springfield passed an ordinance creating a single-parcel historic district encompassing a church owned by the Roman Catholic Bishop of Springfield (RCB). Under the ordinance, RCB could not make any changes affecting the exterior of the church without the permission of the Springfield Historical Commission (SHC). RCB challenged the ordinance, claiming it violated RCB's rights under the First Amendment, the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, and the Massachusetts Constitution. The district court granted summary judgment for the City, concluding that some of RCB's claims were not ripe for review and that its remaining claims failed as a matter of law. The First Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed RCB's unripe claims without prejudice and rejected the remaining ripe claim, holding (1) the claims that the district court found were unripe should have been dismissed without prejudice, not resolved on summary judgment; (2) those of RCB's claims which depended on the potential consequences of compliance with the ordinance were not ripe for adjudication; and (3) RCB's claim based on the enactment of the ordinance was ripe for review but failed on the merits. View "Roman Catholic Bishop of Springfield v. City of Springfield" on Justia Law