Justia Zoning, Planning & Land Use Opinion Summaries

Beginning in 1993 the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers implemented temporary deviations from its 1953 Water Control Manual in operating the Clearwater Dam, to protect agricultural and other uses. Efforts to update the Manual were eventually abandoned. The state sought compensation for "taking" of its flowage easement based on flooding of the 23,000-acre Black River Wildlife Management Area, which resulted in excessive timber mortality. The Court of Claims awarded more than $5.5 million in damages. The Federal Circuit reversed, reasoning that temporary flooding, which is not "inevitably recurring," does not amount to a taking, but, at most, created tort liability. In 2012, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that government-induced flooding can qualify as a Fifth Amendment taking, even if temporary in duration. On remand, the Federal Circuit affirmed the Claims Court, after addressing the issues noted by the Supreme Court: whether the injury was caused by authorized government action, whether the injury was a foreseeable result of that action, and whether the injury constituted a sufficiently severe invasion that interfered with the owner’s reasonable expectations as to the use of the land. View "AR Game & Fish Comm'n v. United States" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from an effort by Mortgage Alliance Corporation (“MAC”) a residential subdivision called "Silverstone." In August 2008, MAC sued the county and various county officials alleging, among other things, that an August 2006 letter to MAC from the county's sole commissioner, which said that the county's position was that any proposal to develop MAC's property as a subdivision would need to comply with a recent amendment to the county's land use ordinances, resulted in a taking of MAC's property without just compensation. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants on the ground that MAC's complaint was untimely. The Court of Appeals affirmed, and the Supreme Court granted MAC's petition for certiorari. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that this case was resolved on the ground that the August 2006 Letter was not a “decision” within the meaning of the applicable statute, and the county never made a final decision on MAC's Silverstone proposal. Consequently, MAC's inverse condemnation claim never ripened for judicial review, and the trial court should have granted summary judgment to the defendants on this ground. Although the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in concluding there was an appealable decision, they reached the right result, and therefore the Court affirmed the appellate court's judgment. View "Mortgage Alliance Corp. v. Pickens County" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted allowance of appeal to determine whether: (1) the repeal of an ordinance mooted any challenges to that ordinance; (2) whether the Commonwealth Court may issue an opinion on the merits of certain issues where it subsequently remands the case for a determination of mootness on another issue; and (3) whether parties to a hearing can continue a challenge to a zoning ordinance once the original challenger has withdrawn. Because “parties to a hearing” are distinct from “party appellants,” unless the former have taken steps to become party appellants, the Supreme Court found they cannot continue the challenge. Accordingly, the Commonwealth Court’s decision permitting parties to the hearing to continue the challenge brought by the original party appellant was reversed, and the attempted challenge was dismissed. View "Stuckley v. ZHB of Newtown Twp." on Justia Law

Woodboro has about 750 residents on 21,857 acres, within Oneida County. Woodboro’s 1998 Land Use Plan encourages low density single family residential development for waterfront properties and maintaining rural character. The 2009 Woodboro Comprehensive Plan incorporates that language. There are 177 parcels on Squash Lake, all but seven zoned for single-family uses. The seven parcels zoned for business were pre-existing uses under initial zoning in 1976. In 2001, Woodboro voluntarily subjected itself to the Oneida County Zoning and Shoreland Protection Ordinance, under which religious uses are permitted throughout the County and Woodboro. Year-round recreational and seasonal camps are permitted in 36 and 72 percent of the County; churches and religious schools are allowed on 60 percent of the land in the County. Churches and schools are permitted on 43 percent of Woodboro land; campgrounds (religious or secular) on about 57 percent. Eagle Cove sought to construct a Bible camp on 34 acres on Squash Lake in Woodboro, asserting that their religion mandates that the camp be on the subject property and operate year-round. The property is zoned Single Family Residential and Residential and Farming. Woodboro recommended denial. The County denied rezoning based on conflict with single-family usage. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the municipalities. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution, and the Wisconsin Constitution. View "Eagle Cove Camp & Conference Ctr., Inc. v. Town of Woodboro, WI" on Justia Law

East Allendale, LLC owned a 2.13 acre parcel of land in the Borough of Saddle River. Part of the property was located in the office zone, which restricted improved lot coverage to 30 percent of the lot's total area. In 2004, East Allendale submitted an application to the Borough's Zoning Board of Adjustment (Board) for a permit to build a 10,000 square foot bank building and parking lot on the property. The site plan required approval of a bulk variance to allow 42 percent improved lot coverage. The Board initially denied the permit and East Allendale subsequently withdrew its application in the face of critical questioning prior to the Board's final action. The Borough later filed a complaint exercising its power of eminent domain in order to acquire the subject property for use as a public park. After the parties agreed that the Borough duly exercised its power of eminent domain, the court appointed three commissioners to determine the just compensation owed to East Allendale. The commissioners completed their appraisals and the court entered an order determining the just compensation for the taking to be $1,593,625. The parties appealed the amount and demanded a jury trial. Just compensation was the sole trial issue. The issue on appeal before the Supreme Court in this matter was whether it was proper to allow the jury to hear evidence on the likelihood of a zoning change without the trial court first determining outside of the jury's presence that there was a reasonable probability of a zoning change. The Court concluded the jury heard evidence about the probability of a zoning change that should have been ruled on by the judge in advance and outside of the jury's presence. A new trial on just compensation was thus required because the jury heard speculative evidence that undermined the soundness of its property valuation determination. View "Borough of Saddle River v. 66 East Allendale, LLC" on Justia Law

Stark County appealed the dismissal of its case against the defendant vehicle and third-party defendant Ryan Strozzi. Stark County Road Superintendent Al Heiser was notified that an excavating machine was being used in a Dickinson subdivision. Heiser went to the subdivision and saw Ryan Strozzi loading an excavator onto a low-boy trailer. Heiser believed the tractor trailer unit carrying the excavator would exceed the 5-ton per axle and 60,000 pound maximum weight restrictions applicable to the roads leading out of the subdivision. Stark County brought an in rem action against the tractor trailer unit for extraordinary use of the highways under Chapter 39-12, N.D.C.C., alleging only that it violated the per axle weight restrictions. Strozzi responded as a third-party defendant. After a court trial, the district court dismissed the complaint with prejudice, ruling the weight restrictions apply to vehicles moved on the road, and the statutory movement requirement had not been met because there was no testimony the tractor trailer unit carrying the excavator had been moved prior to issuance of the ticket. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the district court's finding the vehicle had not been moved was not clearly erroneous, and therefore affirmed the judgment dismissing the County's case. View "Stark County v. A motor vehicle" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was the City's enactment of an ordinance which had the practical effect of prohibiting new group homes - i.e., homes in which recovering alcoholics and drug users live communally and mutually support each other's recovery - from opening in most residential zones. The court reversed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' disparate treatment claims; plaintiffs have created a triable fact that the ordinance was enacted in order to discriminate against them on the basis of disability, and that its enactment and enforcement harmed them; and the court reversed the district court's dismissal of all of plaintiffs' damages claims, except for its dismissal of Terri Bridgeman's claim for emotional distress. View "Pac. Shores Properties v. City of Newport Beach" on Justia Law

St. Louis County appealed a judgment awarding property owners damages from the taking of their real properties by eminent domain. The County claimed the judgment should have been reversed because the trial record was inadequate for appellate review because portions were inaudible or not recorded. Further, the County claimed the trial court abused its discretion in its evidentiary rulings and that the verdict was excessive and unsupported by the evidence. Upon review, the Supreme Court found no error, and that the verdict was supported by sufficient evidence. Therefore, the Court affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "St. Louis County vs. River Bend Estates Homeowners' Association" on Justia Law

Temple B'Nai Zion brought statutory and constitutional challenges to its designation as a historic landmark by a municipality. At issue was whether Temple's challenges were ripe for adjudication. The court concluded that the Temple's complaint alleged a dispute sufficiently concrete to render the instant controversy ripe and justiciable without further delay. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded the judgment of the district court. View "Temple B'Nai Zion, Inc. v. City of Sunny Isles Beach, FL, et al." on Justia Law

Landowners protested pursuant to Mont. Code Ann. 76-2-205(6) to block the Board of County Commissioners of Missoula County from establishing a special zoning district north of Lolo, Montana. Landowners effectively blocked the zoning proposal pursuant to section 76-2-205(6). L. Reed Williams filed a complaint against Commissioners, challenging the constitutionality of the statute. Landowners intervened in the action. The district court denied Landowners' motion to dismiss and granted summary judgment to Williams and Commissioners, concluding that section 76-2-205(6) was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power and an unconstitutional violation of the right to equal protection and the right to suffrage. The Supreme Court upheld the Commissioners' adoption of the special zoning district and affirmed the district court, holding that the district court did not err in (1) denying Landowners' motion to dismiss Williams' complaint for failure to join them as necessary parties; (2) determining that section 76-2-205(6) was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power; and (3) ruling that section 76-2-205(6) was severable from the remainder of the statute. View "Williams v. Bd. of County Commr's" on Justia Law