Justia Zoning, Planning & Land Use Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs filed suit against the City, alleging that the City, acting through it's Board of Zoning Appeals (BZA), violated the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. 2000cc et seq., by denying plaintiffs' request for a variance to permit a certain property to be used as a church facility. The district court dismissed the complaint with prejudice. The court concluded that plaintiffs failed to state a claim that the BZA’s decision imposed a substantial burden on plaintiffs’ right of religious exercise. The court also concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiffs’ request to amend their complaint, because any such amendment would have been futile. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Andon, LLC v. The City of Newport News, VA" on Justia Law

As part of a highway improvement project, plaintiff Oregon Department of Transportation (ODOT or the state), brought a condemnation action against defendant Alderwoods (Oregon), Inc., seeking to acquire "[a]ll abutter’s rights of access, if any," between defendant’s property and Highway 99W. The improvement project involved rebuilding the sidewalk along Highway 99W and eliminating two driveways that previously had allowed direct vehicular access from defendant’s property to the highway. Defendant’s property retained access to the highway, however, by means of two driveways onto a city street that ran perpendicular to and intersected the highway. Before trial, the state moved in limine to exclude as irrelevant evidence of any diminution in value of defendant’s property as a result of the loss of the two driveways. The trial court concluded that the elimination of those driveways had not effected a taking of defendant’s right of access to the highway and granted the state’s motion. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court agreed with the appellate court that there was no taking in this case, and affirmed. View "ODOT v. Alderwoods" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs purchased a restaurant in the City of Angola, Indiana and planned to convert it to an adult-entertainment venue featuring dancers wearing only “pasties and a g-string.” Angola reacted to the proposed sexually-oriented business by amending its zoning and other ordinances to make this use of the property impermissible. Plaintiffs sued the City and two of its officials in federal court alleging claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and state law. Plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction. The district court denied the motion. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiffs’ claim that the City’s actions violated its right to expression under the First Amendment failed because Plaintiffs stipulated away the key factual issue in the analysis of the claim; and (2) to the extent that the preliminary-injunction motion was premised on the state-law claims, the motion was properly denied. View "BBL, Inc. v. City of Angola" on Justia Law

Trona is a sodium carbonate compound that is processed into soda ash or baking soda. Because oil and gas development posed a risk to the extraction of trona and trona worker safety, the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), which manages the leasing of federal public land for mineral development, indefinitely suspended all oil and gas leases in the mechanically mineable trona area (MMTA) of Wyoming. The area includes 26 pre-existing oil and gas leases owned by Barlow. Barlow filed suit, alleging that the BLM’s suspension of oil and gas leases constituted a taking of Barlow’s interests without just compensation and constituted a breach of both the express provisions of the leases and their implied covenants of good faith and fair dealing. The Federal Circuit affirmed the Claims Court’s dismissal of the contract claims on the merits and of the takings claim as unripe. BLM has not repudiated the contracts and Barlow did not establish that seeking a permit to drill would be futile. View "Barlow & Haun, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

This appeal stems from a dispute between outdoor advertising companies and the City over certain billboards with digital displays. Plaintiff Summit Media filed a motion seeking, among other things, an order that “[a]ll digital displays and sign structures” identified in the trial court's April 2013 order “shall be demolished and removed . . . .” Real parties CBS Outdoor wished to resume the use of their sign structures to display static advertising, as they had before the illegal digital conversion. The trial court denied plaintiff's motion to demolish the signs and denied plaintiff's request for attorney fees. The court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to require either the demolition of the structural improvements or the removal of the digital equipment, and that plaintiff offers no persuasive authority for its claim. Further, the record supports the trial court’s conclusion that plaintiff had a personal financial stake in this litigation that was sufficient to warrant its decision to incur significant attorney fees and costs in the vigorous prosecution of this lawsuit. View "Summit Media v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

In 1993, the Patereks, owners of PME, an injection molding company, relocated the business from Macomb County to the Village Armada, after purchasing a former high school auto shop. The Planning Commission issued the required Special Approval Land Use permit (SALU) with restrictions. Over the following years, the Patereks were occasionally in violation of the SALU, obtained modifications, and expanded the business. Paterek became involved in local government and was sometimes at odds with other local politicians, including a planning commissioner. Patereks ultimately filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, after the village declined perform inspections and to issue a certificate of occupancy for a 2013 expansion. The Sixth Circuit reversed summary judgment in favor of the defendants, reasoning that a jury could reasonably find that defendants retaliated against Patereks for having complained about officials, in violation of the First Amendment; that defendants arbitrarily and capriciously ticketed Patereks, in violation of substantive due process; that defendants, due to their animus against Patereks, subjected PME to disparate treatment, in violation of the Equal Protection Clause; and that the district court erroneously denied Patereks’ civil contempt motion. View "Paterek v. Village of Armada" on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal was an ordinance imposing restrictions on the right of sex offenders to reside in the City of Lynn. Plaintiffs, a class of sex offenders subject to the ordinance, challenged the ordinance's constitutionality. A superior court judge invalidated the ordinance under the Home Rule Amendment. Specifically, the judge determined that the ordinance was inconsistent with the Sex Offender Registry Law and the law providing for the care, treatment, and rehabilitation of sexually dangerous persons. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the ordinance was inconsistent with the comprehensive statutory scheme governing the oversight of convicted sex offenders and, therefore, was inconsistent and invalid under the home rule provisions. View "Doe v. City of Lynn" on Justia Law

The County of Sarpy Board of Commissioners adopted a resolution amending an overlay district zoning ordinance. The revised ordinance exempted properties platted before the effective date of the original ordinance. The owner of nonexempt property brought a declaratory judgment action against the county claiming that the exemption was unconstitutional. The district court entered judgment in favor of the county. The owner appealed, arguing that the court erred in determining that the exemption did not constitute special legislation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the exemption was not unconstitutional special legislation because it did not create a closed class and its application was not arbitrary or unreasonable. View "Dowd Grain Co. v. County of Sarpy" on Justia Law

Appellant Columbia Venture, LLC, purchased approximately 4500 acres of land along the eastern bank of the Congaree River in Richland County, intending to develop the property. Columbia Venture knew at the time of the purchase that the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) was in the process of revising the area flood maps and designating most of the property as lying within a regulatory floodway. Pursuant to federal law, development is generally not permitted in a regulatory floodway. When Columbia Venture's efforts to remove the floodway designation were unsuccessful, Columbia Venture sued Richland County, alleging an unconstitutional taking. By consent, the case was referred to a special referee, who after numerous hearings and a multi-week trial dismissed the case and entered judgment for Richland County. The Special Referee concluded that Columbia Venture's investment-backed expectations were not reasonable in light of the inherent risk in floodplain development. Moreover, the Special Referee concluded that, on balance, the "Penn Central" factors preponderated against a taking and therefore that the County could not be responsible for any diminution in the property's value. Like the able Special Referee, the Supreme Court found Richland County's adoption of floodway development restrictions and the County's required utilization of FEMA flood data did not constitute a taking of any sort, and affirmed the Special Referee's decision. View "Columbia Venture v. Richland County" on Justia Law

In 2005, the City of Winona enacted the thirty-percent rule, which limits the number of lots on a block in certain areas of the City that are eligible for certification as rental properties. Appellants brought this action challenging the rental ordinance, claiming that the thirty-percent rule is a zoning law that exceeds the City’s power authorized by Minn. Stat. 462.357 and violates their equal protection and substantive due process rights. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the City, concluding that the ordinance is not unconstitutional and that the City had authority to enact it. The court of appeals affirmed. Appellants filed a petition for review. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding that Appellants' claims had become moot because, under the facts and circumstances of this case, the alleged harm to Appellants’ interests had ceased. View "Dean v. City of Winona" on Justia Law