Justia Zoning, Planning & Land Use Opinion Summaries

Appellant Columbia Venture, LLC, purchased approximately 4500 acres of land along the eastern bank of the Congaree River in Richland County, intending to develop the property. Columbia Venture knew at the time of the purchase that the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) was in the process of revising the area flood maps and designating most of the property as lying within a regulatory floodway. Pursuant to federal law, development is generally not permitted in a regulatory floodway. When Columbia Venture's efforts to remove the floodway designation were unsuccessful, Columbia Venture sued Richland County, alleging an unconstitutional taking. By consent, the case was referred to a special referee, who after numerous hearings and a multi-week trial dismissed the case and entered judgment for Richland County. The Special Referee concluded that Columbia Venture's investment-backed expectations were not reasonable in light of the inherent risk in floodplain development. Moreover, the Special Referee concluded that, on balance, the "Penn Central" factors preponderated against a taking and therefore that the County could not be responsible for any diminution in the property's value. Like the able Special Referee, the Supreme Court found Richland County's adoption of floodway development restrictions and the County's required utilization of FEMA flood data did not constitute a taking of any sort, and affirmed the Special Referee's decision. View "Columbia Venture v. Richland County" on Justia Law

In 2005, the City of Winona enacted the thirty-percent rule, which limits the number of lots on a block in certain areas of the City that are eligible for certification as rental properties. Appellants brought this action challenging the rental ordinance, claiming that the thirty-percent rule is a zoning law that exceeds the City’s power authorized by Minn. Stat. 462.357 and violates their equal protection and substantive due process rights. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the City, concluding that the ordinance is not unconstitutional and that the City had authority to enact it. The court of appeals affirmed. Appellants filed a petition for review. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding that Appellants' claims had become moot because, under the facts and circumstances of this case, the alleged harm to Appellants’ interests had ceased. View "Dean v. City of Winona" on Justia Law

Stars is a nude dancing establishment in Neenah, Wisconsin. When Stars opened in 2006, the County had a zoning ordinance governing Adult Entertainment Overlay Districts. Stars’s application was stalled because, all parties agree, the 2006 ordinance violated the First Amendment. Its owner sued in federal court, arguing that anything is legal that is not forbidden, and Staars was banned only by an unconstitutional ordinance: therefore, Stars was permitted in 2006 and is now a legal nonconforming use that cannot be barred by a later ordinance. The court granted summary judgment to Winnebago County, reasoning that it was possible to use the law’s severance clause to strike its unconstitutional provisions. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part, agreeing that the permissive use scheme laid out in the ordinance was unconstitutional, but reasoning that, after the constitutional problems are dealt with, the remaining questions concern state law. Their resolution depends on facts that were not developed, and on the possible existence of a power not only to sever problematic language but to revise it—a power federal courts do not have. The district court should have declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims and should have dismissed them without prejudice so that the parties may pursue them in state court. View "Green Valley Inv., LLC v. Winnebago Cnty." on Justia Law

Stars is a nude dancing establishment in Neenah, Wisconsin. When Stars opened in 2006, the County had a zoning ordinance governing Adult Entertainment Overlay Districts. Stars’s application was stalled because, all parties agree, the 2006 ordinance violated the First Amendment. Its owner sued in federal court, arguing that anything is legal that is not forbidden, and Staars was banned only by an unconstitutional ordinance: therefore, Stars was permitted in 2006 and is now a legal nonconforming use that cannot be barred by a later ordinance. The court granted summary judgment to Winnebago County, reasoning that it was possible to use the law’s severance clause to strike its unconstitutional provisions. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part, agreeing that the permissive use scheme laid out in the ordinance was unconstitutional, but reasoning that, after the constitutional problems are dealt with, the remaining questions concern state law. Their resolution depends on facts that were not developed, and on the possible existence of a power not only to sever problematic language but to revise it—a power federal courts do not have. The district court should have declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims and should have dismissed them without prejudice so that the parties may pursue them in state court. View "Green Valley Inv., LLC v. Winnebago Cnty." on Justia Law

The Yangs listed their building for sale. In February 2011 the restaurant leasing the property closed. The Yangs never sold the building or found another tenant. They continued to pay property taxes. The building was vandalized and started to fail. In October 2011, city officials posted an abandonment notice and mailed a copy to the owner listed in its files. The notice went to the abandoned building and named the previous owner. Nine months later, the city posted a “repair/demolish” notice and sent notices by certified mailing to the property’s address; the notices were returned. After a title search, which identified the Yangs, the city sent certified mail notices to their home in September 2012. Having no response, the city scheduled a November 1 hearing about demotion and sent the Yangs notice by regular mail, with a copy to their realtor. The post office returned as “unclaimed” the certified mailing. The non-certified mailing was not returned. The Yangs did not appear. Demolition was approved. The city mailed another notice to the home address, but got no response. In January 2013, the city razed the building and mailed a $22,500 bill. The Yings claim to remember getting mail that said something about fixing up the building but ignoring it and that they did not receive notice concerning demolition. The Yangs sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court granted the city summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the city provided all of the notice that was reasonably due. View "Yang v. City of Wyoming" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs in this case were more than 400 residents and homeowners in the upper White Oak Bayou watershed in Harris County. From 1998 to 2002, most of Plaintiffs’ homes were inundated in three successive floods. Plaintiffs filed an inverse condemnation suit against several government entities, arguing that Defendants knew that harm was substantially certain to result to Plaintiffs’ homes when Defendants approved private development in the White Oak Bayou watershed without mitigating its consequences. Defendants responded with a combined plea to the jurisdiction and motion for summary judgment, contending that no genuine issue of material fact had been raised on the elements of the takings claim. The trial court denied the motion. The court of appeals affirmed the denial of the plea to the jurisdiction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a fact question existed as to each element of Plaintiffs’ takings claim, and therefore, the government entities’ plea to the jurisdiction was properly denied. View "Harris County Flood Control Dist. v. Kerr" on Justia Law

Defendant’s predecessor in title ("Wayne") owned two tracts of land (“Wayne Tracts”). Park Creek, LLC held adjacent land. Under a pre-approved plan, Wayne and the LLC began constructing a development plan for a residential subdivision using land owned by both Wayne and the LLC. When Wayne conveyed his property to Defendant, his revocable trust of which he was the trustee, future phases of the subdivision remained undeveloped. The Town of Midland later filed two condemnation actions against Defendant condemning three acres of Defendant’s property necessary for an easement. The trial court determined that no unity of ownership existed as to the contiguous tracts of land owned by Defendant and Park Creek, LLC. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s conclusion that no unity of ownership existed between the Wayne Tracts and the LLC Tract for the purpose of determining compensation. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that, where Defendant and the LLC had a vested right to complete the subdivision pursuant to the pre-approved plan, unity of ownership existed between the adjacent properties. View "Town of Midland v. Wayne" on Justia Law

World Outreach, a religious organization, purchased a YMCA building in a poor area of Chicago, planning to rent rooms to needy persons. The YMCA had a license for that use, even after the area was rezoned as a community shopping district. The city refused to grant World Outreach a license, ostensibly because it did not have a Special Use Permit (SUP). After the area was reclassified as a Limited Manufacturing/Business Park District, the city sued in state court, contending that the use was illegal. The city later abandoned the suit. World Outreach sued under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. 2000cc. The city relented and granted the licenses. According to World Outreach the city continued harassing it. On remand, the district court entered summary judgment in favor of the city on all but one claim. The Seventh Circuit affirmed partial summary judgment in favor of World Outreach, regarding the attorneys’ fees for having to defend itself against a frivolous suit, reversed partial summary judgment to the city, and remanded. The frivolous suit cannot be thought to have imposed a merely insubstantial burden on the organization, but the organization presented weak evidence concerning damages for the two years during which it was denied a license. View "World Outreach Conference Ctr. v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Lost Tree entered into an option to purchase 2,750 acres on the mid-Atlantic coast of Florida, including a barrier island, a peninsula bordering the Indian River, and islands in the Indian River. From 1969 to 1974, Lost Tree purchased most of the land, including Plat 57, 4.99 acres on the Island of John’s Island and Gem Island, consisting of submerged lands and wetlands. Lost Tree developed 1,300 acres into a gated community, but had no plans of developing Plat 57 until 2002, when it learned that a developer applied for a wetlands fill permit for land south of Plat 57 and proposed improvements to a mosquito control impoundment on McCuller’s Point. Because Lost Tree owned land on McCuller’s Point, approval required its consent. Lost Tree sought permitting credits in exchange for the proposed improvements. To take advantage of those credits, Lost Tree obtained zoning and other local and state permits to develop Plat 57. The Army Corps of Engineers denied an application under the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1344 for a section 404 fill permit, finding that Lost Tree could have pursued less environmentally damaging alternatives and had adequately realized its development purpose. On remand, the trial court found that the denial diminished Plat 57’s value by 99.4% and constituted a per se taking and awarded Lost Tree $4,217,887.93. The Federal Circuit affirmed, finding that a “Lucas” taking occurred because the denial eliminated all value stemming from Plat 57’s possible economic uses. View "Lost Tree Vill. Corp. v. United States" on Justia Law

Petitioner Kingston Place, LLC appealed a Superior Court order granting summary judgment to respondent New Hampshire Department of Transportation (DOT) on petitioner's claims that the DOT's long delay in taking a portion of the subject property by eminent domain created a cloud on petitioner's title violated RSA 498-A:4, III(a) (2010) and RSA 230:17 (2009), and constituted a taking by inverse condemnation. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Kingston Place, LLC v. New Hampshire Dept. of Transportation" on Justia Law