Justia Zoning, Planning & Land Use Opinion Summaries

In the 1980s, Simonson began exploring for deposits of pumicite, a porous volcanic rock, which he thought had potential commercial applications. Simonson found high quality pumicite in Kern County and located 23 mining claims in his name. For two decades, Simonson commissioned scientific testing. Lab reports and industry analyses confirmed that pumicite could be useful in industrial paint and plastic manufacture; Simonson began taking orders. In 1987, Simonson submitted a Plan of Operations to Bureau of Land Management to mine 100,000 tons per year. BLM conditionally approved the plan, specifying that it had not yet determined whether Simonson had discovered valuable minerals under the General Mining Law, 30 U.S.C. 22. Simonson postponed mining until BLM completed its common/uncommon variety determination, but hired a consultant to generate investor interest. In 1989, the BLM concluded that Reoforce pumicite was an uncommon mineral, locatable under federal law, but did not establish that Simonson had a right to patent his claims. From 1987-1995, Simonson mined only 200 tons of pumicite and sold only five. In 1995, BLM stated that the lands encompassing 10 of the claims would be transferred to become part of Red Rock Canyon State Park. An agreement between BLM and California permitted some mining claimants to continue operating, depending on prior use of the mine, subject to California’s Surface Mining and Reclamation Act. Ultimately, BLM found pumicite not marketable and the claims invalid. The Department of the Interior later granted Simonson a conditional right to mine some claims. Simonson then sought compensation for a temporary taking (1995-2008). The Federal Circuit affirmed rejection of the claims. Although the character of the government's action did not weigh heavily against the taking claim, the economic-impact and reasonable-investment-backed-expectations factors weighed heavily against Simonson. View "Reoforce, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

In 1991, the Georgia Supreme Court declared Bartow County’s zoning ordinance to be invalid. Two years later, Bartow County enacted a new zoning ordinance that, among other things, included a provision addressing vested rights for nonconforming use that were acquired during the absence of a valid zoning ordinance. Twenty-five years later, this case required a determination as to whether that 1993 vested-right provision was unconstitutional as applied to Appellant Southern States-Bartow County, Inc. Though the trial court concluded that the zoning provision in question suffered no constitutional infirmity, the Supreme Court disagreed. Because the zoning provision is unconstitutional as applied to Southern States, the Court reversed the judgment of the trial court and remanded for further proceedings. View "Southern States-Bartow County, Inc. v. Riverwood Farm" on Justia Law

At issue in this matter was a development by Sunroad Enterprises and Sunroad Centrum Partners L.P. (together, Sunroad) of an office, residential, and retail project in the Kearny Mesa area of San Diego. Since 1997 the City of San Diego (the City) Council has approved the area for development under a master plan and over the ensuing years has thrice assessed the project for environmental impacts as required by CEQA. In 2012, Sunroad obtained a permit from the City to begin certain phases of residential development, including constructing several multilevel buildings over parking and ground level retail space. By the next year, Sunroad modified its design plans, ostensibly to meet real estate market demands, and sought the City's approval of the modified plans through a process known as substantial conformance review (SCR). The City's staff found that the modified plans substantially conformed with the conditions and requirements of the previously issued development permit and there was no need for further environmental impact documentation under CEQA. San Diegans for Open Government and CREED-21 (together, plaintiffs) appealed the staff's decision to the City Planning Commission. Following a public hearing, the Planning Commission voted to uphold the SCR decision. The City denied plaintiffs' appeal to the City Council. Plaintiffs argued they were entitled to appeal the SCR decision to the City Council under CEQA and the San Diego Municipal Code (SDMC). The Court of Appeal disagreed and affirmed the judgment. View "San Diegans for Open Govt. v. City of San Diego" on Justia Law

Brookside filed suit against the City alleging that the City Council's actions in proposing and advocating repeal of a 1990 ordinance - that prohibited the El Monte City Council from passing any form of mobilehome park rent control - violated an express prohibition of such activity in that ordinance. The superior court granted the City's motion for summary judgment. The court concluded that the trial court properly granted summary judgment for the City. The court rejected Brookside's arguments concerning the scope of the prohibitory language in the 1990 ordinance and arguments that the City Council’s actions violated the California Constitution’s implicit withholding of authority for a local government to propose initiative measures that amend or repeal earlier voter-approved ordinances. View "Brookside Investments v. City of El Monte" on Justia Law

The City of Waycross (the “City”), situated primarily in Ware County, annexed property in Pierce County (the “County”) in the 1980's. The City constructed a component of its wastewater treatment facility in the annexed area, and entered into service delivery strategy agreements with the County in 1999. The agreements provided that the City would provide water and sewer services in the annexed area; they did not contain an expiration date. The City provided the agreed upon services and collected fees from the users of the services. The fees covered the costs of providing water and sewer services in the annexed area. Residents of the City did not subsidize the costs of the services. In 2015, the legislature passed House Bill 523, which was signed into law effective July 1, 2015, amending the City’s charter so that no portion of the City would “include any territory within the boundaries of Pierce County.” The City brought suit to enjoin enforcement of House Bill 523 and have it declared unconstitutional. The trial court denied interlocutory relief, partly because it determined the City was still authorized to provide water and sewer services to the formerly annexed area. In July 2015, the City notified businesses and homeowners located in the de-annexed area that new, higher user fees would be charged. The County filed a counterclaim alleging that the new fees were arbitrarily higher than fees charged Ware County residents, and therefore violated the Georgia Service Delivery Strategy Act. In August 2015, the City passed a resolution to halt the delivery of water and sewer services in the formerly annexed area. At that point, the County filed an amended counterclaim requesting the City be enjoined from discontinuing its water and sewer services. After a hearing, the trial court granted the County’s request for an interlocutory injunction. Finding no reversible error in the decision to issue an injunction, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment and remanded this matter for further proceedings. View "City of Waycross v. Pierce Cty. Bd. of Commr's" on Justia Law

Randy and Helen Strode owned real property in the City of Ashland, Saunders County. Since the time of the purchase, the Strodes operated a business for the manufacture of agricultural fencing and the storage of salvage on the property. In 2003, the district court held that Randy’s use of the property to store salvage was in violation of the zoning ordinance but found that the manufacture of agricultural fencing was permitted. In 2013, the Strodes filed suit against the City and the County for inverse condemnation based on the zoning ordinance and the load limit regulation of a bridge used by the Strodes for transporting commercial goods. The district court concluded (1) Randy’s zoning takings claim was barred by claim preclusion because the matter was litigated in the 2003 case, (2) determined that Helen’s regulatory taking lain was barred by the statute of limitations because she was aware of the effect of the zoning ordinance after 2003; (3) found that the regulation of the bridge structure was not a regulatory taking, and (4) the City and County were entitled to summary judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in finding in favor of the City and the County. View "Strode v. City of Ashland" on Justia Law

The Court consolidated two cases in this opinion. Plaintiffs in both cases complained they were denied due process when the Board of County Commissioners of Elbert County (the Board) required them to rezone their properties before they could subdivide them. They argued that after the Board lost the documents reflecting the prior comprehensive zoning ordinance, it created new documents without following proper procedures for enacting an ordinance and covered up their misconduct. "Perhaps these allegations state a claim under Colorado law." After review, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals found that were not deprived of their right to due process under the United States Constitution. View "Onyx Properties v. Elbert Board of County Commissioners" on Justia Law

In 2015, the City of Atlanta proposed to annex property in unincorporated Fulton County that the City recently had acquired, but the County objected. The property at issue was part of the Fulton County Industrial District, and the County pointed the City to a local constitutional amendment, which prohibited the annexation of property within the District. The City then filed a lawsuit against the County, alleging: (1) that the local amendment was never constitutionally adopted; (2) it was repealed in any event by operation of the Constitution of 1983; and (3) local laws purporting to continue the amendment were themselves unconstitutional. The City sought a declaratory judgment that its proposed annexation would be lawful. The trial court entered a declaratory judgment for the City, and the County appealed. After review, the Georgia Supreme Court vacated the declaratory judgment for the City, and remanded for the trial court to dismiss the case as nonjusticiable. View "Fulton County v. City of Atlanta" on Justia Law

The Department of Transportation petitioned to acquire property owned by Amerco Real Estate Co. and occupied by U-Haul Co. by eminent domain, asserting that the property in question was necessary for a highway expansion project. U-Haul opposed the petition, asserting that the Department lacked authority to condemn its land on grounds that the statutory perquisites for acquiring land in the manner the Department used, were not met. The district court declined to dismiss the petition and instead granted the Department's motion for immediate possession. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that the transportation commission's enabling legislation, to the extent that it purported to delegate to the Department the choice of particular properties to be taken for highway projects and the manner of their taking, was an unlawful delegation of the commission's statutorily imposed obligation. The case was remanded back to the district court for dismissal of the Department's original petition. View "Colorado Dept. of Transportation v. Amerco Real Estate" on Justia Law

In 2005, the County adopted the Lauren Book Child Safety Ordinance, Fla., Code of Ordinances ch. 21, art. XVII, which imposes a residency restriction on “sexual offenders” and “sexual predators.” The Ordinance prohibits a person who has been convicted of any one of several enumerated sexual offenses involving a victim under sixteen years of age from “resid[ing] within 2,500 feet of any school.” Plaintiffs filed suit challenging the constitutionality of the County’s residency restriction. The district court dismissed the ex post facto challenge. Plaintiffs argue that they pleaded sufficient facts to state a claim that the residency restriction is so punitive in effect as to violate the ex post facto clauses of the federal and Florida Constitutions. The court concluded that Doe #1 and Doe #3 have alleged plausible ex post facto challenges to the residency restriction where they alleged that they are homeless and that their homelessness resulted directly from the County’s residency restriction “severely restricting available, affordable housing options.” Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "John Doe #1 v. Miami-Dade County" on Justia Law