Justia Zoning, Planning & Land Use Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in Constitutional Law
North American Butterfly Association v. Wolf
National Butterfly Center, a 100-acre wildlife sanctuary and botanical garden owned by the nonprofit North American Butterfly Association, lies along the border with Mexico. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) planned to build a segment of the border wall through the Center. The Association sued, citing the Fourth and Fifth Amendments and two environmental statutes. DHS has not analyzed the environmental impact of border wall-related activities at the Center (42 U.S.C. 4332(2)(C)), nor consulted with other federal agencies about how to minimize the impact of those activities on endangered species. An appropriation act subsequently prohibited funding for border fencing at the Center.The district court dismissed all claims, citing the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, 8 U.S.C. 1103, as stripping jurisdiction over the statutory claims because the DHS Secretary waived the application of environmental laws with respect to the construction of roads and physical barriers at the Center.The D.C. Circuit affirmed in part, first holding that the claims were not moot and that jurisdiction over the statutory claims was not stripped by IIRIRA, nor was review channeled directly to the Supreme Court. The court held that DHS’s waiver determination defeats the statutory claims, that the Association failed to state a Fourth Amendment claim of unreasonable seizure of property it acknowledges to be “open fields,” but that the Association stated a procedural due process claim under the Fifth Amendment. View "North American Butterfly Association v. Wolf" on Justia Law
Signs for Jesus v. Pembroke, New Hampshire
The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of the Town of Pembroke, New Hampshire and dismissing the complaint filed by Signs for Jesus and Hillside Baptist Church (collectively, the Church) challenging the Town's denial of the Church's application for a permit to install an electronic sign on its property, holding that the Town met its summary judgment burden on all counts.Hillside Baptist Church applied for a permit to install an electronic sign on its property to transmit messages provided by the nonprofit corporation Signs for Jesus. The Pembroke Zoning Board of Adjustment denied the permit, citing a provision in the Pembroke Sign Ordinance that bans the use of electronic signs in the zoning district where the Church was located. The Church later brought this complaint, alleging violations of the state and federal Constitutions, the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, and certain New Hampshire zoning laws. The district court granted summary judgment for the Town and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the Church's state statutory claims. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court did not err. View "Signs for Jesus v. Pembroke, New Hampshire" on Justia Law
Toch, LLC v. City of Tulsa
Defendant the City of Tulsa (City), passed an ordinance creating a tourism improvement district that encompassed all properties within City which had hotels or motels with 110 or more rooms available for occupancy. Plaintiff-appellee Toch, LLC owned Aloft Downtown Tulsa (Aloft) with 180 rooms. Toch petitioned for a declaratory judgment that the ordinance was invalid for a variety of reasons, including that the district did not include all hotels with at least 50 rooms available. The court granted summary judgment to Toch based on its determination that City exceeded the authority granted in title 11, section 39-103.1. The question before Oklahoma Supreme Court was whether section 39-103.1 granted authority to municipalities to limit a tourism improvement district to a minimum room-count of a number larger than 50. To this, the Court answered in the affirmative, reversed the trial court, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Toch, LLC v. City of Tulsa" on Justia Law
International Outdoor, Inc. v. City of Troy
International, an outdoor advertising company, sought to erect digital billboards in two separate locations within the City of Troy. International's permit and variance applications were denied. International filed suit (42 U.S.C. 1983), alleging that the ordinance granted unfettered discretion and contained unconstitutional content-based restrictions as it exempted from permit requirements certain categories of signs, such as flags and “temporary signs.” During the litigation, Troy amended the Ordinance.The Sixth Circuit remanded. The original Ordinance imposed a prior restraint because the right to display a sign that did not come within an exception as a flag or as a “temporary sign” depended on obtaining either a permit or a variance. The standards for granting a variance contained multiple vague, undefined criteria, such as “public interest,” “general purpose and intent,” “adversely affect[ing],” and “hardship.” Even meeting these criteria did not guarantee a variance; the Board retained discretion to deny it. The amendment, however, rendered the action for declaratory and injunctive relief moot. The severability of the variance provisions rendered moot its claim for damages. The court reinstated a claim that the ordinance imposed content-based restrictions without a compelling government interest for reconsideration under the correct standard. A regulation of commercial speech that is not content-neutral is still subject to strict scrutiny. View "International Outdoor, Inc. v. City of Troy" on Justia Law
McCraw v. City of Oklahoma City
Oklahoma City Ordinance 25,777 prohibited standing, sitting, or remaining for most purposes on certain medians. Plaintiffs were Oklahoma City residents, a minority political party in Oklahoma, and an independent news organization. They used medians to panhandle, engage in protests or other expressive activity, mount political campaigns, cover the news, or have personal conversations. After they were no longer able to engage in such activity due to the ordinance, plaintiffs sued Oklahoma City and its chief of police, William Citty, (together, “the City”) alleging violations of their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The district court dismissed plaintiff Trista Wilson’s First Amendment claim; granted summary judgment favoring the City on plaintiffs’ due process vagueness claims; and, following a bench trial, entered judgment against plaintiffs on all other claims. After review, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the court’s entry of judgment in favor of the City on plaintiffs’ First Amendment claims; it reversed the dismissal of Wilson’s First Amendment claim; and affirmed on all other claims. View "McCraw v. City of Oklahoma City" on Justia Law
Reagan National Advertising of Austin, Inc. v. City of Austin
After the City of Austin denied applications to digitize existing billboards, Reagan and Lamar filed suit alleging that the distinction in the City's Sign Code between on-premises and off-premises signs violates the First Amendment.The Fifth Circuit held that the City's Sign Code's on-premises/off-premises distinction is content based and the commercial speech exception does not apply. The court held that the Sign Code runs afoul of the First Amendment because the relevant provisions of the Sign Code are not narrowly tailored to serve the compelling government interest of protecting the aesthetic value of the City and public safety. In this case, the ordinance is underinclusive. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's decision to the contrary and remanded. View "Reagan National Advertising of Austin, Inc. v. City of Austin" on Justia Law
Protect Our Parks, Inc. v. Chicago Park District
The Barack Obama Foundation selected Jackson Park in Chicago to house the Obama Presidential Center. Chicago acquired 19.3 acres from the Chicago Park District, enacted the necessary ordinances, and entered into a use agreement with the Obama Foundation. Construction will require the removal of multiple mature trees, the diversion of roadways, and will require the city to shoulder some expenses. Opponents sued, alleging that the defendants violated Illinois’s public trust doctrine, which limits the government’s ability to transfer control or ownership of public lands to private parties and that under Illinois law, the defendants acted beyond their legal authority in entering the use agreement because it delegates decision-making authority to the Foundation and grants the Foundation an illegal lease in all but name, Under federal law, they argued that, by altering the use of Jackson Park and granting control to the Foundation, the defendants took the plaintiffs’ property for a private purpose and deprived them of property in a process lacking in procedural safeguards.The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed as to the federal claims and held that the state claims should have been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Federal courts are only permitted to adjudicate claims that have allegedly caused the plaintiff a concrete injury. The federal claims allege a concrete injury, but the lack of a property interest is a fundamental defect. The state claims allege only policy disagreements. View "Protect Our Parks, Inc. v. Chicago Park District" on Justia Law
Ladd v. Marchbanks
In 2016, the Ohio Department of Transportation began a construction project on a portion of Interstate Highway 75 near the Plaintiffs’ Hancock County properties. As a result of this construction, storm and groundwater flooded those properties three times and caused significant damage. The Plaintiffs filed suit, including a claim brought directly under the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Article I, Section 19 of the Ohio Constitution, seeking a declaratory judgment that the flooding caused a “change in topography [that] constitutes a taking of private property without just compensation,” and compensation for the same, and a claim under 42 U.S.C. 1983 seeking damages for the alleged taking. The district court dismissed, finding that Ohio’s Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity deprived it of subject matter jurisdiction. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. States’ sovereign immunity predates the Constitution; unless the Constitution itself, or Congress acting under a constitutional grant of authority, abrogates that immunity, it remains in place. The Sixth Circuit has previously held that the states’ sovereign immunity protects them from takings claims for damages in federal court and that Ohio’s statutory mechanism for obtaining compensation to remedy a Takings Clause violation does provide reasonable, certain, and adequate procedures. View "Ladd v. Marchbanks" on Justia Law
Agency of Transportation v. Timberlake Associates et al.
R.L. Vallee, Inc. appealed the superior court’s denial of its motion to intervene in a state condemnation action seeking property rights for a highway project. Vallee argued: (1) it had a right to intervene under Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(1) because Vermont’s highway condemnation statute conferred an unconditional right to intervene; and (2) it had a right to intervene under Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2) because it had an interest relating to property that was subject to the condemnation action and intervention was necessary to protect that interest. After review, the Vermont Supreme Court held that Vallee had an unconditional statutory right to intervene under Rule 24(a)(1), and accordingly, reversed. View "Agency of Transportation v. Timberlake Associates et al." on Justia Law
Tenth Street Residential Ass’n v. City of Dallas
TSRA filed suit seeking to enjoin demolitions under the city's new ordinance, DALL. CITY CODE 51A-4.501(i), which streamlined the city's procedure for demolishing dilapidated historical homes smaller than 3,000 feet. The district court dismissed TSRA's claims.The Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that TSRA does not have standing to assert its claims under the Fair Housing Act (FHA) or its 42 U.S.C.1982 and 1983 claims. In regard to the FHA claim, the court held that TSRA failed to prove that its injuries are traceable to the city's alleged misconduct and that its injuries are redressable by judgment in its favor. In this case, TSRA did not put forth any separate theories of standing for its sections 1982 and 1983 claims. Therefore, even assuming that TSRA established a constitutional injury-in-fact for purposes of sections 1982 and 1983, the court held that these claims would likewise suffer the same traceability and redressability defects as its FHA claims. View "Tenth Street Residential Ass'n v. City of Dallas" on Justia Law