Justia Zoning, Planning & Land Use Opinion Summaries

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the City in an action brought by plaintiffs, challenging its enforcement of the City's zoning regulations against them. Plaintiffs' claims stemmed from the City's enforcement of commercial zoning regulations.Even assuming zoning-enforcement decisions are susceptible to class-of-one challenges, the court concluded that plaintiffs have not shown that the City lacked a rational basis for its differential treatment of plaintiffs and other property owners. In this case, plaintiffs have not shown that they are identical or directly comparable to the comparator property owners in every material respect. The court also concluded that plaintiffs did not present sufficient evidence of affirmative misconduct to withstand summary judgment on their equitable-estoppel claim. View "Bruning v. City of Omaha" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs owned a tenancy-in-common interest in a multi-unit San Francisco residential building. Until 2013, San Francisco accepted only 200 applications annually for conversion of such arrangements into condominium ownership. A new program allowed owners to seek conversion subject to conditions, including that nonoccupant owners had to offer their existing tenants a lifetime lease. The plaintiffs and their co-owners obtained approval for conversion. The city refused the plaintiffs’ subsequent request that the city either excuse them from executing the lifetime lease or compensate them. The plaintiffs’ suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleged that the lifetime-lease requirement was an unconstitutional regulatory taking. The district court rejected this claim, citing the Supreme Court’s “Williamson County” holding that certain takings actions are not “ripe” for federal resolution until the plaintiff seeks compensation through state procedures. While an appeal was pending, the Court repudiated that Williamson County requirement. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal, concluding that the plaintiffs had not satisfied the requirement of “finality.”The Supreme Court vacated. To establish “finality,” a plaintiff need only show that there is no question about how the regulations apply to the land in question. Here, the city’s position is clear: the plaintiffs must execute the lifetime lease or face an “enforcement action.” That position has inflicted a concrete injury. Once the government is committed to a position, the dispute is ripe for judicial resolution. Section 1983 guarantees a federal forum for claims of unconstitutional treatment by state officials. Exhaustion of state remedies is not a prerequisite. While a plaintiff’s failure to properly pursue administrative procedures may render a claim unripe if avenues remain for the government to clarify or change its decision, administrative missteps do not defeat ripeness once the government has adopted its final position. Ordinary finality is sufficient because the Fifth Amendment enjoys “full-fledged constitutional status.” View "Pakdel v. City and County of San Francisco" on Justia Law

A California regulation mandates that agricultural employers allow union organizers onto their property for up to three hours per day, 120 days per year. Union organizers sought access to property owned by two California growers, who sought to enjoin enforcement of the access regulation. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit.The Supreme Court reversed. California’s access regulation constitutes a per se physical taking and the growers’ complaint states a claim for an uncompensated taking in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. When the government, rather than appropriating private property for itself or a third party, imposes regulations restricting an owner’s ability to use his own property, courts generally determine whether a taking has occurred by applying the “Penn Central” factors. When the government physically appropriates property, the flexible Penn Central analysis has no place. California’s access regulation appropriates a right to invade the growers’ property and therefore constitutes a per se physical taking. Rather than restraining the growers’ use of their own property, the regulation appropriates for the enjoyment of third parties (union organizers) the owners’ right to exclude. The right to exclude is “a fundamental element of the property right.” The duration of a physical appropriation bears only on the amount of compensation due. The California regulation is not transformed from a physical taking into a use restriction just because the access granted is restricted to union organizers, for a narrow purpose, and for a limited time.The Court distinguished restrictions on how a business generally open to the public may treat individuals on the premises; isolated physical invasions, not undertaken pursuant to a granted right of access; and requirements that property owners cede a right of access as a condition of receiving certain benefits. Government inspection regimes will generally not constitute takings. View "Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid" on Justia Law

In 1994, SGV bought 547 acres in Alabaster for $1.65 million. The master development plan, approved in 1995, zoned the land as R-2 (90-foot wide single-family residences), R-4 (60-foot wide garden homes), and R-7 (townhomes). Most of the development was completed by 2008, except the 142-acre Sector 16, zoned predominantly for R-4 and R-7 with a small part as R-2. In 2011, the city rezoned Sector 16 for R-2 lots only. SGV filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, 1985(3), and 1988, alleging that the rezoning “constitute[d] an unlawful taking” without just compensation and denials of procedural and substantive due process. The court rejected the due process claims. The city objected to evidence of the city’s motive and the “lot method” valuation and argued that the case was not ripe for adjudication, since SGV had not sought variances. The court found that a zoning ordinance was a final matter that could be adjudicated. A jury found that there was a regulatory taking without just compensation; that before the taking, the value of the property was $3,532,849.19; and after the taking, the value of the property was $500,000. The court added prejudgment interest and entered a final judgment of $3,505,030.65. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the just compensation claim was not ripe, that the district court improperly allowed evidence regarding the city’s motivation for enacting th ordinance, and concerning the admission and exclusion of certain other evidence. View "South Grand View Development Co., Inc. v. City of Alabaster" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, who seeks to knock down his beachfront mansion and to build a new one, filed suit against the town, claiming that the criteria the town's architectural review commission used to deny his building permit violated his First Amendment free speech rights and his Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process and equal protection. In this case, plaintiff wants to knock down his "traditional" beachfront mansion and to build a new one, almost twice its size, in the midcentury modern style. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the town.The Eleventh Circuit concluded that summary judgment was not granted too early and affirmed on the First Amendment claim because there was no great likelihood that some sort of message would be understood by those who viewed plaintiff's new beachfront mansion. The court also affirmed the district court's summary judgment on the Fourteenth Amendment claims because the commission's criteria were not unconstitutionally vague and plaintiff has not presented evidence that the commission applied its criteria differently for him than for other similarly situated mansion-builders. View "Burns v. Town of Palm Beach" on Justia Law

Plaintiff New Hampshire Alpha of SAE Trust (SAE) appealed a superior court order ruling that the Town of Hanover Zoning Board of Adjustment (ZBA) had subject matter jurisdiction to hear SAE’s administrative appeal in the related case of New Hampshire Alpha of SAE Trust v. Town of Hanover, 172 N.H. 69 (2019) (SAE I). Defendant Town of Hanover (Town) cross-appealed the trial court’s denial of its request for attorney’s fees. Dartmouth College notified the Planning and Zoning Office that the chapter of the New Hampshire Alpha Chapter of Sigma Alpha Epsilon was suspended by the national organization. The College officially derecognized the fraternity, which meant the facility became ineligible to operate as an “I” district student residence. Continued use of the property as a residence would have been a violation of the zoning ordinance. In subsequent proceedings, SAE challenged the ZBA’s jurisdiction to hear SAE’s appeal in the first instance. The Town argued it was entitled to attorney’s fees because SAE’s challenge in this case was frivolous with no good faith basis in fact or law, and asserted that it was only intended to waste time and needlessly delay final judgment in this matter. Finding no reversible error in the superior court’s judgment, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed judgment to SAE’s appeal and the Town’s cross-appeal. View "New Hampshire Alpha of SAE Trust v. Town of Hanover" on Justia Law

In April 2017, a tax foreclosure action was commenced against the then-owner of the Cincinnati property, Davis. The city was named as a defendant. Notice of a May 2018 order for a sheriff’s sale was served on the city on June 1, 2018. During 2017-2018, a building on the property was also the subject of administrative condemnation proceedings. The condemnation decision, dated July 16, 2018, was sent by certified mail to the then-owner, Davis. After the public hearing, but before the decision to demolish the building was made, Plaintiff was the successful bidder at the July 5 sheriff’s sale. A decree confirming the sale entered on July 17. A sheriff’s deed was issued and was recorded in August.Plaintiff was not aware of the demolition decision. On November 14, 2018, the city sent letters to Plaintiff summarizing the public nuisance proceedings and the decision to raze the building, requesting that Plaintiff respond within 10 days The letters were sent via certified mail but were never delivered to Plaintiff. The city made no subsequent efforts to provide notice to Plaintiff.The building was demolished on April 8, 2019. The city demanded $10,515.00 from Plaintiff for the costs of the demolition. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the rejection of Plaintiff’s claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and for trespass. Plaintiff was provided with “notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances,” of the pendency of the condemnation proceedings. The city did not need to obtain a warrant to demolish a vacant building that had been condemned by administrative proceedings which met due process requirements. View "Keene Group, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati" on Justia Law

As part of a project to construct a new road along the North Diversion Channel, the City of Albuquerque initiated a condemnation proceeding to acquire a thirty-foot-wide strip of land across a 9.859-acre property (Property) owned by SMP Properties, LLC, whose managing member was R. Michael Pack (collectively, SMP). The district court granted Albuquerque entry and ordered the distribution of $143,850 to SMP as “just compensation” for the condemned property. SMP asserted it did not receive full compensation because, prior to initiating the condemnation action, Albuquerque directly communicated its intent to condemn a portion of the Property to one of SMP’s tenants, SAIA Motor Freight Line, LLC (SAIA). Hearing of Albuquerque’s intent to condemn, SAIA apparently decided not to renew its lease before Albuquerque filed the contemplated condemnation action, determining that the condemnation would disrupt its operation and use of the portion of the Property it leased. Based on Albuquerque’s pre-condemnation communications with SAIA and SAIA’s subsequent failure to renew its lease, SMP asserted an inverse condemnation claim against Albuquerque seeking consequential damages, including lost rental income and devaluation of the Property adjacent to the thirty-foot wide strip that Albuquerque condemned. Albuquerque moved for partial summary judgment on SMP’s “claims for consequential damages relating to the loss of potential tenant leases.” The district court granted Albuquerque summary judgment and concluded that Albuquerque’s pre-condemnation activity did not constitute “substantial[] interfere[nce] with the landowner’s use and enjoyment of the [P]roperty,” and therefore, no taking (in the form of an inverse condemnation) occurred. The Court of Appeals reversed the district court, finding there were disputed issues of material fact to preclude summary judgment. Though it did not adopt the appellate court’s reasoning, the New Mexico Supreme Court affirmed reversal of summary judgment. View "City of Albuquerque v. SMP Props., LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs-Appellants Santa Fe Alliance for Public Health & Safety, Arthur Firstenberg, and Monika Steinhoff (collectively the “Alliance”) brought a number of claims under Section 704 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (“TCA”), New Mexico’s Wireless Consumer Advanced Infrastructure Investment Act (“WCAIIA”), the Amendments to Chapter 27 of the Santa Fe City City Code, and Santa Fe mayor proclamations. The Alliance alleged the statutes and proclamations violated due process, the Takings Clause, and the First Amendment. Through its amended complaint, the Alliance contended the installation of telecommunications facilities, primarily cellular towers and antennas, on public rights-of-way exposed its members to dangerous levels of radiation. The Alliance further contended these legislative and executive acts prevented it from effectively speaking out against the installation of new telecommunications facilities. The United States moved to dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), and (b)(6), and the City of Santa Fe moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). The district court concluded that while the Alliance pled sufficient facts to establish standing to assert its constitutional claims, the Alliance failed to allege facts stating any constitutional claim upon which relief could be granted, thus dismissing claims against all defendants, including New Mexico Attorney General Hector Balderas. The Tenth Circuit affirmed dismissal of the Alliance's constitutional claims, finding apart from the district court, that the Alliance lacked standing to raise its takings and due process claims not premised on an alleged denial of notice. Furthermore, the Court held that while the Alliance satisfied the threshold for standing as to its First Amendment and procedural due process claims (premised on the WCAIIA and Chapter 27 Amendments), the district court properly dismissed these claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). View "Santa Fe Alliance v. City of Santa Fe" on Justia Law

Citizens Against Linscott/Interstate Asphalt Plant (“CAL”) challenged a conditional use permit (“CUP”) issued by the Bonner County, Idaho Board of Commissioners (“the County”). The CUP was based on a recent amendment to Bonner County zoning ordinances (“the Amendment”) and authorized Interstate Concrete and Asphalt Company (“Interstate”) to operate an asphalt batch plant within Frank and Carol Linscott’s gravel mine in Sagle, Idaho. In its petition for judicial review by the Bonner County district court, CAL challenged both the validity of the Amendment and the County’s decision to issue the CUP. The district court determined that CAL had standing to file its petition for judicial review of the CUP and that CAL had timely filed its petition. However, the district court concluded that it could not declare the Amendment invalid in a proceeding for judicial review under Idaho Local Land Use Planning Act (“LLUPA”) and the Idaho Administrative Procedure Act (“IDAPA”). Accordingly, the district court upheld the County’s decision to grant the CUP, giving the County deference in applying its own land-use ordinances. During the pendency of this appeal, CAL filed an action for declaratory relief before another district court judge to have the Amendment declared void. In that proceeding, the County admitted that the Amendment had been adopted without proper public notice and stipulated to a judgment and order declaring the Amendment void. On appeal of the administrative decision to the Idaho Supreme Court, CAL argued, among other things, that the subsequent voiding of the Amendment also invalidated the CUP or that the CUP was not issued in conformity with Bonner County zoning laws. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed in part, and reversed in part. The Court found the CUP authorizing the relocation of the Interstate asphalt batch plant to the Linscotts’ gravel mine was invalid because it was based on a void amendment to Bonner County Code. Further, the County acted in a manner that was arbitrary and capricious in refusing to address the gravel pit’s compliance with the nonconforming use provisions of BCRC. View "Citizens Against Linscott v. Bonner County Board of Commissioners" on Justia Law