Justia Zoning, Planning & Land Use Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Civil Rights
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This case stemmed from the closure of the Franklin Shelter, an overnight facility for homeless men in downtown Washington D.C. On appeal, plaintiffs alleged that the closure violated federal and D.C. antidiscrimination statutes. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal on res judicata grounds because plaintiffs could have raised these claims in two prior Superior Court cases. View "Sheptock v. Fenty" on Justia Law

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Good News appealed from the district court's determination on remand from the Ninth Circuit that the Town's ordinance restricting the size, duration, and location of temporary directional signs did not discriminate between different forms of noncommercial speech in an unconstitutional manner. In Reed v. Town of Gilbert, the court held that the ordinance was not a content-based regulation and was a reasonable time, place, and manner restriction. Accepting the court's opinion in Reed as law of the case, the court concluded that the Sign Code was constitutional because the different treatment of types of noncommercial temporary signs were not content-based as that term was defined in Reed, and the restrictions were tailored to serve significant government interests. Good News' other challenges did not merit relief. Further, the court determined that the amendments to the Sign Code made by the Town during the pendency of the appeal did not moot this case and that Good News could file a new action in the district court should it wish to challenge the new provisions of the Sign Code. View "Reed, et al v. Town of Gilbert, Arizona, et al" on Justia Law

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The City brought an eminent domain action to acquire a forty-foot-wide strip of real property from Respondent. Respondent's predecessor-in-interest originally acquired title to this property through a federal land patent that reserved a thirty-three-foot-wide easement across the strip of property for "roadway and public utilities purposes." The City asserted that it sought to utilize its existing rights to the thirty-three-foot right-of-way under the federal land patent's easement and to attain, by condemnation, the remaining seven-foot portion of land. The district court granted Respondent partial summary judgment and awarded Respondent $394,490 in compensation, concluding that the City lacked any right to use the easement because the federal patent did not specifically name the City. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred in (1) determining that the federal land patent did not create a thirty-three-foot-wide easement, as the plain meaning of the patent's language created a valid public easement; (2) determining that the City's proposed use of the easement constituted a taking, as the use of this easement was within its scope and did not strip Respondent of a property interest; and (3) awarding Respondent just compensation and attorney fees. View "City of Las Vegas v. Cliff Shadows Prof'l Plaza, LLC" on Justia Law

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First Korean Church alleged that the township violated its First Amendment right to religious freedom, its Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection, and its rights under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 by preventing First Korean from using its property as a church and seminary. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the township. The Third Circuit affirmed. View "First Korean Church of NY, Inc. v. Cheltenham Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd." on Justia Law

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Petitioners filed a petition for judicial review of the Baltimore City Council's approval of a planned unit development (PUD) with a Wal-Mart supercenter. Both Petitioners' residences were approximately 0.4 miles away from the PUD. The Mayor and City Council of the City, the owners of the property, and the developers of the PUD (Respondents) filed motions to dismiss, alleging that Petitioners lacked standing to challenge the PUD. The circuit court granted Respondents' motions and dismissed Petitioners' petition for review. The court of special appeals affirmed, concluding that Petitioners did not qualify for prima facie aggrieved status and that they had failed to show any special aggrievement different from the general public. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and held that the circuit court did not err in its judgment, as Petitioners failed to allege specific facts that they had been specially aggrieved in a manner different than the public generally. View "Ray v. Baltimore" on Justia Law

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Helena Sand and Gravel, Inc. (HSG) challenged Lewis and Clark County's decision to adopt a citizen-initiated proposal to configure a zoning district that favored residential uses and prohibited mining. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the County, concluding that the County had properly adopted the zoning pattern and regulations creating the district, and the County's zoning decision did not constitute a taking of HSG's property. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and remanded, holding (1) the County's decision to adopt the zoning pattern and regulations for the district was not clearly unreasonable or an abuse of discretion; (2) the County's adoption of zoning regulations prohibiting sand and gravel mining did not constitute illegal reverse spot zoning; and (3) because HSG had a constitutionally protected property interest in property within the district, the Court granted HSG's request for remand to the district court for the parties to brief the Penn Central takings test, narrowly limited to whether the County's adoption of the zoning pattern and regulations in the district constituted a taking of HSG's real property interest without just compensation. View "Helena Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. Planning & Zoning Comm'n" on Justia Law

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Appellant operated a sexually oriented business. Three weeks after the store's opening, the City Council enacted an ordinance establishing licensing requirements and regulations for sexually oriented businesses. Once a three-year grace period for nonconforming businesses already in existence at the time of the ordinance's passage ended, Appellant applied for and received a single six-month hardship extension. After the extension expired and Appellant did not apply for another extension, the City filed this action to enjoin the continuing operation of the store. Appellant counterclaimed, alleging that the ordinance was invalid, it violated the Arkansas Civil Rights Act, and it was unconstitutional. The circuit court found that the doctrines of waiver and estoppel prohibited Appellant from challenging the ordinance because it sought and was granted a hardship license and because it had received the benefit of the ordinance's amortization period. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that the acceptance-of-benefits rule of estoppel did not apply in this case because the passage of the ordinance provided no benefit to the store, and Appellant's acceptance of the temporary hardship extension was not voluntary in any real sense. View "40 Retail Corp. v. City of Clarksville" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff owns properties in a mixed rural/suburban area in central Illinois and lives in a house on one parcel. The other parcels, about 190 acres and near the house, were zoned agricultural and very close to a hog farm. The owners of two other properties in proximity to the hog farm obtained rezoning to the “rural residential” classification, but the county declined plaintiff’s applications for rezoning. Plaintiff sued in state court; the court entered an “Agreed Order” that stated that the parcels should be rezoned, but did not order that they be rezoned. One year later, the zoning board held the required hearing and recommended approval. The County Board voted 11 to 10 in favor of the applications, less than a three-fourths majority, which functioned as a denial. In 2008, the Board granted the applications, but the real estate market had collapsed, and the parcels were no longer worth more zoned residential than they had been when zoned agricultural. Plaintiff sought damages under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court entered summary judgment for the defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that protection of agriculture was a rational, nonretaliatory motive for voting against the applications. View "Guth v. Tazewell County" on Justia Law

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The Church filed suit in federal district court, claiming that a now-repealed city ordinance's church-specific provisions, facially and as applied, violated the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. 2000cc et seq., the First Amendment; the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Mississippi Constitution. The Church simultaneously filed a motion for a preliminary injunction of the challenged provisions. The court subsequently vacated the district court's order denying the Church's motion for a preliminary injunction and remanded for further proceedings. The court concluded that the issues on remand included but were not limited to: (1) whether the Church was likely to succeed on its claims challenging the validity of the newly adopted religious facilities ban; (2) whether the harm the Church would suffer absent a preliminary injunction outweighed the harm an injunction would cause the city; (3) the amount of actual damages the Church suffered on account of Sections 10.86 and 10.89 of the city's zoning ordinance, which violated RLUIPA; and (4) at the district court's discretion, whether the Church should be awarded reasonable attorneys fees as a prevailing party under 42 U.S.C. 1988(b). View "Opulent Life Church, et al v. City of Holly Springs MS, et al" on Justia Law

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This appeal concerned a longstanding land-use dispute between the Church and the Town over the Church's plan to build a worship facility and school on land that it owned within the Town. The Town appealed from the district court's holding that they violated the Church's rights under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. 2000cc et seq., as well as the First Amendment, the Equal Protection Clause, and New York constitutional and statutory law. The court concluded that the Town's arguments on appeal were without merit and concluded that the district court correctly applied the law, discerning no clear error in its factual findings. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Fortress Bible Church v. Feiner" on Justia Law