Justia Zoning, Planning & Land Use Opinion Summaries

This case arose out of a dispute over provisions in a written contract for sewer drainage and treatment services between Groveland Water and Sewer District (“GWSD”) and the City of Blackfoot (“the City”). Individuals living outside city limits, or entities located outside city limits, but within GWSD, were required to sign a “consent to annex” form in order for the City to agree to connect them to sewer services. The dispute ultimately made its way to district court, where GWSD alleged that the City’s requirement violated GWSD’s jurisdictional sovereignty under Idaho Code section 42-3212. GWSD’s complaint against the City sought: (1) a declaratory judgment; (2) a finding of anticipatory breach of contract; and (3) injunctive relief. On motions from the parties, the district court granted GWSD’s request for preliminary injunction and for partial summary judgment on the anticipatory breach claim. After further motions, the district court granted summary judgment to GWSD on the remaining claims. The City appeals. Finding no reversible error, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s decisions. View "Groveland Water and Sewer Dist v. City of Blackfoot" on Justia Law

Cahaba Riverkeeper, Inc., Cahaba River Society, David Butler, and Bradford McLane ("the conservation parties") appealed a circuit court's dismissal of their action for declaratory and injunctive relief against the Water Works Board of the City of Birmingham ("the Board") and the State of Alabama, on the relation of Alabama Attorney General Steve Marshall. At the heart of this case was a settlement agreement executed by the Board and a former attorney general executed in 2001. In 1998, the City of Birmingham ("the City") and its then-mayor began exploring ways to increase funding for its school system, and ultimately sold the assets of the system, including land, reservoirs, and filtration systems, to a private investor to retire debts and to establish an education trust fund. In 2000, the City's newly elected mayor sought to establish a new arrangement in which the Board would operate as a City department. Members of the city council opposed that plan, wishing to keep the Board independent and have it buy back the system assets. In July 2000, the city council approved an ordinance to transfer the assets back to the Board. The mayor later filed suit against the Board and city council in an attempt to prevent the Board from repurchasing the assets. The State Attorney General intervened and counterclaimed against the mayor and city council, all of which ended in the settlement agreement. In their complaint here, the conservation parties alleged that, in 2016, a parcel of land "subject to the settlement agreement was sold for a gas station after unanimous approval by the Board." In 2021, the conservation parties contended the Conservation Easement Agreement ("the CEA") did not establish a valid conservation easement that fulfilled the requirements dictated in paragraph 7 of the settlement agreement. The Alabama Supreme Court found that based on paragraph 6 of the settlement agreement, the conservation parties had a third-party right to seek enforcement of the terms of paragraph 7 of the settlement agreement. The Court also concluded the conservation parties stated a viable justiciable controversy with respect to whether the Board fulfilled its obligation in paragraph 7 of the settlement agreement "to place a conservation easement on the System's real estate described in paragraph 7 of the Acquisition Agreement ...." Therefore, the circuit court's judgment dismissing the conservation parties' claims against the Board is reversed, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings. View "Cahaba Riverkeeper, Inc., et al. v. Water Works Board of the City of Birmingham, et al." on Justia Law

The California Coastal Act of 1976 (Pub. Resources Code 30000) requires a coastal development permit (CDP) for any “development” resulting in a change in the intensity of use of, or access to, land or water in a coastal zone. In December 2018, Los Angeles adopted the Home-Sharing Ordinance, imposing restrictions on short-term vacation rentals, with mechanisms to enforce those restrictions. Objectors sought to enjoin enforcement of the Ordinance in the Venice coastal zone until the city obtains a CDP, claiming the Ordinance constituted a “development” requiring a CDP.The trial court denied relief, finding the petition time-barred by the 90-day statute of limitations in Government Code section 65009, and that the Ordinance does not create a change in intensity of use and, therefore, is not a “development” requiring a CDP. The court of appeal affirmed, agreeing that the 90-day statute of limitations applies, rather than the three-year statute of limitations in Code of Civil Procedure section 338(a). The court did not address whether the Ordinance constitutes a “development” subject to the CDP requirements of the Coastal Act. View "Coastal Act Protectors v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

The Vermont Environmental Division concluded that Snowstone, LLC, did not need an Act 250 permit to operate a small dimensional-stone extraction operation on a 0.93-acre parcel of land to be purchased from landowners Justin and Maureen Savage. It found the proposed sale between landowners and Snowstone was an arm’s-length transaction and that neither party would exercise “control” over the land to be held by the other such that they should be considered one “person” for Act 250 purposes. Neighbors challenged these conclusions on appeal, and challenged other aspects of the court’s merits decision as well. Finding no reversible error, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the Environmental Division. View "In re Snowstone, LLC Act 250 Jurisdictional Opinion (Michael Harrington, et al., Appellants)" on Justia Law

The City of Gautier granted David Vindich a permit to build a 1,410 square foot garage/workshop on his .76 acre lot. When the building was almost completed, Vindich’s neighbor, Martin Wheelan, filed a lawsuit arguing the City’s decision was unlawful because Vindich actually sought a variance, which required a public hearing rather than a building permit. Thus, Wheelan said he was denied due process. Wheelan also claimed the City’s decision was arbitrary and capricious and that the workshop “completely overwhelm[ed]” the neighborhood and created a nuisance. After a trial, the chancellor dismissed Wheelan’s claims, finding that the City’s interpretation of the applicable ordinance was not manifestly unreasonable. The chancellor also found that the building was not a nuisance. Wheelan appealed, but the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Mississippi Supreme Court agreed with the appellate court's dissenting opinion, finding the City erred in its interpretation of the ordinance at issue here. The Court therefore reversed the Court of appeals and the chancery court, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Wheelan v. City of Gautier, et al." on Justia Law

Divide County, North Dakota appealed judgments dismissing its complaints against Stateline Services, Inc., Power Energy Logistics, LLC, and five individuals (collectively, “Defendants”), which alleged they operated overweight vehicles on restricted roads. In 2019, Divide County imposed certain weight restrictions on county and township roads due to wet conditions. Truck drivers for Stateline Services and Power Energy Logistics were pulled over on township roads and cited for operating overweight vehicles. The County filed this civil action against the Defendants for statutory damages under N.D.C.C. 39-12- 17. After a bench trial, the district court dismissed the complaints, concluding the County failed to provide sufficient public notice of the weight restrictions through a uniform county permit system, and failed to erect and maintain signs at each end of the highway. Finding no reversible error, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the district court. View "Divide County v. Stateline Service, et al." on Justia Law

Defendant Joseph Chenard appealed a superior court ruling that he operated or maintained a junk yard in violation of RSA 236:114. Plaintiff Town of Lincoln (town) cross-appealed the trial court’s denial of its request for costs and attorney’s fees. Defendant owned the property at issue, consisting of four lots located in the town's "General Use" zoning district, which allowed junk yards only by special exception. The properties contained “large amounts of personal belongings” stored “both outdoors and in a number of sheds, which are generally in a dilapidated condition.” During its view of the properties, the court observed “old or used scrap metal including numerous machine or automotive parts, tires, wheels, cables and wiring, woodstoves, snowplows, construction debris, steel drums, plastic barrels, and other detritus.” In addition, the court observed “several automobiles that did not appear to be in working order, as well as old snowmobiles, lawnmowers, and ATVs, an old boat, and two semi-trailers.” All of the materials stored on defendant’s properties belonged to him and were stored there for his personal use. Defendant did not have a license to operate a junk yard business, nor did he have a special exception from the town. The superior court ultimately ordered defendant to end his violation of RSA 236:114 and abate the nuisance by a certain date and, if he failed to do so, authorized the town to impose a civil penalty of up to $50 per day for every day the nuisance continued and until such time as the nuisance was abated to the town’s satisfaction. The trial court denied the town’s request for costs and attorney’s fees. Finding that the trial court did not err in finding that provisions of RSA 236:111-:129 applied to defendant’s properties, and that defendant was operating or maintaining a junk yard in violation of RSA 236:114, and that the town was not entitled to attorney's fees, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed. View "Town of Lincoln v. Joseph Chenard" on Justia Law

Landowner Daniel Banyai appealed an Environmental Division decision upholding a notice of violation, granting a permanent injunction, and assessing $46,600 in fines, relating to alleged zoning violations and the construction of a firearms training facility in the Town of Pawlet. Banyai argued he had a valid permit, certain exhibits were improperly admitted at the merits hearing, and the fines were excessive. Finding no reversible error, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the Environmental Division's decision. View "Town of Pawlet v. Banyai" on Justia Law

In 2010, real parties in interest applied to the City of Santa Cruz to construct a 40-unit development on a parcel of land located at 1930 Ocean Street Extension. Following an initial mitigated negative declaration and years of litigation surrounding the impact of the nearby crematory at Santa Cruz Memorial Park, in 2016, the real parties in interest renewed their interest in moving forward with their project. As required by the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA), the project applicant and the City of Santa Cruz prepared and circulated the initial study, the draft environmental impact report (EIR), the partially recirculated draft EIR, and the final EIR. Following a public hearing, the city council adopted a resolution to certify the EIR and to adopt Alternative 3, a 32-unit housing project. The Ocean Street Extension Neighborhood Association (OSENA) filed a petition for writ of mandamus, alleging the City of Santa Cruz and its city council violated CEQA and the Santa Cruz Municipal Code in approving the project. The trial court concluded the City had complied with CEQA, but it determined the City violated the municipal code, and it issued a limited writ prohibiting the City from allowing the project to proceed unless and until it followed the municipal code and the court was satisfied with its compliance. Following entry of judgment, OSENA appealed, arguing the court erred by concluding the City complied with CEQA’s requirements. OSENA contended the City violated CEQA by: (1) insufficiently addressing potentially significant biological impacts and mitigation measures in the initial study rather than in the EIR directly; (2) establishing improperly narrow and unreasonable objectives so that alternative options could not be considered meaningfully; and (3) failing to address cumulative impacts adequately. The City cross-appealed, contending the court incorrectly concluded it violated the municipal code by granting a planned development permit without also requiring the project applicant to comply with the slope modifications regulations After review, the Court of Appeal agreed with the City, and affirmed that portion of the trial court's order and judgment concluding it complied with CEQA. The Court reversed the portion of the order and judgment concluding the City violated its municipal code. View "Ocean Street Extension Neighborhood etc. v. City of Santa Cruz" on Justia Law

Trackside was a proposed mixed-use building project in the City of Davis, California, between the Downtown Core and Old East Davis, an older neighborhood. After the city council approved Trackside, plaintiff Old East Davis Neighborhood Association (“the Association”) petitioned for a writ of mandate, and the trial court found insufficient evidence supported the City’s finding that Trackside was consistent with applicable planning documents. The court specifically cited the lack of evidence that Trackside served as a “transition” from the Downtown Core to Old East Davis. On appeal, defendants City of Davis and City Council, along with real party in interest Trackside Center, LLC (“the City” and “Trackside”) challenged that ruling, contending the trial court applied the wrong legal standard in evaluating consistency with planning documents, and that substantial evidence supported the City’s finding that Trackside was consistent with applicable planning requirements and guidelines. After its review, the Court of Appeal concluded substantial evidence supported the City’s approval, and the Association’s contentions on cross-appeal lacked merit. The Court therefore reversed the judgment granting the petition for writ of mandate. View "Old East Davis Neighborhood Assn. v. City of Davis" on Justia Law