Justia Zoning, Planning & Land Use Opinion Summaries

In 2005, the Regents adopted a long-range development plan (LRDP) for UC Berkeley through the year 2020. An Environmental Impact Report (EIR, California Environmental Quality Act (Pub. Resources Code, 21000) noted the LRDP “represents a maximum amount of net new growth.” which the University could substantially exceed only by amending the LRDP. In 2018, the Regents approved a new development for additional academic space and campus housing and certified a Supplemental EIR, which established an updated population baseline.SBN challenged decisions to increase enrollment beyond the level described in the 2005 EIR without further CEQA review. On remand, the trial court found that parts of the SEIR did not comply with CEQA and ordered the Regents to revise the SEIR and suspend enrollment increases. The Regents cited its certification of a 2021 LRDP and related EIR and Senate Bill 118, which modifies section 21080.09 to clarify that “Enrollment or changes in enrollment, by themselves, do not constitute a project” under CEQA and limit the remedies available if a court finds deficiencies in an environmental review based on enrollment.The court of appeal vacated, holding that certification of the 2021 EIR and S.B. 118 moot SBN’s challenge to the enrollment increases and make unenforceable the orders suspending enrollment increases. The SEIR’s project description complied with CEQA and there was no error in the discussion of mitigation measures for historic resources. View "Save Berkeley's Neighborhoods v. Regents of the University of California" on Justia Law

In this case involving the proposed redevelopment of the Redondo Beach waterfront, the Second Appellate District reversed its previous order awarding attorney's fees to Defendant. After the court initially awarded attorney's feed to Defendant, Plaintiff appealed to the California Supreme Court, which held that a Defendant is only entitled to attorney's fees if the plaintiff brought or maintained an action without foundation.Revisiting the issue, the Second Appellate District reversed its previous decision in light of the Supreme Court's holding. Plaintiffs' claims "marshaled a foundation for their suit" sufficient to avoid paying attorney's fees. View "Travis v. Brand" on Justia Law

Defendants-appellants City of Huntington Beach (Huntington) and the City Council of Huntington Beach (City Council; collectively, the City) appealed the grant of attorney fees in favor of plaintiff and respondent The Kennedy Commission (Kennedy) for litigation pertaining to the City’s housing element plan under California’s Housing Element Law. Prior to 2015, the City had adopted its 2013-2021 housing element (Housing Element), which identified sufficient sites to accommodate the City’s Regional Housing Needs Allocation (RHNA) of lower-income housing mandated by California. This Housing Element was consistent with the general plan of the City. A majority of the units for low-income housing were set aside in an area known as the Beach Edinger Corridors Specific Plan (BECSP). The California Department of Housing and Community Development (HCD) approved the Housing Element. In 2015, after complaints from residents about the density in the BECSP, the City passed an amendment that significantly reduced the number of housing units that could be developed in the BECSP (Amended BECSP), thereby effectively eliminating sites for low-income housing in Huntington. Kennedy advised the City that the Amended BECSP did not meet Huntington’s requirement for their RHNA and it violated state law. Kennedy then petitioned for alternative writ of mandate and complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief alleging that the Amended BECSP was inconsistent with the Housing Element in violation of Government Code sections 65454, 65580, 65583, 65587 and 65860. Kennedy argued that the Amended BESCSP was void as it was not consistent with the Housing Element. The Petition included five other causes of action, including, in the second cause of action, that the City must implement the Housing Element. The trial court applied Government Code section 65454 and declared the Amended BECSP was void because it conflicted with the general plan. The trial court refused to order that the City had to implement the Housing Element as it was written. Kennedy voluntarily dismissed all the other causes of action without prejudice. The trial court also awarded Kennedy attorney fees as the prevailing party. Finding no reversible error in the attorney fee award, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "The Kennedy Com. v. City of Huntington Beach" on Justia Law

The eight-acre San Jose City View Plaza contained nine buildings, including the Bank, built in 1971, which later housed the County Family Court. The Bank was eligible for listing on the California Register of Historic Resources and National Register of Historic Places. The site development permit provided for the demolition of all structures, followed by the construction of three, 19-story office towers, 65,000 square feet of ground-floor retail, and five levels of underground parking.The city council certified the Downtown Strategy 2040 final environmental impact report under the California Environmental Quality Act (Pub. Resources Code 21000 (CEQA)), finding that the Plaza required a supplemental environmental impact report (SEIR). The draft SEIR identified the proposed demolition of the buildings as a “significant unavoidable impact” and presented mitigation measures, to document the structures, advertise their availability for relocation, and otherwise make the structures available for salvage. The city voted not to designate the Bank as a city landmark and approved the permit, certifying the Final SEIR and rejecting project alternatives as infeasible because the “anticipated economic, social, and other benefits” of the project outweighed its “significant and unavoidable impacts.”After the trial court denied a mandate petition filed by opponents, the Bank was demolished. The court of appeal affirmed. The Final SEIR’s discussion of mitigation for the unavoidable loss of significant historic resources complied with CEQA. San Jose did not abuse its discretion by briefly considering and rejecting additional mitigation measures. View "Preservation Action Council of San Jose v. City of San Jose" on Justia Law

This appeal arises from litigation involving a public construction project to build the Central Region 9th Street Span K-8 school in downtown Los Angeles. The Los Angeles Unified School District (LAUSD or District) and Suffolk Construction Company, Inc. (Suffolk), entered into a development and construction agreement (contract), for the development and building of the school. Suffolk later entered into subcontracts with various subcontractors, including R.J. Daum Construction Company (Daum) and Fisk Electric Company (Fisk). Throughout the project, various problems arose, which caused delay and disruption and resulted in increased costs to Suffolk, Daum and Fisk. Suffolk sued LAUSD, alleging breach of the contract, implied contractual indemnity, and seeking declaratory relief. The jury found that Suffolk substantially performed its contract and that LAUSD breached the implied warranty of correctness by providing plans and/or specifications for the concrete footing design that was not correct. Further, the jury determined Suffolk’s damages for the concrete issue decided in phase 1 (TIA 5).   The Second Appellate District found that the phase 1 verdict must be reversed and remanded for retrial on the ground that the special jury instruction based on Public Contract Code section 1104 was improper. The reversal of the phase 1 liability verdict requires that the phase 2 trial of damages for TIA 5 (related to the concrete cracking issue) must also be reversed and remanded for retrial. Finally, the court held that the trial court erred in granting JNOV on the phase 2 jury verdict. Thus, the decision granting the JNOV is reversed with direction to reinstate the jury verdict on that issue. View "Suffolk Construction Co. v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist." on Justia Law

The Map, filed with the Alameda County Recorder’s Office in 1854, depicts lots 15-18. In 1877, those lots were conveyed with others and were separately identified. Lots 15-18 were transferred in a single conveyance in 1885, 1887, and 1913. Lot 18 remained as depicted on the 1854 Map. In 1944, lots 17 and 18 and part of lot 16 were transferred in a single deed. In 2015, Crescent acquired those lots by a single deed. Crescent applied for a certificate of compliance for lot 18. The city surveyor agreed lot 18 “was legally created" but concluded, that lots “18 and 17, and a portion of 15 and 16 were merged" by a 1933 probate judgment because “[t]he adjudicated lines of the original lots were removed" by metes and bounds description, and they were effectively re-subdivided by the 1944 conveyance. There had “been no effort to divide the parcel into the original 25-foot configurations,” no separately assessed parcel existed for lot 18 in 1972, and the lot had not been “separately” conveyed.The court of appeal ruled in favor of Crescent. Lot 18, conveyed in conjunction with three or fewer other lots before the enactment of any ordinance governing such subdivisions, is presumptively lawful (Government Code 66412.6(a) and 66499.30(d)). It is irrelevant whether the original Map created legal parcels or whether lot 18 was ever “merged” into the adjoining lots, as the city never attempted to justify its denial of a certificate of compliance on that basis. View "Crescent Trust v. City of Oakland" on Justia Law

After the San Francisco Planning Commission approved a final mitigated negative declaration for the owner’s proposed renovation of a residence, Kaufman, the owner of an adjacent property, appealed the matter to the San Francisco Board of Supervisors, which reversed the approval. The owner filed a petition for writ of mandate against the City and County, the Board, the Planning Commission, and the Planning Department, naming Kaufman as a real party in interest. In response,Kaufman filed a special motion to strike under the anti-SLAPP (strategic lawsuit against public participation) law (Code Civil Procedure 425.16), arguing that the petition arose from his protected petitioning activity and lacked minimal merit. The trial court granted the anti-SLAPP motion and awarded Kaufman attorney fees as the prevailing party. The court of appeal reversed. The trial court erred in finding the mandamus petition arose from Kaufman’s protected conduct, as the activities that form the basis for the petition’s causes of action are all acts or omissions of the Board. That Kaufman’s administrative appeal preceded or even triggered the events leading to the petition’s causes of action against the Board did not mean that the petition arose from Kaufman’s protected conduct within the contemplation of the anti-SLAPP law. View "Durkin v. City and County of San Francisco" on Justia Law

This case involves the City of Clovis’s (City) housing element and related zoning ordinances and whether they comply with specific statutory requirements designed to assure affordable housing opportunities to lower-income families in California. These requirements for a municipality’s housing element have statewide importance because the housing elements of all cities and counties must include compliant zoning that accommodates the municipality’s need for lower-income housing. Adequacy of Housing Element. Plaintiff, a Clovis resident, sued the City, alleging its housing element for the 2015-2023 planning period, including amendments and zoning changes adopted in March 2019, did not substantially comply with the Housing Element Law. The trial court ruled in Plaintiff’s favor.The Fifth Appellate District reversed the judgment issuing the peremptory writ of mandate to the extent the writ is based on the trial court’s finding the amended housing element does not satisfy the requirements of section 65583.2, subdivision (g) because it does not include the required analysis for sites within the P-F Zone. The court otherwise  affirmed the trial court’s issuance of a peremptory writ of mandate compelling the City to (1) adopt “a housing element for the 2015-2023 planning period that substantially complies with Government Code section 65754”; and (2) implement Program 4 “by zoning or rezoning an adequate number of sites, compliant with Government Code Section 65583.2(h), to accommodate the City’s unmet share of the RHNA from the 2008-2013 planning period, pursuant to Government Code section 65584.09.” View "Martinez v. City of Clovis" on Justia Law

In 1985, Palo Alto established the Commercial Downtown zoning district with parking regulations that allowed for “payment of an in-lieu monetary contribution to the city to defray the cost” of new, off-site parking spaces for “sites which would otherwise be precluded from development due to parking constraints.” In 1995, the city recognized the need to further mitigate insufficient downtown parking facilities and established an in-lieu parking fee for new, nonresidential development in the “University Avenue parking assessment district.” City staff has periodically submitted “five-year findings” on the parking fund, consistent with the Mitigation Fee Act (Gov. Code, 66000).The plaintiffs, developers who paid the fees as a condition of approval of a building project, sued, seeking a refund of their unexpended fees. The city argued that the fee was not subject to the Mitigation Fee Act; that the five-year finding and refund provisions did not apply; that, even if the Act did apply, the claim was barred by the statute of limitations; and that it complied with the Act’s requirements by belatedly adopting five-year findings.The court of appeal reversed the trial court, ordering a refund of the plaintiffs’ unexpended fees. The fee is subject to the Act, and the action is not time-barred. The failure to timely make five-year findings triggered the refund provision. Section 65010(b), does not require that plaintiffs make an independent showing of prejudice for a violation of section 66001(d) View "Hamilton and High, LLC v. City of Palo Alto" on Justia Law

Government Code 65913.4 provides for streamlined, ministerial approval of affordable housing projects meeting specified requirements. Berkeley denied Ruegg’s application for ministerial approval of a mixed-use development under section 65913.4. Ruegg alleged violations of both section 65913.4 and the Housing Accountability Act (HAA, section 65589.5). The trial court found Berkeley was not required to approve the proposed project under section 65913.4 and denied Ruegg’s petition without reaching the HAA issues. The court of appeal, without addressing the HAA, directed the trial court to grant the writ petition.On remand, the trial court reasoned that it could not avoid ruling on the HAA issues. With respect to the section 65913.4 claim the court ordered Berkeley to issue the permits; it set a briefing schedule and hearing date concerning the HAA issues. The court of appeal declined to prohibit that hearing. Berkeley issued the permit. After a hearing, the trial court found that the disapproval of the application violated the HAA and that Ruegg was entitled to the “albeit duplicative” injunctive relief. The court of appeal affirmed, finding that the trial court had jurisdiction to address the HAA issue, which was not forfeited nor rendered moot by the prior order. View "Ruegg & Ellsworth v. City of Berkeley" on Justia Law