Justia Zoning, Planning & Land Use Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed suit seeking to quiet title to two claimed easements within residential gated communities in which plaintiff has no ownership interest. The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's judgment in favor of plaintiff and held that the trial court erred by finding that the individual homeowners in the gated community were not indispensable parties to plaintiff's lawsuit, but nonetheless were bound by the judgment; by finding an express easement over all the private streets of Indian Springs; by providing an express easement or, alternatively, a prescriptive easement; by failing to make the necessary findings to support an equitable easement; and by determining that the Lenope property benefited plaintiff's ranch.Therefore, the court held that there were no enforceable easements over the private streets of the community, or over the Lenope roadway, and thus there was no basis for an award of damages or an injunction against any of the defendants, and no basis for the award of attorney fees. Furthermore, plaintiff's claims for nuisance, declaratory relief, and intentional interference with contractual relations also failed. View "Ranch at the Falls LLC v. O'Neal" on Justia Law

Appellants petitioned the Commission to revoke a coastal development permit (CDP), alleging that MVF's CDP application contained intentional misrepresentations regarding approvals it received from the Los Angeles County Environmental Review Board (ERB), the California Water Resources Control Board (Water Board), and the California Department of Fish and Game (Fish and Game). After the Commission denied the petition, appellants petitioned the superior court for a writ of administrative mandate to set aside the Commission's decision.The Court of Appeal affirmed the superior court's denial of the petition and held that substantial evidence supported the Commission's determination that accurate or complete information would not have caused the Commission to act differently in ruling on MVF's CDP application. In this case, the Commission correctly interpreted and applied section 13105, subdivision (a), and substantial evidence supported the Commission's determination that although MVF's application contained intentional misrepresentations regarding the approvals by the ERB, Fish and Game, and the Water Board, the Commission would not have imposed additional conditions or denied the CDP if accurate information had been provided. View "Hubbard v. Coastal Commission" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed petitions for writs of administrative mandamus and sought declaratory relief requesting a finding that the Board was equitably estopped from asserting that rental properties were subject to rent control. The trial court granted the petitions and the requested declaratory relief.The Court of Appeal held that the trial court erred by applying equitable estoppel to require the Board to act beyond its statutory authority and in contravention of the Rent Control Law. The court also held that the Board did not revoke or modify the removal permits; the doctrine that an administrative agency may not reopen or reconsider a prior decision did not compel affirmance; and a landlord's entitlement to a constitutionally fair return was not affected by the Board's interpretation of section 1803(t) of the Santa Monica City Charter, article XVIII. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "1041 20th Street v. Santa Monica Rent Control Bd." on Justia Law

Real party in interest and respondent Genesee Properties, Inc. (Genesee) sought tentative map approval from respondent County of San Diego (the County) for a 24-lot subdivision on 1416.5 acres of land in San Diego County known as the Hoskings Ranch (the property). The property was within a County-designated agricultural preserve and a majority of it was subject to a Williamson Act contract requiring that the land be restricted to agricultural and compatible uses. The County Board of Supervisors adopted a resolution conditionally approving the tentative map, finding in part that the subdivision "will not result in residential development not incidental to the commercial agricultural use of the land" pursuant to section 66474.4 of the Subdivision Map Act. Plaintiffs-appellants Cleveland National Forest Foundation and others (collectively, Cleveland) unsuccessfully petitioned for a writ of mandate and injunctive and declaratory relief, challenging the legality of the Board's approval. On appeal, Cleveland contended the County's approval of the tentative map violated section 66474.4 and undermined the Williamson Act by permitting a residential, rather than agricultural, subdivision on the property and giving the property developers a valuable residential entitlement while they were still receiving a taxpayer subsidy intended for those who maintain the land in agricultural or compatible nonurban uses. The County and Genesee jointly responded that Cleveland's failure to exhaust administrative remedies effectively negated the appeal, and that Cleveland improperly raised new arguments that it did not make in the trial court during the administrative process. They maintained the subdivision complied with the Map Act, Cleveland did not overcome the legal presumption that the project will sustain agricultural uses, and substantial evidence otherwise supported the Board's findings. Construing section 66474.4 in keeping with the land preservation goals and intent of the Williamson Act, whose principles the Legislature incorporated into that section, the Court of Appeal concluded the Board's finding was not supported by substantial evidence in light of the whole record. As a result, the County's conditional approval of the proposed tentative map did not comply with the Map Act, and constituted an abuse of discretion. The judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Cleveland Nat. Forest Foundation v. County of San Diego" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Sacramentans for Fair Planning contended the City of Sacramento violated zoning law and the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) when it approved entitlements for real party 2500 J Owners, LLC, to construct a high-rise condominium building in the City’s Midtown area. The project was not consistent with the general plan and zoning code standards for building intensity and height. But the City approved it pursuant to a general plan policy authorizing more intense development than zoning otherwise allowed if the project provided a significant community benefit. The City also conducted a streamlined CEQA review. CEQA authorized the less intense review for a type of residential mixed-use development such as the proposed project which, because of its proximity to mass transit services, may help reduce regional greenhouse gas emissions by generating less use of motor vehicles. In a petition for writ of mandate, plaintiff argued that approving the project under the general plan policy violated constitutional law and an implied-in-law zoning contract that required identical uses in a zoning district to be treated uniformly and prohibited a delegation of legislative authority without sufficient standards to govern its use. Plaintiff also claimed the City violated CEQA because the streamlined review did not analyze all of the project’s environmental effects. The trial court denied plaintiff’s petition. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s order and judgment. View "Sacramentans for Fair Planning v. City of Sacramento" on Justia Law

January 13, 2017, a Sonoma County Permit and Resource Management Department engineer inspected respondent’s property and observed inadequate and unpermitted retaining walls, one of which directed water to a single point directly above a failed 25-foot bank that had deposited five cubic yards of earth onto Riverview Drive. Unpermitted grading and terracing had contributed to bank failure and deposit of material into a nearby watercourse. On January 19, a rainstorm caused a four-foot wall of mud to slide onto Riverview Drive. Respondent moved earthen materials from the road, resulting in the runoff of materials into a local stream and on neighboring private property. Respondent believed his actions either did not require permits or were emergency measures. Respondent failed to comply with an administrative order requiring him to abate the code violations and pay abatement costs and civil penalties. Sonoma County filed suit. Respondent did not file a responsive pleading. The court entered a default judgment that ordered penalties significantly lower than ordered by the administrative hearing officer. The court of appeal reversed the order imposing civil penalties at the rate of $20 per day and directed the court to modify its judgment to require payment at $45 per day. That provision of the court’s order altered a final administrative order, was entirely unexplained, and provided respondent with a windfall he did not request. View "County of Sonoma v. Gustely" on Justia Law

Kahan purchased property in Richmond at a foreclosure sale. Shortly before the sale, the city had recorded a “special assessment” lien against the property for unpaid garbage collection fees, pursuant to a municipal ordinance. When Kahan sold the property, he had to pay the delinquent garbage fees plus administrative charges and escrow fees to obtain a release of the lien. Kahan filed a class action lawsuit alleging that the city has no authority to levy “special assessments” for garbage collection charges that are “user fees” under state law and that the ordinance purporting to authorize such assessments violates state laws on lien priority. He also argued that the city’s action violated its ordinance because a garbage lien may not attach if a “bona fide encumbrancer for value” has placed a lien on the property before the garbage lien is recorded. The court of appeal affirmed the dismissal of the suit. Treatment of delinquent garbage fees as a special assessment and the recording of a lien are expressly authorized by Government Code 25831, even if garbage fees are user fees. Government Code sections 25831 and 38790.1 expressly authorize the super-priority status accorded the garbage lien, so the ordinance is consistent with statutory lien priority law. The bona fide encumbrancer exception does not apply. View "Kahan v. City of Richmond" on Justia Law

The Mitigation Fee Act (Gov. Code 66000) authorizes local agencies to impose fees on development projects to defray the cost of public facilities needed to serve the growth caused by the project if the fees are reasonably related to the burden caused by the development. Boatworks challenged Alameda's development fee ordinance. The trial court concluded the fees are excessive and constitute invalid exactions by imposing on new residents the purported cost of acquiring land for parks, although the city does not need to buy new parkland, and found that the city erred by including in its inventory of current parks two parks that were not yet open and by categorizing certain areas as parks rather than (less expensive) open space. The court of appeal reversed in part, holding that the city can properly include Shoreline Park, Osborne Model Airplane Field and two boat ramps in its inventory of parks. With respect to development fees for parks and recreation, the court stated that a fee based in significant part on costs the city will not incur, because it has already acquired ample land at no cost, does not have a “reasonable relationship to the cost of the public facility attributable to the development.” View "Boatworks, LLC v. Alameda" on Justia Law

After Huntington Park enacted and extended an urgency ordinance that imposed a temporary moratorium on charter schools while it considered amending its zoning code, the Association petitioned for writ of mandate seeking an order directing Huntington Park to invalidate approval of the ordinance on the ground it violated, among other things, the Planning and Zoning Law.The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's denial of the petition and held as a matter of law that the ordinance was invalid because the findings contained therein of "numerous inquiries and requests for the establishment and operation of charter schools" did not amount to a "current and immediate threat" as required by section 65858, subdivision (c) to enact an urgency ordinance. View "California Charter Schools Assn. v. City of Huntington Park" on Justia Law

The Mitigation Fee Act, Government Code 66000-66003, requires local agencies seeking to impose fees on private developers as a condition of approval of a development, to determine how there is a “reasonable relationship” between the type of development project, the fee’s use, and the need for the public facilities. The developer of a 100-unit agricultural employee housing complex in Monterey County’s Salinas Union High School District designed the project to accommodate 200-800 seasonal farmworker employees in dormitory-like apartments during the growing season. The project description stated that it was designed for “agricultural employees only, without dependents.” A report prepared for the county board of supervisors found that the project would “not have an adverse impact on schools.” The board approved the project, adopted a mitigated negative declaration under CEQA, and approved a combined permit, subject to conditions, which described the development for “agricultural employees only without dependents.” When the developer applied for project approval, the District adopted an impact fee on new residential construction of $3 per square foot. The court of appeal reversed the trial court, finding that the statutes do not require a school district to separately analyze the impact of a unique subtype of residential construction not contemplated in the statute. To hold otherwise would disrupt the school district’s quasi-legislative authority to impose prospective, district-wide fees based upon development type. View "Tanimura & Antle Fresh Foods v. Salinas Union High School District" on Justia Law