Justia Zoning, Planning & Land Use Opinion Summaries

Margery Kniffen, as Trustee for the Margery T. Kniffen Family Trust and Darrell Kniffen II, purchased an undeveloped tract in Fairbanks North Star Borough, planning to develop a subdivision. They also purchased a lot in Gold Country Estates, an existing subdivision adjacent to the undeveloped tract. The Kniffens sought a variance allowing them to construct a road across their Gold Country Estates lot to provide access to the planned subdivision. After hearing public testimony, the local Platting Board unanimously voted to deny the variance based on safety concerns. But after a subsequent site visit, the Board reconsidered the variance request and approved it. Gold Country Estates homeowners appealed to the Planning Commission, which upheld the Platting Board’s decision. The homeowners filed suit in superior court, arguing that the Platting Board denied them due process and violated the Open Meetings Act and that the proposed road violated Gold Country Estates’ covenants. The superior court ruled that Gold Country Estates’ covenants did not allow a Gold Country lot to be used as access for the new subdivision. Though the Kniffens’ access proposal was defeated, Gold Country continued to pursue its due process and Open Meetings Act claims against the Borough. The superior court ultimately ruled in favor of the Borough on those claims. The homeowners appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that the superior court erred by not finding that the Platting Board denied them due process and violated the Open Meetings Act. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the Borough on the homeowners' Open Meetings Act and due process claims, as well as the superior court's order declining to award attorney’s fees. View "Gold Country Estates Preservation Group, Inc. v. Fairbanks North Star Borough" on Justia Law

Thirty seven years ago, two business partners bought a 160-acre property bordering the Kenai River which they subdivided into 114 lots (Holiday Park Subdivision). The partners reserved an easement across Lot 30 for the benefit of all Holiday Park owners, but disagreements arose over the permissible uses and geographic boundaries of the easement. In 2004, the owner of Lot 30 sold it to Kenai River Airpark, LLC. One of the developers of Holiday Park sued Kenai River Airpark and the Airpark Owners Association to prevent their use of Lot 30. The superior court ruled that members of the Airpark Owners Association could use Lot 30 as long as they did not interfere with Holiday Park owners’ use of the easement. The superior court also ruled that the easement’s scope was limited to a defined path shown on the Holiday Park plat, but that permissible uses of the easement included boat launching, bank fishing, and river access. The Holiday Park developer appealed. Because Holiday Park’s plat unambiguously described the easement’s scope as “30' BOAT LAUNCH ESM’T,” the Supreme Court reversed the superior court’s ruling permitting more expansive use. However, the Court affirmed the superior court’s order regarding the geographic bounds of the easement; the original developer did not establish an expanded easement by prescription, implication, inquiry notice, or estoppel. View "HP Limited Partnership v. Kenai River Airpark, LLC" on Justia Law

Appellant Thomas Price, Jr. posted "no trespassing" signs on his property in 1998 in an attempt to quell what he believed were an excessive number of snow machiners using a trail that crossed his land, damaging it, traveling at high speeds, and causing a great deal of noise. In 2003, the Supreme Court held that a group of snow machiners had established a public prescriptive easement over the trail but twice remanded the case to the superior court to define the scope of the easement. The superior court held additional hearings, and in 2007 issued a memorandum that defined the easement. Appellant appealed the court's definition. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Appellant did not meet his burden of proving that the volume of snow machine traffic exceeded the scope of the easement. However, the Court reversed the superior court's decision that found the easement includes non-snow machine users. The Court remanded the case again for further clarification on the permissible scope of the snow machine easement, including seasonal limits, width and speed limit.

Appellant Frank Griswold appealed the Homer Advisory Planning Commission’s grant of a conditional-use permit to a mariculture association. The city clerk rejected his appeal for lack of standing because Appellant did not show that the permitted action would have an adverse effect on the use, enjoyment or value of his property. Appellant appealed that rejection to the superior court. The court affirmed the Planning Commission’s decision. Upon review of the record and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s decision. The Court found that the Homer City Code restricted standing in land use appeals and that the city clerk correctly rejected Appellant’s appeal.