Justia Zoning, Planning & Land Use Opinion Summaries

A company that leased space to a government agency lost its bid to renew that lease to another landowner in a different zoning district. The new lessor requested the municipal planning department to approve the government agency’s proposed use of its space, which the planning department determined was appropriate for the property’s zoning designation. The former lessor challenged this determination by appealing to the municipal zoning board, which affirmed the planning department’s decision.The former lessor then appealed the zoning board’s decision to the Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Third Judicial District. The superior court, on its own initiative, questioned the former lessor’s standing to appeal. After briefing, the court determined that the former lessor was a “party aggrieved” and therefore had standing. On the merits, the court found the zoning board’s findings insufficient and remanded the case for reconsideration. The new lessor petitioned for review, which was granted.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the case and concluded that the former lessor’s interest as a business competitor was insufficient to show that it was a “person aggrieved” with standing to appeal a zoning decision to the superior court. The court held that a general interest in upholding the zoning plan is not sufficient for aggrievement and that the former lessor’s competitive interest did not meet the statutory requirement of being a “person aggrieved.” Consequently, the Supreme Court reversed the superior court’s decision and remanded with instructions to dismiss the former lessor’s appeal for lack of standing. View "Winco Anchorage Investors I, LP v. Huffman Building P, LLC" on Justia Law

The City of Soldotna sought to expand its boundaries by annexing adjacent land and submitted an annexation petition to the Local Boundary Commission (Commission) for legislative review. The Commission, however, decided to convert the petition to a local vote, exercising its authority under a regulation that had not been previously used. Soldotna appealed the Commission’s decision, arguing that the Commission exceeded its authority, the regulation was invalid due to lack of standards and required rulemaking, there was insufficient basis for the decision, and the decision was internally inconsistent.The Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Third Judicial District, Kenai, upheld the Commission’s decision. The court found that the regulation under which the Commission acted was authorized by the Alaska Constitution and that the Commission’s decision to convert the petition was reasonable. The court held that the Commission acted within its statutory grant of authority and had a reasonable basis for converting the petition.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the case and affirmed the superior court’s decision. The court held that the Commission had the authority under the Alaska Constitution and relevant statutes to adopt the regulation allowing it to convert a legislative review petition to a local action petition. The court found that the regulation provided a standard by requiring the Commission to balance the best interests of the locality and the state. The court also determined that the Commission’s decision had a reasonable basis in the record, considering the public opposition to the annexation and the support for local action from the Kenai Peninsula Borough. The court concluded that the Commission acted within its discretion and expertise in deciding to proceed by local action. View "City of Soldotna v. State" on Justia Law

A group of property owners and entities challenged the Albany County Board of County Commissioners' amendments to zoning regulations known as the Aquifer Protection Overlay Zone (APOZ). The amendments aimed to protect the Casper Aquifer, which supplies drinking water to many residents in Albany County, including those in the City of Laramie. The property owners argued that the Board's adoption of the amendments was arbitrary, capricious, and exceeded its authority.The District Court of Albany County dismissed the petitions for review, concluding that it lacked jurisdiction because the amendments were legislative acts and not reviewable under the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act (WAPA). The property owners and entities appealed, arguing that the Board's actions were reviewable and that the Board lacked the authority to adopt the amendments.The Wyoming Supreme Court reviewed the case and clarified that there is no common law or general statutory exception to judicial review of agency legislative actions. The court held that the characterization of the Board’s action as legislative or adjudicatory dictates the scope and nature of the review. The court concluded that the district court has jurisdiction to review the APOZ amendments and remanded the case to the district court to conduct an analysis in conformance with the opinion. The court emphasized that judicial review of agency legislative actions is limited by the separation of powers doctrine and should focus on whether the actions were contrary to constitutional rights, not in accordance with the law, in excess of statutory authority, or divergent from the agency's own rules. View "Warren Livestock, LLC v. Board of County Commissions" on Justia Law

Catherine Sullivan, trustee of the Catherine Sullivan Family Trust of 2000, owns residential property adjacent to Megan Gruver's equestrian facility, Silver Bell Ranch, in Blaine County, Idaho. Gruver was issued a conditional use permit (CUP) in 2019 to operate the facility, which Sullivan did not appeal. In 2021, Gruver sought modifications to the CUP to hold three events per year, board additional horses, and hire more staff. Sullivan objected, citing concerns about noise, traffic, and property devaluation, but the Blaine County Board of Commissioners approved the modified CUP with conditions.Sullivan appealed the Board's decision to the district court, arguing that the Board erred in categorizing Silver Bell Ranch as an "Outdoor Recreational Facility" rather than an "Agricultural Business" and that the modifications would prejudice her substantial rights. The district court affirmed the Board's decision, finding that Sullivan failed to show how the modifications prejudiced her substantial rights and that her arguments regarding the categorization of the facility were time-barred because she did not appeal the 2019 CUP.The Idaho Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The Court held that Sullivan's arguments regarding the categorization of Silver Bell Ranch were time-barred and that she failed to establish prejudice to her substantial rights under Idaho Code section 67-5279(4). The Court also found that the district court acted within its discretion in excluding Sullivan's arguments related to prejudice that were raised for the first time in her reply brief. Blaine County was awarded attorney fees on appeal under Idaho Code section 12-117(1), while Gruver was not entitled to attorney fees as she was not an adverse party to Blaine County. Both Blaine County and Gruver were awarded costs on appeal. View "Sullivan v. Blaine County" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over the use of farm dwellings in the agricultural district of Hawai‘i for short-term vacation rentals. In 2019, the County of Hawai‘i passed an ordinance banning short-term vacation rentals on lots built after 1976 in the agricultural district. The Rosehill Petitioners, who own lots created after 1976, sought nonconforming use certificates to use their farm dwellings as short-term vacation rentals, which the County denied. The Petitioners appealed the denial to the County Board of Appeals, and both parties agreed to stay the appeal and seek a declaratory order from the Land Use Commission (LUC).The LUC ruled that farm dwellings could not be used as short-term vacation rentals, finding that such use was incompatible with the agricultural district's purpose. The LUC also found the Rosehill Petitioners' request speculative and hypothetical. The Petitioners appealed to the Circuit Court of the Third Circuit, which reversed the LUC's decision, holding that farm dwellings and short-term vacation rentals were not incompatible and that the LUC had abused its discretion.The LUC appealed to the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA), arguing that the circuit court erred in its findings and that the LUC's interpretation of HRS § 205-4.5 was correct. While the case was pending, the Hawai‘i Supreme Court issued a decision in In re Kanahele, which clarified that appeals from LUC declaratory orders should be made directly to the Supreme Court. The Rosehill Petitioners then applied for transfer to the Supreme Court, which was granted.The Supreme Court of Hawai‘i held that the case could be transferred nunc pro tunc to the date the appeal was initially filed in the circuit court. The Court reviewed the entire record, including the circuit court and ICA proceedings, but gave no weight to the circuit court's findings. The Court affirmed the LUC's decision, holding that farm dwellings in the agricultural district could not be used as short-term vacation rentals, as such use would undermine the purpose of the agricultural district. The Court vacated the circuit court's judgment and affirmed the LUC's declaratory order. View "Rosehill v. State" on Justia Law

A couple owning a lot in Homer, Alaska, added a second dwelling made from a shipping container and obtained a permit from the city. A neighboring property owner challenged the permit, arguing that the container dwelling required a conditional use permit and was a nuisance under the city’s zoning code. The city’s zoning board determined that the container dwelling was an accessory building to the existing mobile home and did not require a conditional use permit. The board also found that the container dwelling was not a nuisance because it had been modified and no longer functioned as a shipping container.The neighboring property owner appealed to the Homer Board of Adjustment, which upheld the zoning board’s decision. The Board of Adjustment concluded that the container dwelling was an accessory building and did not require a conditional use permit. It also agreed that the container dwelling was not a nuisance. The neighboring property owner then appealed to the superior court, which affirmed the Board of Adjustment’s decision and awarded attorney’s fees to the city.The Supreme Court of Alaska reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court’s decision. The court held that the Board of Adjustment’s interpretation of the zoning code was reasonable and that the container dwelling qualified as an accessory building. The court also found that the Board’s conclusion that the container dwelling was not a nuisance had a reasonable basis. However, the court vacated the superior court’s award of attorney’s fees and remanded for further proceedings, noting that fees cannot be awarded for defending against nonfrivolous constitutional claims, and some of the challenger’s constitutional claims were not frivolous. View "Griswold v. City of Homer" on Justia Law

King County Ordinance 19030 altered zoning and business licensing regulations for wineries, breweries, and distilleries (WBDs) in agricultural and rural areas. The ordinance aimed to support economic development but faced challenges regarding compliance with the Growth Management Act (GMA) and the State Environmental Policy Act (SEPA). The ordinance allowed for expanded WBD operations and introduced new licensing requirements, but it also raised concerns about environmental impacts and the preservation of agricultural land.The Central Puget Sound Growth Management Hearings Board found that the County failed to comply with SEPA and the GMA, invalidating parts of the ordinance. The Board's decision was appealed to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the Board's ruling. Friends of Sammamish Valley and Futurewise sought further review, arguing that the County did not adequately address environmental impacts and agricultural land preservation. The County contended that the ordinance was a "nonproject action" not requiring environmental review under SEPA and presumed valid under the GMA.The Supreme Court of Washington reviewed the case and reversed the Court of Appeals' decision, reinstating the Board's order. The Court held that the County's SEPA checklist was insufficient, failing to address the full range of probable environmental impacts. The Court emphasized that the GMA requires the conservation of agricultural land and that the ordinance's changes could significantly impact the environment. The Court concluded that the County must conduct a comprehensive environmental review to comply with SEPA and the GMA. View "King County v. Friends of Sammamish Valley" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, a property owner in Fairfield, Connecticut, sought approval from the town's zoning commission to build a forty-unit affordable housing development. The application included a request for a text amendment to the zoning regulations and approval of a site plan and certificate of zoning compliance. The proposed building exceeded the height limits of the residence A zone district, where the property is located, which typically allows only single-family dwellings with a maximum height of thirty-two feet.The zoning commission denied the text amendment request, citing inconsistency with the town's plan of conservation and development, among other reasons. However, it conditionally approved the site plan and certificate of zoning compliance, provided the building height was reduced to three stories and forty feet. The commission justified the height restriction by stating that the proposed building's visibility from a nearby historic district would harm the district's integrity, which it deemed a substantial public interest.The plaintiff appealed to the Superior Court, which consolidated the case with an appeal from four intervenors who opposed the development. The trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiff, finding that the commission had improperly failed to apply the standards of Connecticut's affordable housing statute (§ 8-30g) to the text amendment request. The court also concluded that the commission did not meet its burden of proving that the height restriction was necessary to protect a substantial public interest that outweighed the need for affordable housing.The Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision regarding the height restriction, agreeing that the commission failed to demonstrate that the restriction was necessary to protect a substantial public interest in historic preservation that outweighed the need for affordable housing. However, the Supreme Court partially reversed the trial court's decision on the text amendment, ruling that § 8-30g applied only to the plaintiff's property and not to the entire residence A zone district. The case was remanded with instructions to grant the text amendment limited to the plaintiff's property. View "131 Beach Road, LLC v. Town Plan & Zoning Commission" on Justia Law

Shawn Valentine sought a writ of mandamus to compel the Lucas County Board of Elections to place a zoning referendum on the November 5, 2024, general-election ballot. The referendum concerned a zoning amendment approved by the Spencer Township Board of Trustees, which rezoned a portion of property owned by Jeff Davis Properties, L.L.C. Valentine and others circulated a petition for the referendum but included a map that outlined the area originally requested for rezoning, not the smaller area actually rezoned by the trustees.The Lucas County Board of Elections reviewed the petition and found it contained the required number of valid signatures. However, Jeff Davis Properties filed a protest, arguing that the map included with the petition was not appropriate. The Board of Elections held a hearing and sustained the protest, deciding that the map did not comply with the requirements of R.C. 519.12(H), which mandates that a referendum petition be accompanied by an appropriate map of the area affected by the zoning proposal.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and determined that the map submitted with the petition was misleading because it did not accurately reflect the area affected by the zoning resolution. The court found no evidence that the map was approved by the board of township trustees as reflecting the zoning amendment. Consequently, the court held that the Board of Elections did not abuse its discretion or act in clear disregard of applicable legal provisions when it sustained the protest and refused to place the referendum on the ballot. The writ of mandamus was denied, along with Valentine’s requests for costs and attorney fees. View "State ex rel. Valentine v. Schoen" on Justia Law

The case involves Montanans Against Irresponsible Densification, LLC (MAID), which challenged two laws passed by the 2023 Montana Legislature aimed at addressing affordable housing. Senate Bill 323 (SB 323) mandates that duplex housing be allowed in cities with at least 5,000 residents where single-family residences are permitted. Senate Bill 528 (SB 528) requires municipalities to allow at least one accessory dwelling unit on lots with single-family dwellings. MAID, consisting of homeowners from various cities, argued that these laws would negatively impact their property values and quality of life, and filed for declaratory and injunctive relief.The Eighteenth Judicial District Court in Gallatin County granted MAID a preliminary injunction, temporarily halting the implementation of the laws. The court found that MAID had standing and had demonstrated the likelihood of irreparable harm, success on the merits, and that the balance of equities and public interest favored the injunction. The court cited concerns about potential impacts on property values and neighborhood character, as well as constitutional issues related to public participation and equal protection.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case and reversed the District Court's decision. The Supreme Court found that MAID did not meet the burden of demonstrating all four factors required for a preliminary injunction. Specifically, the court held that MAID's evidence of potential harm was speculative and did not show a likelihood of irreparable injury. The court also noted that the balance of equities and public interest did not favor the injunction, given the legislative intent to address the housing crisis. The Supreme Court remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Montanans Against Irresponsible Densification, LLC, v. State" on Justia Law