Justia Zoning, Planning & Land Use Opinion Summaries

Craig Lussi, a homeowner on Gibson Island, Maryland, sought to build an assisted living facility for elderly people with disabilities. The Gibson Island Corporation, a homeowners association, opposed the project, citing a restrictive covenant prohibiting business use of homes without approval. Lussi requested an exemption as a reasonable accommodation under the Fair Housing Act (FHA) and Maryland law, but the Corporation imposed four conditions, which Lussi found unreasonable. Negotiations failed, leading to litigation.The United States District Court for the District of Maryland granted summary judgment to the Corporation, finding that Lussi could not show the requested accommodation was necessary for providing equal housing opportunities. The court also dismissed Lussi's retaliation and discrimination claims, concluding there was no evidence of adverse actions or discriminatory intent by the Corporation.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the district court erred in its analysis of the necessity element by focusing on the removal of the Corporation's conditions rather than the requested exemption itself. The appellate court held that the exemption was necessary to provide equal housing opportunities for disabled individuals on Gibson Island. The court also found genuine disputes of material fact regarding the reasonableness of the Corporation's conditions, which should be resolved by a jury.Additionally, the appellate court determined that Lussi's retaliation and discrimination claims presented jury questions. The court noted evidence suggesting the Corporation's stated reasons for opposing the project might be pretextual and that community hostility towards disabled residents could imply discriminatory intent.The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court's summary judgment in favor of the Corporation and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Group Home on Gibson Island, LLC v. Gibson Island Corp." on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over the South Dakota Department of Corrections' (DOC) decision to purchase state-owned agricultural land in Lincoln County for a new men's state prison, authorized by House Bill 1017 (HB 1017). The plaintiffs, a group of private individuals and a non-profit corporation, sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the State of South Dakota, the DOC, and the DOC Secretary, arguing that the State must comply with local zoning regulations, which do not permit a prison in an agricultural district without a conditional use permit or rezoning.The Circuit Court of the Second Judicial Circuit in Lincoln County dismissed the plaintiffs' action. The court found that only two plaintiffs had standing based on alleged property value decreases. However, it dismissed the case on the grounds of sovereign immunity and preemption, determining that the DOC's actions were discretionary and that state law preempted local zoning regulations.The South Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's dismissal. The Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs lacked a justiciable claim of right to enforce the local zoning ordinance against the State. The court emphasized that the Declaratory Judgments Act does not create substantive rights and that the plaintiffs failed to identify any statutory or other legal authority granting them a private right to enforce the zoning ordinance. Consequently, the case was deemed non-justiciable, and the court did not address the merits of the sovereign immunity and preemption claims. View "Jensen v. Dept Of Corrections" on Justia Law

Residents of South Seaside Park filed a petition to deannex their community from Berkeley Township and annex it to the Borough of Seaside Park. South Seaside Park is geographically isolated from the mainland section of Berkeley Township, requiring residents to drive 13-16 miles through seven other municipalities to reach the mainland. The community has limited municipal facilities and relies more on Seaside Park for services. The petitioners argued that deannexation would benefit them economically and socially, while not significantly harming Berkeley Township.The Township Council referred the petition to the Planning Board, which conducted 38 hearings over four years. The Planning Board's professional planner, who was supposed to be impartial, instead assisted the Township in opposing the deannexation. Additionally, some Planning Board members made public comments against the petition. The Planning Board ultimately recommended denying the petition, and the Township Council followed this recommendation.Plaintiffs sought judicial review of the Council's decision. The trial court found that the Planning Board's process was biased and that the Township's denial of the petition was arbitrary and unreasonable. The court also found that the denial was detrimental to the economic and social well-being of South Seaside Park residents and that deannexation would not significantly harm Berkeley Township. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court's decision.The Supreme Court of New Jersey reviewed the case and agreed with the lower courts. It held that the Planning Board failed to conduct an impartial review and that plaintiffs met their burden of proof under N.J.S.A. 40A:7-12.1. The Court affirmed the trial court's order for deannexation, allowing South Seaside Park to seek annexation by Seaside Park. View "Whiteman v. Township Council of Berkeley Township" on Justia Law

In this case, the Prince George’s County Council, sitting as the District Council, engaged in a 2009 comprehensive rezoning process known as a sectional map amendment for subregions 5 and 6. Several property owners, including Christmas Farm and MCQ Auto Servicenter, were affected by this rezoning. Christmas Farm sought a more intensive zoning classification but failed to file the required ethics affidavit. MCQ’s property was downzoned, but MCQ successfully petitioned for a revisory petition, resulting in the restoration of its original zoning classification.The Circuit Court for Prince George’s County and the Appellate Court of Maryland reviewed the zoning decisions multiple times, resulting in several remands to the District Council. The courts found that the District Council failed to comply with procedural requirements, including the failure to provide notice and an opportunity to be heard. The most recent remand occurred in 2019, where the District Council adopted sectional map amendments without holding a public hearing or notifying the affected property owners.The Supreme Court of Maryland reviewed whether a 2021 countywide rezoning constituted a substantive change in the law that rendered moot the property owners' assertions of error from the 2019 proceeding. The Court also examined whether the District Council erred in failing to provide notice and an opportunity to be heard and whether it complied with the Appellate Court’s prior remand order.The Supreme Court of Maryland held that the 2021 countywide rezoning was not a comprehensive rezoning or a substantive change in the law that rendered the property owners' assertions moot. The rezoning was a technical mapping exercise intended to align zoning classifications with the new zoning ordinance. The Court also held that the District Council failed to comply with state and local laws requiring notice and a public hearing and did not follow the Appellate Court’s remand instructions. The judgment of the Appellate Court was affirmed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. View "County Council of Prince George's County. v. Robin Dale Land LLC" on Justia Law

Grange Hill LLC sought approval from Yamhill County to operate a nine-guestroom bed and breakfast on its vineyard property, which is zoned for Exclusive Farm Use (EFU). The county approved the application, determining that the proposed bed and breakfast would operate as a "home occupation" within a "dwelling" that Grange Hill had yet to build. Friends of Yamhill County challenged this approval, arguing that the proposed structure did not meet the statutory requirements for a home occupation on EFU land, specifically that it must operate within a "dwelling" as defined by ORS 215.448(1).The Land Use Board of Appeals (LUBA) affirmed the county's decision, reasoning that the proposed structure qualified as a "dwelling" because it met the design standards for a single-family residence and would be used as a residence for the innkeeper. LUBA dismissed Friends' argument that the structure needed to satisfy all requirements for a "primary dwelling in conjunction with farm use," including being the home of a farm operator.The Oregon Court of Appeals reversed LUBA's decision, concluding that the proposed structure was not a "dwelling" as a matter of law because it resembled a motel more than a home. The court emphasized that the entire structure must be a farm dwelling occupied by a group of people sharing a household on a long-term basis.The Oregon Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed in part and reversed in part the Court of Appeals' decision. The Supreme Court held that the "dwelling" requirement in ORS 215.448 means a structure that satisfies the requirements for a category of dwelling allowed in the zone, specifically a "primary dwelling" on EFU land, which must be the home of a farm operator. The court concluded that LUBA erred in affirming the county's approval without ensuring the proposed structure met this requirement. The case was remanded to LUBA for further consideration. View "Friends of Yamhill v. Yamhill County" on Justia Law

Applicants sought an Act 250 permit to construct a farm store on Route 5 in Hartland, Vermont. The proposed project includes a 9000 square-foot, two-story building with a deli, bakery, eating area, and parking lot. The store will sell products primarily from the applicants' nearby farm, Sunnymede Farm. The project site is a vacant lot near the Interstate 91 interchange, with significant traffic and no existing sidewalks.The District 3 Environmental Commission approved the project and issued the permit. The Hartland Planning Commission (HPC) appealed to the Environmental Division, arguing the project did not meet Act 250 Criteria 9(L) and 10. The Environmental Division granted summary judgment to the applicants, finding the project satisfied both criteria. The HPC then appealed to the Vermont Supreme Court.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case de novo. The court concluded that the project made efficient use of land, energy, roads, utilities, and other supporting infrastructure, as required by Criterion 9(L). Although the project met the definition of strip development, the court found it would not contribute to a pattern of strip development due to its agricultural nature and specific conditions limiting its use. The court also determined that the project conformed with the local town plan under Criterion 10, despite the HPC's argument to the contrary. The court affirmed the Environmental Division's grant of summary judgment to the applicants. View "In re SM Farms Shop, LLC Permit Appeal" on Justia Law

The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Church) submitted a site plan and an application for a conditional use permit (CUP) to the City of Cody Planning, Zoning, and Adjustment Board (Board) for the construction of a temple. The Board approved the site plan and CUP application at a meeting on June 15, 2023. Preserve Our Cody Neighborhoods (POCN), an association of local landowners, opposed the construction and filed petitions for review in the district court challenging the Board's approvals.The district court determined that it lacked jurisdiction over POCN’s petitions because they were untimely. The court found that the Board had approved the site plan and CUP at the June 15, 2023 meeting, and any subsequent actions by the Board to reconsider or modify those approvals were unauthorized. POCN's petitions for review were filed more than 30 days after the June 15, 2023 meeting, making them untimely.The Wyoming Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The Court held that the Board's approval of the site plan and CUP at the June 15, 2023 meeting constituted final agency action, as it concluded the proceedings regarding the Church’s site plan and CUP application. The Court found that the Board did not have the authority to reconsider or modify its approvals at subsequent meetings. Therefore, POCN's petitions for review, filed in August 2023, were untimely, and the district court correctly determined it lacked jurisdiction to consider them. View "Preserve Our Cody Neighborhoods v. The Church of Jesus Christ of the Latter-Day Saints" on Justia Law

Lauren and John Paul Szymkowicz, who live near Georgetown University, experienced secondhand smoke infiltrating their home from a neighboring property occupied by a Georgetown undergraduate student. The smoke caused health issues and discomfort for the couple. Despite their efforts to address the issue directly with the student and through various university channels, the problem persisted until the student was eventually relocated by the university.The Szymkowiczes filed a lawsuit against Georgetown University in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, asserting claims of negligence, negligent infliction of emotional distress, public and private nuisance, and breach of contract. They argued that the university had a duty to mitigate the impacts of student behavior on the surrounding neighborhood, as outlined in Georgetown’s campus plan and the Zoning Commission’s order approving that plan. The trial court dismissed the case, ruling that Georgetown owed no duty to the Szymkowiczes and that no contract existed between the university and the couple.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case de novo. The court affirmed the trial court’s decision, holding that Georgetown University did not owe a duty of care to the Szymkowiczes under common law or based on the campus plan and Zoning Commission’s order. The court also found that the university was not in control of the student’s conduct and thus could not be held liable for nuisance. Additionally, the court determined that no enforceable contract existed between Georgetown and the District of Columbia that would allow the Szymkowiczes to sue for breach of contract. Consequently, the court upheld the dismissal of all claims. View "Szymkowicz v. President and Directors of the College of Georgetown University" on Justia Law

Newfield Sand, a Maine corporation engaged in mineral extraction, owns a nearly three-hundred-acre parcel in the Town of Newfield. In 1994, the Planning Board granted a permit to the previous owner for a five-acre gravel-extraction operation with specific conditions on hours of operation and truck trips. Newfield Sand acquired the property in 1998 and sought to expand its operations. In May 2022, Newfield Sand applied for a conditional use permit to operate on thirty acres of open pit at a time and extract minerals from about eighty-five acres. The Planning Board approved the application in November 2023, subject to conditions, including provisions allowing the Board to reevaluate the hours of operation and truck trip limits.The Business and Consumer Docket affirmed the Planning Board’s decision. Newfield Sand appealed, arguing that the Planning Board lacked the authority to retain jurisdiction and modify permit conditions post-approval. The Town contended that the Board’s authority to impose such conditions was implied.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and concluded that the ordinance did not explicitly or implicitly authorize the Planning Board to modify or revoke a permit after issuance or retain jurisdiction over it. The Court found that the conditions allowing reevaluation of hours of operation and truck trips were outside the Board’s authority and did not clearly define compliance requirements. Consequently, the Court vacated the lower court’s judgment and remanded the matter to the Planning Board for further consideration of Newfield Sand’s application for a conditional use permit. View "Newfield Sand v. Town of Newfield" on Justia Law

Old Golden Oaks LLC applied for an encroachment permit and a grading permit from Amador County for a housing development project. The county deemed the applications incomplete and requested additional information. Old Golden Oaks filed a petition for writ of mandate, arguing that the county violated the Permit Streamlining Act by requesting information not specified in the submittal checklists for the permits.The Superior Court of Amador County sustained the county’s demurrer without leave to amend, finding that the encroachment permit checklist allowed the county to request additional information and that the county had statutory authority to seek information necessary for compliance with the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA).The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court agreed with Old Golden Oaks that the catch-all provision in the county’s encroachment permit submittal checklist violated the Permit Streamlining Act because it did not specify in detail the required information. However, the court found that the county could condition the completeness of the grading permit application on additional environmental information because the grading permit checklist informed Old Golden Oaks that the project must comply with CEQA. The court reversed the trial court’s judgment regarding the encroachment permit but affirmed the judgment regarding the grading permit. Each party was ordered to bear its own costs on appeal. View "Old Golden Oaks v. County of Amador" on Justia Law