Justia Zoning, Planning & Land Use Opinion Summaries

In 2019, the governing body of a Tennessee county adopted a resolution regulating the operation and location of quarries and similar activities in unincorporated areas. The resolution prohibited quarries from being located within 5,000 feet of residences, schools, parks, and various other establishments. After purchasing property and leasing it for quarry operations, the plaintiffs were informed by the county mayor that their quarry violated this resolution and were asked to cease operations. The plaintiffs filed a declaratory judgment action, arguing that the resolution was void because it functioned as a zoning ordinance and was not enacted in compliance with statutory zoning procedures. The county, in response, maintained that the resolution was not a zoning ordinance but rather a proper exercise of its police powers.The case was first heard in the Chancery Court for Grundy County, which granted summary judgment in favor of the county. The court reasoned that, because the county did not have a comprehensive zoning plan, the resolution could not be considered tantamount to zoning and thus was not subject to the County Zoning Act’s requirements. The Tennessee Court of Appeals affirmed, but on different grounds. It held that the absence of a comprehensive zoning plan was not determinative but concluded that the resolution did not divide the county into districts and thus was not a zoning ordinance.The Supreme Court of Tennessee reviewed the case and reversed the lower courts. The Court held that the resolution was, in effect, a zoning ordinance because it divided the county into zones—prohibiting quarrying in certain areas based on proximity to designated establishments—and substantially affected land use. The Court found that the county failed to comply with the procedural requirements of the County Zoning Act, rendering the resolution unenforceable. The judgment was reversed, and the case was remanded for entry of summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. View "Tinsley Properties, LLC v. Grundy County, Tennessee" on Justia Law

The property in question had operated as a tavern under a nonconforming-use exception in an area zoned for residential use. The tavern ceased operations in April 2019 after its liquor license became inactive in January 2019. In March 2022, one of the property’s owners and a representative inquired with the township zoning inspector about the property’s status, prompted by interest from a potential buyer who wanted to reopen the tavern. The inspector responded by email, stating that the property no longer qualified as a nonconforming use due to over two years of discontinued operation and referenced the applicable zoning resolution provision.Following this, the property owners, through counsel, requested clarification and formal notice regarding the property’s zoning status. The township’s legal counsel confirmed the inspector’s position by forwarding the original email as the official communication. The owners then appealed to the Hinckley Township Board of Zoning Appeals (BZA), which dismissed the appeal as untimely, finding that the email constituted a “decision” under Ohio law and that the 20-day appeal period had lapsed. The Medina County Court of Common Pleas affirmed the BZA’s dismissal, concluding that the email was a “decision” and that notice was sufficient. On further appeal, the Ninth District Court of Appeals disagreed, holding that the email was not a formal “decision” under the relevant statutes and therefore did not trigger the appeal deadline.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and affirmed the Ninth District’s judgment. The Court held that the zoning inspector’s email was not a “decision” as contemplated by Ohio Revised Code sections 519.14 and 519.15, and so did not trigger the statutory appeal deadline. The BZA therefore lacked jurisdiction to entertain the property owners’ appeal. View "729 W. 130th St., L.L.C. v. Hinckley Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals" on Justia Law

New Cingular Wireless PCS, LLC applied to install six antennas on top of a water tower owned by the York Water District. The Town of York Planning Board approved the application. Two nearby property owners opposed the project, claiming it violated the local Wireless Communications Facilities Ordinance, specifically regarding fencing and setbacks from residential structures. They filed an administrative appeal with the Town of York Board of Appeals, which held public hearings. During the process, the Board asked New Cingular Wireless to provide a more accurate site plan showing distances to neighboring residences. After reviewing the updated information, the Board denied the neighbors’ appeal, stating it was satisfied with the information provided.The neighbors then sought judicial review in the York County Superior Court, arguing that the project did not comply with fencing and setback requirements. The Superior Court affirmed the Board’s decision. The neighbors appealed to the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, continuing to dispute whether the project met the ordinance’s requirements.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court concluded that the neighbors did not preserve their argument about fencing requirements, as this issue was not raised before the Board of Appeals and was therefore waived. However, the Court found that the setback issue had been properly preserved for review. The Court determined that the Board’s findings regarding setbacks were insufficient for appellate review, as the Board did not explain from where the setback was measured or whether the project met the ordinance’s requirements. The Court vacated the Superior Court’s judgment and remanded the matter to the Superior Court with instructions to remand it to the Board of Appeals for further factual findings and explanation regarding compliance with setback requirements. View "Drew v. Town of York" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs own a historic farm property in Vermont crossed by two public trails established by the Town in 1987. After purchasing the land, the plaintiffs maintained these trails for hiking, but opposed the idea of bicycle use and eventually stopped maintaining the trails, allowing them to become overgrown. The Town subsequently adopted procedures for private individuals to apply for permission to maintain and repair the trails. The plaintiffs sought a judicial declaration that the Town lacked authority to conduct maintenance or repairs on these public trails crossing their property.Initially, the Superior Court, Orange Unit, Civil Division, granted the Town’s motion to dismiss, finding the issue was not ripe because no one had actually applied for or received permission to maintain the trails. On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the plaintiffs’ allegations showed a concrete threat of interference with their property rights. Remanded, the civil division considered cross-motions for summary judgment, ultimately granting judgment for the Town. The court found that, under both historical and current statutes and common law, public trails constitute easements allowing towns to maintain them to ensure public access, and that the 1986 statutory amendments did not strip towns of this authority.On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court applied the same summary judgment standard and interpreted Title 19. The Court held that public trails are public rights-of-way, and towns have authority to maintain and repair them to ensure public access for intended purposes. The Court found that neither statutory language nor legislative history supported the plaintiffs’ argument that the 1986 amendments removed town authority. The main holding is that Vermont towns retain the authority to maintain and repair public trails across private land, and the judgment for the Town was affirmed. View "Echeverria v. Town of Tunbridge" on Justia Law

Virginia Electric and Power Company sought certificates of public convenience and necessity to construct two high-voltage overhead transmission line projects in Loudoun County, including the Aspen-Golden and Apollo-Twin Creeks Projects. The Aspen-Golden Project involved approximately nine miles of transmission lines, some running beside Route 7 in the Lansdowne community. VEPCO evaluated several routes and preferred Route 1AA, asserting it minimized adverse impacts. The Apollo-Twin Creeks Project involved about 1.9 miles of transmission lines, some collocated with the Aspen-Golden lines, to serve data centers. VEPCO proposed overhead construction for both projects due to feasibility concerns with underground alternatives.The State Corporation Commission consolidated the applications for review. Loudoun County and Lansdowne Conservancy objected to overhead lines along Route 7, arguing for underground construction to protect scenic and historic assets, including Belmont Manor. They submitted an Updated Hybrid Proposal for partial underground construction, but VEPCO and Commission staff questioned its feasibility, cost, and engineering challenges. After public hearings and detailed testimony, the hearing examiner recommended approval of overhead construction along Route 1AA, finding underground options infeasible within required timelines and statutory criteria, and noting the proposal’s analytical deficiencies.The Supreme Court of Virginia reviewed the Commission’s final orders, affirming the Commission’s approval of the CPCNs. The Court held that the Commission properly verified the need for the Aspen-Golden Project, reasonably rejected underground construction due to cost, engineering challenges, and timing, and gave due consideration to the local comprehensive plan and scenic easement. The Court concluded that the Commission’s decisions minimized adverse impacts to the extent reasonably practicable and found no abuse of discretion in declining to impose additional mitigation conditions or in approving the Apollo-Twin Creeks Project. The judgments were affirmed. View "Lansdowne Conservancy v. SCC" on Justia Law

A property owner sought judicial review of a city’s decision under the Land Use Petition Act (LUPA) after the city canceled her land use application for inactivity. The owner, having taken over the application from the prior owner, received multiple requests from the city for additional information and corrections over two years but failed to satisfy them. After being granted several extensions, the city sent a written decision canceling the application via e-mail to the owner and her attorney.The owner filed a LUPA petition in King County Superior Court and attempted service on the city within the statutory 21-day period, but the first attempt was made on a city office assistant who was not statutorily authorized to receive service. A subsequent attempt, this time on the city manager (an authorized person), occurred after the 21-day deadline. The superior court dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction due to improper and untimely service, and the owner appealed. The Washington Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the first service attempt sufficed and that the three-day tolling provision for mailed decisions applied to decisions sent by e-mail, making the second attempt timely.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington reviewed the case. It held that personal service under RCW 4.28.080(2) must be made on individuals specifically designated by statute, such as the mayor, city manager, or city clerk, or their designated agents. Service on a non-designated city employee is insufficient. The court further held that LUPA’s three-day tolling provision applies only to decisions sent by postal mail, not by e-mail. Thus, the 21-day period began when the city’s e-mail provided notice of the decision’s public availability. The court reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded for further proceedings. View "Chandrruangphen v. City Of Sammamish" on Justia Law

A religious organization planned to build a large temple in Heber Valley, Utah, and Wasatch County approved the project through a legislative development agreement. Several nearby property owners, concerned about adverse impacts on their health, welfare, privacy, and enjoyment of their property, filed a lawsuit against Wasatch County. They alleged that the county’s approval violated local land-use regulations and state law. The plaintiffs sought a declaration invalidating the ordinance and requested injunctive relief to halt construction.The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints intervened, and both the Church and Wasatch County moved for summary judgment. The Fourth District Court granted summary judgment fully to the Church and partially to the County, finding that the ordinance was neither preempted nor contrary to law, and that plaintiffs had not overcome the highly deferential standard of review for land use actions. The court dismissed the case, prompting an appeal from the plaintiffs. After the Church began construction, the plaintiffs moved for an injunction to stop construction during the appeal. The district court granted the injunction, reasoning that plaintiffs would suffer irreparable harm if construction proceeded and was later found unlawful.The Supreme Court of Utah reviewed the district court’s order, focusing solely on whether the injunction should remain pending appeal. Applying Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 8, the Court found that the plaintiffs had not identified specific irreparable harm that would result from construction during the appeal. The Court concluded that inconvenience or temporary changes to the land did not constitute irreparable harm absent clear evidence of injury that could not be remedied. Therefore, the Supreme Court of Utah granted the Church’s motion and suspended the injunction pending resolution of the appeal. View "VAN DUSEN v. WASATCH COUNTY" on Justia Law

The case concerns a referendum petition submitted in Norman, Oklahoma, regarding a municipal ordinance that adopted the Rock Creek Entertainment District Project Plan. The ordinance created two tax increment financing districts to support the construction of a multipurpose arena, parking garage, and related infrastructure. The increments from local sales and ad valorem taxes were designated to fund the project up to certain financial limits or for a maximum period of twenty-five years. The ordinance was enacted without voter approval, prompting proponents to submit a referendum petition seeking a public vote on the ordinance.After the petition was filed, including 10,689 signatures, a protest was lodged in the District Court of Cleveland County, challenging both the legal sufficiency and signature count of Referendum Petition 2425-1. The protest focused on alleged inaccuracies and omissions in the petition’s gist, which is intended to briefly and accurately describe the purpose and effect of the proposed measure for potential signatories. The District Court, presided over by Judge Jeff Virgin, concluded that the gist was insufficient, specifically finding that it misrepresented the financial triggers and duration of the tax districts, and ordered the petition invalidated and stricken.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma reviewed the sufficiency of the gist de novo. The Court determined that the gist failed to accurately state the maximum amount of public assistance and omitted the fact that the tax districts would expire upon the earliest of three specified events, not necessarily after twenty-five years. These deficiencies rendered the gist misleading and legally insufficient. The Supreme Court affirmed the District Court’s order invalidating Referendum Petition 2425-1, holding that the petition’s gist was legally insufficient and therefore the petition could not proceed. View "Allison v. McCoy-Post" on Justia Law

A local government prepared and certified a program-level Environmental Impact Report (EIR) as part of a comprehensive update to its general plan, including an updated housing element. The housing element identified 17 sites, including Site H, to accommodate the town’s projected regional housing needs. Site H was proposed to be rezoned for very high density residential use, increasing its development capacity. No specific housing project had been proposed for Site H or the other sites at the time of the general plan update.The Committee for Tiburon LLC filed a petition for a writ of mandate in Marin County Superior Court, challenging the adequacy of the EIR. The Committee argued the EIR was deficient under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) because it failed to include a site-specific analysis of environmental impacts related to the potential high-density development of Site H. The petition also alleged the Town’s general plan was internally inconsistent and incompatible, and objected to the rezoning of Site H. The trial court agreed with the Committee and granted the petition, finding the EIR should have included a site-specific analysis for Site H.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court held that when a local government updates its general plan and housing element, and no specific project is proposed for a listed site, CEQA does not require the EIR to include a site-specific environmental analysis for that site. The absence of project-specific details makes such analysis infeasible, and site-specific review can be deferred until a project is proposed. The court reversed the trial court’s judgment granting the writ, and remanded the matter for further proceedings on the issues of CEQA exemption for rezoning and general plan consistency. View "The Committee for Tiburon LLC v. Town of Tiburon" on Justia Law

A real estate developer purchased a vacant parcel of land in Worthington, Ohio, previously owned by a youth home. The property was primarily zoned for public or institutional uses such as parks, hospitals, and churches. The developer sought to build a mixed-use project and applied for rezoning and development plan approval. After public meetings where concerns about greenspace, traffic, and density were raised, the municipal planning commission tabled the initial application. The developer later reduced the number of proposed residential units, but the commission still declined to recommend approval, and the city council denied the rezoning application. Subsequently, the city amended its comprehensive plan to emphasize greenspace. The developer, having purchased the property after waiving a rezoning contingency, filed suit, alleging constitutional violations due to the city’s refusal to rezone and amend the comprehensive plan.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio dismissed most of the developer’s claims at the motion-to-dismiss stage, including due process counts, and granted summary judgment to the city on the remaining regulatory takings and declaratory judgment claims. The developer appealed, challenging the dismissal and grant of summary judgment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the grant of summary judgment and dismissal de novo. The court held that the city’s actions did not constitute a regulatory taking under the Penn Central factors, as the developer lacked a reasonable investment-backed expectation of rezoning approval and the city’s actions had legitimate public purposes. The court also found that the zoning ordinance was not unconstitutional beyond fair debate and that the developer failed to allege a cognizable property interest or arbitrary government action for its due process claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment in all respects. View "Lifestyle Communities, Ltd. v. City of Worthington" on Justia Law