Justia Zoning, Planning & Land Use Opinion Summaries

A developer sought to build a 30-unit condominium project, including six affordable units, within the coastal zone of the City of Redondo Beach. The proposed site was located in a zone designated under the City’s Local Coastal Program (LCP) for public access uses, commercial-recreational facilities, and services supporting boating and fishing; residential uses were not permitted. Despite knowing this, the developer submitted its application, asserting that the project qualified for approval under the Housing Accountability Act’s “builder’s remedy” provisions, which can override local zoning restrictions if a city lacks a compliant housing element.At the time of the application, the City did not have a certified compliant housing element, triggering the builder’s remedy provisions. However, after the application, the City informed the developer that residential uses were not permitted in the relevant zone under the certified LCP and suggested that the developer apply for an amendment to the LCP. The developer did not pursue this amendment process. After the City declined to process the application, and an administrative appeal failed, the developer filed a petition for writ of mandate in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, seeking to compel approval under the Housing Accountability Act. The superior court denied the petition, finding that the builder’s remedy provisions did not override the Coastal Act or the City’s LCP.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. The court held that the City’s denial was required under the Coastal Act because the proposed residential use was not permitted by the certified LCP, and no feasible method existed to comply without an LCP amendment, which the developer did not seek. The court affirmed the superior court’s judgment, finding no abuse of discretion and concluding that the Housing Accountability Act does not displace the requirements of the Coastal Act or Commission-certified LCPs regarding permitted uses. View "New Commune DTLA v. Redondo Beach" on Justia Law

A municipality in Pennsylvania investigated two properties owned by a rabbi after receiving complaints about their use. One property was used as a residence for young men engaging in religious study, while the other served as a space for prayer, study, and religious instruction. Both properties were located in a commercially zoned district. Citing a new zoning ordinance, the municipality issued violation notices to the rabbi, asserting that such religious uses were not permitted in the district. The municipality then obtained administrative search warrants, conducted inspections, and condemned the properties the day before a major religious holiday, barring occupancy until the buildings were brought into compliance. The municipality also threatened daily fines for continued non-compliance.The rabbi and his congregation filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania against the municipality and its officers, raising several claims under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), among other federal and state claims. They sought a preliminary injunction to regain access to the properties and halt enforcement actions during litigation. The District Court denied their request, finding no likelihood of success on the merits or irreparable harm, and reasoning that alternative locations for religious activities were available.On interlocutory appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the denial of preliminary injunctive relief. The Third Circuit held that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their RLUIPA substantial-burden claim as to the zoning ordinance, since enforcement prevented access to property for religious exercise and imposed significant penalties. The court found irreparable harm and determined that the balance of hardships and public interest favored the plaintiffs. The Third Circuit reversed the District Court’s order denying a preliminary injunction and remanded for further proceedings, instructing the lower court to enter appropriate injunctive relief. View "Anash Inc v. Borough of Kingston" on Justia Law

A gravel pit in the Town of Sabattus was granted conditional approval in 2003 to mine gravel from a four-acre area adjacent to F. Sanborn Road, with requirements for buffer zones and slope ratios. The Abutters, who own properties along the shore and use the road for access, raised concerns about compliance with these conditions. In late 2023, the Town found violations, including expansion beyond the permitted area and encroachment into the buffer zone and Shoreland Zoning area. Poirier, the operator, agreed to cease excavation, and the Town issued a notice of violation.Following negotiations, the Town filed a land use complaint and proposed a consent judgment in spring 2025. The District Court in Lewiston allowed the Abutters to intervene and heard their objections to the consent judgment, which required Poirier to execute a new reclamation plan, stabilize the berm, create a thirty-foot reclaimed buffer, and cease further mineral extraction. The Abutters argued that the judgment violated state law and local ordinances by not requiring a fifty-foot buffer and permitting ongoing violations. The District Court approved the consent judgment in September 2025, and the Abutters appealed.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the matter de novo, applying the standard from Pike Industries, Inc. v. City of Westbrook. The Court held that the consent judgment did not violate state performance standards, as it required compliance with Maine law and allowed for enforcement if violations occurred. The judgment was consistent with the Town's ordinances, as the ordinances applied to new development or active excavation, not reclamation. The Court found no impermissible effects on third parties and no violation of public policy, concluding that the judgment was fair, adequate, and reasonable. The judgment of the District Court was affirmed. View "Town of Sabattus v. L.P. Poirier & Son, Inc." on Justia Law

A restaurant owner applied for a liquor license for a property in Providence, Rhode Island. Nearby property owners, including the appellant, filed an objection to the license under a state law that allows such objections to bar issuance of liquor licenses within 200 feet of their property. After the local licensing board could not issue the license due to this objection, the restaurant owner lobbied the General Assembly, which enacted a special law allowing the Providence Board of Licenses to exempt this specific address from the objection rule. This exemption applied only to the property at 225 Waterman Street and was enacted without a vote by local Providence voters.After the special law was passed, the restaurant owner reapplied, and the Board granted the license over objections. The appellant appealed to the Rhode Island Department of Business Regulation (DBR), which stayed the license but did not rule on the constitutional issue. The appellant then filed suit in the Rhode Island Superior Court, arguing that the special exemption was unconstitutional because Article 13, Section 4 of the Rhode Island Constitution requires local voter approval for legislation relating specifically to the property, affairs, or government of a particular city or town. The Superior Court granted summary judgment for the defendants, holding that liquor licensing is a matter of statewide concern and does not require local voter approval.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island reviewed the constitutionality of the special law. The court held that the legislation, which singled out a specific property in Providence for exemption from a generally applicable law, related to the property, affairs, and government of a particular city. Because the law did not receive local voter approval as required by Article 13, Section 4, it was void. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the Superior Court and remanded for entry of judgment in favor of the appellant. View "Myles Standish Associates, LP v. The City of Providence" on Justia Law

A condominium resident entered into an agreement with the developer, the unit owners’ association, and other unit owners after concerns were raised about infrastructure and proposed changes to the condominium plan. The agreement required the developer to complete infrastructure work, pay a sum to the association, and convey a vacant lot to the association in exchange for the unit owners withdrawing their opposition to a planning board application. The agreement included a provision requiring planning board approval of the developer’s application by March 1, 2023, as a condition for the parties’ obligations. The planning board, however, did not approve the application until March 28, 2023. After learning that the lot was to be sold to a third party, the resident sued for specific performance of the agreement.The Superior Court (York County) granted the developer’s motion to dismiss, ruling that the failure to obtain planning board approval by the specified date was an unmet condition precedent, discharging all parties from their obligations under the agreement. The court also dismissed the resident’s claims for quantum meruit, unjust enrichment, and declaratory relief on independent grounds.On appeal, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed whether the timing requirement for planning board approval was necessarily a material condition precedent as a matter of law. The Court held that, in actions seeking equitable relief such as specific performance, whether time is of the essence is a factual question dependent on the intent of the parties and the circumstances. The Court concluded that the materiality of the March 1 deadline could not be determined solely from the pleadings, and that the complaint alleged facts which, if proven, could entitle the resident to relief. The Court vacated the dismissal of the breach of contract claim and remanded for further proceedings. View "Constance L. Beane v. Village on Great Brook, LLC" on Justia Law

A property owner received municipal approval to renovate the interior of a building on its land, which was subject to a special permit allowing use as a religious institution with specific conditions. Among these, one condition prohibited a “material change” or “intensification” of any approved use without explicit authorization, while another allowed the building to serve as an operations center for security and administrative purposes. The renovations included subdividing garage and open space to create more offices, expanding an office, and converting a closet into a bathroom. Abutting landowners challenged the issuance of the zoning permit, arguing these changes violated the conditions of the special permit.The Zoning Board of Appeals of the Town of New Canaan held hearings and ultimately rejected the challenge. The plaintiffs appealed to the Superior Court, which initially remanded the matter so the board could consult with the Planning and Zoning Commission for interpretation of the special permit’s conditions. After this consultation, the board reaffirmed its denial. The Superior Court then reviewed the merits and dismissed the plaintiffs’ appeal, finding substantial evidence in the record supported the board’s decision.On further appeal, the Supreme Court of Connecticut assumed, without deciding, that the remand to the commission may have been improper. Nonetheless, it concluded there was substantial evidence in the original record to sustain the board’s decision. The court clarified that “material change” means a significant alteration in the character of use, and “intensification” requires an increase or strengthening in the degree of use—not merely a minor or modest change. The evidence showed the renovations did not alter the building’s footprint, number of occupants, or its approved use. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment dismissing the plaintiffs’ appeal. View "Markatos v. Zoning Board of Appeals" on Justia Law

In 2025, the Frederick County Council enacted legislation establishing a Critical Digital Infrastructure (CDI) Overlay Zone, enabling data centers and related infrastructure to be built on a limited portion of county land. The boundaries and zoning designations of the Overlay Zone were later set by Ordinance 26-01-001 (the CDI Ordinance), which included color maps as exhibits to indicate the precise locations and zoning designations. A group of residents, the Frederick County Data Center Referendum Committee, sought to challenge this ordinance by referendum and gathered sufficient signatures for a petition. However, the petition included only black-and-white reproductions of the ordinance’s maps, which did not clearly show the Overlay Zone boundaries or zoning distinctions.The sufficiency of the petition was initially upheld by the Director of the Frederick County Board of Elections, who found it met requirements as to form, though she did not decide whether the ordinance was a proper subject for referendum. Several parties opposed the referendum, arguing in the Circuit Court for Frederick County that the ordinance was not subject to referendum under the County Charter and that the petition was deficient because it did not include a full and accurate reproduction of the ordinance. The circuit court agreed, finding both that the CDI Ordinance was not a “law” subject to referendum under the Charter and that the petition’s reproduction of the ordinance was insufficient due to the lack of accurate color maps.On direct appeal, the Supreme Court of Maryland affirmed the circuit court’s judgment. The Court held that under the Frederick County Charter, zoning ordinances, such as the CDI Ordinance, are not subject to referendum because the Charter intended to maintain pre-Charter limitations on referenda for such ordinances. Additionally, the Court held that the petition was insufficient because it did not contain a full and accurate reproduction of the ordinance, as the black-and-white maps omitted essential information. View "In re: Frederick Cnty. Data Center Referendum" on Justia Law

Robert and Jennifer Audette purchased a lakefront property in Minnesota and constructed a 12-foot-wide concrete ramp from their home to the lake’s ordinary high-water mark without first obtaining approval from Lake of the Woods County. County officials had previously advised them about permissible improvements, including limitations on new concrete and the importance of staying within existing fill, but the Audettes exceeded these instructions. Subsequent inspections revealed substantial wetland impacts, and the County issued restoration orders and identified violations of both zoning ordinances and a state-funded shoreline stabilization project.After the ramp was constructed, the Audettes sought an after-the-fact conditional use permit, citing the need for handicap accessibility for Jennifer Audette, who has multiple sclerosis. The Lake of the Woods County Planning Commission recommended approval with conditions, but the Lake of the Woods County Board denied the permit, emphasizing environmental concerns, procedural violations, and the availability of less impactful alternatives. The Audettes then applied for approval under the Wetland Conservation Act, which was also denied by the County and, upon appeal, by the Minnesota Board of Water and Soil Resources. The Minnesota Department of Natural Resources later cited the Audettes for failure to comply with restoration orders.The Audettes filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota, alleging discrimination under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act due to denial of their permit application. The district court granted summary judgment for the County, finding the Audettes had not timely requested an accommodation and had violated County instructions. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court’s summary judgment de novo and affirmed. The Eighth Circuit held that the County did not violate ADA accommodation duties, as the Audettes never sought a reasonable accommodation at the appropriate time and provided no evidence of intentional discrimination. View "Audette v. Lake of the Woods County" on Justia Law

A nonprofit environmental organization challenged the Maui Planning Commission’s amended rules, which governed development in Maui’s Special Management Area (SMA), a protected coastal zone. The amendments created fifteen categorical exemptions from environmental assessment, some with monetary thresholds and some based on landowner declarations. The rules also allowed continuation, repair, or renovation of previously approved developments without new environmental review, and replaced the requirement for a final environmental assessment (EA) with a draft EA for permit applications.After the rules were enacted, the nonprofit filed a complaint in the Circuit Court of the Second Circuit, arguing that the commission’s rules unlawfully bypassed the Coastal Zone Management Act’s (CZMA) required assessment process, shifting the duty to regulated parties and undermining statutory and constitutional protections. The commission responded that its exemptions were within its rulemaking power, claiming they excluded non-development activities from the CZMA process. The circuit court granted summary judgment for the nonprofit, invalidating the relevant rule sections and restoring the final EA requirement.The Maui Planning Commission and County of Maui appealed. The Supreme Court of the State of Hawaiʻi affirmed the circuit court’s decision. The court held that the commission’s rules exceeded its statutory authority by creating categorical exemptions from the CZMA’s assessment process and unlawfully delegating assessment duties to private parties. The court also found that replacing the final EA with a draft EA undermined required environmental safeguards. The Supreme Court clarified that counties may streamline permitting but cannot eliminate the statutory assessment process or delegate it to applicants. The court affirmed the invalidation of the amended rules. View "Maui Tomorrow Foundation v. Maui Planning Commission" on Justia Law

The case concerned property owners who sought approval from the City of Cannon Beach to build a house on an oceanfront lot and to develop an adjacent public right-of-way to provide vehicular access. Both the lot and the right-of-way are located in a landslide hazard zone, and the city code imposes restrictions requiring applicants to demonstrate either the absence of geologic hazard or that proposed engineering methods will eliminate or minimize the hazard. The dispute arose because a state statute requires local standards regulating the “development of housing” to be “clear and objective,” while the city’s geologic hazard standard includes a subjective component.After initial conditional approval, the city ultimately denied both applications—one for the house and one for the road—based on grounds unrelated to geologic hazards. However, it did not apply its geologic hazards standards to either application, reasoning that the “clear and objective” statutory requirement precluded it from applying subjective standards to the housing development. Both parties appealed to the Land Use Board of Appeals (LUBA), which agreed with the city’s interpretation and held that the statute preempted application of the geologic hazard standards to the road development. The Court of Appeals, however, reversed LUBA’s decision in part, holding that the “clear and objective standards” requirement did not prevent the city from applying its geologic hazard standards to the application to develop a public road.The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon reviewed the case and affirmed the Court of Appeals. The court held that the statutory requirement of “clear and objective” standards for “the development of housing” applies only to the housing itself, not to the development of a public road on an adjacent public right-of-way, unless the city requires the road development as a condition of approving housing. The city and LUBA’s interpretation was incorrect, and the case was remanded to LUBA for further proceedings. View "Roberts v. City of Cannon Beach" on Justia Law