Justia Zoning, Planning & Land Use Opinion Summaries

A railroad company operating in Massachusetts sought to acquire a 155-acre parcel in the town of Hopedale to build a new transloading facility. The land had been classified as forest land under Massachusetts General Law Chapter 61, which gives municipalities a right of first refusal to purchase such land if the owner wishes to sell or convert it to another use. After an initial notice of intent to sell was deemed deficient by the town, the seller withdrew the notice. Without issuing a new notice, the seller then transferred beneficial ownership of the property to the railroad company through a transaction that attempted to circumvent the town’s rights. Hopedale asserted its rights under Chapter 61 and filed suit in Massachusetts Land Court to enforce its right of first refusal and prevent further site work by the railroad.After a failed settlement agreement—subsequently invalidated by the Massachusetts Superior Court and with state litigation ongoing—the railroad company petitioned the Surface Transportation Board for a declaratory order that the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act (ICCTA) preempted the town’s rights under Chapter 61. The Surface Transportation Board denied the petition, finding that Chapter 61 was a generally applicable property law not categorically preempted by ICCTA, and that the railroad had not established a valid property interest in the land. The Board also concluded that the town’s actions did not unreasonably burden or interfere with rail transportation.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the Board’s order. It held that ICCTA does not preempt Chapter 61’s right-of-first-refusal provisions, as they are generally applicable state property laws and do not directly regulate railroad operations. The court further found that, without a settled property interest, the railroad’s as-applied preemption arguments failed. The court denied the railroad’s petition for review and affirmed the Board’s order. View "Grafton & Upton Railroad Company v. Surface Transportation Board" on Justia Law

A vineyard in Riley County sought to expand its operations through an amendment to its planned unit development. Some neighboring property owners filed a protest petition, as permitted by Kansas law if at least 20% of the affected landowners sign. One property bordering the vineyard was owned by two parties as tenants in common, but only one signed the petition. The Board of Riley County Commissioners counted only half the acreage of that property toward the 20% threshold, reasoning that only half the owners had signed. This calculation meant the protest petition narrowly failed to reach the required threshold, but it would have succeeded if the entire property had been counted.The Riley District Court reviewed the Board’s calculation and the applicability of the protest petition process. The Kansas Court of Appeals later affirmed in part and reversed in part, agreeing with the Board’s approach of counting only the proportional share represented by the signing tenant in common. The Court of Appeals also held that the local regulation incorporated the full protest petition process from state law. Both Prairiewood Holdings, LLC (one of the protest petitioners) and the Board sought further review.The Supreme Court of the State of Kansas affirmed the Court of Appeals’ judgment but clarified the rule. It held that for acreage owned by tenants in common to count toward a protest petition under K.S.A. 12-757(f)(1), all tenants in common of a property must sign the petition. If only one tenant in common signs, none of the acreage for that property should be counted. The Supreme Court also affirmed that the local regulation incorporated the full protest petition process. The judgment of the Court of Appeals and the district court was affirmed in part and reversed in part. View "Prairiewood Holdings v. Board of Riley County Comm'rs" on Justia Law

SWN Production Company, LLC sought to drill multiple horizontal natural gas wells on a 301-acre tract within the City of Weirton, West Virginia. The City required a conditional use permit for oil and gas extraction under its zoning ordinance. SWN applied for such a permit, and the City’s Board of Zoning Appeals (BZA) held hearings where community members raised concerns about traffic, noise, and the effect on local development. The BZA denied SWN’s application, citing incompatibility with the City’s comprehensive development plan and other adverse impacts. Afterward, SWN obtained a drilling permit from the West Virginia Department of Environmental Protection (DEP).SWN filed two actions in the Circuit Court of Brooke County: a petition for a writ of certiorari challenging the BZA’s decision and a complaint seeking a declaration that the City’s zoning ordinance was preempted by state law, especially the Natural Gas Horizontal Well Control Act. The circuit court rejected SWN’s preemption argument and affirmed the BZA’s denial of the permit. SWN appealed both rulings to the Intermediate Court of Appeals of West Virginia (ICA). The ICA reversed the circuit court on the preemption issue, finding the City’s ordinance conflicted with state law, but dismissed SWN’s appeal of the certiorari ruling for lack of jurisdiction.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed both appeals. It held that there was no irreconcilable conflict between the City’s zoning ordinance and the state’s environmental statutes; rather, any overlap was incidental and not preempted. The Court reversed the ICA’s decision on preemption and reinstated the circuit court’s order dismissing SWN’s facial preemption challenge. Regarding the certiorari appeal, the Court affirmed the ICA’s dismissal, holding that the ICA lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to review extraordinary remedies such as certiorari. View "City of Weirton v. SWN Production Company, LLC" on Justia Law

A nonprofit organization applied for a special use permit to operate a residential addiction-recovery facility on a 27-acre parcel in a rural residential zoning district. The facility would house ten to sixteen residents in a converted single-family home. Local property owners adjacent to the site expressed concerns about increased traffic, potential for trespass, noise, privacy, and other impacts. The organization classified its application as an “Assisted Living Residence” (ALR) after consulting with the county zoning administrator, who advised that this was the appropriate category under the local land use code. During hearings before the county Board of Adjustment, both sides presented expert testimony on property values and traffic, though some opinions were excluded by the Board.After the Board granted the permit with certain conditions, the neighbors filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the Henderson County Superior Court. The trial court reversed the Board’s decision, ruling that: (1) the facility should have been classified as a “Mental Health Facility” rather than an ALR; (2) the Board erred by excluding the petitioners’ expert testimony; and (3) the Board erred by admitting the respondent’s expert testimony. The trial court ordered the Board to revoke the permit and require any future application to be categorized as a Mental Health Facility.The North Carolina Court of Appeals reviewed the case. It held that the neighbors had standing due to special damages. The court determined the Board acted reasonably in categorizing the facility as an ALR, as this was consistent with the text of the county code and the code did not enumerate “Mental Health Facility” as a permitted use. The appellate court also found the Board did not err in its evidentiary rulings. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals reversed the superior court’s order and reinstated the Board’s grant of the special use permit. View "Hall v. Henderson Cnty" on Justia Law

A developer sought approval from a municipal planning board to build a new residential subdivision, proposing two access roads: one through an existing neighboring subdivision and another via a road in a neighboring town. The developer’s plan designated the road through the existing subdivision as the main entrance and the other as an emergency access. During public hearings and board review, nearby residents and their homeowners’ association raised concerns about traffic safety, particularly for pedestrians and children, on the proposed main access road. After review and site visits, the planning board approved the subdivision but imposed a condition requiring that the road through the existing subdivision be limited to emergency access, making the other road the primary entrance.The developer challenged this condition in the York County Superior Court, arguing that the planning board lacked authority to impose such a restriction, that the decision was unsupported by evidence, and that it was arbitrary and capricious. The Superior Court initially remanded the matter for additional findings, after which the planning board reaffirmed its condition, citing pedestrian and bicycle safety concerns. The Superior Court ultimately denied the developer’s appeal, upholding the planning board’s decision.On further appeal, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the planning board’s decision directly for errors of law, abuse of discretion, or lack of substantial evidence. The Court held that the planning board had authority under the municipal ordinance to impose conditions to ensure public safety, that the condition was supported by substantial evidence including resident testimony and board observations, and that the decision was not arbitrary or capricious. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court. View "Mick Land Development, Inc. v. Town of South Berwick" on Justia Law

Sockwell Corners, LLC owned a parcel of land zoned as agricultural-residential in Newton County. The company, along with proposed purchasers and developers, sought to have the property rezoned. The Newton County Board of Commissioners denied their rezoning application on July 16, 2024. The applicants then filed a verified complaint in the Superior Court of Newton County, arguing that the county’s zoning ordinance was unconstitutional as applied to their property. After a bench trial, the Superior Court ruled against the applicants, rejecting their as-applied constitutional challenge in an order dated August 7, 2025.The applicants appealed directly to the Supreme Court of Georgia, asserting that appellate jurisdiction was proper due to the constitutional issues raised and on the basis that recent statutory amendments permitted a direct appeal under OCGA § 5-6-34(a)(14), which they claimed allowed direct review of final judgments or orders reviewing zoning decisions. The Supreme Court asked for supplemental briefing on whether the discretionary application procedures of OCGA § 5-6-35 should have been followed instead.The Supreme Court of Georgia held that the recent legislative amendments to the Zoning Procedures Law and the Appellate Practice Act did not abrogate its prior precedent, specifically Diversified Holdings, LLC v. City of Suwanee, 302 Ga. 597 (2017). That precedent requires appeals from superior court decisions reviewing local administrative agency decisions—such as the denial of a rezoning request for a specific property—to proceed by discretionary application. The Court found that the statutory amendments did not modify the relevant language or the nature of the decisions at issue. Because the appellants failed to file a discretionary application as required, the Supreme Court of Georgia dismissed the appeal. View "SOCKWELL CORNERS, LLC v. NEWTON COUNTY" on Justia Law

A property development company sought to build mixed-use housing developments near a public-use airport operated by the City of Longmont, Colorado. The proposed developments were located under the airport’s approach and departure paths. The company received preliminary approvals from the City for its projects and obtained “Determinations of No Hazard” from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), which found the developments would not obstruct flight paths. However, the FAA sent letters to the City warning that approving the developments would violate a grant assurance tied to the airport’s federal funding, specifically regarding land use compatibility. The City subsequently denied the company’s proposal, citing multiple reasons, including the FAA’s letters, concerns from state authorities, its own findings of incompatibility, and public opposition.After the City’s decision, the developer asked the FAA to withdraw its letters, but the FAA declined. The company then petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit to order the FAA to vacate and withdraw these letters, arguing that the FAA’s actions directly caused its injury by influencing the City’s denial.The D.C. Circuit dismissed the petition for lack of standing. The court held that the developer failed to demonstrate that vacating the FAA’s letters would likely result in the City approving the developments, as the City had provided multiple independent reasons for its denial beyond the FAA’s communications. The court also found that the company did not comply with the court’s procedural rule requiring petitioners to argue and provide evidence of standing in their opening brief. Accordingly, the petition was dismissed. View "ModernWest Longmont, LLC v. FAA" on Justia Law

Renewable Redevelopment, LLC, a subsidiary of U.S. Wind, owns property in Sussex County, Delaware, and sought a conditional use permit from Sussex County to build an electrical substation supporting a major offshore wind project. The county’s Planning and Zoning Commission recommended approval, but after a public hearing, the Sussex County Council denied the permit. Renewable Redevelopment challenged the denial in the Superior Court. While that case was pending, the Delaware General Assembly enacted Senate Bills 159 and 199, which retroactively mandated approval of qualifying electrical substation permits and prohibited counties from actions that would undermine such applications. The Governor signed the bills the same day.Following this legislative action, Sussex County and the Town of Fenwick Island filed suit in the Court of Chancery, claiming the new statute violated the Delaware Constitution’s separation of powers, Article II, Section 25 (delegation of zoning authority), Article II, Section 16 (one-subject rule), and public due process rights. The Court of Chancery expedited the case, denied a temporary restraining order, and ultimately granted summary judgment for the defendants. The court found that Fenwick Island lacked standing, that separation of powers did not bar the General Assembly’s actions, that the Assembly retained ultimate zoning authority, that the statute’s title and subject matter complied with constitutional requirements, and that due process protections did not apply to the counties in this context.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Delaware reviewed the constitutional challenges de novo, affirmed the judgment, and held that: (1) separation of powers does not operate vertically within a branch and the General Assembly may override delegated zoning decisions; (2) Article II, Section 25 does not restrict the Assembly’s power to reclaim zoning authority; (3) the statute’s title and subject matter satisfied Article II, Section 16; and (4) no due process violation was shown. The Court affirmed the Court of Chancery’s summary judgment for the defendants. View "Town of Fenwick Island v. State" on Justia Law

A group of individuals who own or reside in the Makila Plantation neighborhood in Launiupoko, Maui, sought to intervene in a public hearing concerning a special use permit (SUP) application submitted by Goodfellow Bros., LLC. Goodfellow had applied for the SUP to operate a temporary rock-crushing facility on nearby agricultural land, which would process rocks for use in local construction projects. The project had been the subject of community outreach and was publicized through required legal notices and additional informational meetings. The Appellants were not entitled to direct notice as they did not live within 500 feet of the project, but they became aware of the hearing through their homeowners association and submitted written testimony expressing concerns about the project’s impact.Despite knowing about the project and the public hearing, Appellants filed their petition to intervene less than 24 hours before the scheduled hearing, missing the deadline set by the Maui Planning Commission’s (MPC) rules. At the August 8, 2023 hearing, the MPC considered whether there was “good cause” for the untimely filing of the petition. After discussion and testimony from both sides, the MPC found that Appellants had sufficient notice and opportunity to file earlier but did not show good cause for their delay. The MPC voted unanimously to deny the petition to intervene and subsequently approved the SUP application with amended conditions, including prohibiting rock-crushing on the property.The Supreme Court of the State of Hawaiʻi reviewed the matter on appeal. The court held that the MPC did not abuse its discretion in denying the untimely petition because Appellants failed to demonstrate good cause for their late filing. The court also found no evidence that the MPC’s decision was based on Appellants’ residency status, nor was the MPC required to hold a contested case hearing on the untimely petition. The court affirmed the MPC’s decision. View "Gutschmidt v. Maui Planning Commission" on Justia Law

T-Mobile South, a wireless service provider, applied for a permit to construct a 108-foot cell phone tower on vacant residential property in Roswell, Georgia. The City of Roswell denied the application based on its zoning ordinance, which required permits for new wireless facilities and allowed decision-makers to consider several factors. T-Mobile then sued, claiming the denial both prevented it from filling a service coverage gap and discriminated among service providers. The company sought an injunction compelling Roswell to issue the permit.Proceedings in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia resulted in an initial grant of summary judgment for T-Mobile, which was reversed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. The Supreme Court also reviewed the case and remanded it. On remand, the district court ultimately ruled in favor of T-Mobile after a bench trial, applying the “significant gap” test: it found T-Mobile had a significant gap in service that only the proposed tower would remedy and ordered Roswell to approve the necessary permits.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed whether the “effective prohibition” provision of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 applies to a single permit denial. The court held that the statutory prohibition on local “regulation” that “prohibits or has the effect of prohibiting” wireless service applies to general rules or regulations, not to individual zoning decisions or permit denials. The Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings under the correct legal standard, concluding that T-Mobile must challenge the city’s rules themselves, not individual permit denials, to invoke the effective prohibition clause. View "T-Mobile South, LLC v. City of Roswell, Georgia" on Justia Law