Justia Zoning, Planning & Land Use Opinion Summaries

South Branch Solar, L.L.C. sought approval to build a 130-megawatt solar-powered electric generation facility in Hancock County, Ohio, on approximately 700 acres of agricultural land. The project included solar panels, related equipment, and infrastructure. Local government officials and residents had varied reactions, with some supporting the facility for its economic and environmental benefits and others expressing concerns about impacts on land use, aesthetics, property values, wildlife, and local drainage systems. Travis Bohn, who lives near the project site, opposed the project and intervened in the proceedings.The Ohio Power Siting Board reviewed South Branch’s application, which included environmental studies and mitigation plans. After a public hearing and extensive opportunity for public input, the board staff recommended approval subject to 50 conditions. A joint stipulation was agreed to by South Branch, the board staff, the county commissioners, and the Ohio Farm Bureau Federation, but not by Bohn. Following an adjudicatory hearing, the Board issued an order granting the certificate. Bohn unsuccessfully sought rehearing, arguing that the Board misapplied statutory criteria, failed to require adequate wildlife and flood analysis, and improperly weighed local opposition and economic impacts.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the Board’s order using a standard that allows reversal only if the order was unlawful or unreasonable. The court held that the Board’s determinations under R.C. 4906.10(A)(2), (A)(3), and (A)(6)—concerning environmental impact, minimum adverse impact, and public interest—were supported by sufficient probative evidence and complied with statutory and regulatory requirements. The court found no reversible error in the Board’s approval of South Branch’s application and affirmed the order granting the certificate. View "In re Application of S. Branch Solar, L.L.C." on Justia Law

Craig and Michelle Opperman sought approval from their homeowners association to construct an accessory dwelling unit (ADU) by converting their garage and building a new garage on their property within a planned development managed by Portola Ranch Association. The Design Review Committee, lacking expertise on ADUs, referred the application to the Board of Directors. After retaining an independent consultant and reviewing the application, the Board denied the proposal, citing concerns about traffic and fire safety. During this period, adjacent property owners, Martin and Anna Eng, filed a quiet title action against the Oppermans regarding a non-exclusive easement affecting the area in front of the Oppermans’ garage.In response to the Engs’ action, the Oppermans filed a cross-complaint against the Association, asserting claims including breach of governing documents, breach of fiduciary duty, interference with business expectancy, and declaratory relief. The Portola Ranch Association moved for summary judgment, arguing its decision was protected by the business judgment rule and was within its authority under the governing documents. The Superior Court of San Mateo County granted summary judgment for the Association, finding that the Board acted properly and that the business judgment rule applied. The court later awarded attorney fees to the Association.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the consolidated appeals. It applied de novo review and affirmed the trial court’s summary judgment. The appellate court held that the Board had authority under the Association’s governing documents to review and deny the ADU application based on safety concerns and that its decision was protected by the business judgment rule and the doctrine of judicial deference articulated in Lamden v. La Jolla Shores Clubdominium Homeowners Assn. The court further affirmed the award of attorney fees to the Association. View "Eng v. Opperman" on Justia Law

A joint drainage district, managed by the boards of supervisors for Floyd and Cerro Gordo Counties, sought to require a railroad company to install a new, larger drainage culvert through a railroad embankment to improve water flow and address aging infrastructure. The existing culvert, over a century old, was deteriorating and positioned too high to drain water effectively. The proposed construction involved a trenchless “jack and bore” method designed to avoid any interruption to rail service. The railroad company objected, arguing that federal law preempted state drainage law and that the construction would jeopardize railroad operations.After a remand from the Surface Transportation Board, the Iowa District Court for Floyd County conducted a bench trial and concluded that federal law—the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act—preempted the drainage district’s authority. The district court found that the proposed installation posed risks to rail operations and issued a writ of mandamus preventing the project. The Iowa Court of Appeals affirmed this decision.On further review, the Iowa Supreme Court held that the federal statute did not categorically preempt state drainage law in this context and that preemption would only apply if the project imposed more than incidental interference with rail operations. After a de novo review of the evidence, the court determined that the proposed culvert installation would have only incidental effects on rail transportation and that the railroad had not met its burden of showing unreasonable interference. The Iowa Supreme Court vacated the Court of Appeals’ decision, reversed the district court’s judgment, and remanded the case for entry of judgment in favor of the drainage district, dissolving the writ of mandamus. View "Iowa Northern Railway Company v. Floyd County Board of Supervisors" on Justia Law

A property owner sought to develop a parcel of land in a town, which required rezoning and environmental review. In 2017, while preparing its zoning petition, the owner and the town entered into a memorandum of understanding (MOU) that purported to bind the town and its successors to continue reviewing the zoning petition until a final determination was reached, based on empirical data. The owner submitted its petition and participated in the environmental review process, investing significant resources. After local elections in 2019, a new town supervisor and board, who opposed the project, voted to terminate review of the zoning petition and the related environmental process.The property owner filed suit against the town, its board, and the supervisor, alleging breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, based on the town’s termination of the review process. The defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that the MOU was unenforceable under the term limits doctrine and contract zoning doctrine. The Supreme Court, Dutchess County, dismissed the complaint, holding the MOU invalid. The Appellate Division, Second Department, affirmed that decision.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case after granting leave to appeal. The Court held that the MOU was invalid and unenforceable under the term limits doctrine because it impermissibly bound successor town boards in the exercise of their legislative discretion over zoning matters. The Court found that such an agreement was not specifically authorized by statute or charter, and did not fall within an exception for proprietary acts. As a result, the property owner’s contractual claims failed as a matter of law. The Court affirmed the Appellate Division’s order. View "Hudson View Park Co. v Town of Fishkill" on Justia Law

A non-profit religious organization sought to build an outdoor grotto, including a shrine, plaza, and walking path, on land adjacent to its existing church property. The new grotto was planned for a parcel subject to a lease and eventual transfer to the organization. The property was zoned for residential use, and while the church itself predated the zoning ordinance, the construction of accessory religious structures was not directly permitted under the current ordinance unless the church was located adjacent to an arterial street. The organization’s application acknowledged this restriction but requested approval for the project and setback variances.The Park Hills Board of Adjustment held a public hearing, received input both for and against the project, and ultimately approved the conditional use permit and variances, conditioned on the property transfer. Neighbors opposed to the project, specifically the Frederics, challenged the Board’s decision in the Kenton Circuit Court, arguing that the Board exceeded its authority under local ordinances and state law. The circuit court ruled in favor of the defendants, finding that the church was “grandfathered” due to its pre-zoning existence and that the Board did not act arbitrarily. The court did not address the federal Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) claim raised during summary judgment.On appeal, the Kentucky Court of Appeals reversed, holding the Board acted arbitrarily and exceeded its authority, as the expansion constituted an impermissible enlargement of a nonconforming use under both the zoning code and state law. The court also found no RLUIPA violation, reasoning that the ordinance did not impose a substantial burden on religious exercise.The Supreme Court of Kentucky granted discretionary review. The Court held that the RLUIPA defense was properly before it, as it had been tried by implied consent of the parties. On the merits, the Court concluded that denial of the permit did not impose a substantial burden under RLUIPA, applying the Sixth Circuit’s standard. The Court also found that the zoning ordinance did not violate RLUIPA’s equal-terms provision. The Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ ruling, vacating the Board’s grant of the permit and variances. View "MISSIONARIES OF SAINT JOHN THE BAPTIST, INC. V. FREDERIC" on Justia Law

Timothy Hale and Sonja Ringen constructed a storage building on their commercially zoned property in Laramie without first obtaining a building permit. When the City of Laramie discovered the construction, it issued a stop work order and a cease-and-desist letter. Despite these notices, Hale and Ringen continued building and subsequently applied for a permit, which the City denied due to deficiencies in the application. After further unsuccessful permit attempts and ongoing disputes over the City’s requirements—including requests for disassembly of the structure—the City sought and obtained a permanent injunction from the District Court of Albany County, restricting use of the building until permitting was complete and compliance was achieved.The District Court of Albany County conducted a bench trial in May 2022 and granted the City’s request for a permanent injunction. The court outlined a process for inspections, identification of code violations, and corrective actions, but continued conflict between the parties hindered progress. Multiple rounds of correspondence, inspections, and motions ensued, with the City insisting on structural disassembly and Hale/Ringen providing documentation to support their position. Hale and Ringen eventually moved to vacate the injunction, arguing it was no longer equitable given their efforts and the City’s refusal to issue a permit. The district court denied their motion, citing only the parties’ lack of agreement, and provided no substantive analysis of the evidence.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Wyoming determined that the district court abused its discretion by failing to consider the evidence and arguments presented before denying the motion to vacate or modify the injunction. The Supreme Court held that a court must exercise discretion and decide motions on their merits, rather than requiring agreement between adversarial parties. Consequently, the Supreme Court reversed the district court’s order and remanded the case for full consideration of Hale/Ringen’s motion in light of all relevant facts and equities. View "Hale v. City of Laramie" on Justia Law

A flea market operator in Durham, North Carolina, received a notice of violation (NOV) from the city's planning department following a field inspection. The NOV stated that the market had failed to comply with an approved site plan, referencing the city’s Unified Development Ordinance (UDO), and warned of possible civil penalties unless corrective action was taken within thirty days. The NOV included copies of photographs and a copy of the site plan but did not specifically identify which aspects of the property were in violation or the specific corrective measures required.The market appealed the NOV to the City’s Board of Adjustment (BOA). At the quasi-judicial hearing, city staff explained that the NOV was intentionally broad because there were several violations, and listing each one would allow the market to fix only some issues. One BOA member expressed concern that the NOV’s lack of specificity failed to inform the market of the exact violations or needed corrections. Despite this, the BOA voted to deny the market’s appeal. The market then appealed to the Superior Court, Durham County, arguing that the NOV was too vague and did not comply with ordinance requirements. The superior court affirmed the BOA’s decision and ordered the market to come into compliance within thirty-six months. The market further appealed, and the North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed, finding the NOV sufficient under the UDO.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the appeal and held that the NOV did not comply with the city’s ordinance because it failed to provide a description of the specific violations as required by UDO § 15.2.1.C. The court concluded that property owners must receive enough detail to understand the alleged violations and what corrective action is required. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded with instructions for the city to dismiss the NOV. View "Durham Green Flea Market v. City of Durham" on Justia Law

A developer challenged the legality of “recreation fees” imposed by a municipality on builders of new subdivisions. The developer argued that the town’s fees, charged in lieu of dedicating land for public recreation, either exceeded statutory limits or were unconstitutional because they were not proportionate to each development’s impact. The developer further alleged that the municipality did not use the fees as required, instead commingling them with general funds and failing to create or improve public recreation areas near the developments.In the Superior Court of Wake County, the developer pursued a putative class action seeking declaratory relief and a refund of all such fees paid since November 2017. The Superior Court certified a class including all payers of the recreation fees, finding several common legal questions appropriate for resolution on a class-wide basis. These included whether the fees violated statutory requirements, whether their calculation was legally proper, whether their use complied with statutory mandates, and whether they were constitutionally proportionate. The municipality appealed directly to the Supreme Court of North Carolina, arguing that individualized factual inquiries predominated over common issues and that a class action was not the superior method of adjudication.The Supreme Court of North Carolina held that the class as certified did not satisfy the predominance requirement for class actions. The Court explained that several claims—such as whether fees exceeded fair market value or were roughly proportional—would require individualized, fact-intensive determinations for each class member, resulting in mini-trials that would overwhelm the common legal issues. Consequently, the Supreme Court vacated the trial court’s class certification order and remanded for further proceedings, instructing the lower court to reconsider class certification in light of these findings. View "Empire Contractors Inc. v. Town of Apex" on Justia Law

A dispute arose between two competing billboard companies after one company constructed an electronic billboard in Gulfport, Mississippi. The company that operated existing billboards nearby filed suit, claiming that the new billboard violated a city ordinance enacted as part of a settlement resolving earlier litigation involving the city and the plaintiff. The defendant, along with related entities, countered with claims for declaratory and injunctive relief and challenged the plaintiff’s standing to bring the suit. The property owner on whose land the disputed billboard was constructed also became a party to the litigation.The litigation began in the Chancery Court of Harrison County, which denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, specifically rejecting their standing argument. The defendants removed the case to federal court, which remanded it and awarded costs to the plaintiff. After the defendants’ interlocutory appeal was denied by the Supreme Court of Mississippi, the case was transferred to circuit court. There, the court again denied summary judgment, and further unsuccessful dispositive motions were filed by the defendants. Over several years, the case involved multiple motions, removal, transfer, and appeals, with no claims proceeding to trial. Eventually, after the defendants transferred their interest in the billboard to a third party who settled with the plaintiff, the plaintiff moved to dismiss the case with prejudice. The Circuit Court of Harrison County granted the motion and denied the defendants’ subsequent request for attorney’s fees and costs, finding that much of the litigation expense was due to the defendants’ own aggressive litigation strategies, and declined to impose sanctions, concluding the suit was not frivolous.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the appeal, focusing on whether the trial court erred in denying attorney’s fees and sanctions to the defendants. The court held that the decision to award attorney’s fees or impose sanctions was within the trial court’s discretion, and found no abuse of discretion in denying fees or sanctions, affirming the dismissal with prejudice. View "Busby v. The Lamar Company, LLC" on Justia Law

A company sought approval to construct a 500 kW solar-energy project in Randolph, Vermont. The proposed project required a certificate of public good (CPG) from the Vermont Public Utility Commission (PUC). A portion of the project's infrastructure, such as its access road and interconnection line, would be located on land with slopes exceeding 25%. Local and regional planning commissions, as well as the Town of Randolph Selectboard, initially supported the project and jointly requested the site be designated as a “preferred site.” After neighbors raised concerns that some panels would be located on steep slopes in conflict with the Town Plan, the applicant agreed to revise the project so that no panels would be built on slopes over 25%. The Town conditioned its continued support on this revision and on receiving the final site plan.The PUC’s hearing officer initially recommended denying the CPG due to uncertainty about whether the Town’s conditions regarding slope measurement had been met. The PUC rejected this recommendation, refocusing on whether the Town itself was satisfied with the conditions. The applicant subsequently provided a letter from the Town confirming its support and satisfaction with the conditions. The PUC found the project's compliance with soil-erosion control measures sufficient, particularly in light of a stormwater permit issued by the Agency of Natural Resources (ANR), and ruled that the project would not unduly interfere with the region’s orderly development. The PUC granted the CPG; the neighbors’ motion for reconsideration was denied, and they appealed.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case, giving deference to the PUC’s expertise and factual findings. The Court affirmed the PUC’s grant of the CPG, holding that the PUC correctly applied the legal standards under 30 V.S.A. § 248, properly considered the Town Plan’s land-conservation measures, reasonably relied on the Town’s assurances and ANR’s permit, and did not misapply its own rules regarding “preferred site” status. View "In re Petition of Randolph Davis Solar LLC" on Justia Law