Justia Zoning, Planning & Land Use Opinion Summaries

Several property owners in New Braunfels, Texas, challenged a city zoning ordinance that prohibits short-term rentals in residential districts. The ordinance, originally enacted in 2006 and amended in 2011, was in place prior to the appellants’ purchase of their properties. Despite knowing about the restrictions, the appellants either engaged in or sought to engage in short-term rental activities and, after being denied zoning changes to permit such use, filed suit against the city. Their claims alleged the ordinance violated the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of both the United States and Texas Constitutions.The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas initially dismissed the appellants’ claims under Rule 12(b)(6). The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in a prior decision, vacated and remanded, allowing the appellants to proceed to discovery. After discovery, both parties moved for summary judgment. The district court again ruled in favor of the city, granting summary judgment on all claims. The appellants then sought review of this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that Texas law does not recognize a protected property interest in the right to lease one’s home on a short-term basis, which is required for a due process claim. It further found that the ordinance’s restrictions on short-term rentals survive rational-basis review under the Equal Protection Clause, as the city’s goal of preserving the residential character of neighborhoods is a legitimate government interest, and the line drawn between short-term and longer-term rentals was not arbitrary. Accordingly, the court found no constitutional violation and affirmed the summary judgment in favor of the city. View "Marfil v. City of New Braunfels" on Justia Law

A Michigan-based real estate developer and related parties sought to redevelop a commercial property in the City of Pontiac to include medical marijuana cultivation and processing facilities. After purchasing the property in 2019, the developer obtained rezoning approval from the city, but the process of securing required permits and special exceptions for tenants became protracted. The city clerk cited deficiencies in tenant applications and, at one point, argued that the project violated city ordinances regarding overlay districts for marijuana businesses. Despite eventual approvals—including a court order requiring the city to issue permits—the tenants withdrew due to the delays, and the project collapsed. Subsequently, the developer’s affiliate lost another business opportunity, which plaintiffs attributed to city officials’ retaliation.The plaintiffs filed suit in Oakland County Circuit Court, seeking injunctive, declaratory, and monetary relief, and later brought civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. The district court granted summary judgment for the city and the city clerk, finding insufficient evidence of constitutional violations and concluding that the delays and alleged retaliation did not violate the plaintiffs’ rights.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that the plaintiffs lacked a cognizable property interest under the Due Process Clause because city approval for marijuana facilities was discretionary, not a matter of right. The court also found that the delays did not constitute a “taking” under the Fifth Amendment, as the length and nature of the delays were not extraordinary. The equal protection claim failed for lack of evidence that similarly situated applicants were treated more favorably. Finally, the court determined that the plaintiffs’ First Amendment retaliation claim could not proceed against the city because the mayor lacked final policymaking authority over zoning and no municipal policy or custom was established. View "Rubicon Real Estate Holdings v. City of Pontiac" on Justia Law

Sable Offshore Corp. and Pacific Pipeline Company acquired the Las Flores Pipelines, which run through the coastal zone in Santa Barbara County, California. After the 2015 Refugio Beach oil spill, the pipelines were inactive until Sable purchased them in 2024 and began repair and maintenance work at numerous sites. The California Coastal Commission sent Sable a Notice of Violation, then issued Executive Director Cease and Desist Orders, directing Sable to seek permits for both prospective and already completed work. Sable submitted zoning clearance applications to the County, which declared the repair work authorized by existing permits and declined to act on the applications. The Commission subsequently issued further cease and desist orders and filed a cross-complaint seeking injunctive relief. After observing ongoing construction, the Commission requested a preliminary injunction.The Superior Court of Santa Barbara County held hearings and ultimately granted a preliminary injunction enforcing the Commission’s cease and desist order. Sable appealed, arguing the Commission lacked jurisdiction to issue the order because the County had determined no new permits were necessary and had declined enforcement action.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Six, reviewed the case. It held that under Public Resources Code section 30810, the Commission was authorized to issue a cease and desist order when the County declined to act regarding an alleged violation, regardless of the County’s reasons for its decision. The court found that the trial court properly issued the preliminary injunction upon a prima facie showing of a Coastal Act violation, and no balancing of equities was required under section 30803. The court also rejected Sable’s due process and federal preemption arguments and affirmed the trial court’s judgment. View "Sable Offshore Corp. v. Cal. Coastal Commission" on Justia Law

Brighton Properties, LLC was the original developer of the Butcher Creek Planned Unit Development (PUD) in Telluride, Colorado. Under the PUD Agreement with the Town, various lots were designated for specific uses, with Lot A set aside as open space due to its steep slopes. The Agreement included a clause requiring the consent of all parties for any amendments. After selling all lots except Lot A, Brighton sought to amend the Agreement to allow for affordable housing development on the southern portion of Lot A. The Town declined, citing the lack of required consent from all property owners. Subsequently, Brighton pursued a citizen initiative to rezone Lot A, but the Town rejected this effort, asserting that such an amendment was administrative or quasi-judicial rather than legislative, and thus not a proper subject for an initiative.Brighton challenged the Town’s decision in district court, arguing that the initiative was legislative in character. The district court disagreed, finding that amending the PUD Agreement was administrative and not suitable for the initiative process; it granted summary judgment to the Town. Brighton appealed, and the Colorado Court of Appeals reversed the decision. The appellate court relied on Margolis v. District Court, reasoning that zoning and rezoning decisions are generally legislative and thus subject to initiative.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case and reversed the appellate court’s decision. The Supreme Court held that while the adoption of a PUD enabling ordinance is legislative, amendments to specific PUD agreements are administrative because they are site-specific and do not set new general policy. Therefore, such amendments are not a proper subject for the initiative process. The case was remanded to the court of appeals with instructions to remand to the district court for consideration of the Town’s attorney fees request. View "Kavanaugh v. Telluride Locals Coal. Petitioners' Comm." on Justia Law

A railroad company operating in Massachusetts sought to acquire a 155-acre parcel in the town of Hopedale to build a new transloading facility. The land had been classified as forest land under Massachusetts General Law Chapter 61, which gives municipalities a right of first refusal to purchase such land if the owner wishes to sell or convert it to another use. After an initial notice of intent to sell was deemed deficient by the town, the seller withdrew the notice. Without issuing a new notice, the seller then transferred beneficial ownership of the property to the railroad company through a transaction that attempted to circumvent the town’s rights. Hopedale asserted its rights under Chapter 61 and filed suit in Massachusetts Land Court to enforce its right of first refusal and prevent further site work by the railroad.After a failed settlement agreement—subsequently invalidated by the Massachusetts Superior Court and with state litigation ongoing—the railroad company petitioned the Surface Transportation Board for a declaratory order that the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act (ICCTA) preempted the town’s rights under Chapter 61. The Surface Transportation Board denied the petition, finding that Chapter 61 was a generally applicable property law not categorically preempted by ICCTA, and that the railroad had not established a valid property interest in the land. The Board also concluded that the town’s actions did not unreasonably burden or interfere with rail transportation.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the Board’s order. It held that ICCTA does not preempt Chapter 61’s right-of-first-refusal provisions, as they are generally applicable state property laws and do not directly regulate railroad operations. The court further found that, without a settled property interest, the railroad’s as-applied preemption arguments failed. The court denied the railroad’s petition for review and affirmed the Board’s order. View "Grafton & Upton Railroad Company v. Surface Transportation Board" on Justia Law

A vineyard in Riley County sought to expand its operations through an amendment to its planned unit development. Some neighboring property owners filed a protest petition, as permitted by Kansas law if at least 20% of the affected landowners sign. One property bordering the vineyard was owned by two parties as tenants in common, but only one signed the petition. The Board of Riley County Commissioners counted only half the acreage of that property toward the 20% threshold, reasoning that only half the owners had signed. This calculation meant the protest petition narrowly failed to reach the required threshold, but it would have succeeded if the entire property had been counted.The Riley District Court reviewed the Board’s calculation and the applicability of the protest petition process. The Kansas Court of Appeals later affirmed in part and reversed in part, agreeing with the Board’s approach of counting only the proportional share represented by the signing tenant in common. The Court of Appeals also held that the local regulation incorporated the full protest petition process from state law. Both Prairiewood Holdings, LLC (one of the protest petitioners) and the Board sought further review.The Supreme Court of the State of Kansas affirmed the Court of Appeals’ judgment but clarified the rule. It held that for acreage owned by tenants in common to count toward a protest petition under K.S.A. 12-757(f)(1), all tenants in common of a property must sign the petition. If only one tenant in common signs, none of the acreage for that property should be counted. The Supreme Court also affirmed that the local regulation incorporated the full protest petition process. The judgment of the Court of Appeals and the district court was affirmed in part and reversed in part. View "Prairiewood Holdings v. Board of Riley County Comm'rs" on Justia Law

SWN Production Company, LLC sought to drill multiple horizontal natural gas wells on a 301-acre tract within the City of Weirton, West Virginia. The City required a conditional use permit for oil and gas extraction under its zoning ordinance. SWN applied for such a permit, and the City’s Board of Zoning Appeals (BZA) held hearings where community members raised concerns about traffic, noise, and the effect on local development. The BZA denied SWN’s application, citing incompatibility with the City’s comprehensive development plan and other adverse impacts. Afterward, SWN obtained a drilling permit from the West Virginia Department of Environmental Protection (DEP).SWN filed two actions in the Circuit Court of Brooke County: a petition for a writ of certiorari challenging the BZA’s decision and a complaint seeking a declaration that the City’s zoning ordinance was preempted by state law, especially the Natural Gas Horizontal Well Control Act. The circuit court rejected SWN’s preemption argument and affirmed the BZA’s denial of the permit. SWN appealed both rulings to the Intermediate Court of Appeals of West Virginia (ICA). The ICA reversed the circuit court on the preemption issue, finding the City’s ordinance conflicted with state law, but dismissed SWN’s appeal of the certiorari ruling for lack of jurisdiction.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed both appeals. It held that there was no irreconcilable conflict between the City’s zoning ordinance and the state’s environmental statutes; rather, any overlap was incidental and not preempted. The Court reversed the ICA’s decision on preemption and reinstated the circuit court’s order dismissing SWN’s facial preemption challenge. Regarding the certiorari appeal, the Court affirmed the ICA’s dismissal, holding that the ICA lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to review extraordinary remedies such as certiorari. View "City of Weirton v. SWN Production Company, LLC" on Justia Law

A nonprofit organization applied for a special use permit to operate a residential addiction-recovery facility on a 27-acre parcel in a rural residential zoning district. The facility would house ten to sixteen residents in a converted single-family home. Local property owners adjacent to the site expressed concerns about increased traffic, potential for trespass, noise, privacy, and other impacts. The organization classified its application as an “Assisted Living Residence” (ALR) after consulting with the county zoning administrator, who advised that this was the appropriate category under the local land use code. During hearings before the county Board of Adjustment, both sides presented expert testimony on property values and traffic, though some opinions were excluded by the Board.After the Board granted the permit with certain conditions, the neighbors filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the Henderson County Superior Court. The trial court reversed the Board’s decision, ruling that: (1) the facility should have been classified as a “Mental Health Facility” rather than an ALR; (2) the Board erred by excluding the petitioners’ expert testimony; and (3) the Board erred by admitting the respondent’s expert testimony. The trial court ordered the Board to revoke the permit and require any future application to be categorized as a Mental Health Facility.The North Carolina Court of Appeals reviewed the case. It held that the neighbors had standing due to special damages. The court determined the Board acted reasonably in categorizing the facility as an ALR, as this was consistent with the text of the county code and the code did not enumerate “Mental Health Facility” as a permitted use. The appellate court also found the Board did not err in its evidentiary rulings. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals reversed the superior court’s order and reinstated the Board’s grant of the special use permit. View "Hall v. Henderson Cnty" on Justia Law

A developer sought approval from a municipal planning board to build a new residential subdivision, proposing two access roads: one through an existing neighboring subdivision and another via a road in a neighboring town. The developer’s plan designated the road through the existing subdivision as the main entrance and the other as an emergency access. During public hearings and board review, nearby residents and their homeowners’ association raised concerns about traffic safety, particularly for pedestrians and children, on the proposed main access road. After review and site visits, the planning board approved the subdivision but imposed a condition requiring that the road through the existing subdivision be limited to emergency access, making the other road the primary entrance.The developer challenged this condition in the York County Superior Court, arguing that the planning board lacked authority to impose such a restriction, that the decision was unsupported by evidence, and that it was arbitrary and capricious. The Superior Court initially remanded the matter for additional findings, after which the planning board reaffirmed its condition, citing pedestrian and bicycle safety concerns. The Superior Court ultimately denied the developer’s appeal, upholding the planning board’s decision.On further appeal, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the planning board’s decision directly for errors of law, abuse of discretion, or lack of substantial evidence. The Court held that the planning board had authority under the municipal ordinance to impose conditions to ensure public safety, that the condition was supported by substantial evidence including resident testimony and board observations, and that the decision was not arbitrary or capricious. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court. View "Mick Land Development, Inc. v. Town of South Berwick" on Justia Law

Sockwell Corners, LLC owned a parcel of land zoned as agricultural-residential in Newton County. The company, along with proposed purchasers and developers, sought to have the property rezoned. The Newton County Board of Commissioners denied their rezoning application on July 16, 2024. The applicants then filed a verified complaint in the Superior Court of Newton County, arguing that the county’s zoning ordinance was unconstitutional as applied to their property. After a bench trial, the Superior Court ruled against the applicants, rejecting their as-applied constitutional challenge in an order dated August 7, 2025.The applicants appealed directly to the Supreme Court of Georgia, asserting that appellate jurisdiction was proper due to the constitutional issues raised and on the basis that recent statutory amendments permitted a direct appeal under OCGA § 5-6-34(a)(14), which they claimed allowed direct review of final judgments or orders reviewing zoning decisions. The Supreme Court asked for supplemental briefing on whether the discretionary application procedures of OCGA § 5-6-35 should have been followed instead.The Supreme Court of Georgia held that the recent legislative amendments to the Zoning Procedures Law and the Appellate Practice Act did not abrogate its prior precedent, specifically Diversified Holdings, LLC v. City of Suwanee, 302 Ga. 597 (2017). That precedent requires appeals from superior court decisions reviewing local administrative agency decisions—such as the denial of a rezoning request for a specific property—to proceed by discretionary application. The Court found that the statutory amendments did not modify the relevant language or the nature of the decisions at issue. Because the appellants failed to file a discretionary application as required, the Supreme Court of Georgia dismissed the appeal. View "SOCKWELL CORNERS, LLC v. NEWTON COUNTY" on Justia Law