Justia Zoning, Planning & Land Use Opinion Summaries

A renewable energy developer spent several years and millions of dollars planning a large wind turbine project across numerous parcels in Worth County, Iowa. The developer did not select a turbine model or finalize the number and placement of turbines, nor did it apply for or secure any county permits for the construction or operation of the turbines. The only permits obtained related to meteorological towers. While the developer’s preliminary activities were extensive, they did not include actual construction of any turbines. At the time, part of the county was zoned, but most was unzoned and did not require permits for such projects.Public opinion shifted against wind energy development, leading to the election of new county supervisors. In response, the Worth County Board of Supervisors imposed a temporary moratorium on commercial wind energy systems while drafting new regulations. Eventually, the Board enacted an ordinance imposing setbacks, maximum turbine heights, noise limits, and shadow flicker restrictions. Rather than seeking waivers or adapting the project to the new rules, the developer filed suit, arguing it had vested rights under the prior regulatory framework and that the county acted in bad faith. After a bench trial, the Iowa District Court for Worth County ruled for the developer, finding both vested rights and bad faith.The Supreme Court of Iowa reviewed the case de novo and reversed the district court’s decision. The Supreme Court held that, under Iowa law, the vested rights doctrine applies only where a developer has obtained a permit or formal governmental approval for the project. Since the developer had not applied for or received such approval for the turbines, no vested rights existed. The court further found no evidence of illegality or improper purpose in the county’s actions, rejecting the bad faith claim. The court remanded the case for further proceedings on any remaining claims. View "Worthwhile Wind, LLC v. Worth County Board of Supervisors" on Justia Law

A property owner sought permission from San Luis Obispo County to construct single-family homes on several lots in Los Osos, an already developed coastal community. The County granted the permit, concluding the homes were an appropriate use under local zoning. However, the California Coastal Commission appealed the County’s decision to itself and denied the permit, asserting that it had appellate jurisdiction because the proposed development was situated in a sensitive coastal resource area (SCRA) under the County’s local coastal program (LCP), and because the site was designated for more than one principal permitted use.After the Commission's denial, the property owner filed a petition for a writ of administrative mandate in San Luis Obispo County Superior Court, contending the Commission lacked appellate jurisdiction on both grounds. The superior court sided with the Commission on the SCRA issue but rejected the Commission’s alternative jurisdictional basis. On appeal, the California Court of Appeal affirmed, holding the Commission properly exercised appellate jurisdiction based on the SCRA designation and did not address the alternative argument.The Supreme Court of California reviewed the case and clarified several important principles. It held that courts must exercise independent judgment—not deferential review—when determining the Commission’s appellate jurisdiction if the matter turns on legal interpretation of an LCP. The court further held that, where the Commission and a local government offer conflicting interpretations of an LCP, judicial deference to either is unwarranted when no interpretive advantage is clearly established. Examining the LCP, the court found that the proposed development was not in an SCRA as designated by the LCP. It also ruled the Commission does not have appellate jurisdiction solely because a site has multiple principal permitted uses; jurisdiction arises only if the proposed use is not among those principal permitted. The judgment of the Court of Appeal was reversed. View "Shear Development Co. v. Cal. Coastal Com." on Justia Law

Applicants sought to build two principal residences on a single residential property in the Forest Hills neighborhood of Washington, D.C. Because the proposed construction did not comply with the minimum lot width requirement for the area, the applicants, Nezahat and Paul Harrison, requested a special exception for a “theoretical subdivision” from the District of Columbia Board of Zoning Adjustment (BZA), which would allow multiple principal buildings on one record lot by waiving certain development standards, including lot width. In the alternative, they applied for a variance from the minimum lot width requirement. Neighbors who held an easement over the property opposed the applications, expressing concerns about property values, stormwater drainage, and neighborhood character.The BZA considered both requests. The D.C. Office of Planning and the local Advisory Neighborhood Commission both recommended approval of the special exception, though opinions varied about the variance. After public hearings, the BZA granted the special exception for the theoretical subdivision, thereby waiving the minimum lot width requirement, but denied the request for a variance. The neighbors, Deborah Hernandez and Mary Lee, appealed, arguing that the BZA could not lawfully waive lot width requirements through a special exception while denying a variance for the same requirement.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the BZA’s decision. The court held that the applicable zoning regulations allow the BZA to grant a theoretical subdivision as a special exception and to waive minimum lot width requirements without the need to also grant a variance. The court found that the standards for special exceptions and variances are independent and that the BZA did not act arbitrarily. The court affirmed the BZA’s decision. View "Hernandez v. District of Columbia Board of Zoning Adjustment" on Justia Law

Several property owners challenged the City of Waveland’s approval of applications submitted by a developer for a residential planned development project near their properties. The developer sought conditional use and preliminary plat approval to create nineteen residential lots on approximately six acres. After the city’s Planning and Zoning Commission held hearings and recommended approval, the City’s Board of Aldermen also approved the applications. The property owners objected, arguing that the proposed development would improperly alter existing lots and that the city failed to follow required legal procedures. They also asserted that the development was inconsistent with zoning rules and that the city’s attorney’s involvement as a hearing officer was improper.After the initial Board approval, the property owners appealed to the Hancock County Circuit Court, which first reversed the approval on procedural grounds. The developer then resubmitted nearly identical applications, which again received Commission and Board approval after additional hearings. The property owners appealed, but the circuit court dismissed the appeal due to a procedural defect in the notice of appeal. The Supreme Court of Mississippi reversed this dismissal, holding that the failure to name all necessary parties in the notice was not jurisdictional and could be corrected. On remand, the circuit court affirmed the Board’s approval of the development.On further appeal, the Supreme Court of Mississippi held that the city’s approval was supported by substantial evidence and was neither arbitrary nor capricious. The Court concluded that the statutory notice requirements for altering a recorded plat did not apply because there was no evidence of a properly recorded plat. The Court also found that the city’s process complied with local ordinances, and the appointment of the city attorney as hearing officer was not prejudicial. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed the circuit court’s judgment. View "Longo v. The City of Waveland" on Justia Law

Seventeen property owners in Burlington sought a declaratory judgment that the city’s newly adopted ordinances regulating short-term rentals did not apply to their twenty-two nonowner-occupied properties, arguing that these uses were preexisting and nonconforming, and thus exempt from the new regulations. The city’s ordinances, passed in 2022, imposed significant restrictions on short-term rentals, including prohibiting most nonhost-occupied rentals and establishing new definitions and requirements. The property owners asserted that the ordinances threatened their ability to continue operating their properties as short-term rentals.Previously, these owners brought a similar action in the Civil Division of the Vermont Superior Court, seeking a declaration that their properties were legally permitted nonconforming uses. The Civil Division dismissed their claim for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, finding that issues of nonconforming use arose under Chapter 117 of Title 24, over which the Environmental Division had exclusive jurisdiction. The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed that dismissal in a prior case—32 Intervale, LLC v. City of Burlington—concluding that the Civil Division properly declined jurisdiction.While that earlier appeal was pending, the owners filed a new declaratory judgment action in the Environmental Division. The city moved to dismiss, arguing that the claim was not ripe and that the Environmental Division lacked jurisdiction because the ordinance at issue was not enacted under the zoning statutes. The Environmental Division agreed, concluding that the owners’ claims were premature, involved factual issues inappropriate for declaratory relief, and should first be addressed through the statutory appeals process.On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the Environmental Division’s dismissal. The Court held that a declaratory judgment was inappropriate because the owners’ claims were not ripe: no enforcement action was imminent, and the factual questions about each property’s status required more concrete controversy. The owners were not left without remedy, as they could pursue administrative determinations or appeals if enforcement occurred. View "32 Intervale, LLC v. City of Burlington" on Justia Law

Leslie and Karen Turgeon own property in Spearfish, South Dakota, which can only be accessed by the Thoen Stone Road. The City of Spearfish owns the Thoen Stone Monument and the surrounding parkland, and has maintained a locked gate at the northern entrance of the Road for over forty years, providing keys to certain property owners, including the Turgeons. The Turgeons occasionally experienced issues with the key, hindering their access. They filed a declaratory action seeking a determination that the Road is a public right-of-way, asking the court to order the City to remove the gate and any other obstructions, and to enjoin the City from restricting access for themselves and the public.The Circuit Court for the Fourth Judicial Circuit, Lawrence County, reviewed cross-motions for summary judgment. The court determined that earlier documents (the 1953 Easement, 1971 Agreement, and 1972 Warranty Deed) did not manifest an intent to dedicate the Road for public use. The court found that the 2012 Plat expressly dedicated the Road as a public right-of-way but concluded that the City had not accepted this dedication, either expressly or impliedly, in part because the locked gate was inconsistent with public use. On this basis, the court granted summary judgment to the City and denied all relief to the Turgeons.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota affirmed the lower court's decision that the Road was not dedicated for public use until the 2012 Plat, and that there was no express acceptance of dedication by the City. However, it reversed the lower court’s grant of summary judgment regarding implied acceptance, finding that genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether the City impliedly accepted the dedication of the Road as a public right-of-way. The case was remanded for trial on this issue. View "Turgeon v. City Of Spearfish" on Justia Law

A non-governmental organization challenged a county planning department’s approval of a family transfer exemption that allowed a landowner to divide an 80-acre tract of land into eight parcels, gifting them to family members. The organization alleged that the planning department failed to provide public notice before approving the exemption, in violation of county subdivision regulations. The land division was discovered years after its approval, when one of the organization’s members was researching a neighboring tract. The organization contended that the lack of public notice denied its members an opportunity to comment on the exemption application, as required by the county’s regulations.The organization filed suit in the Montana Twenty-First Judicial District Court, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The county moved to dismiss, arguing that its regulations did not require public notice for exemption applications. The District Court granted the county’s motion, dismissing all claims, and specifically found that the county regulations did not mandate published notice for review of proposed subdivision exemptions.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. It held that the plain language of the county’s regulations, which state that “the public shall be permitted to comment” on exemption applications, necessarily implies that public notice must be provided; otherwise, the right to comment would be meaningless. The court emphasized that although the regulations do not specify the manner of notice, adequate notice is required to effectuate public participation. The Supreme Court reversed the District Court’s dismissal and remanded for further proceedings. The holding was that the county’s subdivision regulations require the planning department to provide public notice of pending subdivision exemption applications to enable meaningful public comment. View "Sapphire v. Ravalli County" on Justia Law

This case centers on a dispute involving the planned construction of a new cottage by a hotel operator on Martha’s Vineyard. The hotel, situated in a residential area, is considered a preexisting nonconforming commercial use. In 2008, the hotel’s predecessor sought permission for expansion and entered into an agreement with a neighboring property owner, who agreed not to oppose the project or appeal permit decisions, in exchange for promises including the installation and maintenance of vegetative screening. After subsequent changes to the project—including the removal and replacement of screening and the relocation and resizing of the cottage—the neighbor, acting as trustee, objected to the most recent modifications in 2023, claiming inadequate screening and diminished privacy.Following the 2023 decision by the Edgartown zoning board of appeals approving the hotel’s modifications, the trustee filed suit challenging that decision and asserting additional claims against the hotel. The hotel counterclaimed for abuse of process, alleging that the suit was frivolous and vexatious. The Superior Court denied the trustee’s special motion to dismiss the counterclaim under the Massachusetts anti-SLAPP statute, concluding that the underlying lawsuit was a sham. The trustee appealed. The Appeals Court reversed, finding that it could not determine at that stage whether the trustee’s claims were meritless because the underlying suit was unresolved.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that the anti-SLAPP statute requires the party opposing dismissal to prove that the petitioning activity (the lawsuit) was devoid of reasonable factual support or any arguable basis in law. The court determined that the hotel failed to meet this burden because the trustee’s challenge to the 2023 decision was not frivolous on its face. The order denying the special motion to dismiss was therefore reversed, and the case remanded for further proceedings, including an award of attorney’s fees to the trustee. View "Allegaert v. Harbor View Hotel Owner LLC" on Justia Law

Defendants constructed an accessory dwelling unit on a property in Fair Oaks without obtaining the required building permit from the County of Sacramento. They initially applied for a permit, but their application was incomplete and they failed to make necessary corrections. Despite receiving multiple notices of violation and stop work orders from the County, defendants completed construction and leased the unit to a tenant without ever obtaining a final permit or a certificate of occupancy, nor did the County inspect the unit for code compliance.After defendants unsuccessfully appealed the first notice of violation to the County Building Board of Appeals and did not challenge subsequent notices, the County filed suit in the Superior Court of Sacramento County. The County alleged that defendants’ conduct violated state and local building codes and constituted a public nuisance per se under local ordinances. Following a court trial, the Superior Court ruled in favor of the County on both causes of action and issued a permanent injunction, finding that building without a permit was a public nuisance per se as declared by County ordinance.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court rejected defendants’ arguments that the County lacked standing, that its nuisance ordinances conflicted with state law, and that the trial court misapplied the law in finding a nuisance per se. The appellate court held that the County had the authority and standing to enforce its building and nuisance codes, that its ordinances did not conflict with state law, and that construction without a permit constitutes a nuisance per se as expressly declared by County ordinance. The judgment was affirmed, and costs on appeal were awarded to the County. View "County of Sacramento v. NKS Real Estate Holdings" on Justia Law

A renewable energy developer was awarded a standard-offer contract in 2014 to build a solar facility in Bennington, Vermont, with a requirement to commission the project by 2016. The developer repeatedly sought and received extensions to this deadline, while simultaneously pursuing a certificate of public good (CPG), which is also required for construction. The Public Utility Commission (PUC) granted the CPG in 2018, but it was appealed, reversed, and ultimately denied on remand due to violations of local land conservation measures and adverse impacts on aesthetics. The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the final CPG denial in 2023.While litigation over the CPG was ongoing, the developer continued to seek extensions of its standard-offer contract’s commissioning milestone. The fifth extension request, filed in 2021, asked for a deadline twelve months after the Supreme Court’s mandate in the CPG appeal. The hearing officer recommended granting it, but the PUC did not act on the request until 2024, by which time the developer’s CPG had been finally denied. The PUC dismissed the fifth extension request as moot, finding the contract had expired by its own terms. The PUC also denied the developer’s motion for reconsideration and a sixth extension request, on the same grounds.On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the PUC’s actions with deference, upholding its factual findings unless clearly erroneous and its discretionary decisions unless there was an abuse of discretion. The Court held that the PUC properly concluded the requested extension was moot, the contract was null and void by its terms, and there was no abuse of discretion. The Court also rejected arguments that the PUC’s actions were inconsistent with other cases or violated constitutional rights. The orders of the PUC were affirmed. View "In re Petition of Apple Hill Solar LLC" on Justia Law