Justia Zoning, Planning & Land Use Opinion Summaries

A company engaged in outdoor advertising sought to erect a large billboard in a business district of Bath Township, Ohio. The local zoning inspector denied its application, citing a categorical ban on “off-premises” signs under the township’s zoning resolution. The company’s proposed billboard would have been a two-sided structure, 30 feet tall and 360 square feet per side. Notably, the company did not challenge other relevant provisions of the zoning resolution, such as the bans on “pole signs” and “high-rise” signs, which also would have prohibited the proposed billboard.The company, joined by a related entity, filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, asserting that the off-premises sign ban violated the First Amendment and conflicted with Ohio law. The defendants, Bath Township’s board of trustees and zoning officials, moved to dismiss on the ground that the plaintiffs lacked standing because even if the off-premises ban were invalidated, other unchallenged provisions would still bar the billboard. The district court agreed and dismissed the case, declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claim.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The court held that the plaintiffs lacked Article III standing because invalidating the off-premises sign ban would not redress their injury, as the bans on pole and high-rise signs would independently prohibit the billboard. The court found that this reasoning was controlled by its prior decision in Midwest Media Property, L.L.C. v. Symmes Township. The Sixth Circuit also found that the plaintiffs had forfeited any alternative standing theories, such as those based on the permitting process or application fees, by not properly raising them. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Summit Locations, LLC v. Bd. of Trustees, Bath Township" on Justia Law

The dispute involves the town of Nahant and Northeastern University over a peninsula known as East Point. Northeastern owns most of the land, using part for its Marine Science Center, while the town owns a smaller parcel at the tip, which it maintains as a public park. The town also holds an easement over Northeastern’s property for access to the park. In 2018, Northeastern announced plans to expand its campus with a new building, sparking local opposition. In response, Nahant residents voted in 2021 to authorize the town’s board of selectmen to use eminent domain to acquire conservation and access easements across portions of Northeastern’s property. The town then petitioned the Massachusetts Superior Court to establish its right to take these property interests.Northeastern challenged the taking, arguing it was undertaken in bad faith, claiming the town’s real motive was to block its development project. On cross motions for summary judgment, the Superior Court judge sided with Northeastern, finding that the town’s stated public purpose was pretextual and that its true intent was to prevent the proposed expansion. As a result, the judge dismissed the town’s petition and awarded Northeastern over $1 million in fees and costs.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case on direct appellate review. It held that Nahant’s stated purposes for the taking—conservation, open space, and public access—constitute valid public purposes under Massachusetts law. The Court found no reasonable expectation that Northeastern could prove the town acted in bad faith or that the taking was improperly motivated by private interests, and rejected alternative public policy arguments. The Court reversed the Superior Court’s judgment, vacated the fee award, and remanded for entry of an order establishing the town’s right to take the property interests, and for further proceedings. View "Town of Nahant v. Northeastern University" on Justia Law

The City of Indian Wells enacted ordinances regulating short-term rentals (STRs) in response to complaints about nuisances caused by such rentals. Initially, the City imposed a 29-night minimum stay requirement for residential rentals, effectively banning STRs. To accommodate owners in common interest developments (CIDs) who wished to operate STRs, the City adopted an ordinance allowing CID members to vote to opt out of the minimum stay requirement, subject to certain conditions. Matthew and Rebecca Parsons, owners of property in a CID, sought a permit to operate an STR after their CID conducted an opt-out vote. When the City denied their permit request, the Parsons filed a petition for writ of mandate, claiming that the City’s ordinance conflicted with state law (specifically Civil Code section 4740, part of the Davis-Stirling Common Interest Development Act) and constituted an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority.The Superior Court of Riverside County ruled in favor of the Parsons, finding that the City’s opt-out provision was preempted by state law and improperly delegated authority to private parties. The court granted a writ of mandate directing the City to issue an unrestricted STR permit to the Parsons and awarded attorney fees.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two reviewed the case. The court held that the City’s ordinance was not preempted by Civil Code section 4740 because the opt-out vote did not require an amendment to CID governing documents. The court also held that delegating the decision to CID members to opt out of the minimum stay requirement did not violate due process rights. Additionally, it concluded the City did not enact the ordinance arbitrarily or capriciously. The judgment and postjudgment order awarding attorney fees were reversed. View "Parsons v. City of Indian Wells" on Justia Law

A group of residents in the District of Columbia challenged amendments to the District’s Comprehensive Plan, a document that guides land use decisions. The 2021 amendments, enacted after a lengthy planning and public comment process, increased land use densities in certain neighborhoods, prompting concerns among residents about potential harms such as increased risk of displacement, infrastructure strain, and changes to neighborhood character. The residents sued, alleging that the Mayor’s Office of Planning failed to produce an adequate environmental assessment and did not give proper consideration to their Advisory Neighborhood Commissions.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia reviewed the complaint and dismissed it with prejudice, finding that none of the plaintiffs had standing. The court determined that the alleged injuries were too hypothetical and amounted to generalized grievances rather than concrete, particularized harm. Additionally, it concluded that there was no causal link between the Office of Planning’s actions and the claimed injuries, and that the injuries were not redressable because the court could not prevent implementation of the enacted Plan.On appeal, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals agreed that the appellants lacked standing, holding that none had alleged an injury-in-fact that was sufficiently concrete or imminent. The court explained that most harms were generalized or speculative and not tied to any specific development project at the time the Plan was enacted. However, the appellate court found that the Superior Court erred in dismissing the suit with prejudice; dismissals for lack of standing should be without prejudice. The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal for lack of standing but remanded for the trial court to revise the judgment to reflect that it is without prejudice. View "Booth v. District of Columbia" on Justia Law

A group of residents and electors from the city of Trenton proposed an amendment to the city charter that would prohibit the construction of data centers within the city. They submitted a petition with 336 valid signatures to the city council to have this amendment placed on the ballot. The Butler County Board of Elections confirmed the number of valid signatures and reported that 1,277 voters participated in the most recent general municipal election, while 8,197 individuals were registered to vote at that time.The Trenton City Council convened and concluded that the petition did not contain a sufficient number of signatures, reasoning that the requirement was ten percent of all registered voters, not ten percent of votes cast. Accordingly, the council refused to certify the petition to the board of elections for inclusion on the ballot. The residents then filed an action for a writ of mandamus in the Supreme Court of Ohio, seeking to compel the council to place the amendment before the voters and to recover court costs and attorney fees.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the relevant constitutional provisions and its prior decisions. The court held that, consistent with Article XVIII, Sections 8, 9, and 14 of the Ohio Constitution and its decision in State ex rel. Huebner v. W. Jefferson Village Council, the required number of signatures for a charter amendment petition is ten percent of the votes cast in the last preceding general municipal election, not ten percent of all registered voters. The court found that the petitioners had exceeded the required number of signatures and ordered the city council to pass an ordinance certifying the petition to the board of elections for submission to the electors at a special election within the constitutionally specified timeframe. The court denied the request for court costs and attorney fees. View "State ex rel. Blankenship v. Trenton City Council" on Justia Law

A business specializing in adult products sought to open a store in downtown Fargo, North Dakota, in a zone designated for mixed-use development. The proposed store intended to sell items such as lingerie and sexual wellness products, but not sexually explicit media like books or DVDs. To proceed, the business’s landlord applied for a change-of-use permit to allow retail sales and service at the location. The City of Fargo, through its Director of Planning and Development, denied the application, concluding that the business constituted an "Adult Bookstore" as defined by the city’s municipal code, which prohibited such establishments in the downtown zone. The city’s decision was upheld by both the Fargo Board of Adjustment and the Board of City Commissioners.Following these administrative decisions, the business filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of North Dakota, raising constitutional claims including violations of the First Amendment, the imposition of a prior restraint, denial of procedural due process, and unconstitutional vagueness in the city’s code. The business also challenged the Commissioners’ decision under state law, arguing it was arbitrary and capricious. While the lawsuit was pending, Fargo amended its code to explicitly prohibit “Sexual Device Shops” in the relevant zone.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the dismissal of all federal claims, holding that the business’s planned activities were not protected expressive conduct under the First Amendment, the permit process was not a prior restraint, and the business received adequate procedural process. The court also found the city’s ordinance was not unconstitutionally vague. However, the court determined that denying the permit as an “Adult Bookstore” was arbitrary and capricious under state law, reversed the dismissal of the state-law claim, and remanded for further proceedings regarding possible relief. View "Romantix-Fargo, Inc. v. City of Fargo" on Justia Law

The property at issue has a long history of agricultural use, initially for tobacco farming and processing. This activity predates the Town of Suffield’s zoning regulations, making it a legal nonconforming use. In 2019, the plaintiff obtained state approval to cultivate and process hemp at the property, which was determined by local officials to fall within the scope of the existing nonconforming tobacco use. Following Connecticut’s legalization of recreational cannabis in 2021, the plaintiff sought a zoning determination that cannabis cultivation and processing would also be a lawful continuation of the existing nonconforming use. The zoning enforcement officer denied this request, citing distinct licensing and regulatory requirements for hemp and cannabis.The Zoning Board of Appeals of the Town of Suffield upheld the zoning officer’s decision, relying primarily on the legal and regulatory distinctions between hemp and cannabis. The plaintiff appealed to the Superior Court for the judicial district of Hartford. The trial court applied the factors from Zachs v. Zoning Board of Appeals to assess whether the proposed cannabis use impermissibly expanded the scope of the nonconforming use. The court found that the regulatory differences were relevant but not dispositive and concluded that cannabis cultivation and processing were sufficiently similar to the existing hemp operation to constitute a lawful continuation of the nonconforming use. The trial court reversed the board’s decision.The Supreme Court of Connecticut reviewed the case. It held that a difference in state licensing or regulatory schemes is relevant but not determinative in assessing whether a proposed use constitutes an impermissible expansion of a nonconforming use. Instead, courts must conduct a fact-intensive inquiry, considering the nature, purpose, character, and effects of the use. Here, the Supreme Court found no evidence that cannabis cultivation and processing would materially change the property’s use or impact the neighborhood. Thus, it affirmed the trial court’s judgment, allowing the cannabis operation as a lawful continuation of the nonconforming use. View "Lasa Extract, LLC v. Zoning Board of Appeals" on Justia Law

A town served by a privately owned water utility experienced significant rate increases after the utility was sold to an investment fund. Responding to community concerns, the town decided to pursue public ownership of the water system. In 2015, it adopted two resolutions of necessity to begin eminent domain proceedings, aiming to take over the utility’s assets both within and just outside its boundaries. The utility, now owned by a new company, did not challenge the procedural validity of the resolutions but argued that the requirements of public necessity and more necessary public use, as mandated by California’s Eminent Domain Law, were not satisfied.The San Bernardino County Superior Court, presiding over a bench trial, determined that special statutory rules for takings of privately owned public utilities applied. The court found that, in this context, the utility could rebut the presumption of necessity by a preponderance of the evidence, rather than being limited to showing gross abuse of discretion by the public entity. After trial, the court found in favor of the utility, concluding that the town had not established the requisite elements to justify the taking. The Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reversed, holding that the trial court should have reviewed the town’s findings only for gross abuse of discretion and had failed to give proper deference to the town’s determinations.The Supreme Court of California reviewed the matter and held that, under the 1992 amendments to the Eminent Domain Law, a public entity’s resolution of necessity for taking privately owned utility property creates only a rebuttable presumption, not a conclusive one. Therefore, the trial court is to exercise independent judgment as the trier of fact, determining whether the utility owner has rebutted the presumption by a preponderance of the evidence. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeal’s judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "Town of Apple Valley v. Apple Valley Ranchos Water" on Justia Law

The dispute centers on a property owner that purchased a vacant and dilapidated parcel in Nashville’s East Bank district, intending to redevelop it into a multi-family residential project in accordance with local zoning rules. The owner submitted a building permit application that, according to its allegations, fully complied with all applicable zoning requirements. However, in mid-2022, the local government placed an indefinite “development hold” on the property, effectively barring any consideration or approval of the permit. The stated reason was that authorities were assessing possible routes for a planned major roadway that might require acquisition of part of the property. As a result, the owner claims the property has become undevelopable and unsellable, resulting in millions of dollars in carrying costs.After unsuccessful efforts to have the hold lifted, the owner filed suit in state court, alleging violations of the Takings and Due Process Clauses of the U.S. Constitution and the Tennessee Constitution. The case was removed to the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee, where the defendants moved to dismiss on several grounds, including untimeliness and qualified immunity. The district court, on its own initiative, dismissed the complaint for lack of “jurisdictional” ripeness, reasoning that there had been no final decision on the permit application.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit considered only the ripeness issue. The court held that the owner’s claims were both constitutionally and prudentially ripe because the local government’s development hold constituted a definitive, final decision barring any development of the property. The appellate court reversed the district court’s dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings on the remaining issues. View "SW Nashville EB Owner, LLC v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville & Davidson Cnty." on Justia Law

Juanita C. Clark and her husband complained to the Code Enforcement Officer (CEO) of the Town of Phippsburg about a neighbor, Dan Gurney, who was allegedly operating a nuisance wood-selling business in violation of the land use ordinance. The Board of Appeals found that Gurney’s business constituted a nuisance, but the Board of Selectmen later found that the nuisance had been abated. After the Superior Court affirmed the Board of Selectmen’s decision, Clark and her husband appealed, resulting in a prior ruling by the Maine Supreme Judicial Court that the Board of Selectmen had exceeded its authority and violated due process. The matter was remanded for proper action.Following remand, the Board of Selectmen conducted a series of meetings, some involving ex parte communications with Gurney and limiting public participation. Ultimately, the Board agreed to enter into a consent agreement with Gurney and the CEO issued a cease-and-desist order. Clark later reported that Gurney continued to violate the order, submitting evidence to the CEO, who informed the Board that legal action should be considered. The Board held further discussions, some of which Clark was not notified about, and eventually voted that there was no violation and that no action would be taken. The CEO then notified Clark of this decision. When Clark sought formal findings, the Board clarified that its previous statement was just an opinion and that the CEO’s determination was final.Clark filed a complaint in the Sagadahoc County Superior Court challenging the Board’s actions and alleging due process violations. The Superior Court dismissed the complaint, reasoning that the Board’s clarification left no final government action for review. On appeal, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court held that Clark’s allegations regarding the Board’s refusal to take legal action presented a reviewable question of final government action. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the dismissal and remanded for further proceedings. View "Clark v. Town of Phippsburg" on Justia Law