Justia Zoning, Planning & Land Use Opinion Summaries

A developer sought to construct an 82-lot residential subdivision on a 66-acre parcel in unincorporated Sussex County, Delaware, where the property’s current zoning permitted such use as of right. The Sussex County Planning & Zoning Commission approved the developer’s subdivision plan but imposed 19 conditions. The developer objected to two of these: one eliminating a lot (lot 64) due to concerns about isolation and flooding, and another requiring a 25-foot fixed buffer from non-tidal wetlands, which the developer argued was inconsistent with existing regulations and a recently adopted ordinance that exempted pending applications.After the Commission declined to reconsider, the developer sought certiorari review in the Superior Court of the State of Delaware. The Superior Court found that the Commission had erred as a matter of law, holding that the elimination of lot 64 was based on generalized neighborhood opposition rather than minimizing adverse impacts, and that the buffer condition was inconsistent with the applicable code and improperly applied to the pending application. The Superior Court struck both conditions as unreasonable.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Delaware reviewed whether the Commission had exceeded its discretion and clarified the standard for “reasonable” conditions. The Supreme Court held that local governments may impose reasonable, fact-based conditions on subdivision approvals, but those conditions must be rationally related to specific land use impacts and cannot be based only on generalized community opposition. The Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court’s decision striking the buffer condition, finding no code support or articulated rationale for it. However, it reversed and remanded the decision regarding the elimination of lot 64, instructing the Commission to further investigate the environmental and drainage concerns and to base any condition on substantial evidence. Thus, the judgment was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "Sussex County Planning & Zoning Commission v. Smokey Hollow, LLC" on Justia Law

Two businesses operating an industrial warehouse and distribution center in Bonner Springs, Kansas, were affected by an ordinance enacted by the neighboring City of Edwardsville. This ordinance prohibited vehicles weighing over six tons from traveling on 110th Street—the street dividing the two cities—unless the trucks were entering or exiting Edwardsville. As a result, heavy trucks serving the businesses could not access 110th Street to enter or exit their properties. In response, the businesses filed suit against Edwardsville and certain city officials, alleging violations of federal and state law and seeking a preliminary injunction to prevent enforcement of the ordinance.The United States District Court for the District of Kansas dismissed the plaintiffs’ federal claims, including those under the Surface Transportation Assistance Act, the Equal Protection Clause, and the Dormant Commerce Clause, and denied the request for a preliminary injunction. However, the district court declined to dismiss the remaining state-law claims, leaving them pending.While the appeal was pending before the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, Edwardsville repealed the challenged ordinance and replaced it with a new one. The new ordinance allowed southbound trucks to enter the businesses from 110th Street, though certain restrictions remained. The Tenth Circuit determined that the repeal and replacement of the ordinance rendered the appeal moot because the controversy over the original ordinance no longer existed. The court found no exception to mootness applied and declined to vacate the district court’s order or exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction over the dismissed claims. Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "Scannell Properties #516 v. City of Edwardsville, Kansas" on Justia Law

Several residential property owners and a short-term rental platform challenged two ordinances enacted by the city. The first ordinance, adopted in 2023, restricts short-term rental licenses to one per residential block and distributes them by lottery. The second ordinance, adopted in 2024, requires short-term rental platforms to verify the license status of properties before facilitating transactions, and to periodically reverify this status. Plaintiffs alleged that these ordinances infringed upon their constitutional and statutory rights, including claims under the Takings Clause and Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana reviewed the plaintiffs’ claims. It dismissed all claims under Rule 12(b)(6), except for Airbnb’s Fourth Amendment challenge regarding a monthly reporting requirement in the 2024 Ordinance. The district court granted Airbnb summary judgment on that particular claim. Airbnb appealed the dismissal of its other claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit examined the case de novo. The court held that the 2023 Ordinance did not constitute a per se or regulatory taking under the Takings Clause, noting that the ordinance neither physically appropriated property nor severely impaired economic expectations. It also found the ordinance to be a reasonable zoning regulation that balanced public interests. Regarding Section 230, the Fifth Circuit ruled that neither the booking nor verification requirements of the 2024 Ordinance treated Airbnb as the publisher or speaker of third-party content, and thus were not preempted. The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the Takings Clause claim and the Section 230 claim, as well as the dismissal of other claims raised by the plaintiffs. View "Bodin v. New Orleans" on Justia Law

Enbridge sought approval to construct a tunnel beneath the Straits of Mackinac to house a new segment of its Line 5 pipeline, as part of a negotiated agreement with Michigan aimed at decommissioning the existing dual underwater pipelines. The project would replace the above-lakebed pipelines with a 30-inch pipe inside a concrete-lined tunnel, with ownership of the tunnel transferring to the Mackinac Straits Corridor Authority (MSCA) and Enbridge receiving a long-term lease. Several environmental groups and tribal communities opposed the project, citing environmental and public trust concerns, while labor and propane associations supported it.The Michigan Public Service Commission (PSC) referred the matter to an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), who largely limited the scope of review to the tunnel project itself and excluded broader issues such as the overall public need for Line 5, its operational safety, and climate impacts beyond the new segment. The ALJ found that prior approvals in 1953 established Line 5’s public need indefinitely. The PSC affirmed the ALJ’s approach, restricted its environmental review under Michigan’s Environmental Protection Act (MEPA) to the replacement project, and approved Enbridge’s application, finding no feasible or prudent alternatives and declining to examine the common-law public trust doctrine. The Court of Appeals affirmed the PSC’s decision, applying a deferential review standard.The Michigan Supreme Court reversed, holding that courts must review agency MEPA determinations de novo, regardless of procedural origin. The Court found the PSC erred by not considering whether the tunnel project would factually and proximately cause the continued operation of Line 5 and attendant environmental harms, by inconsistently comparing alternatives, and by failing to assess impacts on public trust resources. The Supreme Court vacated the PSC’s order and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "In Re Application Of Enbridge Energy To Replace & Relocate Line 5" on Justia Law

A developer sought to build a 30-unit condominium project, including six affordable units, within the coastal zone of the City of Redondo Beach. The proposed site was located in a zone designated under the City’s Local Coastal Program (LCP) for public access uses, commercial-recreational facilities, and services supporting boating and fishing; residential uses were not permitted. Despite knowing this, the developer submitted its application, asserting that the project qualified for approval under the Housing Accountability Act’s “builder’s remedy” provisions, which can override local zoning restrictions if a city lacks a compliant housing element.At the time of the application, the City did not have a certified compliant housing element, triggering the builder’s remedy provisions. However, after the application, the City informed the developer that residential uses were not permitted in the relevant zone under the certified LCP and suggested that the developer apply for an amendment to the LCP. The developer did not pursue this amendment process. After the City declined to process the application, and an administrative appeal failed, the developer filed a petition for writ of mandate in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, seeking to compel approval under the Housing Accountability Act. The superior court denied the petition, finding that the builder’s remedy provisions did not override the Coastal Act or the City’s LCP.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. The court held that the City’s denial was required under the Coastal Act because the proposed residential use was not permitted by the certified LCP, and no feasible method existed to comply without an LCP amendment, which the developer did not seek. The court affirmed the superior court’s judgment, finding no abuse of discretion and concluding that the Housing Accountability Act does not displace the requirements of the Coastal Act or Commission-certified LCPs regarding permitted uses. View "New Commune DTLA v. Redondo Beach" on Justia Law

A municipality in Pennsylvania investigated two properties owned by a rabbi after receiving complaints about their use. One property was used as a residence for young men engaging in religious study, while the other served as a space for prayer, study, and religious instruction. Both properties were located in a commercially zoned district. Citing a new zoning ordinance, the municipality issued violation notices to the rabbi, asserting that such religious uses were not permitted in the district. The municipality then obtained administrative search warrants, conducted inspections, and condemned the properties the day before a major religious holiday, barring occupancy until the buildings were brought into compliance. The municipality also threatened daily fines for continued non-compliance.The rabbi and his congregation filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania against the municipality and its officers, raising several claims under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), among other federal and state claims. They sought a preliminary injunction to regain access to the properties and halt enforcement actions during litigation. The District Court denied their request, finding no likelihood of success on the merits or irreparable harm, and reasoning that alternative locations for religious activities were available.On interlocutory appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the denial of preliminary injunctive relief. The Third Circuit held that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their RLUIPA substantial-burden claim as to the zoning ordinance, since enforcement prevented access to property for religious exercise and imposed significant penalties. The court found irreparable harm and determined that the balance of hardships and public interest favored the plaintiffs. The Third Circuit reversed the District Court’s order denying a preliminary injunction and remanded for further proceedings, instructing the lower court to enter appropriate injunctive relief. View "Anash Inc v. Borough of Kingston" on Justia Law

A gravel pit in the Town of Sabattus was granted conditional approval in 2003 to mine gravel from a four-acre area adjacent to F. Sanborn Road, with requirements for buffer zones and slope ratios. The Abutters, who own properties along the shore and use the road for access, raised concerns about compliance with these conditions. In late 2023, the Town found violations, including expansion beyond the permitted area and encroachment into the buffer zone and Shoreland Zoning area. Poirier, the operator, agreed to cease excavation, and the Town issued a notice of violation.Following negotiations, the Town filed a land use complaint and proposed a consent judgment in spring 2025. The District Court in Lewiston allowed the Abutters to intervene and heard their objections to the consent judgment, which required Poirier to execute a new reclamation plan, stabilize the berm, create a thirty-foot reclaimed buffer, and cease further mineral extraction. The Abutters argued that the judgment violated state law and local ordinances by not requiring a fifty-foot buffer and permitting ongoing violations. The District Court approved the consent judgment in September 2025, and the Abutters appealed.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the matter de novo, applying the standard from Pike Industries, Inc. v. City of Westbrook. The Court held that the consent judgment did not violate state performance standards, as it required compliance with Maine law and allowed for enforcement if violations occurred. The judgment was consistent with the Town's ordinances, as the ordinances applied to new development or active excavation, not reclamation. The Court found no impermissible effects on third parties and no violation of public policy, concluding that the judgment was fair, adequate, and reasonable. The judgment of the District Court was affirmed. View "Town of Sabattus v. L.P. Poirier & Son, Inc." on Justia Law

A restaurant owner applied for a liquor license for a property in Providence, Rhode Island. Nearby property owners, including the appellant, filed an objection to the license under a state law that allows such objections to bar issuance of liquor licenses within 200 feet of their property. After the local licensing board could not issue the license due to this objection, the restaurant owner lobbied the General Assembly, which enacted a special law allowing the Providence Board of Licenses to exempt this specific address from the objection rule. This exemption applied only to the property at 225 Waterman Street and was enacted without a vote by local Providence voters.After the special law was passed, the restaurant owner reapplied, and the Board granted the license over objections. The appellant appealed to the Rhode Island Department of Business Regulation (DBR), which stayed the license but did not rule on the constitutional issue. The appellant then filed suit in the Rhode Island Superior Court, arguing that the special exemption was unconstitutional because Article 13, Section 4 of the Rhode Island Constitution requires local voter approval for legislation relating specifically to the property, affairs, or government of a particular city or town. The Superior Court granted summary judgment for the defendants, holding that liquor licensing is a matter of statewide concern and does not require local voter approval.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island reviewed the constitutionality of the special law. The court held that the legislation, which singled out a specific property in Providence for exemption from a generally applicable law, related to the property, affairs, and government of a particular city. Because the law did not receive local voter approval as required by Article 13, Section 4, it was void. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the Superior Court and remanded for entry of judgment in favor of the appellant. View "Myles Standish Associates, LP v. The City of Providence" on Justia Law

A condominium resident entered into an agreement with the developer, the unit owners’ association, and other unit owners after concerns were raised about infrastructure and proposed changes to the condominium plan. The agreement required the developer to complete infrastructure work, pay a sum to the association, and convey a vacant lot to the association in exchange for the unit owners withdrawing their opposition to a planning board application. The agreement included a provision requiring planning board approval of the developer’s application by March 1, 2023, as a condition for the parties’ obligations. The planning board, however, did not approve the application until March 28, 2023. After learning that the lot was to be sold to a third party, the resident sued for specific performance of the agreement.The Superior Court (York County) granted the developer’s motion to dismiss, ruling that the failure to obtain planning board approval by the specified date was an unmet condition precedent, discharging all parties from their obligations under the agreement. The court also dismissed the resident’s claims for quantum meruit, unjust enrichment, and declaratory relief on independent grounds.On appeal, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed whether the timing requirement for planning board approval was necessarily a material condition precedent as a matter of law. The Court held that, in actions seeking equitable relief such as specific performance, whether time is of the essence is a factual question dependent on the intent of the parties and the circumstances. The Court concluded that the materiality of the March 1 deadline could not be determined solely from the pleadings, and that the complaint alleged facts which, if proven, could entitle the resident to relief. The Court vacated the dismissal of the breach of contract claim and remanded for further proceedings. View "Constance L. Beane v. Village on Great Brook, LLC" on Justia Law

A property owner received municipal approval to renovate the interior of a building on its land, which was subject to a special permit allowing use as a religious institution with specific conditions. Among these, one condition prohibited a “material change” or “intensification” of any approved use without explicit authorization, while another allowed the building to serve as an operations center for security and administrative purposes. The renovations included subdividing garage and open space to create more offices, expanding an office, and converting a closet into a bathroom. Abutting landowners challenged the issuance of the zoning permit, arguing these changes violated the conditions of the special permit.The Zoning Board of Appeals of the Town of New Canaan held hearings and ultimately rejected the challenge. The plaintiffs appealed to the Superior Court, which initially remanded the matter so the board could consult with the Planning and Zoning Commission for interpretation of the special permit’s conditions. After this consultation, the board reaffirmed its denial. The Superior Court then reviewed the merits and dismissed the plaintiffs’ appeal, finding substantial evidence in the record supported the board’s decision.On further appeal, the Supreme Court of Connecticut assumed, without deciding, that the remand to the commission may have been improper. Nonetheless, it concluded there was substantial evidence in the original record to sustain the board’s decision. The court clarified that “material change” means a significant alteration in the character of use, and “intensification” requires an increase or strengthening in the degree of use—not merely a minor or modest change. The evidence showed the renovations did not alter the building’s footprint, number of occupants, or its approved use. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment dismissing the plaintiffs’ appeal. View "Markatos v. Zoning Board of Appeals" on Justia Law