Justia Zoning, Planning & Land Use Opinion Summaries

A special independent recreation district was established in 2018 to manage and improve recreational facilities within a residential community, including a country club and golf course. In 2019, the district issued $24 million in bonds to purchase and maintain these facilities, pursuant to a referendum and a master trust indenture. A provision in the first supplemental indenture for the 2019 bonds included bracketed language suggesting that no further bonds would be issued, except for certain purposes. However, in 2023, the district's Board proposed a new $21 million bond issue to fund additional improvements, which was approved by a majority of residents in a 2024 referendum. The Board subsequently amended the 2019 indenture, clarifying that the bracketed language was never formally adopted and authorized the new bonds.In the Twelfth Judicial Circuit Court for Manatee County, a resident who moved into the district in 2021 challenged the district’s authority to issue the new bonds, arguing that the language in the 2019 indenture barred further bond issues, and questioned whether the special assessments to repay the bonds provided sufficient special benefit to the properties. He also raised due process concerns about the proceedings. The circuit court admitted evidence, including expert testimony on property value benefits, and found for the district, validating the 2024 bond issue. The court found the district had authority to issue the bonds and that the special benefits exceeded the debt burden.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Florida affirmed the circuit court’s judgment. The Court held that the district had statutory and referendum-based authority to issue the 2024 bonds, that the Board properly clarified and amended the indenture, and that legislative findings and expert testimony supported the conclusion that the special assessments conferred a special benefit. The Court also found no due process violation. View "Matt v. State of Florida" on Justia Law

Chip and Anne Andrews applied to the Town of Kittery for approval of a conservation subdivision. Their application sought waivers from certain general street design and construction standards, such as requirements for right-of-way width, street length, street grade, and sidewalk width, as outlined in the town’s Land Use and Development Code. The Planning Board held several hearings, received public input, and ultimately granted the requested waivers and approved the subdivision, finding the waivers met the ordinance’s requirements and did not adversely affect public health, safety, the natural environment, or general welfare. Judith Andrews, a neighboring landowner, opposed the waivers, arguing that only the Board of Appeals could grant such relief because, in her view, the street standards functioned as zoning requirements.After the Planning Board’s decision, Judith Andrews sought judicial review in the Maine Superior Court (York County). The court affirmed the Planning Board’s decision, concluding that the street standards at issue were not zoning requirements, but rather subdivision standards that the Planning Board was authorized to waive under the Code. The Superior Court found that the Board acted within its delegated authority and that no variance from the Board of Appeals was required.On further appeal, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the Planning Board’s decision directly, as the trial court had acted in an appellate capacity. The Supreme Judicial Court held that the general street standards in the Code were not zoning requirements, but rather general, town-wide subdivision standards, and therefore could be waived by the Planning Board under its express authority. The Court distinguished these standards from zone-specific zoning requirements, clarified that there was no violation of state law, and affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court. View "Andrews v. Town of Kittery" on Justia Law

A group of neighboring landowners challenged the approval of two minor land division applications submitted by Tricore Investment, LLC, concerning adjacent parcels on Priest Lake. Tricore had acquired three tracts of land and, through a series of quitclaim deeds, divided them into numerous lots, some of which were not subject to planning approval. The contested applications sought to create a total of eight lots from the remaining parcels, and the challengers argued that these contiguous divisions effectively constituted a subdivision under Idaho law, which would require stricter procedural and substantive scrutiny.Bonner County staff conditionally approved the minor land division applications, and the Board of County Commissioners (BOCC) gave final approval, each time without issuing written findings of fact or conclusions of law. The challengers petitioned for reconsideration, alleging the applications circumvented subdivision requirements and violated notice and environmental standards. After reconsideration was denied, the challengers timely sought judicial review in the District Court for the First Judicial District, Bonner County. The district court initially remanded the approvals for lack of written decisions but, upon reconsideration, dismissed the consolidated petitions, holding that minor land divisions were not subject to judicial review under Idaho’s Local Land Use Planning Act (LLUPA) because they did not meet the statutory definition of a subdivision, nor did they qualify as a “similar application” under Idaho Code section 67-6521(1)(a)(i). The challengers appealed this dismissal.The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho reversed the district court’s order. It held that the minor land division applications at issue were subject to judicial review under LLUPA, interpreting Idaho Code section 67-6521(1)(a)(i) to encompass “other similar applications” authorized under LLUPA, including those that, in effect, function as subdivisions. The case was remanded for further proceedings, and costs were awarded to the appellants. View "BUDIG vs. BONNER COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS" on Justia Law

Dennis and Jeannette Burton own property along the Flathead River near Kalispell, Montana. Their land contains a pond, historically a “scour feature” of the river, which has existed for decades and was enhanced by a man-made channel connecting it to the river, likely predating their ownership. The property frequently experiences flooding in a pole barn during high river flows. In 2024, the Burtons applied to the Flathead Conservation District (FCD) for a permit under the Natural Streambed and Land Preservation Act to dredge the pond and channel and to use the dredged material to build a berm to protect the pole barn from flooding.The FCD conducted a site visit and, based on findings that the project could cause erosion, alter river flows, and have negative impacts on aquatic habitat, denied the permit. The FCD reasoned that the project conflicted with its rules, which discourage or prohibit dredging connected artificial or in-stream ponds. The Burtons sought judicial review and declaratory relief in the Eleventh Judicial District Court, Flathead County, arguing that the FCD’s decision was unsupported and that its rules did not apply to their project. The District Court upheld the FCD’s denial, finding the FCD had jurisdiction because the pond and channel were connected to the river and that the project fit the definition of a regulated off-stream pond. The court also concluded that the FCD’s consideration of prior applications for the property was not improper.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the District Court’s judgment. The Supreme Court held that the FCD had jurisdiction, that its rules applied to the project, and that there were sufficient legal grounds for the permit denial. The Court further concluded that any deficiencies in the FCD’s explanation were harmless given the record support for the decision. View "Burton v. Flathead Conservation Dist." on Justia Law

The dispute arose when a property owner sought to construct a small campground on the rear portion of her land in the Town of Tremont. The property was split between two zones: the front in a Commercial Fishery/Maritime Activity (CFMA) zone, containing a residence and an existing paved access way, and the rear in a Residential-Business (RB) zone, where the campground would be located. While campgrounds are allowed in the RB zone, the issue centered on whether the proposed use of the existing access way, traversing the CFMA zone, violated local zoning restrictions, particularly those prohibiting expansion of nonconforming driveways in that zone.After the initial application was denied by the Tremont Planning Board due to concerns over site access, subsequent applications and appeals followed. The Planning Board, after remand from the Superior Court (transferred to the Business and Consumer Docket), held hearings and issued findings that the access way was a driveway, not a road or trail, and that the proposed project would unlawfully expand a nonconforming use. The Board of Appeals affirmed the denial. The Superior Court again reviewed the matter, finding legal error in the Board’s failure to fully consider the length of the access way and the “similar use” argument, and ordered the Board to approve the application and direct issuance of a permit.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case, applying a standard that gives deference to the Planning Board’s findings of fact and reviews legal interpretations de novo. The Court held that the Board’s determination—that the access way was a driveway and that the proposed expansion was prohibited under the ordinance—was supported by substantial evidence. The Court vacated the lower court’s judgment and remanded with instructions to affirm the Planning Board’s denial of the application. View "Brogdon v. Town of Tremont" on Justia Law

Larry Danduran attended public meetings held by the Eddy County Zoning Board and the Eddy County Commissioners to consider amendments to Eddy County’s wind-energy zoning regulations. He raised concerns about potential conflicts of interest among members of both bodies and alleged that public comment was improperly restricted during the decision-making process. Despite his objections, the Zoning Board recommended, and the County Commission adopted, the proposed amendments. After a grievance hearing failed to change the outcome, Danduran filed a lawsuit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to void the zoning amendments, require recusals for conflicted officials, and obtain costs and other relief.The District Court of Eddy County, Southeast Judicial District, reviewed the case. The County moved to dismiss Danduran’s amended complaint, arguing that any challenge to a zoning decision must be brought through the exclusive statutory appeal procedures outlined in North Dakota law. Danduran had initially filed a timely statutory appeal under N.D.C.C. § 28-34-01 but voluntarily dismissed it with prejudice. The district court concluded that his claims, though framed as statutory and constitutional violations, substantively challenged the validity of the rezoning proceedings and decision. The court ruled it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because Danduran had failed to properly pursue the exclusive statutory remedy.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of North Dakota affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The Supreme Court held that when a statutory appeal process is available to challenge a local governing body’s zoning decision, that process is the exclusive remedy. Collateral attacks through separate actions for declaratory or injunctive relief are not permitted. The Supreme Court found that Danduran’s claims, despite their characterization, fell within the scope of the exclusive statutory review process, and because he did not pursue that remedy, dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction was proper. View "Danduran v. Eddy Cty. Zoning Bd." on Justia Law

A developer sought approval to build a solar farm in Spencer County, Indiana, parts of which would be located both within the Town of Grandview and within its two-mile extraterritorial jurisdiction (“ETJ”) fringe. The Town of Grandview granted a special exception approval for the project, despite its comprehensive plan and zoning ordinance only covering land within the town’s corporate limits and not properly providing for ETJ authority. Years later, landowners adjacent to the proposed solar farm challenged the Town’s approval, arguing it was void because the Town lacked authority over the ETJ at the time the approval was granted.Initially, Grandview Solar obtained approvals from both the Town and County, and invested millions into the project. When the Town later refused to issue an improvement location permit due to public opposition, Grandview Solar sued, leading to a preliminary injunction directing the Town to issue the permit. After settlement and dismissal of that suit, the landowners filed a new declaratory judgment complaint. The Spencer Circuit Court granted summary judgment to the Town and Grandview Solar. The Indiana Court of Appeals reversed, holding the special exception approval was “ultra vires and void,” subject to collateral attack at any time.The Indiana Supreme Court, on transfer, vacated the Court of Appeals’ opinion and affirmed the trial court. The Court held that the Town’s failure to properly provide for ETJ authority before granting the special exception rendered the approval voidable, not void. Because Indiana’s enabling statutes authorized the Town to provide for ETJ and grant special exceptions, any objections had to be raised within the statutory 30-day review window. The landowners’ late challenge constituted an impermissible collateral attack. The Court clarified that only actions truly outside statutory and ordinance authority are void and subject to collateral attack; errors within general authority are merely voidable. View "Wike v. Grandview Solar Project LLC" on Justia Law

A group of registered voters in Massachusetts challenged the Attorney General’s certification of an initiative petition proposing to limit annual rent increases for residential properties. The petition would repeal the Statewide ban on rent control and instead institute a cap on rent increases, but it expressly exempted certain types of properties, including those in facilities operated solely for religious, educational, or nonprofit purposes. The Attorney General had certified that the petition did not contain excluded matters, issued the required summary, and the Secretary of the Commonwealth prepared the petition for circulation and potential inclusion on the November 2026 ballot after sufficient signatures.The plaintiffs filed a civil action in the Supreme Judicial Court for Suffolk County, seeking a declaration that the petition was invalid under the Massachusetts Constitution, an order quashing the certification, and an injunction preventing the petition from appearing on the ballot. The parties agreed to reserve and report the case to the full Supreme Judicial Court. The central argument was that the petition impermissibly “relates to religion, religious practices or religious institutions,” which is prohibited by Article 48 of the Amendments to the Massachusetts Constitution.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case de novo and concluded that, because the petition included an exemption for facilities operated solely for religious purposes, it “relates to religion” within the meaning of Article 48. The Court explained that the exemption makes religion a factor in the law’s application and would require governmental determinations about religious purpose, thereby conferring preferential treatment on religious institutions. The Court held that the petition is barred from the initiative process by Article 48 and directed that it may not be placed on the 2026 Statewide election ballot. The judgment was remanded for entry of a declaratory judgment and an injunction consistent with this holding. View "Cella v. Attorney General" on Justia Law

A resident of Treasure County, Montana, submitted a petition for a citizen initiative proposing a county ordinance to establish a permitting process and regulatory standards for wind energy conversion systems (WECS) exceeding certain size thresholds. The ordinance sought to regulate various aspects of WECS, including setbacks, noise, wildlife impacts, and penalties for non-compliance, and would have required the county commissioners to administer and enforce the permitting regime. After the petition’s form was approved, the petitioner made minor revisions and resubmitted it.Following these events, the Board of County Commissioners of Treasure County filed a complaint in the Montana Sixteenth Judicial District Court, seeking a declaratory judgment that the proposed ordinance was invalid and unconstitutional. The County argued that specific Montana statutes—namely, Title 76, chapter 2—set forth exclusive processes and requirements for county land-use and zoning regulation, with which the proposed ordinance did not comply. The petitioner responded, generally denying the allegations and seeking a declaration that the ordinance was valid, or that invalid provisions could be severed.The District Court construed the parties’ motions for summary judgment as addressing the validity and constitutionality of the ordinance. It concluded that the ordinance was invalid under § 7-5-135, MCA, because it purported to regulate land use under the county’s general powers when specific statutes governed such regulations, and its provisions exceeded the county’s legislative authority. The court did not reach the constitutional question.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed, holding that this particular proposed ordinance was invalid because it created a permitting and enforcement regime outside the authority delegated to the county by the Legislature. The court clarified that its holding was narrow and did not foreclose all citizen initiatives affecting land use, but only invalidated this ordinance as drafted. View "Treasure County v. Edlund" on Justia Law

Several property owners in New Braunfels, Texas, challenged a city zoning ordinance that prohibits short-term rentals in residential districts. The ordinance, originally enacted in 2006 and amended in 2011, was in place prior to the appellants’ purchase of their properties. Despite knowing about the restrictions, the appellants either engaged in or sought to engage in short-term rental activities and, after being denied zoning changes to permit such use, filed suit against the city. Their claims alleged the ordinance violated the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of both the United States and Texas Constitutions.The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas initially dismissed the appellants’ claims under Rule 12(b)(6). The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in a prior decision, vacated and remanded, allowing the appellants to proceed to discovery. After discovery, both parties moved for summary judgment. The district court again ruled in favor of the city, granting summary judgment on all claims. The appellants then sought review of this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that Texas law does not recognize a protected property interest in the right to lease one’s home on a short-term basis, which is required for a due process claim. It further found that the ordinance’s restrictions on short-term rentals survive rational-basis review under the Equal Protection Clause, as the city’s goal of preserving the residential character of neighborhoods is a legitimate government interest, and the line drawn between short-term and longer-term rentals was not arbitrary. Accordingly, the court found no constitutional violation and affirmed the summary judgment in favor of the city. View "Marfil v. City of New Braunfels" on Justia Law