Justia Zoning, Planning & Land Use Opinion Summaries

In 2025, the Frederick County Council enacted legislation establishing a Critical Digital Infrastructure (CDI) Overlay Zone, enabling data centers and related infrastructure to be built on a limited portion of county land. The boundaries and zoning designations of the Overlay Zone were later set by Ordinance 26-01-001 (the CDI Ordinance), which included color maps as exhibits to indicate the precise locations and zoning designations. A group of residents, the Frederick County Data Center Referendum Committee, sought to challenge this ordinance by referendum and gathered sufficient signatures for a petition. However, the petition included only black-and-white reproductions of the ordinance’s maps, which did not clearly show the Overlay Zone boundaries or zoning distinctions.The sufficiency of the petition was initially upheld by the Director of the Frederick County Board of Elections, who found it met requirements as to form, though she did not decide whether the ordinance was a proper subject for referendum. Several parties opposed the referendum, arguing in the Circuit Court for Frederick County that the ordinance was not subject to referendum under the County Charter and that the petition was deficient because it did not include a full and accurate reproduction of the ordinance. The circuit court agreed, finding both that the CDI Ordinance was not a “law” subject to referendum under the Charter and that the petition’s reproduction of the ordinance was insufficient due to the lack of accurate color maps.On direct appeal, the Supreme Court of Maryland affirmed the circuit court’s judgment. The Court held that under the Frederick County Charter, zoning ordinances, such as the CDI Ordinance, are not subject to referendum because the Charter intended to maintain pre-Charter limitations on referenda for such ordinances. Additionally, the Court held that the petition was insufficient because it did not contain a full and accurate reproduction of the ordinance, as the black-and-white maps omitted essential information. View "In re: Frederick Cnty. Data Center Referendum" on Justia Law

Robert and Jennifer Audette purchased a lakefront property in Minnesota and constructed a 12-foot-wide concrete ramp from their home to the lake’s ordinary high-water mark without first obtaining approval from Lake of the Woods County. County officials had previously advised them about permissible improvements, including limitations on new concrete and the importance of staying within existing fill, but the Audettes exceeded these instructions. Subsequent inspections revealed substantial wetland impacts, and the County issued restoration orders and identified violations of both zoning ordinances and a state-funded shoreline stabilization project.After the ramp was constructed, the Audettes sought an after-the-fact conditional use permit, citing the need for handicap accessibility for Jennifer Audette, who has multiple sclerosis. The Lake of the Woods County Planning Commission recommended approval with conditions, but the Lake of the Woods County Board denied the permit, emphasizing environmental concerns, procedural violations, and the availability of less impactful alternatives. The Audettes then applied for approval under the Wetland Conservation Act, which was also denied by the County and, upon appeal, by the Minnesota Board of Water and Soil Resources. The Minnesota Department of Natural Resources later cited the Audettes for failure to comply with restoration orders.The Audettes filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota, alleging discrimination under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act due to denial of their permit application. The district court granted summary judgment for the County, finding the Audettes had not timely requested an accommodation and had violated County instructions. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court’s summary judgment de novo and affirmed. The Eighth Circuit held that the County did not violate ADA accommodation duties, as the Audettes never sought a reasonable accommodation at the appropriate time and provided no evidence of intentional discrimination. View "Audette v. Lake of the Woods County" on Justia Law

A nonprofit environmental organization challenged the Maui Planning Commission’s amended rules, which governed development in Maui’s Special Management Area (SMA), a protected coastal zone. The amendments created fifteen categorical exemptions from environmental assessment, some with monetary thresholds and some based on landowner declarations. The rules also allowed continuation, repair, or renovation of previously approved developments without new environmental review, and replaced the requirement for a final environmental assessment (EA) with a draft EA for permit applications.After the rules were enacted, the nonprofit filed a complaint in the Circuit Court of the Second Circuit, arguing that the commission’s rules unlawfully bypassed the Coastal Zone Management Act’s (CZMA) required assessment process, shifting the duty to regulated parties and undermining statutory and constitutional protections. The commission responded that its exemptions were within its rulemaking power, claiming they excluded non-development activities from the CZMA process. The circuit court granted summary judgment for the nonprofit, invalidating the relevant rule sections and restoring the final EA requirement.The Maui Planning Commission and County of Maui appealed. The Supreme Court of the State of Hawaiʻi affirmed the circuit court’s decision. The court held that the commission’s rules exceeded its statutory authority by creating categorical exemptions from the CZMA’s assessment process and unlawfully delegating assessment duties to private parties. The court also found that replacing the final EA with a draft EA undermined required environmental safeguards. The Supreme Court clarified that counties may streamline permitting but cannot eliminate the statutory assessment process or delegate it to applicants. The court affirmed the invalidation of the amended rules. View "Maui Tomorrow Foundation v. Maui Planning Commission" on Justia Law

The case concerned property owners who sought approval from the City of Cannon Beach to build a house on an oceanfront lot and to develop an adjacent public right-of-way to provide vehicular access. Both the lot and the right-of-way are located in a landslide hazard zone, and the city code imposes restrictions requiring applicants to demonstrate either the absence of geologic hazard or that proposed engineering methods will eliminate or minimize the hazard. The dispute arose because a state statute requires local standards regulating the “development of housing” to be “clear and objective,” while the city’s geologic hazard standard includes a subjective component.After initial conditional approval, the city ultimately denied both applications—one for the house and one for the road—based on grounds unrelated to geologic hazards. However, it did not apply its geologic hazards standards to either application, reasoning that the “clear and objective” statutory requirement precluded it from applying subjective standards to the housing development. Both parties appealed to the Land Use Board of Appeals (LUBA), which agreed with the city’s interpretation and held that the statute preempted application of the geologic hazard standards to the road development. The Court of Appeals, however, reversed LUBA’s decision in part, holding that the “clear and objective standards” requirement did not prevent the city from applying its geologic hazard standards to the application to develop a public road.The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon reviewed the case and affirmed the Court of Appeals. The court held that the statutory requirement of “clear and objective” standards for “the development of housing” applies only to the housing itself, not to the development of a public road on an adjacent public right-of-way, unless the city requires the road development as a condition of approving housing. The city and LUBA’s interpretation was incorrect, and the case was remanded to LUBA for further proceedings. View "Roberts v. City of Cannon Beach" on Justia Law

Appellants, owners of rowhouses abutting a proposed residential development in Washington, D.C., challenged the actions of the D.C. Zoning Commission regarding the approval of a Design Review application submitted by a developer. Their properties shared an easement with the development site, and a prior agreement in 2017 and a subsequent one in 2022 set the terms of access. During the Commission’s public hearing, both Appellants and Developer discussed the easement, with Developer assuring that the agreement was signed, though not yet recorded. Appellants voiced concerns about the easement’s finality and requested further review.After the Commission approved the Design Review application and issued its Order of Approval, Appellants pursued separate legal actions against the Developer, which were dismissed following the new easement agreement. Subsequently, Appellants filed a complaint against the District of Columbia in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, claiming violations of their substantive due process rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. They alleged the Commission deliberately ignored statutory requirements by failing to collect their signatures for the application and by neglecting to properly investigate the easement’s final status.The Superior Court dismissed the complaint, citing lack of subject matter jurisdiction due to Appellants’ failure to exhaust administrative remedies, and also found that Appellants failed to state a viable due process claim. On appeal, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals determined that dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction was improper, as exhaustion of administrative remedies is not a jurisdictional requirement. However, the Court affirmed the dismissal for failure to state a claim, concluding that Appellants’ allegations amounted at most to negligence, not the egregious conduct required for a substantive due process violation. The judgment of the Superior Court was affirmed. View "Samaddar, DDS v. District of Columbia" on Justia Law

A company owned a vacant shopping center located within a city. The city repeatedly identified the property as blighted and unsafe, urging the owner to submit an abatement plan and later ordering the property to be boarded up and fenced. Over time, city officials considered and ultimately planned for the demolition of the shopping center by means of a controlled burn, citing concerns over trespassing and public safety. The owner neither expressly agreed to the controlled burn nor provided an alternative abatement plan. The city proceeded with the demolition by fire, after notifying the owner, and later removed the resulting debris.The owner filed suit in the Circuit Court of the City of Hopewell, asserting claims against the city and contractors for intentional trespass, statutory business conspiracy, tortious interference with a business expectancy, waste, and a takings claim under the Virginia Constitution. The owner also sought declaratory relief concerning costs and penalties imposed by the city. The city raised sovereign immunity as a defense, filing a plea in bar to dismiss all claims except the takings claim. The Circuit Court denied the plea in bar, finding it could not determine whether the city’s actions were within its governmental function. The city then pursued an interlocutory appeal.The Supreme Court of Virginia reviewed the denial of the plea in bar de novo, based on the pleadings and exhibits. It held that the city’s actions in demolishing the shopping center constituted a governmental function—blight abatement—which is protected by sovereign immunity, even if the city had additional motives or failed to comply with all statutory requirements. The court therefore reversed the circuit court’s judgment, holding the city immune from all tort and statutory claims, as well as most declaratory relief sought, but not from the constitutional takings claim. The case was remanded for further proceedings on the takings claim and claims involving third parties. View "City of Hopewell v. Shree Arihant Motel, Inc." on Justia Law

The case concerns a property dispute in Hampstead, New Hampshire, where the owners of a non-conforming lakefront cottage sought a special exception from the zoning ordinance to add a second story to their seasonal residence. Because their lot is smaller than what the ordinance requires and lacks sufficient frontage, any alteration required a special exception from the Town’s Zoning Board of Adjustment. The owners applied for the exception, and after a hearing where they described their plans but did not address how their proposal met the ordinance’s criteria, the Zoning Board granted the exception. The petitioner, an abutter whose property faces the cottage across the road, objected that the addition would block her lake view and decrease her property value, and she introduced photographic evidence.After the Zoning Board of Adjustment granted the exception without making specific written findings, the petitioner requested a rehearing, which was denied. She then appealed to the New Hampshire Housing Appeals Board, arguing that the applicants failed to demonstrate compliance with the special exception criteria, specifically the requirement that the project not diminish surrounding property values. The Housing Appeals Board affirmed the Zoning Board’s decision, concluding that it was not unreasonable or unlawful.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case and held that the applicants did not meet their burden of proof to show their addition would not diminish surrounding property values, as required by the zoning ordinance. The court found that the evidence presented by the applicants was insufficient, and the Zoning Board’s implicit finding to the contrary was not supported by the record. The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reversed the Housing Appeals Board’s decision and remanded the case with instructions to reverse the Zoning Board’s grant of the special exception. View "Appeal of Murray" on Justia Law

Sunpin Energy Services, LLC and Ralph P. Lapinkas, Jr. sought to construct a large-scale ground-mounted solar energy system on a parcel of undeveloped, mostly forested land in Petersham, Massachusetts. Because the proposed site was outside the town’s designated solar electric overlay district, Sunpin applied for a special permit from the Zoning Board of Appeals. The project would require clearing trees from approximately 14.3 acres, and Sunpin secured an order of conditions from the town conservation commission under the Wetlands Protection Act. The permit application was denied after one of three board members voted against it, citing concerns about deforestation and referencing the town’s bylaw goals of maintaining the town’s beauty and proper land use.The plaintiffs challenged the board’s denial in the Land Court Department. The Land Court judge granted summary judgment in favor of the board, concluding that the board member properly applied the zoning bylaw criteria, including the protection of public health, safety, and welfare, and concerns about tree removal. The plaintiffs appealed, and the Massachusetts Appeals Court vacated the judgment, holding that the board’s decision was arbitrary and capricious, improperly favoring forest preservation over solar energy siting and relying on speculation about future development.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case and held that, under the Dover Amendment’s solar provision (G. L. c. 40A, § 3, ninth paragraph), municipalities must provide reasonable opportunities for solar energy systems and may not deny a special permit unless it is necessary to protect public health, safety, or welfare. The Court found that the denial, based on general concerns about tree cutting, amounted to a blanket prohibition in a town that is ninety-seven percent forested, which was improper. The Court vacated the Land Court’s judgment and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Sunpin Energy Services, LLC v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Petersham" on Justia Law

Several property owners and ranching entities challenged amendments adopted in 2023 by the Albany County Board of County Commissioners to the Aquifer Protection Overlay Zone (APOZ) regulations. The Casper Aquifer, which supplies drinking water to many residents of Albany County and the City of Laramie, had been the subject of prior regulatory efforts. The 2023 amendments included a 35-acre minimum lot size requirement and revised procedures for changing the APOZ boundaries. Appellants argued that the Board exceeded its authority, violated equal protection guarantees, and acted arbitrarily and capriciously in enacting the amendments.Previously, in Bienz v. Board of County Commissioners, County of Albany, 2024 WY 102 (Bienz I), the Wyoming Supreme Court reviewed whether amendments to the APOZ regulations were subject to direct judicial review under the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act (WAPA). The district court had concluded it lacked jurisdiction, finding the Board's actions legislative and not reviewable under the WAPA. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that legislative agency actions are reviewable, and remanded the case for the district court to consider the merits. While litigation was pending, the Board further amended the APOZ regulations, requiring the district court to identify which amendments remained at issue. The district court ultimately upheld the Board’s authority and the amendments.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Wyoming addressed whether the Board exceeded its authority, whether the amendment procedures violated equal protection, and whether the arbitrary and capricious standard applied to agency legislative action. The Court held the Board acted within its statutory authority in protecting the Casper Aquifer, the distinct procedures for overlay zone amendments did not violate equal protection guarantees, and agency legislative actions are subject to the arbitrary and capricious standard. It concluded the 2023 APOZ amendments, including the 35-acre minimum lot size, were not arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law, and affirmed the district court’s decision. View "Warren Livestock, LLC v. Board of County Commissione" on Justia Law

A developer applied to the zoning board of a New Jersey township for a use variance to construct a senior living facility on a residentially-zoned eight-acre property. The proposed development, which included independent, assisted living, and memory care units, was undisputedly an “inherently beneficial use” as defined by the state’s Municipal Land Use Law. The application also sought several bulk variances. The planning board had previously declined to include the property in a newly created Senior Housing Overlay Zone, following public opposition and a policy goal of preserving farmland and open space. After a multi-day hearing, the zoning board denied the variance, finding that the detrimental impact on the zoning plan and ordinance, including concerns about density, impervious coverage, drainage, traffic, and prior zoning decisions, outweighed the public benefits of the proposed use.The developers challenged the denial in the Superior Court, Law Division, which reversed the board’s decision, finding insufficient evidence of substantial negative impact and remanding for the imposition of reasonable conditions, but barring reduction in the number of units. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that the zoning and master plan did not specifically preclude the use, and that the board’s concerns did not justify denial under the deferential review standard.The Supreme Court of New Jersey reviewed the case to clarify the standard for granting use variances for inherently beneficial uses after a 1997 legislative amendment to the Municipal Land Use Law. The Court held that the fourth step of the Sica v. Board of Adjustment of Wall test must be revised: before balancing positive and negative criteria, the zoning board must now specifically determine whether the applicant has shown that the variance “will not substantially impair the intent and the purpose of the zoning plan and zoning ordinance.” The Supreme Court reversed the Appellate Division’s judgment and remanded for application of the revised standard. View "Monarch Communities, LLC v. Township of Montville" on Justia Law